Sylvester L. Zurn, individually and as beneficiary of the Sylvester L. Zurn Trust, dated December 30, 2002, et al., Appellants,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0505

Sylvester L. Zurn, individually and as beneficiary of the Sylvester L. Zurn Trust,
dated December 30, 2002, et al.,
Appellants,

vs.

Anthony N. Zurn, individually and as Co-Trustee of the Sylvester L. Zurn Trust,
dated December 30, 2002, et al.,
Respondents.

Filed January 27, 2025
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Larson, Judge

Becker County District Court
File No. 03-CV-17-589

Zenas Baer, Zenas Baer Law Office, Hawley, Minnesota (for appellants)

Todd E. Zimmerman, Aubrey J. Zuger, Fredrikson & Byron, P .A., Fargo, North Dakota
(for respondents)

Considered and decided by Larson, Presiding Judge; Wheelock, Judge; and Smith,
John, Judge.
∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARSON, Judge
Appellants Sylvester Zurn and Diantha Niles (appellants) challenge the district
court’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of their siblings, respondents Anthony
Zurn and Mary Jo Brunner (respondents), on appellants’ undue-influence, duress, and lack-
of-capacity claims. 1 Appellants also challenge the district court’s decisions to: grant
summary judgment on their equitable-accounting claim related to a breach of trust; order a
limited equitable accounting on their equitable-accounting claim related to farm
operations; and approve the resulting equitable-accounting report. Because the district
court legally erred when it concluded certain contracts were valid even if Sylvester signed
them while incompetent, we reverse the district court’s decision to grant summary
judgment on appellant’s undue -influence, duress, and lack -of-capacity claim s. We
otherwise affirm.
FACTS
This case concerns transfers of land between two brothers, Sylvester and Anthony.
On June 9, 1997, Sylvester executed a statutory, short-form power of attorney. See Minn.
Stat. § 523.23 (1996).
2 As relevant here, the power of attorney authorized Anthony to act
as Sylvester’s attorney-in-fact in the event of future incapacitation or incompetency.

1 Because Anthony and Sylvester share a surname, we use their first names.
2 This version of Minn. Stat. § 523.23 was operative when Sylvester executed the power of
attorney in 1997. The statute has since been materially modified. See 2013 Minn. Laws
ch. 23, § 2, at 116.
3
Sylvester granted Anthony all the powers listed on the short-form document, including the
power to make real-property transactions and to transfer Sylvester’s property to himself.
On December 31, 1998, Sylvester suffered a stroke. The district court declared
Sylvester incompetent on September 28, 1999, and his two sisters became his co-guardians.
One sister was discharged as co-guardian on August 24, 2000. The other sister, Niles, was
discharged as guardian on May 7, 2001. The guardianship matter was dismissed, but
Sylvester did not regain competency.
At the time he became incompetent, Sylvester owned 520 acres of land (the private
land), machinery and equipment, and grain stores. Sylvester also had debts, including loans
with a farm-credit service. In 2004 and 2005, Anthony purchased Sylvester’s private land
via a contract for deed, a warranty deed, and two quit claim deeds (the contracts). On each
contract, Sylvester’s name is printed as the seller and Anthony’s name is printed as the
buyer. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Sylvester, Sylvester signed his own
name on each contract. 3 The contracts do not indicate that Anthony was acting in his
capacity as Sylvester’s attorney-in-fact when the parties signed the contracts. The parties
do not dispute that Sylvester was incompetent at the time the parties signed the contracts.

