State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0493

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Bryan Duane Arnesen,
Appellant.

Filed March 3, 2025
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

McLeod County District Court
File No. 43-CR-23-53

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Lydia Villalva Lijó, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Ryan Hansch, McLeod County Attorney, Glencoe, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Considered and decided by Wheelock, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and
Bjorkman, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant challenges his convictions of first- and third-degree criminal sexual
conduct against his daughter, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by
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precluding him from presenting alibi evidence as a sanction for failing to disclose the
evidence before trial. He contends there was no discovery violation because the evidence
rebutted his daughter’s testimony and, even if there was a violation, the sanction was too
severe. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Bryan Duane Arnesen married L.A.’s mother (mother) in 2009, when
L.A. was two or three years old. Arensen and mother have multiple joint children, and
Arnesen adopted L.A. in December 2017.
In January 2023, mother told L.A. that she and Arnesen were getting divorced.
Shortly thereafter, L.A. disclosed that Arnesen had been sexually abusing her for years.
She told mother that the abuse started in 2018 and the last instance was on December 30,
2022. As L.A. told a police officer about Arnesen “rap[ing] her multiple times throughout
the years,” she was “sobbing uncontrollably.”
Arneson was charged with two counts of first -degree criminal sexual conduct, one
count of second-degree criminal sexual conduct, and one count of third-degree criminal
sexual conduct. In preparation for trial, the state demanded disclosure of various
information, including notice of defense witnesses and any alibi. Arneson identified six
defense witnesses, including his neighbor (neighbor), but did not give notice of an alibi.
At trial, L.A. was the state’s principal witness. She testified that Arnesen began
abusing her in early 2018, when she had just turned 12. She described an incident in which
Arnesen removed her clothes and “touched [her] in inappropriate places,” including putting
his fingers and his penis into her vagina. She testified that the abuse happened repeatedly
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thereafter when mother was away and she and Arnesen were at home, generally in the same
manner each time. She testified that similar incidents happened after she turned 13,
occurring more than ten times per year when she was 13 and 14 years old. When asked
about 2022— the year she turned 16—L.A. testified that “[i]t hadn’t happened for almost
that entire year, and then it happened on December 30th.” She said that she remembered
the date because one of the family’s dogs had puppies. L.A. explained that she was napping
“early” that afternoon before an evening work shift and Arnesen came in and locked the
door and began touching her, eventually putting his penis in her vagina. When asked why
she did not report Arnesen’s conduct earlier, she testified that he is “scary to [her],” he said
if she told anyone she would be sent away and nobody would believe her, and she did not
want to be the cause of the family “being separated.”
Arnesen presented several defense witnesses, including neighbor. During his
testimony, neighbor began talking about December 30, 2022, and his understanding of
what Arnesen and the family were doing that day. The state objected, explaining that the
defense’s disclosures related to neighbor indicated that he would discuss events from the
summer of 2022 but “there was no other disclosure” about the events of December 30,
despite the fact neighbor was apparently poised to testify that Arnesen’s semi-truck was
not in front of the family residence, where he usually parked it, from morning into mid-
afternoon that day. The state asserted that Arnesen was “clearly” setting up a previously
undisclosed “alibi defense, trying to place him somewhere other than at that home.”
Arnesen argued that he did not know until L.A.’s testimony “what time of day” the
December 30 inci dent happened and therefore was unable to provide notice earlier. In
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short, Arnesen contended that he did not know that he “had an alibi . . . until she testified.”
The state countered that permitting the alibi testimony would be very prejudicial; the only
way the state could rectify the prejudice would be to obtain Arnesen’s cell location data to
refute it, which would require a warrant and more than a brief trial continuance. Ultimately,
the district court precluded the testimony “regarding the semi” but permitted neighbor to
testify about his communications and interactions with Arnesen on December 30.
The jury found Arnesen guilty of all charges. The district court entered convictions
for the two first-degree offenses and the third-degree offense and sentenced him to prison.
Arnesen appeals his convictions.
DECISION
I. Arnesen committed a discovery violation by failing to disclose neighbor’s alibi
testimony.

