Ronald A. Hagle, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0526

Ronald A. Hagle,
Appellant,

vs.

Gossett Properties LLC, et al.,
Respondents,

John Doe, et al.,
Defendants.

Filed March 31, 2025
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Sherburne County District Court
File No. 71-CV-21-576

Ronald A. Hagle, Forest Lake, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Jevon C. Bindman, Jonathan R. Septer, Emily A. Liebman, Maslon LLP, Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for respondents)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Bratvold, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Appellant Ronald A. Hagle appeals from the district court’s judgment on remand
dismissing Hagle’s complaint challenging the termination of his contract for deed. On
remand, the question before the district court was whether respondent Gossett Properties
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LLC had properly served Hagle with a notice of termination of contract for deed by
substitute service at Hagle’s usual place of abode. Hagle v. Gossett Properties LLC, No.
A22-0135, 2022 WL 17086660, at *7 (Minn. App. Nov. 21, 2022). Because the district
court did not clearly err by finding that the home at which service was made was Hagle’s
usual place of abode and properly determined that, as a result, Hagle’s contract for deed
was legally terminated and dismissal of Hagle’s claim was appropriate, we affirm.
FACTS
We recited the facts of this case in more detail in Hagle’s prior appeal. Id. at *1-3.
Here, we identify only those facts that are relevant to this appeal.
In 2007, Hagle entered into a contract for deed to purchase real property in
Sherburne County from seller Prism Real Estate Inc. As part of the contract for deed, Hagle
agreed to assume two promissory notes, pay off the remainder of the purchase price over
the next year, and pay taxes and assessments on the property. Hagle did not record the
contract for deed, as required by statute. See Minn. Stat. § 507.235, subd. 1 (2024 )
(requiring vendee to record their interest in contract for deed).
In March 2019, Gossett Properties obtained a quitclaim deed to the property and
recorded the deed. The owners of Gossett Properties later asserted in a joint affidavit filed
in the district court as part of this proceeding that they had been told before purchasing the
property that Hagle’s “unrecorded contract for deed either did not exist, had been
terminated, or was abandoned.”
In April 2021, Gossett Properties prepared a notice of termination of Hagle’s
contract for deed on the ground that Hagle was in default for failing to make all the
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payments required under the contract for deed. See Minn. Stat. § 559.21, subd. 2a (2024)
(allowing termination of real-estate contract upon purchaser’s default). The notice provided
Hagle with 60 days to cure the default, as required by statute. See id.
On April 29, 2021, a process server executed an affidavit stating that she served the
notice of termination that afternoon “by handing to and leaving with Jane Doe, mother, a
person of suitable age and discretion then and there residing at . . . the usual abode of
[Hagle].” And, in a handwritten postservice note, the process server stated, “Lady came to
window. Said Ron wasn’t home. I asked if she lived there. She said yes, she was Ron’s
mother. I said I could leave with her. She said I ain’t taking anything. Leave in front
d[oo]r.” It is uncontested that the woman upon whom service was made was Andree
McNeill, Hagle’s mother-in-law.
In June 2021, Hagle filed a complaint against Gossett Properties and one of its
owners, Erika Gossett (collectively, Gossett), alleging, in relevant part, that the notice of
termination was not properly served. Additionally, Hagle filed two affidavits, one from
himself and one from McNeill. In his affidavit, Hagle stated that he and McNeill lived in
“separate living units” and that McNeill live d on the upper level of the split- level home
while Hagle and his wife, Tara Hagle, live d on the lower level. Hagle stated that his
“residence ha[d] separate entrances through the garage or through a backdoor that open[ed]
to the stairs down to where [he] live[d].”
McNeill, in her affidavit, provided a similar description of the home. McNeill also
described her discussion with the process server, stating: “I told [the process server that]
Ronald Hagle lives downstairs and if the garage door was open, she should go knock on
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his door, if not she should go around the back and knock on the back door that provided
access to his downstairs living unit.”
On June 29, 2021, the notice of termination, the affidavit of service, and an affidavit
from Gossett’s attorney averring that Hagle failed to cure the default within 60 days of
service of the notice of termination were recorded with the county recorder. Gossett then
moved the district court to dismiss Hagle’s action pursuant to Minnesota Rule of Civil
Procedure 12.02(e) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, arguing
that Hagle’s claim of improper service of the notice of termination was meritless and that
the contract for deed was terminated when Hagle did not cure the default within 60 days.
The district court held a hearing on Gossett’s motion to dismiss, after which Hagle
and Gossett both submitted additional evidence and memoranda of law. Hagle submitted
photos of the home showing a separate mailbox behind the property near the back door and
his and his wife’s names below the back door’s doorbell.
The district court granted Gossett’s motion and dismissed Hagle’s action. Taking
into account the parties’ submissions beyond the complaint, the district court determined
that the notice of termination was properly served on Hagle and that Hagle had failed to
show that he cured the claimed default within 60 days of service. It concluded that, because
Hagle did not cure the default or obtain an injunction to suspend the termination, the
contract for deed was terminated along with all rights that it conferred.
On appeal, we treated the district court’s grant of Gossett’s motion to dismiss as a
grant of summary judgment. Hagle, 2022 WL 17086660, at *3. We concluded that, based
on the undisputed evidence, the district court did not err by determining that McNeill was
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of suitable age and discretion for substitute service. Id. at *6. But we also concluded that
there was a genuine issue of material fact about whether service occurred at Hagle’s usual
place of abode. Id. We questioned whether the separate entrances to the home indicated
that there were two separate residences and noted that the district court’s reliance on the
zoning of the home as a single-family residence “does not foreclose the possibility that
Hagle and McNeill actually maintain[ed] two residences.” Id. at *5. We remanded to the
district court, stating: “On remand, the district court shall make the findings of fact
concerning Hagle’s residence that are necessary to determine whether he was properly
served with the notice of termination by substituted service at his ‘usual place of abode.’”
Id. at *7.
Following remand, the district court held a review hearing and clarified that the
immediate issue before it was whether Hagle was properly served with the notice of
termination. The district court permitted both parties to submit additional evidence on that
issue, which they did. Hagle’s filings, which included a supplemental affidavit from
McNeill, asserted that he and McNeill lived separately, as evidenced by there being two
separate sets of rooms and appliances in the home, including washing machines , dryers,
refrigerators, dishwashers, kitchens, and storage areas.
Thereafter, the district court filed an order regarding the issue of service. The district
court found that, although the home is divided internally between Hagle and McNeill, the
record—specifically, zoning records, county records, property tax statements, the deed, the
mortgage, Hagle’s filings with the district court, and the process server’s reasonable
observations that the home was a single-family residence— supported finding that McNeill
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and Tara Hagle co-owned the entire property and, therefore, McNeill and Hagle shared a
usual place of abode. Accordingly, the district court determined that the substitute service
on McNeill was effective on Hagle and, as a result, Hagle’s contract for deed was legally
terminated.
Following some additional arguments from the parties, the district court filed an
order reinstating its prior judgment of dismissal and judgment was entered accordingly.
Hagle appeals.
DECISION
Hagle makes two arguments related to service of the notice of termination. 1 First,
Hagle argues that the district court erred when it determined that substitute service on
McNeill was proper despite there being evidence in the record indicating that Hagle and
McNeill maintained separate residences. Second, Hagle argues that the district court erred
by relying on tenancy in common to conclude that McNeill had access to Hagle’s residence
because, Hagle asserts, co-tenants maintain the right to divide a property into two separate
abodes. Additionally, as part of his second argument, Hagle asserts that the district court

