Larry Koch, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0503

Larry Koch,
Appellant,

vs.

Riley Purgatory Bluff Creek Watershed District, et al.,
Respondents.

Filed September 30, 2024
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge *

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-23-18762

John Hayden, Quantum Lex PA, Edina , Minnesota (for appellant)

Paul Donald Reuvers, Andrew A. Wolf, Iverson Reuvers, Bloomington, Minnesota (for
respondents)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Ede, Judge; and Reilly, Judge .
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REILLY, Judge
Appellant Larry Koch challenges a district court order denying his motion for a
temporary restraining order ( TRO). Koch also challenges a subsequent order in which the

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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district court denied his motion to reconsider its earlier order. Because the district court did
not abuse its discretion by denying the TRO and the motion to reconsider, w e affirm.
FACTS
Koch is a taxpayer and the appointed manager of respondent Riley Purgatory Bluff
Creek Watershed District (the watershed district). Respondent Terry Jeffery is the
watershed district’s administrator. In A ugust 2021, the watershed district “issued
conditional approval of a permit” for a developer to build housing on three parcels of land
in Eden Prairie (the property) . The property is next to Frederick Miller Spring , and
additional “properties to the south and to the west are . . . passive recreation
parkland/preserve.” Community activists grew concerned about the environmental
ramifications of the development, and a nonprofit organization sued the watershed district
to challenge the permit.
The watershed district then began to explore acquiring the property itself. In October
2023, after receiving an appraisal, the watershed district’s board of managers approved and
executed an agreement to purchase the property for $5,775,000. Under the agreement, the
watershed district would have until December 2023 “to complete a feasibility period in
which to obtain project financing” and to “c omplete the statutory processes ” to amend its
water resources management plan. The watershed district discussed the acquisition with
Hennepin County and expected the county to issue bonds to finance the purchase, which
the watershed district would then repay. In November 2023, the watershed district learned
that Hennepin County would only be able to provide long- term financing on the project
beginning in 2024. As a result, the watershed district began to explore issuing its own bonds
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“as a bridge to the Hennepin County long- term financing.” When a purchaser offered to
buy $5,804,000 in watershed-district bonds, the board of managers accepted the offer in
December 2023.
That same month, Koch sued respondents, alleging they violated numerous state
statues while acquiring the property.1 Koch’s allegations primarily concerned the adequacy
of the procedures by which respondents sought to acquire the property.
Simultaneously, Koch moved for a TRO to enjoin t he land acquisition by arguing
that respondents threatened him with irreparable injury and by invoking the five factors
under Dahlberg Bros., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 137 N.W.2d 314 (Minn. 1965) . See
Miller v. Foley, 317 N.W.2d 710, 712 (Minn. 1982) (stating that a temporary injunction
requires a clear showing of irreparable injury in consideration of the Dahlberg factors); see
also M.G.M. Liquor Warehouse Int’l, Inc. v. Forsland, 371 N.W.2d 75, 76 (Minn. App.
1985) ( stating that Dahlberg applies to TROs). Relevant to this appeal, the second
Dahlberg factor requires a district court to consider “ [t]he harm to be suffered by plaintiff
if the temporary restraint is denied as compared to that inflicted on defendant if the
injunction issues pending trial .” Dahlberg, 137 N.W.2d at 321. Meanwhile, the third
Dahlberg factor requires a district court to consider the likelihood a party “will prevail on
the merits.” Id.

1 Koch asserts taxpayer standing. Minnesota law permits “taxpayer standing only when the
central dispute involves alleged unlawful disbursements of public funds.”
Minn. Voters All. v. Hunt, 10 N.W.3d 163, 169 (Minn. 2024) .
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In his motion, Koch argued that injunctive relief was necessary to prevent
irreparable harm because, “as [he] claimed in [his] verified complaint,” the watershed
district’s “acquisition of real property was illegal, and the process by which [it] authorized
the acquisition was also illegal.” And when arguing that the comparative harms between
the parties weighed in his favor, Koch asserted that “[t]he irreparable harm to taxpayers
when the government illegally expends public funds is well established” and not only will
he face “an increased tax levy,” but the watershed district will also deny him “the lawful
review process that could have otherwise ensured the expenditure was prudent and within
[the watershed district’s] authority.”
The district court denied Koch’s motion. In applying the five Dahlberg factors, the
district court concluded that the first factor weighed against a TRO while the remaining
factors were neutral. The district court analyzed the second factor as follows:
[Koch] has not sufficiently demonstrated why the due process
in the Board of Managers approving this Project and
expenditure was insufficient or unlawful. [Koch] has not
sufficiently demonstrated why [the watershed district ’s]
purchase of this land is inconsistent with [its] Plan and harmful
to the public.
. . . .
Because the harm alleged by both parties is speculative,
[the second factor] weighs neither in favor of or against the
injunction.