3 When reviewing the district court’s decision to grant a motion for summary judgment,
we view the evidence in the light most favorable to Sylvester. See STAR Ctrs., Inc. v.
Faegre & Benson, L.L.P., 644 N.W.2d 72, 76-77 (Minn. 2002). From the record, it appears
that Sylvester signed each of the contracts. Accordingly, for our purposes in reviewing the
summary-judgment order, we construe this fact in the light most favorable to Sylvester and
determine that a trier of fact could find that Sylvester signed the contracts himself. We do
not decide which of the contracts, if any, Sylvester physically signed.
4
Sylvester received payments from Anthony under these contracts from June 2004 to
February 2019.
On December 30, 2002, Sylvester became the beneficiary of the Sylvester L. Zurn
Trust (the trust), established by his parents. The trust entitled Sylvester to regular payments
derived from the proceeds of real property consisting of 142 acres (the trust land). The
trust land was deeded to respondents as co-trustees. Sylvester began receiving payments
from the trust in 2008. In 2013, respondents , as co- trustees, conveyed the trust land to
Anthony, individually, via quit claim deed for no consideration, removing the sole asset
from the trust. After the trust land was conveyed to Anthony, Anthony made payments to
Sylvester representing the rental value of the trust land until 2014.
On January 27, 2015, appellants signed a document revoking Anthony’s power of
attorney. In February 2017, a North Dakota district court found that Sylvester had
sufficiently recovered from the stroke to regain competency. Sylvester was therefore
adjudicated competent. Appellants thereafter filed the complaint that gave rise to this
appeal, alleging six causes of action: (1) breach of fiduciary duty; (2) undue influence ;
(3) duress; (4) lack of capacity; (5) equitable accounting–farming ; and (6) equitable
accounting–breach of trust.4 The district court subsequently issued several orders, four of
which are pertinent here.
First, the district court issued an order on respondents’ motion for summary
judgment (the summary-judgment order). The district court granted respondents’ motion

4 Sylvester alleged undue influence, duress, and lack of capacity as defenses to the
enforcement of the contracts and, accordingly, sought a judgment voiding the contracts.
5
for summary judgment on appellants’ undue-influence, duress, and lack-of-capacity
claims, and both equitable-accounting claims. With regard to the undue-influence, duress,
and lack- of-capacity claims, the district court determined that Anthony purchased the
private land using a valid power of attorney. The district court reasoned that, although it
appeared Sylvester had signed some of the contracts, the matter of who “held the pen” had
no legal significance in light of the power of attorney. The district court also determined,
as an alternative basis for granting summary judgment, that Sylvester could not rescind the
contracts because he ratified them after regaining competency by accepting monthly
payments from Anthony under the contracts . With regard to the equitable-accounting
claims, the district court reasoned that appellants had not demonstrated that the claims were
sufficiently complex to require an equitable accounting.
Second, after a two-day bench trial, the district court issued its findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and an order for judgment on April 1, 2022 (the April 1 order). The
district court found in appellants’ favor on the breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim. In doing
so, the district court voided the conveyance of the trust land to Anthony and ordered
respondents to reimburse the trust for the fair rental value of the land while it was
wrongfully in Anthony’s possession. In the April 1 order, the district court vacated its
summary-judgment order on the equitable accounting–farming claim. The district court’s
decision to vacate the summary-judgment order stemmed from Anthony’s testimony at trial
that raised concerns regarding the amount of Sylvester’s debts that Anthony had paid and
whether Anthony paid for the trust land. Accordingly, the district court ordered an
equitable accounting with the following scope (paragraph 53):
6
Finally, the Court’s prior orders for summary
[judgment] on count five of the complaint [ are vacated] to
allow for an equitable accounting of the portion of the debt
related to equipment and operating loans to allow the successor
trustee to determine if Anthony has paid for the trust property
as he testified to during the trial. The Court finds there is no
way to evaluate whether Anthony is entitled to the trust
property without developing the evidence of what he believes
he paid after an account of the payments made on the operating
loan and sale or purchase of Sylvester’s equipment.

