State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0506

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Carlos Ramone Sargent,
Appellant.

Filed March 3, 2025
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

Beltrami County District Court
File No. 04-CR-22-810

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

David L. Hanson, Beltrami County Attorney, Symon Schindler-Syme, Assistant County
Attorney, Bemidji, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara L. Martin, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Wheelock, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and
Bjorkman, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant challenges his convictions of unlawful possession of a firearm or
ammunition and controlled-substance possession, arguing that (1) the prosecutor
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committed misconduct by failing to adequately prepare the state’s witnesses to avoid
blurting out inadmissible testimony, and (2) the district court plainly erred when it failed
to provide a specific-unanimity instruction because the state alleged separate instances of
firearm and ammunition possession to which he had separate defenses. We affirm.
FACTS
During the early morning of March 17, 2022, Deputy Brandon Newhouse of the
Beltrami County Sheriff’s Office and a second officer conducted a routine traffic stop of a
vehicle in which appellant Carlos Ramone Sargent was a passenger. After arresting the
vehicle’s driver, the officers instructed Sargent to exit the vehicle so it could be searched
and towed. By this point, a third officer, Deputy Anthony Hanson, had arrived at the scene.
As Sargent exited the vehicle, the officers observed a firearm on the vehicle floor
just in front of the passenger seat where Sargent had been sitting. The officers arrested
Sargent and searched his person, finding three rounds of ammunition—a .44 caliber bullet,
a .45 caliber bullet, and a .410 shotgun shell—and two small plastic bags containing a white
crystalline substance that was later identified as methamphetamine. One of the bags was
located inside a package of cigarettes after Sargent informed the officers that there was a
“fifth-degree inside of the cigarette box.” Sargent also told the officers that he knew he
was not supposed to possess a firearm.
That evening, Deputy Newhouse interviewed Sargent at the jail. After being
advised of his Miranda rights,1 Sargent agreed to speak to Deputy Newhouse and admitted

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (holding that statements made in custodial
interrogation are generally inadmissible unless the suspect is first warned that “he has a
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that the recovered firearm was his and that he had owned it for 25 years. He explained that
the firearm shoots .45 caliber ammunition “right on the money,” but can also shoot .44
caliber ammunition less accurately. And Sargent stated that he had been awake for ten
days straight and uses approximately two grams of methamphetamine every day.
Deputy Newhouse obtained a warrant to collect Sargent’s DNA, which was
provided to the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA) for testing along with
the firearm. The DNA testing revealed that, although the firearm contained the DNA of
multiple individuals, Sargent’s DNA matched the “major male” DNA profile located on
the grip, and on the hammer, safety, and release components of the weapon.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Sargent with one count of possession of a
firearm and/or ammunition by an ineligible person under Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2)
(2020), and one count of fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance under Minn.
Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2(1) (2020). Prior to trial, Sargent stipulated that he is ineligible to
possess a firearm or ammunition. During the two-day trial, the jury heard testimony from
the three arresting officers as described above and viewed excerpts of body-camera footage
of the arrest and the jailhouse interview. And the jury heard testimony from a BCA
scientist who explained the DNA testing process and results.

right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against
him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed”);
see also State v. Horst , 880 N.W.2d 24, 30-31 (Minn. 2016) (describing when Miranda
warnings are required).
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The jury found Sargent guilty of both charges. The district court imposed a 60-
month prison sentence for the ineligible-possession offense and a concurrent 19-month
sentence for the controlled-substance offense.
Sargent appeals.
DECISION
I. Sargent was not deprived of a fair trial because any prosecutorial misconduct
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

A prosecutor is a “minister of justice whose obligation is to guard the rights of the
accused as well as to enforce the rights of the public.” State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294,
300 (Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted). Accordingly, a prosecutor has a duty to ensure a
defendant receives a fair trial, regardless of the strength of the evidence against them. Id.
This duty includes “prepar[ing] [the state’s] witnesses, prior to testifying, to avoid
inadmissible or prejudicial statements.” State v. McNeil, 658 N.W.2d 228, 232 (Minn.
App. 2003). Failure to do so may constitute prosecutorial misconduct. State v. Patzold,
917 N.W.2d 798, 807 (Minn. App. 2018), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 27, 2018).
The following exchange occurred while the prosecutor was questioning Deputy
Newhouse about the traffic stop and subsequent arrest of Sargent:
Q: What happened when you asked Mr. Sargent to get out of
the vehicle?
A: He exited the vehicle. He was cooperative. One of my
partners at the time . . . was with me, and he told me that he
saw a gun in the car; so Mr. Sargent was placed under arrest.