1 Hagle makes additional arguments on appeal that are unrelated to service of the notice of
termination. Appellate courts generally do not address issues that were not considered or
decided by the district court. Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (“A
reviewing court must generally consider only those issues that the record shows were
presented and considered by the trial court in deciding the matter before it.” (quotation
omitted)); see also Singelman v. St. Francis Med. Ctr., 777 N.W.2d 540, 543 (Minn. App.
2010) (“This court generally does not address issues presented in but not decided by the
district court.” (quotation omitted)). Because, consistent with our instructions, the district
court on remand considered and decided only whether Hagle was properly served with the
notice of termination by substitute service at his usual place of abode, we decline to address
Hagle’s other arguments.

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violated his due-process rights by relying on tenancy in common when neither party had
briefed the issue and by not addressing Hagle’s subsequent filings challenging the district
court’s reliance on tenancy in common.
As we noted in Hagle’s previous appeal, notice of termination of a contract for deed
“must be served within the state in the same manner as a summons in the district court.”
Minn. Stat. § 559.21, subd. 4(a) (202 4); Hagle, 2022 WL 17086660 at *3. Accordingly,
Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 4 and caselaw interpreting that rule govern whether the
notice of termination was properly served on Hagle.
Rule 4 allows for a summons to be served on a natural person “by leaving a copy at
the individual’s usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion then
residing therein.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.03(a). This is commonly referred to as “substitute
service.” Jaeger v. Palladium Holdings, LLC, 884 N.W.2d 601, 6 04-05 (Minn. 2016).
“Usual place of abode” refers to “the place where the [individual] is actually living at the
time when service is made.” Berryhill v. Sepp, 119 N.W. 404, 405 (Minn. 1909).
“Whether service of process is effective presents a question of law,” which appellate
courts review de novo, but an individual’s residency, including the identification of a usual
place of abode, presents a question of fact. Jaeger , 884 N.W.2d at 606-07. “[W]hen
reviewing whether substitute service is effective, [appellate courts] must defer to the
district court’s factual findings on the residency of the individual served unless they are
clearly erroneous.” Id. at 607. “It is not the province of [an appellate court] to reconcile
conflicting evidence.” Fletcher v. St. Paul Pioneer Press , 589 N.W.2d 96, 101 (Minn.
1999) (quotation omitted). “Findings of fact are clearly erroneous only if the reviewing
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court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. ” Id.
(quotation omitted).
A. The district court’s factual findings that McNeill and Hagle shared a
usual place of abode are not clearly erroneous.

