Royce James Stute, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0517

Royce James Stute, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota, Commissioner of Public Safety,
Respondent.

Filed December 9, 2024
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge

Hubbard County District Court
File No. 29-CV-23-1264

Isaiah P. Volk, Thorwaldsen & Malmstrom, PLLP, Detroit Lakes, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Elizabeth Johnston, Nicholas R. Moen, Assistant
Attorneys General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Bentley,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRATVOLD, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s order sustaining the revocation of his
driver’s license for driving while impaired (DWI). Appellant argues that the district court
erred because he was illegally seized when a law-enforcement officer opened appellant’s
car door and grabbed his wrist before conducting field sobriety tests. Because the district
2
court did not err in determining that law enforcement lawfully seized appellant to
investigate his suspected impairment and that appellant refused to comply with the officer’s
reasonable requests to exit the vehicle, we affirm.
FACTS
The following summarizes the district court’s factual findings issued after an
evidentiary hearing, along with the record evidence that facilitates understanding of the
issues on appeal.
At about 10:30 p.m. on September 14, 2023, a sheriff’s deputy was controlling
traffic on County Road 39 in Hubbard County while coordinating with a tow-truck operator
who was pulling a car out of a ditch. The deputy’s squad car was stationary and partially
in one of the two driving lanes ; the deputy activated the squad car’s emergency lights.
While seated inside the squad car, the deputy saw a 2006 Ford Expedition sports utility
vehicle (SUV) pull up behind him. The deputy exited the squad car and motioned for the
driver “to go around him.” The driver did not move the SUV as suggested. The deputy
walked up to the driver-side window and spoke with appellant Royce James Stute, who
rolled his window partway down.
The deputy testified that he observed Stute’s speech was slow, his eyes were
bloodshot and watery, and his “physical movements, such as turning his head, were slow.”
The deputy believed Stute was showing signs of impairment. The deputy asked Stute
questions about where he was going. As they were speaking, the deputy activated his
body-worn camera; the recording was received into evidence. Stute told the deputy that he
3
was “about a mile” away from his home. The deputy asked how much Stute had to drink.1
The deputy then asked Stute to put the SUV in park and exit the SUV to perform field
sobriety tests. Without responding orally, Stute rolled up the driver-side window and faced
forward with both hands on the steering wheel. Stute asked the deputy, “Why?” three times
as the deputy again asked Stute to step out of the SUV. Stute did not comply.
Fifty seconds after the deputy first asked Stute to exit, the deputy said, “Nope?” and
opened Stute’s SUV door.
What happened next is at issue in this appeal and is described slightly differently in
various parts of the record. The deputy testified that he grabbed Stute’s wrist but “didn’t
pull him from the vehicle. He eventually stepped out of the vehicle as [the deputy] was
holding on to his wrist.” The body-camera recording shows that the deputy held onto
Stute’s wrist for around 13 seconds as he asked Stute to step out of the SUV. Then the
deputy released Stute’s wrist, turned off the SUV, and grabbed Stute’s keys. Stute stepped
out of the SUV on his own.
Overall, the deputy asked Stute to exit the SUV 11 times before Stute complied.
About 77 seconds passed from the time the deputy first asked Stute to exit until Stute
stepped out of the SUV.
Stute performed two field sobriety tests, and his performance on those tests led the
deputy to believe that he was impaired. The deputy asked Stute to submit to a preliminary

1 The body-camera recording includes the deputy’s comments but captured only some of
what Stute said. For example, Stute’s response is inaudible after the deputy asks how much
he had to drink. Stute’s attorney cross-examined the deputy about whether the recording
differed from the deputy’s testimony.
4
breath test (PBT). Stute put his mouth on the PBT device but failed to blow. The deputy
then arrested Stute for DWI, and respondent commissioner of public safety later revoked
Stute’s driver’s license.2
Stute petitioned the district court to rescind his license revocation. The district court
conducted an evidentiary hearing, and the parties submitted briefs after the hearing. Stute
argued that he was illegally seized when the deputy opened the SUV door and grabbed his
wrist. Stute also contended that probable cause was required to validly seize him because
“there was no traffic stop, no complaint of improper driving conduct, no complaints or
informative tip as it related to [Stute] at all.” As for the deputy’s belief that Stute was
“possibly impaired,” Stute argued that the deputy had a “hunch” and was “not certain.”
Stute alternatively argued that, if law enforcement lawfully seized Stute before the deputy
opened the SUV door, the deputy lacked reasonable suspicion and impermissibly expanded
the investigation when the deputy “open[ed] the door and force[d] entry, attempting to pull
[Stute] out of the vehicle by his wrist.”
The commissioner agreed that Stute “was seized when [the deputy] opened the door
to [Stute’s] vehicle in order to conduct field sobriety tests.” The commissioner maintained,
however, that the deputy needed reasonable suspicion to lawfully open a car door, not
probable cause as Stute contended. The commissioner argued that Stute’s seizure and the
field sobriety tests were justified by the deputy’s reasonable suspicion that Stute was an
impaired driver based on the deputy’s observations.