Third, on February 23, 2023, the district court issued an order reaffirming the scope
of the equitable accounting (the February 23 order). The February 23 order, authored by a
newly assigned judge, appointed a forensic accountant and directed that accountant to
“conduct an equitable accounting of the [t]rust.” The order also stated that the equitable
accounting should “proceed as directed in [p]aragraph 53 of the [April 1 order].”
Fourth, the district court issued a final order directing entry of judgment (the final
order). In light of Sylvester regaining competency, the district court terminated the trust
and transferred the trust land to Sylvester. The district court also approved the equitable-
accounting report. The results of the report showed that Anthony personally paid $3,426
in real-estate taxes on the trust land. This amount was subtracted from the $91,300 the
district court determined respondents owed the trust for the rental value of the trust land.
Final judgment was therefore entered against respondents in the amount of $87,874,
representing the rental value of the trust land owed less the real-estate taxes paid by
Anthony.
This appeal follows.
7
DECISION
Appellants raise two primary challenges on appeal. 5 First, appellants argue the
district court improperly granted summary judgment on appellants’ undue-influence,
duress, and lack-of-capacity claims. Specifically, appellants assert the district court legally
erred when it determined the contracts were valid and that, if the contracts were invalid,
Sylvester ratified the contracts after regaining competency. Second, appellants raise
several claims regarding the district court’s equitable-accounting orders. Namely,
appellants argue the district court improperly narrowed the scope of the equitable
accounting and abused its discretion when it approved the equitable-accounting report. We
address each challenge in turn below.
I.
Appellants first challenge the district court’s decision to grant respondents’ motion
for summary judgment on appellants’ undue-influence, duress, and lack-of -capacity
claims. A motion for summary judgment should be granted “if the movant shows that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.01. A genuine issue of material fact exists if, considering the

5 In their reply brief, appellants challenge the district court’s decision to deny their motion
to amend the complaint to add a claim for damages. Because appellants did not raise this
issue in their principal brief, it is forfeited. Moorhead Econ. Dev. Auth. v. Anda, 789
N.W.2d 860, 887 (Minn. 2010); McIntire v. State, 458 N.W.2d 714, 717 n.2 (Minn. App.
1990), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 28, 1990); see also Wood v. Diamonds Sports Bar & Grill,
Inc., 654 N.W.2d 704, 707 (Minn. App. 2002) (stating that “[i]f an argument is raised in a
reply brief but not raised in an appellant’s main brief, and it exceeds the scope of the
respondent’s brief, it is not properly before [the court of appeals] and may be stricken from
the reply brief”), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 26, 2003).
8
record as a whole, a rational trier of fact could find for the nonmoving party. Frieler v.
Carlson Mktg. Grp., Inc., 751 N.W.2d 558, 564 (Minn. 2008). We apply a de novo
standard of review to a district court’s legal conclusions and view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party. STAR Ctrs., Inc., 644 N.W.2d at 76-77.
In granting summary judgment, the district court made two legal conclusions. First,
the district court determined that because Anthony was Sylvester’s attorney-in-fact, it did
not matter if Sylvester personally signed the contracts while incompetent. Second, the
district court determined that, even if the contracts may be void because Sylvester signed
them while incompetent, Sylvester ratified the contracts after regaining competency when
he continued to accept payments from Anthony. Appellants challenge both bases for
granting summary judgment, and we address each in turn.
A. Validity of the Contracts
Appellants first challenge the district court’s decision not to “accord any legal
significance to who held the pen.” The district court determined that it did not matter
whether Sylvester signed the contracts as the seller because Anthony—as Sylvester’s
attorney-in-fact—could have signed the contracts on Sylvester’s behalf. We agree with
appellants that the district court legally erred when it made this determination.
A person is competent to contract if he has “enough mental capacity to understand,
to a reasonable extent, the nature and effect of what he is doing.” Rebne v. Rebne,
13 N.W.2d 18, 20 (Minn. 1944). A contract signed by an incompetent person is void. See
Krueger v. Zoch , 173 N.W.2d 18, 20-21 (Minn. 1969) (affirming district court’s
determination that contract was void where one of the parties was incompetent at signing);
9
In re Guardianship of Dawson, 502 N.W.2d 65, 68 (Minn. App. 1993) (same), rev. denied
(Minn. Aug. 16, 1993); see also State Bank v. Schrupp, 375 N.W.2d 48, 52 (Minn. App.
1985) (“If [the appellant’s] incompetency defense succeeds at trial, the guaranty is invalid
. . . .”), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 13, 1985).6
An incompetent person can nevertheless enter a contract using a power of attorney
executed while the person was competent. By executing a power of attorney, a principal
authorizes their attorney-in-fact to execute contracts on their behalf should they become
incompetent. See Minn. Stat. § 523.07 (2024 ); Minn. Stat. § 523.23 (2024); Minn. Stat.
§ 523.24 (2024). Since January 1, 2014, when signing a contract on behalf of the principal,
an attorney-in-fact must disclose their relationship to the principal by signing either
“attorney-in-fact for (name of the principal)” or “(name of the principal) by (name of the
attorney-in-fact) the principal’s attorney-in-fact.” Minn. Stat. § 523.23, subd. 1; see also
2013 Minn. Laws ch. 23, § 2, at 116. But in 1997, the year Sylvester executed his power
of attorney, the statutory, short-form power of attorney allowed an attorney-in-fact to
execute contracts for a principal by simply signing the principal’s name. See In re
Disciplinary Action Against Trombley, 916 N.W.2d 362, 367 n.5 (Minn. 2018); Minn. Stat.