In March 2024, Koch requested permission to file a motion for the district court to
reconsider its order denying the TRO. Koch argued that in its earlier analysis the district
court erroneously conflated the second Dahlberg factor (comparing harms between the
parties) with the third Dahlberg factor (likelihood of success on the merits). Therefore,
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Koch argued, the district court’s earlier justification for denying the TRO was “palpably
wrong.” The district court denied Koch’s request, reasoning that the very harm Koch
alleged was “the governmental body’s unlawful expenditure of public funds.”
Koch appeals.

DECISION
On appeal, Koch argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying his
TRO motion and his request for reconsideration because it erroneously conflated the
second Dahlberg factor (comparing harms between the parties) with the third Dahlberg
factor (likelihood of success on the merits). He also argues that the district court
insufficiently analyzed the second Dahlberg factor.
Under Minn. R. Civ. P. 65, a district court may grant injunctive relief in the form of
a TRO or a temporary injunction. The purpose of such relief is “to maintain the status quo
until the case can be decided on the merits.” Pickerign v. Pasco Mktg., Inc., 228 N.W.2d
562, 564 (Minn. 1975) (emphasis added) . Because temporary injunctive relief “is an
extraordinary equitable remedy” that enjoins conduct “prior to a complete trial on the
merits,” a party is entitled to the remedy only when their rights would be subject to
irreparable injury before trial. Miller, 317 N.W.2d at 712. “The party seeking the injunction
must demonstrate that there is an inadequate legal remedy and that the injunction is
necessary to prevent great and irreparable injury.” U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Angeion Corp.,
615 N.W.2d 425, 434 (Minn. App. 2000), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 25, 2000). A district
court must consider the five Dahlberg factors to determine whether a party would suffer
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irreparable injury before trial without injunctive relief. See DSCC v. Simon, 950 N.W.2d
280, 286-87 (Minn. 2020).
The “propriety of injunctive relief is a decision that ‘rests within the sound
discretion of the [district] court, and its action will not be disturbed on appeal unless, based
upon the whole record, it appears that there has been an abuse of such discretion,’” which
the party challenging the decision “bears the burden to show.” First & First, LLC v. Chadco
of Duluth, LLC , 999 N.W.2d 553, 557 (Minn. App. 2023) (alteration in original) (quoting
Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Grounds & Assocs., Inc., 278 N.W.2d 81, 91 (Minn. 1979)) ,
rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 20, 2024) . “A district court abuses its discretion by making
findings of fact that are unsupported by the evidence, misapplying the law, or delivering a
decision that is against logic and the facts on record.” Woolsey v. Woolsey , 975 N.W.2d
502, 506 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted).
Moreover, a district court may grant leave for a motion to reconsider “upon a
showing of compelling circumstances.” Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 115.11. District courts “will
‘rarely’ exercise their power to reconsider decisions and are likely to do so only where
intervening legal developments have occurred . . . or where the earlier decision is palpably
wrong in some respect.” Stern 1011 First St. S., LLC v. Gere, 979 N.W.2d 216, 220 (Minn.
2022) (alteration in original) (quoting Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 115.11, 1997 advisory comm.
cmt.). We also review a district court’s decision to deny leave to file a motion for
reconsideration for an abuse of discretion. Goerke Fam. P’ship v. Lac qui Parle -Yellow
Bank Watershed Dist., 857 N.W.2d 50, 52- 53 (Minn. App. 2014).
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Under the second Dahlberg factor, a district court must evaluate “[t]he harm to be
suffered by plaintiff if the temporary restraint is denied as compared to that inflicted on
[the] defendant if the injunction issues pending trial.” Dahlberg, 137 N.W.2d at 321.
Although the focus of the second factor is on comparing the relative harms between the
parties, an important underlying consideration remains that injunctive relief must be
necessary to protect the moving party from irreparable injury. See Miller, 317 N.W.2d at
712-13 (analyzing under the second factor whether the moving party would experience
irreparable injury without injunctive relief); see also Metro. Sports Facilities Comm’n v.
Minn. Twins P’ship, 638 N.W.2d 214, 221- 26 (Minn. App. 2002) (same), rev. denied
(Minn. Feb. 4, 2002).
By comparison, under the third Dahlberg factor, a district court must consider “[t]he
likelihood that one party or the other will prevail on the merits.” Dahlberg, 137 N.W.2d at
321. “The bar for establishing likelihood of success on the merits is low.” First & First ,
999 N.W.2d at 560. When “a plaintiff makes even a doubtful showing as to the likelihood
of prevailing on the merits, a district court may consider issuing a temporary injunction to
preserve the status quo until trial on the merits.” Metro. Sports, 638 N.W.2d at 226.
Koch contends the district court abused its discretion because it conflated the second
Dahlberg factor ( comparing harms between the parties ) with the third Dahlberg factor
(likelihood of success on the merits) . In weighing the second factor, the district court
concluded that Koch’s harm was “speculative” because he never “sufficiently
demonstrated why the due process in the Board of Managers approving [the] Project and
expenditure was insufficient or unlawful,” nor why the watershed district’s “purchase of
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[the] land [was] inconsistent with [its plan] and harmful to the public .” Koch argues the
district court erroneously required him to “prove” the merits of his case under the second
factor when the merits are only a consideration under the third factor. But in its analysis,
the district court responded to the arguments that Koch himself presented in his motion :
that “[t]he irreparable harm to taxpayers when the government illegally expends public
funds is well established,” 2 and that not only would he fac e “an increased tax levy,” but
the watershed district will also have denied him “the lawful review process that could have
otherwise ensured the expenditure was prudent and within [the watershed district’s]
authority.” Koch cannot both present arguments related to the second factor and then
contend the district court erred when it addressed those arguments. We therefore do not
conclude that the district court abused its discretion by conflating the Dahlberg factors.
Lastly, Koch contends that the district court insufficiently analyzed the second
Dahlberg factor. He argues that t he district court failed to analyze “why an illegal
expenditure was not an irreparable [injury] to [him]” and why his “alleged irreparable