2 The record does not include the criminal complaint or mention the statute that Stute
allegedly violated.
5
The district court issued an order sustaining the revocation on February 1, 2024,
which included factual findings. Relevant to the issues on appeal, the district court found
that the deputy’s testimony was credible. It also found that the deputy first approached
Stute’s SUV because the deputy was “unsure why” Stute “had parked behind his squad
[car].” The district court found that the deputy asked Stute “several times to step out of the
vehicle” and that Stute “continued to refuse.” The district court also found that the deputy
“attempted to help” Stute “out of his car” and that Stute “finally complied.”
The district court determined that the deputy had “reasonable, articulable suspicion”
that Stute was an impaired driver after the deputy observed Stute’s bloodshot and watery
eyes, slow physical movements, and lack of cooperation with “questions and requests .”
The district court concluded that “all of” the deputy’s requests of Stute were “tied to and
justified by” the deputy’s reasonable suspicion that Stute was impaired. The district court
also determined that “the expansion of the stop of [Stute’s] vehicle was lawful.”
Stute appeals.
DECISION
Under Minnesota’s implied-consent law, when a peace officer certifies that probable
cause existed to believe a driver was impaired and the officer also reports that the driver
refused or failed a chemical test, the commissioner must revoke the driver’s license. Minn.
Stat. § 169A.52, subds . 3-4 (2022). The driver may petition for judicial review of their
license revocation, including the officer’s probable-cause determination. Minn. Stat.
§ 169A.53, subds. 2(a), 3(b)(1) (2022).
6
On appeal, Stute challenges the denial of his petition to rescind his license
revocation, revising his district court argument somewhat because Stute no longer asserts
that probable cause was required for the deputy to ask Stute to exit the SUV. Stute instead
contends that the district court erred because (1) the deputy lacked reasonable suspicion of
impairment and therefore unlawfully seized Stute when he opened Stute’s door and (2) the
deputy unreasonably expanded the scope and intensity of the investigative stop when he
grabbed Stute’s wrist. We review “a district court’s determination regarding the legality of
an investigatory traffic stop and questions of reasonable suspicion de novo.” Wilkes v.
Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 777 N.W.2d 239, 242-43 (Minn. App. 2010).
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit “unreasonable searches and
seizures” by the government. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. 1, § 10. A seizure
occurs when an officer’s actions would cause a reasonable person to believe that they are
not free to leave. In re Welfare of E.D.J., 502 N.W.2d 779, 783 (Minn. 1993). A seizure
may occur when an officer orders a person to stop, either on the street or while driving a
vehicle. Id. at 782-83; see State v. Riley, 667 N.W.2d 153, 156 (Minn. App. 2003) (stating
that “a vehicle stop is a seizure”), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 21, 2003). An officer may
lawfully conduct a brief investigative seizure or stop if it is supported by reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968); State v. Askerooth,
681 N.W.2d 353, 363 (Minn. 2004) (adopting the Terry framework for “evaluating the
reasonableness of seizures during traffic stops”).
In Minnesota, evidence obtained by law enforcement in violation of the constitution
cannot be used in a civil implied-consent proceeding to sustain a license revocation, which
7
may result in the rescission of a driver’s-license revocation. See Ascher v. Comm’r of Pub.
Safety, 519 N.W.2d 183, 184, 187 (Minn. 1994) (holding that law enforcement obtained
evidence of the appellant’s intoxication from a sobriety checkpoint in violation of the