6 The supreme court has issued decisions holding that a contract signed by an incompetent
person is voidable, rather than void. See Champ v. Brown, 266 N.W. 94, 98 (Minn. 1936)
(“The deed of an insane person not under guardianship is not void, but only voidable . . . .”
(quotation omitted)); Schultz v. Oldenburg, 277 N.W. 918, 921 (Minn. 1938) (“The law is
well settled that a contract of an insane person is not void but voidable . . . .”). However,
we apply the supreme court’s most recent precedent. See Prokop v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No.
625, 754 N.W.2d 709, 715 (Minn. App. 2008) (applying “most recent precedential case on
point”). And the most recent case from the supreme court instructs that contracts signed
by an incompetent person are void. See Krueger, 173 N.W.2d at 20-21.
10
§ 523.23 (1996). Thus, the question we must decide is whether the contracts in this case
are valid because Anthony could have signed Sylvester’s name on the contracts as his
attorney-in-fact.
We find our decision in Younggren v. Younggren instructive on this issue. 556
N.W.2d 228 (Minn. App. 1996). There, a principal executed a power of attorney naming
his children as his attorneys-in-fact. Id. at 230. Pursuant to the power of attorney, the
attorneys-in-fact took over management of the principal’s affairs, operated his farm, and
paid his debts. Id. While the children were the principal’s attorneys-in-fact, the principal
also signed deeds conveying his property to the attorneys-in-fact, reserving a life estate for
himself. Id. at 231. A year later, the principal revoked the power of attorney and initiated
an action against his attorneys-in-fact, claiming—as relevant here—that he was
incompetent when he signed the deeds. Id. The district court concluded that the deeds
were valid. Id. at 232. We affirmed, relying on testimony from the principal’s attorney
and physician that supported a finding that the principal was competent—not the fact that
the deeds were signed by the attorneys-in-fact as buyers. See id. at 232-33.
We discern from Younggren that serving a dual role as attorney-in- fact and buyer
does not, alone, cure a defect that arises from having an incompetent principal sign a
contract as the seller. While we affirmed the district court’s determination that the deeds
in Younggren were valid, the case hinged on whether the principal was competent—not
that the buyers could have signed the deed s as the principal’s attorneys-in-fact. See id.
Younggren, therefore, instructs that when faced with a contract that the principal signed as
the seller and the attorney-in-fact signed as the buyer, the relevant inquiry is whether the
11
principal was competent, not whether the attorney-in-fact could have signed the contract
as both the buyer and seller. See id.
Here, respondents do not dispute that Sylvester was incompetent when the contracts
were signed. And, taking the facts in the light most favorable to Sylvester, Sylvester’s
signature appears on the contracts. Thus, a trier of fact could determine that Sylvester
signed the contracts and, if so, the contracts are void even though Anthony could have
signed Sylvester’s name as the seller using the power of attorney.
Respondents disagree with this analysis, relying on Trombley. There, an attorney-
in-fact was granted all available powers under a short-form power of attorney, including
the power to transfer the principal’s property to herself. See Trombley, 916 N.W.2d at 364.
Like the version of the statute applicable in this case, see Minn. Stat. § 523.23, subd. 1
(1996), the version of the statute governing the power of attorney in Trombley lacked the
language requiring attorneys-in-fact to identify their relationship to the principal when
signing on behalf of the principal, see Minn. Stat. § 523.23, subd. 1 (2012). The attorney-
in-fact signed the principal’s name on checks without identifying that she was signing as
the principal’s attorney-in-fact. Trombley, 916 N.W.2d at 364. When these checks were
challenged, a referee found that the attorney- in-fact’s actions were dishonest. Id. at 367.
The supreme court disagreed, clarifying that the existing statute did not indicate how an
attorney-in-fact must sign documents or expressly prohibit an attorney-in-fact from signing
the principal’s name. Id. at 367 n.5.
Trombley does not govern this case. Unlike Trombley, based on the existing
evidence, a trier of fact could determine that Sylvester, not Anthony , signed Sylvester’s
12
name on the contracts. And while, under Trombley, Anthony could have signed the
contracts on Sylvester’s behalf without indicating he was doing so as the attorney-in -fact,
taking the facts in the light most favorable to Sylvester, that does not appear to be what
Anthony did. And we cannot analyze the case based on hypothetical facts. See Seiz v.
Citizens Pure Ice Co., 290 N.W. 802, 805 (Minn. 1940) (declining to consider claims where
they were “based on a hypothetical state of facts”); Bolen v. Glass, 737 N.W.2d 856, 866
(Minn. App. 2007), rev’d on other grounds, 755 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2007) (“[W]e must
decide the case on the present facts . . . .”); Jones v. Green Bay Packaging, Inc., No. A15-
0017, 2015 WL 4715538, at *4 (Minn. App. Aug. 10, 2015) (describing argument as
“without merit” when it was “based solely on facts either outside the record or hypothetical
in nature”).
7
Respondents also argue that the district court appropriately concluded the contracts
were valid because attorneys were involved in their creation. But Minnesota appellate
courts have repeatedly invalidated contracts signed by incompetent individuals despite
attorney involvement. See Younggren, 556 N.W.2d at 231-33 (considering whether
principal was competent when deeds were signed to determine their validity,
notwithstanding that deeds were prepared by principal’s attorney); Dawson, 502 N.W.2d
at 66, 68 (affirming district court’s decision that deed signed by an incompetent person was
void when the deed was initially signed in front of four witnesses and later re-signed before
a notary and an attorney); Lauer v. Lauer, No. A12 -1216, 2013 WL 3868073, at *1, 5