Q: Why?
A: I know Sargent from prior experience and knowledge from
other law enforcement officers that he’s inelig—

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(Emphasis added.) Defense counsel objected. After sustaining the objection, the district
court gave the following curative instruction: “Ladies and gentlemen, I am going to instruct
you that you should disregard any testimony regarding prior contact between the deputy
and Mr. Sargent.”
The prosecutor pursued a similar line of questioning with Deputy Hanson:
Q: What happened when Mr. Sargent was being removed from
the vehicle?
A: At the time, [an officer] observed a firearm in the vehicle
as we were removing [Sargent].

Q: So what did you do?
A: I immediately placed [Sargent] under arrest.

Q: Why?
A: Because my previous experiences with [Sargent], I knew
that he was a felon, and that—I know that he wasn’t able to—

(Emphasis added.) Defense counsel again objected, this time moving for a mistrial. The
district court denied the motion, instead directing the jury to “disregard the last answer of
Deputy Hanson,” and to “not speculate as to that answer.”
Sargent argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct because they failed to
prepare two of the testifying officers to ensure they would not blurt out inadmissible
character evidence that he was known to law enforcement and a felon. And Sargent
contends that the prosecutor’s failure to do so deprived him of his right to a fair trial. The
state acknowledges that the challenged evidence was inadmissible but asserts that any
resulting prejudice was minimal.
When reviewing objected-to prosecutorial misconduct, we apply a two-tiered
harmless-error test. State v. Yang, 774 N.W.2d 539, 559 (Minn. 2009). For “less -serious
6
misconduct,” we consider whether the misconduct played a substantial part in influencing
the jury’s verdict. State v. Jackson, 773 N.W.2d 111, 121 (Minn. 2009). But in cases
involving “unusually serious prosecutorial misconduct,” we review the misconduct to
determine whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. “Prosecutorial
misconduct is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if the jury’s verdict was surely
unattributable to the misconduct.” State v. Whitson, 876 N.W.2d 297, 304 (Minn. 2016)
(quotation omitted).2
When determining whether misconduct in the presentation of evidence was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we consider several nonexclusive factors, including
(1) how the improper evidence was presented; (2) whether the evidence was highly
persuasive; (3) whether the state emphasized the evidence during the trial, particularly
during closing argument; and (4) whether the defendant countered the evidence. State v.
Bigbear, 10 N.W.3d 48, 54 (Minn. 2024) (evidence); State v. Wren, 738 N.W.2d 378, 394
(Minn. 2007) (prosecutorial misconduct). We may also consider the strength of the other
evidence establishing the defendant’s guilt. Bigbear, 10 N.W.3d at 54; Wren, 738 N.W.2d
at 394.
Here, even assuming that any prosecutorial misconduct was “serious,” the record
persuades us that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt for three reasons. First, the

2 The supreme court has questioned the continuing validity of the two-tiered approach to
prosecutorial-misconduct claims. See, e.g., State v. Carridine, 812 N.W.2d 130, 146
(Minn. 2012). This issue remains unresolved. Compare Whitson, 876 N.W.2d at 304 &
n.2 (noting questions regarding the viability of the two-tiered approach and applying the
more stringent standard), with Woodard v. State, 994 N.W.2d 272, 277-78 n.2 (Minn. 2023)
(explaining that the less stringent standard applies to “nonserious” misconduct).
7
district court’s curative instructions mitigated the risk of prejudice from the inadmissible
testimony. The court instructed the jury that it should “disregard” the testimony and refrain
from “speculat[ing]” about any prior contact Sargent may have had with law enforcement
after each objectionable statement. We presume the jury follows the district court’s
instructions, Whitson, 876 N.W.2d at 305, and Sargent has failed to identify evidence
suggesting that the jury disregarded the court’s instructions or improperly considered the
evidence in any way.
Second, the challenged testimony was not presented in a prominent way. It was
brief—amounting to two sentences out of the 518-page trial transcript—both of which were
cut off by defense counsel’s objection before they could be completed. See Bigbear, 10
N.W.3d at 56 (considering the “relative number of transcript pages that the [inadmissible]
evidence occupies” when analyzing prominence). And the prosecutor did not reference
either statement or Sargent’s criminal history during closing argument or at any other point
during the trial. See Wren, 738 N.W.2d at 394 (concluding that prosecutorial misconduct
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in part because the “objectionable conduct was
brief”).
Third, the evidence of Sargent’s guilt was strong. The three officer s testified that
they saw the firearm at Sargent’s feet as he exited the vehicle, and they found ammunition
and methamphetamine on his person. The jury viewed excerpts of body-camera footage
in which Sargent acknowledged that he was not supposed to have a firearm, admitted to
owning the firearm, and reported that the firearm could shoot the calibers of ammunition
8
he was carrying in his pocket. Moreover, the jury was presented with evidence showing
that Sargent’s DNA was present on the weapon.
Because any alleged prosecutorial misconduct was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt—the more stringent of the two prosecutorial-misconduct standards of review —we
conclude that Sargent’s right to a fair trial was not infringed.
II. The district court did not commit reversible error by failing to instruct the jury
on specific unanimity for the firearm-possession charge.