Minnesota Constitution and overturning the district court’s decision to sustain license
revocation); Olson v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 371 N.W.2d 552 , 556 (Minn. 1985)
(affirming the rescission of a license revocation after determining that law enforcement did
not have reasonable suspicion to justify the investigative stop under the Fourth
Amendment).
Stute does not challenge the legality of the deputy approaching him and asking
questions after Stute stopped behind the squad car. Generally, no seizure occurs when an
officer walks up and speaks with a driver sitting in an already stopped car. State v.
Vohnoutka, 292 N.W.2d 756, 757 (Minn. 1980). Instead, Stute appears to contend that he
was seized when the deputy asked him to exit his SUV to perform field sobriety testing.
Stute does not directly argue that the request to exit the SUV was unlawful, but Stute’s
brief to this court explicitly challenges as unlawful the deputy’s acts of opening the SUV
door and grabbing Stute’s wrist.
The commissioner maintains that asking Stute to exit and perform field sobriety
tests was a lawful investigative stop. The commissioner argues that the “facts here
objectively support a reasonable belief” that Stute was an intoxicated driver, which justified
the deputy’s request that Stute exit the car, his opening of the SUV door, and his grabbing
of Stute’s wrist.
8
Here, the deputy conducted an investigative stop or seizure when he asked Stute to
exit the SUV so that he could investigate Stute’s impairment by performing field sobriety
tests. See Vondrachek v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 906 N.W.2d 262, 269 (Minn. App. 2017)
(“We evaluate the propriety of roadside sobriety testing as an investigatory expansion of a
traffic stop rather than as a search.”), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 28, 2018). We therefore
consider the reasonableness of the deputy’s investigative stop of Stute and any expansion
of the stop in two steps: (1) whether “the stop was justified at its inception” and (2) whether
“the actions of the police during the stop were reasonably related to and justified by the
circumstances that gave rise to the stop in the first place.” Askerooth , 681 N.W.2d at 364
(applying Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20).
To satisfy the first step , a law-enforcement officer must have reasonable suspicion
of criminal activity based on specific, particularized, and objective facts. State v. Diede ,
795 N.W.2d 836, 842-43 (Minn. 2011). While this is a “low hurdle,” the officer’s suspicion
must be based on more than a mere hunch. State v. Taylor, 965 N.W.2d 747, 757 (Minn.
2021). The officer may rely on their training and experience to make deductions that might
elude an untrained person in forming reasonable suspicion. State v. Richardson,
622 N.W.2d 823, 825 (Minn. 2001).
To satisfy the second step, “each incremental intrusion during a stop must be strictly
tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered the initiation of the stop
permissible.” Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 364 (quotation omitted). Thus, a stop supported
by reasonable suspicion at the outset may become invalid “if it becomes ‘intolerable’ in its
‘intensity or scope.’” Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 17-18).
9
In other words, the reasonableness of an investigative stop turns on whether, with
the facts available to the law-enforcement officer at each stage of the investigative stop, a
person of reasonable caution would believe that the action taken was appropriate. See id.
at 364-65. The reasonableness of the search or seizure is based on “a balancing of the
government’s need to search or seize ‘and the individual’s right to personal security free
from arbitrary interference by law officers.’” Id. at 365 (quoting United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975)).
I. The deputy reasonably suspected Stute’s impairment before asking him to exit
the SUV.