7 This case is nonprecedential and, therefore, not binding. We cite nonprecedential cases
as persuasive authority only. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
13
(Minn. App. July 29, 2013) (concluding divorce settlement agreement and resulting
judgment entered by district court were void when one party was incompetent , despite
attorney involvement).
For these reasons, we conclude that the district court legally erred when it
determined that the contracts were valid as a matter of law.
B. Ratification8
Appellants also challenge the district court’s alternative decision that, even if the
contracts were void, Sylvester ratified them after regaining competency. Because we
conclude a factfinder could determine that Sylvester signed the contracts when he was
incompetent and the contracts, therefore, may be void, we must determine whether
Sylvester could— nonetheless—ratify the contracts.
“Ratification occurs when one, having full knowledge of all the material facts,
confirms, approves, or sanctions, by affirmative act or acquiescence, the originally
unauthorized act of another . . . .” Anderson v. First Nat’l Bank, 228 N.W.2d 257, 259
(Minn. 1975). A void contract generally cannot be ratified. See Law v. Butler, 47 N.W.

8 The district court also granted summary judgment on the ground that “Sylvester has not
taken an essential step in seeking a rescission of contract: he has not offered to return the
parties to the [status quo ante] by returning the benefits he received from the contract.”
Rescission undoes a contract so that the parties are “put in the same position they would
have been had the contract never existed.” Johnny’s, Inc. v. Njaka, 450 N.W.2d 166, 168
(Minn. App. 1990). But a recission does not apply to a void contract, because the contract
was always invalid. Todd v. Bettingen, 124 N.W. 443, 445-46 (Minn. 1910) (“ There was
here no contract to guide the court in adjudicating the rights of the parties, because the
agreement made was void . . . [W]e reiterate, there was no contract to be rescinded.”).
Thus, because the supreme court has concluded a contract signed by an incompetent person
is void and not voidable, the doctrine of recission is inapplicable. See Krueger, 173 N.W.2d
at 20-21.
14
53, 54 (Minn. 1890) (“The practical distinction between a deed voidable and one wholly
void is that the former may be ratified . . . while a deed wholly void is incapable of
ratification.”); Marple v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co., 132 N.W. 333, 334 (Minn. 1911)
(“The general rule undoubtedly is that where a party to a contract that is not void, but
voidable, seeks to rescind by his own act, he must return or offer to return what he received
under the contract.”); Logan v. Panuska, 293 N.W.2d 359, 362 (Mi nn. 1980) (explaining
that as between “voidable” and “void” contracts, “only a voidable contract can be ratified
or confirmed”).
The supreme court has carved out an exception to that general rule. In Wood v.
Newell, the supreme court reviewed a district court decision that a land-sale contract was
not void despite the seller’s incompetency at the time of the sale. 182 N.W. 965, 965
(Minn. 1921). The supreme court affirmed, concluding that a contract signed by an
incompetent seller will not be annulled when the buyer signed the contract in good faith,
paid fair consideration, did not procure the seller’s signature by fraud, and did not know of
the seller’s incompetency. Id. at 966.
The supreme court reaffirmed this exception in Krueger. There, the district court
determined the respondent was incompetent when he signed a contract, rendering it void.
Krueger, 173 N.W.2d at 20. On appeal, the supreme court analyzed whether the Wood
exception applied. Id. at 21. The supreme court concluded the exception was inapplicable
because the respondent suffered a long period of incompetency and there was evidence in
the record indicating the appellant knew the respondent was incompetent at the time the
parties signed the contract. Id. Thus, the supreme court affirmed the district court. Id.
15
We conclude that this case is more similar to Krueger than Wood. Like in Krueger,
Sylvester suffered a long period of incompetency—nearly twenty years. And when the
contracts were signed in 2004 and 2005, Sylvester had been incompetent since 1999.
Further, the record plainly shows that Anthony knew Sylvester was incompetent at the time
the parties signed the contracts. Thus, we conclude the Wood exception does not apply.
See 182 N.W. at 966. In the absence of an exception, Sylvester could not ratify the
contracts if they were void. See Law, 47 N.W. at 54.
For this reason, we conclude the district court erred when it determined Sylvester
ratified the contracts when he accepted payments from Anthony under the contracts after
regaining competency.
C. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, taking the facts in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Sylvester signed
the contracts. If a factfinder determines Sylvester signed the contracts, the Wood exception
does not apply and the contracts are void. We, therefore, conclude the district court legally
erred when it granted summary judgment on appellants’ undue-influence, duress, and lack-
of-capacity claims. As the district court dismissed these claims solely on the basis that the
contracts were enforceable as a matter of law, we otherwise express no opinion on the
viability of these claims. Accordingly, we reverse and remand the undue-influence, duress,
and lack-of-capacity claims for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
16
II.
Appellants next challenge the district court’s decisions in connection with their
equitable-accounting claims. Broadly, appellants contend the district court: (1) improperly
narrowed the scope of the equitable accounting and (2) abused its discretion when it
approved the equitable-accounting report. We review each contention below.
A. Breadth of Equitable Accounting
Appellants raise two primary claims regarding the breadth of the equitable
accounting.9 First, appellants challenge the district court’s decision to grant summary
judgment on their equitable accounting –breach of trust claim. Second, appellants
challenge the scope of the district court’s order regarding the equitable accounting–farming
claim.
1. Equitable Accounting–Breach of Trust
Appellants first argue that the district court erred when it granted summary
judgment on their equitable accounting–breach of trust claim. As set forth above, we
review a district court’s decision to grant summary judgment de novo and view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. STAR Ctrs., Inc., 644 N.W.2d
at 76-77.