A defendant must, at the prosecutor’s request, make various disclosures before the
omnibus hearing. Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.02, subd. 1. If the defendant “intend s to offer
evidence of an alibi,” these disclosures must include: “(a) the specific place or places where
the defendant was when the alleged offense occurred; [and] (b) the names and addresses of
the witnesses the defendant intends to call at the trial in support of the alibi.” Id.,
subd. 1(7). Whether a discovery violation occurred is a question of law, which we review
de novo. State v. Palubicki, 700 N.W.2d 476, 489 (Minn. 2005).
Arnesen does not dispute that neighbor’s proposed testimony about December 30 is
alibi evidence. And he does not dispute that the state requested disclosure of alibi evidence
under rule 9.02. Rather, he cites State v. Yang for the proposition that neighbor’s alibi
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testimony was not subject to disclosure because it was rebuttal evidence, and “[d]isclosure
rules do not apply to rebuttal evidence.” 627 N.W.2d 666, 677 (Minn. App. 2001), rev.
denied (Minn. July 24, 2001). We are not persuaded. Yang addresses the state’s disclosure
obligations and use of rebuttal evidence. Id. It does not address a defendant’s duty to
disclose alibi evidence and therefore does not support Arnesen’s argument that alibi
evidence is exempt from disclosure if it is used as rebuttal evidence. Nor does that
argument withstand scrutiny. Rebuttal evidence is “that which explains, contradicts, or
refutes” the other party’s evidence. State v. Swaney, 787 N.W.2d 541, 563 (Minn. 2010)
(quotation omitted). Alibi evidence will always tend to contradict or refute the state’s
evidence because “[a] successful alibi defense means the defendant was not in the location
of the crime and thus the defendant is free of guilt.” State v. Cruz, 997 N.W.2d 537, 550
(Minn. 2023) . That neighbor’s alibi testimony serves to contradict or refute L.A.’s
testimony does not mean that Arnesen had no duty to disclose it. His failure to do so
violated rule 9.02.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by precluding Arnesen from
presenting neighbor’s alibi testimony as a sanction for the discovery violation.

If a party fails to comply with discovery rules, a district court may “grant a
continuance, or enter any order it deems just in the circumstances.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.03,
subd. 8. It may even exclude undisclosed evidence, but that is “a severe sanction which
should not be lightly invoked.” Cruz, 997 N.W.2d at 547 (quotation omitted). In
determining the appropriate remedy, a district court “should take into account: (1) the
reason why disclosure was not made; (2) the extent of prejudice to the opposing party;
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(3) the feasibility of rectifying that prejudice by a continuance; and (4) any other relevant
factors.” State v. Lindsey, 284 N.W.2d 368, 373 (Minn. 1979). We will not disturb the
district court’s imposition of sanctions for discovery violations absent an abuse of
discretion. Cruz, 997 N.W.2d at 547. The Lindsey factors guide our review of the district
court’s exercise of discretion, whether it articulated its reasoning as to those factors on the
record or, as here, it did not. See id.
As to the first Lindsey factor, Arnesen contends he was unaware that he had an alibi
for the December 30 incident until L.A. testified that it happened in the early afternoon.
But he undisputedly had notice, from the beginning of this case, about an alleged incident
on that day because the complaint references the incident. He also knew from L.A.’s
January 2023 forensic interview that she described it happening when she was taking a
nap—meaning, during the daytime. And defense counsel acknowledged in their opening
statement—before L.A.’s testimony—that the state would seek to prove that the incident
happened “in the afternoon, before [L.A.] went to work.” Even if Arnesen did not actually
know before L.A.’s testimony that neighbor could supply an alibi for the December 30
incident, he had ample notice to investigate such a possibility. Accordingly, we conclude
that the reason for nondisclosure weighs against Arnesen.
With respect to the second factor, Arnesen asserts there was minimal prejudice to
the state because it knew neighbor would be a defense witness and had access to Arnesen’s
cell phone and “presumably . . . would have been interested in Arnesen’s location” on that
day. But because Arnesen gave no notice of an alibi, the state would have had no reason
to investigate whether neighbor or Arnesen’s cell data might indicate that Arnesen was
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anywhere other than at the family home that afternoon. It is prejudicial for the state to be
“denied the opportunity to investigate an alibi.” In re Welfare of M.P.Y., 630 N.W.2d 411,
418 (Minn. 2001) (observing that “[o]ne of the purposes of the disclosure of alibi rule is to
avoid” surprise alibi testimony at trial). This factor also weighs against Arnesen.
As to the third factor, Arnesen argues that a “short continuance” could have rectified
the prejudice to the state because it would have enabled the state to interview neighbor and
prepare a cross-examination. Such a continuance may have yielded some value. But an
alibi is a complete defense; it means he was not there, so he could not have done it. See
Cruz, 997 N.W.2d at 550. It was therefore well within the district court’s discretion to
determine that the most reasonable course for the state would be to pursue a similarly
complete evidentiary response— obtain a search warrant for Arnesen’s cell site location
information—and that doing so would not have been feasible with only a brief trial
continuance. This factor weighs against Arnesen.
Finally, we consider other relevant factors. On this point, Arnesen contends that
neighbor’s alibi testimony was “crucial to the defense.” The record defeats this contention.
The alibi evidence concerned only the December 30 incident, which was the basis for only
one of the four charges against Arnesen (the third-degree offense). And while a jury
presented with an alibi for that incident might have found L.A. not credible in that respect,
it does not mean that the jury would have rejected the rest of her testimony. Nor would the
jury necessarily have believed the alibi testimony from neighbor, who readily
acknowledged that he is “very, very close friends” with Arnesen.
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In sum, the first three Lindsey factors all weigh against Arnesen, and he identifies
no other countervailing considerations. On this record, we discern no abuse of discretion
by the district court in precluding neighbor’s alibi testimony as a sanction for Arnesen’s
discovery violation.
Affirmed.