Stute challenges the deputy’s acts of opening of the SUV door and grabbing Stute’s
wrist as unlawful seizures or expansions of the investigative stop. In doing so, Stute
specifically challenges the district court’s factual findings and legal determinations that the
deputy reasonably suspected that Stute was impaired.3
In reviewing a district court’s order sustaining an implied-consent revocation,
appellate courts will not set aside findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. In re
Source Code Evidentiary Hearings, 816 N.W.2d 525, 537 (Minn. 2012); see Minn. R. Civ.
P. 52.01. A district court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous when they are “manifestly
contrary to the weight of the evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a

3 At oral argument, Stute’s counsel was asked whether reasonable suspicion supported the
deputy’s request for Stute to exit the SUV. He conceded, “ For the [deputy] to ask [Stute]
to exit the vehicle, I do believe so.” Stute’s brief, however, disputes the district court’s
factual findings related to the reasonable- suspicion determination. To be thorough, this
opinion addresses all three stages of the investigative stop, including the deputy’s request
that Stute exit the SUV.
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whole.” Tonka Tours, Inc. v. Chadima, 372 N.W.2d 723, 726 (Minn. 1985). We will “defer
to the district court’s credibility determinations and ability to weigh the evidence.”
Constans v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 835 N.W.2d 518, 523 (Minn. App. 2013).
With this standard of review in mind, we consider whether the district court’s factual
findings were clearly erroneous and whether the deputy reasonably suspected that Stute
was impaired before asking Stute to exit the SUV. Signs that a driver is intoxicated may
provide reasonable suspicion to justify an investigative stop, including field sobriety
testing. Minn. Stat. § 169A.41, subd. 1 (2022); Mesenburg v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety,
969 N.W.2d 642, 648 (Minn. App. 2021), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 15, 2022). Only one
objective sign of intoxication is needed to establish reasonable suspicion. Holtz v. Comm’r
of Pub. Safety, 340 N.W.2d 363, 365 (Minn. App. 1983). “Common indicia of intoxication
include an odor of alcohol, bloodshot and watery eyes, slurred speech, and an
uncooperative attitude.” State v. Kier, 678 N.W.2d 672, 678 (Minn. App. 2004).
The district court focused on the deputy ’s observations suggesting Stute’s
intoxication. The district court credited the deputy’s testimony and found that “Stute’s
speech was slow, he had bloodshot, watery eyes, and his physical movements, such as
turning his head, were slow.” The district court also found that Stute was “uncooperative
throughout [the deputy’s] questions and requests.” The district court concluded, based on
these specific and objective facts, that the deputy reasonably suspected that Stute was
impaired. The district court also concluded that the deputy’s request that Stute exit the SUV
was lawfully “tied to and justified by [the deputy’s] continuing reasonable articulable
suspicion that [Stute] was an impaired driver.”
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Stute’s brief to this court argues that the district court clearly erred in its factual
findings related to the deputy’s testimony about Stute’s suspected intoxication. Stute
challenges whether the record evidence supports each sign of intoxication mentioned by
the district court. Stute contends that the body-camera recording shows Stute’s speech and
physical movements were “normal” and not slow and that Stute did not have “glassy or
bloodshot eyes” during their initial encounter. The commissioner argues that Stute’s
“disagreement with the district court’s factual findings and credibility determinations does
not render them clearly erroneous or permit this court to ignore them.”
Stute made the same arguments about the deputy’s testimony during the district
court proceedings and urged that the deputy was not credible. The district court found the
deputy to be credible and determined that the body-camera recording corroborated the
deputy’s testimony “where they overlap.” We defer to the district court’s credibility
finding. See Constans, 835 N.W.2d at 523. The deputy testified that Stute showed signs of
impairment—specifically, that Stute’s speech was slow, his eyes were bloodshot and
watery, and his movements were “physically slow.” While the district court noted that the
body-camera recording did not clearly show Stute’s eyes due to “the angle of the camera,
the flashing emergency lights, and the lack of light at night,” the district court found that
the body-camera recording corroborated the deputy’s testimony . We have reviewed the
record, including the body-camera recording, and conclude that the record evidence
supports the district court’s factual findings about Stute’s suspected impairment.
Stute emphasizes that the deputy encountered Stute while controlling traffic for a
tow truck and not during a routine traffic stop. Stute argues that other indicia of impairment,
12
such as driving conduct, are not present here. He also contends that “it was reasonable” for
Stute “to pull up behind [the deputy’s] squad car and be confused how to advance.” While
Stute correctly recites the undisputed facts, Stute’s arguments do not alter our legal
analysis.
Although a driver’s suspicious behavior might be explained by another cause, such
as a minor distraction, “reasonable suspicion ‘need not rule out the possibility of innocent
conduct.’” Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 403 (2014) (quoting United States v.
Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002)). Even if we assume that Stute was confused about the
squad car’s position in the roadway, it merely explains why Stute stopped behind the squad
car rather than going around it. And while the deputy did not observe Stute’s driving
behavior before Stute stopped the SUV, this does not undercut the deputy’s observations
that Stute showed signs of impairment when they first spoke.
Because reasonable suspicion of impairment requires that law enforcement detect
at least one objective sign of impairment and the deputy observed more than one sign of
Stute’s impairment during their initial encounter, we conclude that the deputy reasonably
suspected that Stute was an impaired driver. Thus, the deputy made a lawful request for
Stute to exit the SUV for field sobriety testing.
II. The d eputy’s act of opening Stute’s SUV door was an additional intrusion
justified by the deputy’s investigation of Stute’s impairment and his persistent
uncooperative conduct.