Hagle argues that the district court erred because the affidavit from McNeill stating
that she had told the process server that Hagle lived downstairs, combined with the photos
of the back door and mailbox, make clear that Hagle and McNeill maintained separate
residences. Hagle also challenges the district court’s finding that the process server
observed that the home was a single-family residence because there is no such statement
from the process server in the record.
Gossett asserts that the district court’s decision is not clearly erroneous because it is
supported by the documents in the record and Hagle’s own representations in his court
filings, which list the home’s address without indicating that Hagle lived in a specific unit
inside the home. Gossett also contends that, to the extent that the district court’s conclusion
relied on its finding about the process server’s observations, the district court did not clearly
err by making that finding because evidence in the record supports that the indications of
separate residences within the home, including Hagle’s mailbox and doorbell, were at the
back of the property and would not have been visible to the process server.
The district court’s finding that the property was a single-family residence co-owned
by McNeill and Tara Hagle is based on zoning records, county records, property tax
statements, the deed, and the mortgage. As we stated in Hagle’s previous appeal, such
documents do not necessarily foreclose the possibility that Hagle and McNeill maintained
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separate residences. Hagle, 2022 WL 17086660, at *5. But, when considered in
combination with Hagle’s own filings— which Hagle does not contest list the address of
the property without specifying any unit therein—and the process server’s observations,
the district court’s finding is not clearly erroneous.
Hagle is correct that the district court did not have a statement from the process
server describing their observations of the home. However, the process server’s postservice
note and the photos in the record support that the process server approached the front door
of the property and would not have been able to determine, based on observations alone,
that the home was divided internally because Hagle’s separate mailbox and door were at
the back of the property and not visible from the front. And, while McNeill submitted an
affidavit as part of this proceeding stating that she had informed the process server that
Hagle lived downstairs in a separate residence, the existence of that affidavit does not make
the district court’s finding about the process server’s observations clearly erroneous
because other facts in the record, namely, the process server’s postservice note, describe
the conversation between McNeill and the process server and do not describe McNeill as
making those statements.
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court’s findings that McNeill co-owned
the single-family residence with Tara Hagle, and therefore shared Hagle’s usual place of
abode, are supported by the record and are not clearly erroneous. See Fletcher, 589 N.W.2d
at 101.
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B. The district court’s discussion of tenancy in common is not erroneous or
a violation of Hagle’s due-process rights.

After determining that substitute service was effective on Hagle, the district court
stated:
Lastly, Minnesota real estate law provides that a tenant
in common shares a common right to possess the entire interest
of the property. A tenant in common may not exclude a
cotenant. Therefore, we find that, despite any informal
agreement between the parties, Ms. McNeill and Tara Hagle
both have access to all parts of a building that they co-own in
the entirety, and neither may exclude the other.
(Citations omitted.)
First, Hagle argues that the district court erred by deciding that Tara Hagle and
McNeill were tenants in common and, thus, substitute service on McNeill was proper.
Hagle asserts that co-owners may still enter into an implied contract with one another to
divide the property and that that was the case here. Gossett asserts that the district court did
not rely on tenancy in common in reaching its conclusion but, instead, referenced it for
purposes of illustration and that the district court’s finding that Hagle and McNeill share a
single abode is supported by the evidence, including “the deed, mortgage, county records,
property tax statements, zoning records, mailbox placement, and [Hagle’s] representations
in court filings.”
Gossett’s argument is persuasive. The district court had already made its factual
findings and determined that the building was a single-family residence co-owned by Tara
Hagle and McNeill before it discussed tenancy in common. Because the findings of fact
are not clearly erroneous and the discussion of tenancy in common does not undermine the
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factual findings, the district court did not err in determining that McNeill and Hagle shared
a usual place of abode.
Second, Hagle argues that, because neither party filed memoranda in the district
court on the issue of tenancy in common, the district court’s reliance on tenancy in common
in its order and its failure to address Hagle’s subsequent filings challenging the district
court’s use of tenancy in common in its reasoning was a violation of Hagle’s due-process
rights.
An individual’s due-process rights are guaranteed by the United States and
Minnesota Constitutions. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Minn. Const. art. I, § 7. “Generally,
due process requires adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. But
adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard are flexible concepts depending
on the circumstances.” Staeheli v. City of St. Paul, 732 N.W.2d 298, 304 (Minn. App. 2007)
(citation omitted). We review whether a party’s procedural due-process rights were
violated de novo. Id.
Here, the district court held a review hearing , which Hagle attended; it accepted
several filings from Hagle on the issue of service of process; and it ultimately filed its order
determining that service was proper, which addressed Hagle’s filings and arguments. Given
that the district court’s finding that McNeill and Hagle shared an abode does not turn on
its tenancy-in-common analysis, Hagle was not deprived of a meaningful opportunity to be
heard when the district court referenced tenancy in common in its order. Accordingly, we
determine that there was no violation of due process by the district court.
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In conclusion, because the district court did not clearly err by finding that substitute
service of the notice of termination was made at Hagle’s usual place of abode and did not
err or violate Hagle’s due-process rights by discussing tenancy in common in its order, we
affirm the district court’s order dismissing Hagle’s claims.
Affirmed.