9 Appellants also contend that they were statutorily entitled to an equitable accounting. See
Minn. Stat. § 523.21 (2024). Appellants did not raise this issue in their principal brief.
Moorhead Econ. Dev. Auth., 789 N.W.2d at 887; McIntire, 458 N.W.2d at 717 n.2; see
also Wood, 654 N.W.2d at 707. Appellants also did not raise this argument before the
district court. See Hoyt Inv. Co. v. Bloomington Com. & Trade Ctr. Assocs., 418 N.W.2d
173, 175 (Minn. 1988); see also Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (stating
that appellate courts generally address only those questions previously presented to and
considered by the district court). For both reasons, this argument is forfeited.
17
“[E]quitable accounting is available . . . when a fiduciary owes an equitable duty to
account and when the accounts at issue are exceedingly complicated.” United Prairie
Bank-Mountain Lake v. Haugen Nutrition & Equip., LLC, 813 N.W.2d 49, 57 n.3 (Minn.
2012). “The necessary prerequisite to the right to maintain a suit for an equitable
accounting . . . is . . . the absence of an adequate remedy at law.” Landgraf v. Ellsworth,
126 N.W.2d 766, 769 (Minn. 1964) (quotation omitted).
The district court determined that appellants were not entitled to an equitable
accounting related to a breach of trust because the record did not indicate one was
necessary. The district court noted that the following facts were undisputed: respondents
transferred the trust land to Anthony for no consideration, yet Sylvester continued to
receive payments according to the terms of the trust. Given these undisputed facts, the
district court found that there was no reason to believe that any discrepancies that arose
because of these transactions could not be uncovered via discovery and resolved via a legal
remedy.
We conclude the district court correctly granted summary judgment on appellants’
equitable accounting –breach of trust claim. The two undisputed facts identified by the
district court—that the trust land was transferred for no consideration and that Sylvester
continued to receive payments under the trust—establish that the trust account was not
“exceedingly complicated.” See United Prairie Bank- Mountain Lake, 813 N.W.2d at 57
n.3; see also In re Weitzel & Weitzel 2007 Irrev. Tr., No. A17-1698, 2018 WL 4201181, at
*7 (Minn. App. Sept. 4, 2018) (affirming that an equitable accounting was not available
where trust account was not exceedingly complicated because it consisted primarily of cash
18
contributions, disbursements were made to small number of beneficiaries, and it had
limited number of investment instruments that were not subject to frequent transactions).
The evidence before the district court included Anthony’s deposition, wherein he testified
that the trust land was transferred to him for no consideration and that it was his intention
to continue making payments to Sylvester under the terms of the trust. Anthony’s affidavit
described the trust as containing 110 acres of tillable farmland and requiring cash rent at a
rate of $50 per acre. Anthony began making those payments in 2008 and stopped in 2014.
However, Anthony stated in an affidavit that he understood Sylvester’s right to ongoing
trust payments and was willing and able to continue to make those payments in accordance
with the terms of the trust until Sylvester’s death. This evidence is not contradictory on its
face and does not suggest that the trust was so complicated that an equitable accounting
was necessary.
Further, having now fully litigated the breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim, it appears the
district court already resolved the potential accounting issues arising from respondents’
breach of trust. The district court determined that respondents breached their fiduciary
duties as co-trustees of the trust land by transferring the trust land out of the trust to
Anthony for no consideration. Accordingly, the district court voided the conveyance of
the trust land to Anthony, as well as ordered reimbursement for the fair rental value owed
to the trust for the time that the trust land was in Anthony’s possession. The district court
calculated this amount to be $91,300. While not determinative, the ability of the district
court to make this calculation lends additional support to our conclusion that the district
court did not err when it determined there was an adequate remedy at law.
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Therefore, we conclude the district court appropriately granted summary judgment