Stute argues that there must be a “very particularized justification” for law
enforcement to open a car door and that the deputy’s observation of “possible signs of
impairment” did not meet this standard. Stute cites federal caselaw upholding the
13
reasonableness of a law-enforcement officer opening a car door for various reasons. See,
e.g., United States v. Meredith, 480 F.3d 366, 371 (5th Cir. 2007) (officer opened vehicle
door to visually inspect a driver who claimed to be physically unable to exit the car); United
States v. Ryles, 988 F.2d 13, 15 (5th Cir. 1993) (officer opened vehicle door to determine
whether a passenger could lawfully drive the appellant’s car).
Stute concedes that an officer’s act of opening of a car door “has been found lawful
if there are enough facts to support a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” For
example, the United States Supreme Court had held that, during an investigative stop, law
enforcement may order a driver out of their car because the risk of the officer being
assaulted outweighs the driver’s liberty interest in remaining in their car. Pennsylvania v.
Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110-11 (1977). The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that there is
“little practical difference” between an officer ordering a driver out of their car and an
officer opening the car door and directing the driver to exit, because the same officer-safety
concern applies. State v. Ferrise, 269 N.W.2d 888, 890 (Minn. 1978).
An officer’s act of opening a car door, however, is an additional “intrusion” subject
to a reasonableness inquiry. See id. at 891.
4 Thus, an officer conducting a valid

4 Stute points out that no emergency-aid exception to the warrant requirement applies to
the deputy’s act of opening Stute’s SUV door. He suggests that, without the emergency-aid
exception, probable cause is required before law enforcement may open a car door. The
commissioner does not contend that the emergency-aid exception applies here.
Under the emergency -aid exception, an officer may open a car door if they
reasonably believe there is an ongoing emergency and they have some “reasonable basis,
approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with the area or place to be
searched.” Ries v. State, 920 N.W.2d 620, 632 (Minn. 2018) (quotation omitted); see
Overvig v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 730 N.W.2d 789, 792-93 (Minn. App. 2007) (applying
the emergency-aid exception to an implied- consent case), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 7,
14
investigative stop may open a car door if doing so is justified by (1) the original purpose
of the investigation, (2) independent probable cause, or (3) reasonableness. See Askerooth,
681 N.W.2d at 365.
Askerooth illustrates how to apply this reasonableness inquiry to a series of intrusive
steps during an investigative stop. Id. In that case, a law-enforcement officer stopped a
driver for failing to obey a stop sign. Id. at 356-57. The officer learned that Askerooth did
not have a license, asked Askerooth to exit his van, and conducted a pat search for weapons.
Id. at 357. The officer then confined Askerooth to the back of the squad car and later
charged Askerooth with drug possession based on drugs found in the squad car. Id. The
officer testified that Askerooth “was cooperative and did not do anything to arouse his
suspicion or lead him to believe” that Askerooth was dangerous. Id . at 358. The officer
also testified that he placed Askerooth in the squad car so he would not have to “go back
and forth between the vehicles” while verifying Askerooth’s identity. Id. at 365.
In reviewing the district court’s denial of Askerooth’s motion to suppress, the
supreme court reasoned that Askerooth’s confinement to the squad car could not be
justified by the original reason for the stop and lacked independent probable cause. Id.
When discussing the reasonableness of the additional intrusion, the supreme court held that
Askerooth’s liberty interest in being free from unreasonable seizures outweighed the
government’s nominal interest in “officer convenience.” Id. at 365-66. Accordingly, the

2007). We agree with the parties that the emergency-aid exception does not apply to the
deputy’s act of opening Stute’s SUV door.
15
supreme court concluded that confining Askerooth to the back of the squad car was
unreasonable and unconstitutional and reversed the conviction. Id. at 369-70.
Unlike the officer’s conduct in confining Askerooth to the squad car , the deputy’s
act of opening Stute’s SUV door was justified by the original purpose of the stop: to
investigate whether Stute was driving while impaired. After the deputy observed multiple
signs of intoxication, the deputy asked Stute to place his SUV in park and exit the SUV to
perform field sobriety tests. Stute then rolled up his window, kept his hands on the steering
wheel, and looked forward while the deputy repeated his requests. Stute asked the deputy,
“Why?” three times and did not turn the SUV off. The body-camera recording shows that
Stute made no effort to step outside even after the deputy asked Stute five times to exit the
SUV. As the district court explained, Stute “was uncooperative throughout [the deputy’s]
questions and requests .” Stute’s repeated refusal to cooperate with the deputy’s requests
that he exit the SUV and Stute’s lack of communication strengthened the deputy’s
“reasonable articulable suspicion that [Stute] was an impaired driver.”
After waiting 50 seconds for Stute to comply , the deputy opened the SUV door.
Because the deputy’s opening of Stute’s SUV door was tied to and justified by the deputy’s
request for Stute to exit and participate in field sobriety tests so that the deputy could
investigate Stute’s suspected impairment, we conclude that opening the SUV door was
reasonable and lawful. In short, the government’s interest in protecting public safety
outweighed Stute’s liberty interest in remaining in his SUV. See id. at 365. Consequently,
the additional intrusion of opening the SUV door was objectively reasonable under the
16
circumstances. See id. Therefore, the deputy lawfully opened Stute’s SUV door during the
investigative stop.
III. Based on these particular facts, the deputy’s act of grabbing Stute’s wrist was
reasonable.