2 For this proposition, Koch relies primarily on the nearly century -old case
Williams v. Klemmer, 224 N.W. 261 (Minn. 1929). In Williams, a group of taxpayers sued
members of a city council and other city leaders to enjoin a public expenditure that violated
charter provisions. 224 N.W. at 262. After the district court granted injunctive relief to
prohibit the expenditure , the supreme court affirmed, reasoning that an “injury is
irreparable where threatened acts complained of would result in the unauthorized or
unlawful expenditure of a substantial sum of money out of the funds of the city raised by
taxation and no other prompt remedy is provided.” Id. at 262-63. Thus, the supreme court
concluded, “[e]quity will enjoin unauthorized acts of city officials, where such acts will
result in unauthorized or unlawful expenditure or diversion of public funds.” Id. at 263.
That said, in Williams, the district court granted injunctive relief after the district court
“fully tried” the case. Id. at 262. Therefore, it presents a scenario that is distinct from
injunctive relief pending trial and based on a full analysis of the Dahlberg factors.
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[injury] should not be balanced against the harms alleged by [r]espondents.” Instead, he
argues, the district court “merely stated” that he “failed to show irreparable harm in [ a]
conclusory fashion.”
Koch is correct that when a district court applies the Dahlberg factors, it “has a
responsibility to explain the analysis used in reaching its decision.” Minneapolis
Federation of Tchrs. v. Minneapolis Pub. Schs., 512 N.W.2d 107, 110 (Minn. App. 1994) ,
rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 31, 1994) . That said, contrary to Koch’s arguments, the district
court never asserted that an illegal expenditure would not be an irreparable injury to Koch,
nor did it “merely state[] that [Koch] failed to show irreparable [injury] in [a] conclusory
fashion.” Rather, it concluded that the threat of irreparable injury that Koch alleged was
“speculative” because he did not adequately demonstrate why the “expenditure was
insufficient or unlawful.” And the district court did compare the harms that the parties
alleged, concluding that the allegations on both sides were speculative, and therefor e,
finding the factor neutral. The district court did not improperly exercise its discretion based
on its analysis of the second factor in the manner Koch argues.
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Koch’s
motion for a TRO nor did it abuse its discretion by denying his request to file a motion for
reconsideration.
Affirmed.