on this claim.
2. Equitable Accounting–Farming
Appellants also argue the district court improperly narrowed the scope of the
equitable accounting–farming claim. Specifically, appellants argue that (1) the district
court should have fully vacated the summary-judgment order to allow for the equitable
accounting alleged in the complaint and (2) the newly assigned judge improperly narrowed
the scope of the equitable accounting.
We review the district court’s decision to grant an equitable remedy for an abuse of
discretion. Herlache v. Rucks, 990 N.W.2d 443, 449-50 (Minn. 2023). The “district court
abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against
logic and the facts in the record.” Thompson v. Schrimsher, 906 N.W.2d 495, 500 (Minn.
2018) (quotation omitted). District courts have the power to grant equitable relief based
on the facts and circumstances of a particular case. DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d
755, 758 (Minn. 1981).
We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in the April 1 order when
it revived appellants’ equitable accounting–farming claim. As set forth above, an equitable
accounting is available “when the accounts at issue are exceedingly complicated.” United
Prairie Bank-Mountain Lake, 813 N.W.2d at 57 n.3. The district court vacated summary
judgment because, unlike the equitable accounting–breach of trust claim, Anthony’s
testimony at trial revealed that the farm ing accounts at issue were more complex than
originally ascertained. Specifically, during summary judgment, Anthony told the district
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court that he had fully paid Sylvester’s debts years ago. But at trial, Anthony admitted that
he attempted to access farm-capital-credit dividends for the trust land in 2016 to offset
Sylvester’s debts. The district court, accordingly, questioned why Anthony would attempt
to access credit dividends if Anthony had already paid Sylvester’s debts. It was on this
basis that the district court ordered a limited equitable accounting of the portion of the debts
related to the equipment and operating loans. It is clear that the district court was
specifically targeting this gap in the evidentiary record and using the equitable accounting
to uncover these necessary facts. We discern no abuse of discretion in the district court
determining that only this aspect of the accounts was “exceedingly complicated” enough
to justify the equitable accounting.
We, further, do not agree with appellants’ representation that the newly assigned
judge narrowed the scope of the equitable accounting from what was ordered in the April 1
order. In the February 23 order, the district court specifically ordered that the equitable
accounting would “proceed as directed in [p]aragraph 53 of the [April 1 order].”
Paragraph 53 authorized an equitable accounting “of the portion of the debt related to
equipment and operating loans.” Thus, the newly assigned judge simply reaffirmed the
scope of the equitable accounting ordered in the April 1 order.
For these reasons, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion when it
ordered an equitable accounting on the specific issue it determined was “exceedingly
complicated” after a trial on the merits.
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B. Equitable-Accounting Report
Finally, appellants argue the district court abused its discretion when it approved the
equitable-accounting report because the forensic auditor submitted an “unreasonably
narrow” report and failed to review all the relevant information. We review the approval
of an equitable accounting for an abuse of discretion. In re Conservatorship of Moore, 409
N.W.2d 14, 16 (Minn. App. 1987). As stated above, a district court “abuses its discretion
when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts
in the record.” Thompson, 906 N.W.2d at 500 (quotation omitted).
In this case, the forensic auditor reviewed trust expenses and income, payments
made by Anthony to the trust, Sylvester’s balance sheets and tax returns, real estate
mortgages, and farming ledgers.10 The forensic auditor also indicated in his report that he
“broadly read [the district court’s] directive to include a review of all the assets of
Sylvester’s farming operation as of the date of his stroke, and to review the claimed
personal expenses from 1999, which could be considered the assumption of debt by
Anthony.” Based on his review, the forensic auditor concluded that Anthony did not