According to Stute’s brief to this court, the body-camera recording shows that the
deputy “reach[ed] over” Stute, “grab[bed]” Stute’s right wrist, and “attempt[ed] to pull him
out of the vehicle.” Stute argues that the deputy unreasonably expanded the investigative
stop when he grabbed Stute’s wrist. He maintains that this additional intrusion made the
stop “intolerable in its intensity or scope” under Askerooth. Id. at 364 (quotation omitted).
The added intrusion of grabbing a driver’s wrist during an investigative stop is also
governed by reasonableness. See id. at 364- 65. To determine whether an officer used
unreasonable force to seize a defendant requires “a careful balancing of the nature and
quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the
countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396
(1989) (quotations omitted). An appellate court must consider the totality of the
circumstances, including “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an
immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether [the suspect is] actively
resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1985)). Reasonableness is assessed based on the objective perspective of
a reasonable officer on the scene, without perfect hindsight. Id.
As discussed, the deputy reasonably suspected that Stute was an impaired driver.
Stute did not comply with the deputy’s many requests that he exit the SUV, put it in park,
17
or turn off the ignition. Because Stute was stopped behind the deputy’s squad car at night
on a public road, Stute’s potential intoxication and refusal to comply with the DWI
investigation posed an immediate danger to himself and others.
The parties dispute the “nature and quality” of the additional intrusion imposed
when the deputy grabbed Stute’s wrist. Id. (quotation omitted). Stute contends that the
deputy grabbed his wrist and held onto it for “a long period of time.” Stute argues that the
deputy’s “primary purpose was to force [Stute] to perform standardized field sobriety
testing.”
The commissioner contends that the deputy’s actions amounted to “briefly
grasping” Stute’s wrist and that the deputy “grasped [Stute’s] wrist for approximately
11 seconds, and then released it without incident.” The commissioner notes that Stute
“exited the car himself” and argues that grabbing Stute’s wrist “was a minimally intrusive
means of furthering [the deputy’s] investigation” of driver impairment.
The district court found that the deputy “opened the door and attempted to help
[Stute] out of his car and [Stute] finally complied.” (Emphasis added.) But the district court
did not expressly determine whether the deputy’s act of grabbing Stute’s wrist was
reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.
Based on our review, the body-camera recording shows that the deputy grabbed
Stute’s wrist and held it for 13 seconds while repeatedly asking Stute to step out of the
SUV. The deputy then released Stute’s wrist, and Stute stepped out of the SUV on his own.
The record does not support Stute’s claim that the deputy pulled him from the SUV. Rather,
the record supports the district court’s inference that the deputy “attempted to help” Stute
18
exit the SUV. Thus, the district court’s findings are not clearly erroneous and support its
conclusion that the deputy sought to assist Stute when he grabbed his wrist.
We also conclude that the deputy’s act of briefly grabbing Stute’s wrist posed a
minimal intrusion on Stute’s liberty interests and that any intrusion is outweighed by the
government’s interest in investigating an uncooperative, potentially impaired driver. The
investigation of driver impairment is a “compelling” governmental interest. Bendorf v.
Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 727 N.W.2d 410, 417 (Minn. 2007). Impaired drivers pose a
“severe threat” to the public. Heddan v. Dirkswager, 336 N.W.2d 54, 63 (Minn. 1983).
To summarize our decision, the deputy conducted an investigative stop when he
questioned Stute and asked him to exit the SUV to perform field sobriety testing.
Reasonable suspicion of Stute’s impairment supported the deputy’s request for Stute to exit
the SUV. The deputy’s act of opening Stute’s SUV door was reasonable and justified by
the deputy’s DWI investigation and Stute’s repeated refusal to comply with the deputy’s
request that he exit the SUV. And finally, the deputy’s act of grabbing Stute’s wrist was
reasonable under the circumstances because it facilitated Stute’s exit from the SUV . For
all of these reasons, the district court did not err when it sustained Stute’s license
revocation.
Affirmed.