A person previously convicted of a crime of violence is ineligible to possess a
firearm or ammunition; doing so is a crime. Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2). “Possession
may be proved through evidence of actual or constructive possession.” State v. Harris,
895 N.W.2d 592, 601 (Minn. 2017). Actual possession requires “direct physical control”
over an object. State v. Stone, 982 N.W.2d 500, 510 (Minn. App. 2022) (quotation
omitted), aff’d, 995 N.W.2d 617 (Minn. 2023). In contrast, constructive possession occurs
when there is a strong inference that “the defendant physically possessed the item at one
time and did not abandon his possessory interest in it.” State v. Smith, 619 N.W.2d 766,
770 (Minn. App. 2000), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 16, 2001).
At trial, the state presented evidence of both actual (ammunition) and constructive
(firearm) possession. Sargent offered distinct defenses to each possession theory.
Regarding the firearm, he argued that he was unaware of its presence due to his exhausted
state and that any of his DNA found on the weapon could be attributed to physical
proximity. As to the bullets, he contends they did not meet the legal definition of
“ammunition” because they were not proven operable.
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Following the close of evidence, the district court gave a general -unanimity
instruction, advising the jurors that their verdict must be unanimous. But the court did not
instruct them that they must unanimously agree upon which act of firearm or ammunition
possession Sargent committed. Instead, the court instructed the jury that it must determine
whether Sargent “knowingly possessed a firearm and/or ammunition.” Sargent did not
object to the jury instructions but now challenges the district court’s failure to give a
specific-unanimity instruction.
We review unobjected-to jury instructions for plain error. State v. Wenthe, 865
N.W.2d 293, 299 (Minn. 2015). To establish plain error the appellant must show (1) error,
(2) that is plain, and (3) that affects a defendant’s substantial rights. State v. Griller, 583
N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 1998). If any one of these requirements is not met, we need not
consider the others. State v. Webster, 894 N.W.2d 782, 786 (Minn. 2017). And if all the
requirements are satisfied, we may correct the error only if it seriously affects the “fairness
and integrity of our judicial system.” State v. Bey, 975 N.W.2d 511, 521 (Minn. 2022)
(quotation omitted).
Here, we need not consider the first two plain-error requirements because we
conclude that the claimed error did not affect Sargent’s substantial rights. A defendant’s
substantial rights are prejudiced when it is reasonably likely that the district court’s error
had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict. Griller, 583 N.W.2d at 741. The defendant
bears the “heavy burden” of establishing that the third plain-error requirement is met. Id.
Sargent has not carried this burden.
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As noted above, the evidence of Sargent’s guilt was strong. The state presented the
testimony of multiple witnesses who observed the firearm on the floor of the car next to
the passenger seat and recovered ammunition from Sargent’s person, the body-camera
footage of the arrest and interview, and the DNA results linking Sargent to the firearm.
This evidence, coupled with Sargent’s stipulation that he could not lawfully possess a
firearm or ammunition, convinces us that it is not reasonably likely that the district court’s
failure to issue a specific-unanimity instruction had a significant impact on the jury’s
verdict. See Bey, 975 N.W.2d at 522 (concluding the substantial-rights prong of the plain-
error standard was not met, in part, because the evidence of the defendant’s guilt, which
included testimony from multiple witnesses and video recordings, was “strong”). Because
the alleged instructional error did not prejudice Sargent’s substantial rights, reversal is not
warranted. See Griller, 583 N.W.2d at 741.
Affirmed.