10 Appellants make ancillary arguments regarding the forensic auditor’s report. Appellants
first claim that the forensic auditor breached a duty of care owed to Sylvester by failing to
make certain accountings in his report. But appellants do not point to any legal authority
indicating that it is a breach of fiduciary duty for a forensic accountant to submit a report
with which appellants disagree. An assignment of error based on “mere assertion” and not
supported by argument or authority is waived unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere
inspection. Schoepke v. Alexander Smith & Sons Carpet Co., 187 N.W.2d 133, 135 (Minn.
1971). We conclude that prejudicial error is not obvious on mere inspection. Second,
appellants argue that the forensic auditor was biased against them. The district court found
this assertion to be unsupported by evidence , and our review of the record supports this
determination.
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effectively pay for the trust land by paying or assuming Sylvester’s debts related to
equipment and operating loans.
In accepting the equitable-accounting report and entering final judgment, the district
court determined that the forensic auditor’s report had been conducted in accordance with
the district court’s prior orders. The district court found that the forensic auditor’s findings
were accurate and, relying on the equitable-accounting report, deducted the amount of real-
estate taxes paid on the trust land by Anthony from the rental value of the trust land for the
time it was in Anthony’s possession, as determined in the April 1 order. In sum, the
forensic auditor provided a report that adhered to the district court’s order and made clear
findings on whether Anthony was entitled to the trust land.
Based on the record, we discern no abuse of discretion in the district court approving
the equitable-accounting report.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.