State of Minnesota, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0544

State of Minnesota,
Appellant,

vs.

Jesse Travis White,
Respondent.

Filed September 30, 2024
Reversed and remanded
Halbrooks, Judge *

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-23-7315

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Kacy Wothe, S enior Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Robert M. Paule, Robert M. Paule, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Segal , Chief Judge; and
Halbrooks, Judge .

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
HALBROOKS, Judge
In this pretrial appeal, the state argues that the district court erred by granting
respondent’s motion to suppress evidence obtained in a warrantless vehicle search.
Because we conclude that police had probable cause to conduct the warrantless search, we
reverse and remand.
FACTS
On the evening of March 22, 2023, law enforcement officers with the Minneapolis
Police Department and the Hennepin County Sheriff’s Office were working on a “focused
enforcement detail” in the city of Minneapolis to address ongoing gun violence and drug
crime in the area. An officer described this program as an effort between the police
department and other agencies, including the sheriff’s office, to “target . . . high crime
areas.”
Two officers testified at the suppression hearing about the events giving rise to
respondent Jesse Travis White’s arrest. Officer Spies has been in law enforcement for 20
years. He is currently a police officer with the Minneapolis Police Department Community
Response Team. Among other things, the response team investigates narcotics complaints
and “target[s] higher crime areas known for narcotics dealing and gunfire.” Officer Spies
has been involved in hundreds of drug- related cases. He testified that he has witnessed
thousands of hand-to-hand transactions over his career. Detective Wong is an officer with
the Violent Offender Task Force of the Hennepin County Sheriff’s Office.
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Detective Wong and his partner were patrolling an area near First Avenue North in
downtown Minneapolis that evening and drove by a parking lot. He knew, based on his
experience, that this lot was “a high drug and crime area lot.” Detective Wong testified
that he had been involved in “several arrests in that parking lot involving narcotics and
firearms.” As he drove by, he saw a vehicle with its lights on backed into a parking spot
near the exit. Detective Wong stated that this vehicle “drew [his] attention” because it was
the only vehicle backed into a parking space in that lot with its lights on. Detective Wong
relayed the vehicle’s license plate number to dispatch and learned that the vehicle belonged
to White, whom he recognized sitting in the driver’s seat.
Detective Wong testified that he was familiar with White because he had received
information on “[m]ultiple occasions” over the course of six months about White’s alleged
illegal activities. Specifically, a confidential informant (CI) had told Detective Wong that
he had seen White use and sell “large amounts” of methamphetamine. Detective Wong
described the CI as someone who had “provided information about several criminals,
people that were engaged in narcotics use or sales, or weapons carrying or sales.” Detective
Wong testified that the CI had a signed contract with the Violent Offender Task Force and
that he had been able to verify information provided by the CI “[m]ultiple times,” leading
to three arrests and the discovery of contraband including drugs and guns. Detective
Wong’s most recent contact with the CI regarding White’s activities was one month before
the night of White’s arrest.
Based on the CI’s reports and his own observations, Detective Wong believed that
White was conducting narcotics activities out of his parked vehicle. Detective Wong asked
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Officer Spies to begin monitoring this area through the Milestone City Surveillance
System.1 Detective Wong then parked his squad vehicle a block or two away to await more
information from Officer Spies.
Officer Spies was located in a precinct office in Minneapolis and remotely viewed
the surveillance camera from this office . Officer Spies testified that he was familiar with
this area of the city because it was “in the heart of the downtown entertainment district”
and that “surface lots are commonly used in this area for people that sell narcotics, and they
tend to target people that are in the city . . . looking to enhance their time while under the
influence of a controlled substance.” Officer Spies considered it unusual that White was
parked in his vehicle with its headlights on for “an extended period of time” and noted that
this behavior was common in drug- transaction cases because it allowed the driver to
monitor foot traffic.
Officer Spies testified that he observed White accessing the center console and then
holding an object that the officer stated was “consistent with a digital scale that someone
may use to weigh narcotics.” About ten minutes later, two people got into a truck that was
parked two spaces away from White. The male driver then got out of the truck and
approached White’s vehicle on the passenger side. The man leaned into the open window
in such a way that his head and upper portion of his body, including his hands, were inside

1 According to Officer Spies, “[t]he Milestone [camera system] is a digital platform that is
run by the City of Minneapolis where it has cameras throughout the city. A lot of the
cameras have . . . [a] handheld zoom function where you can move the camera and zoom
in or pan out.” Of ficers can access these cameras through the Milestone system. Officer
Spies was able to maneuver the camera from his location in the police department precinct.
5
White’s vehicle. White bent down toward the center of the vehicle so that his head was
almost below the dash, which suggested to the officer that White was “accessing the center
console and weighing out a specific quantity of narcotics.” After approximately one
minute, Officer Spies stated that the man tucked something into his right pocket, walked
back to his own vehicle, and drove off . Officer Spies acknowledged that he could not see
White pass a specific item to the man but, based on his training and experience, he believed
that he had witnessed a hand -to-hand drug transaction.
Officer Spies relayed these details to Detective Wong. B ased on the information
from the CI, Officer Spies’s observations through the surveillance cameras, and his own
observations, Detective Wong believed that he had probable cause to search White’s
vehicle. He and his partner approached the vehicle, conducted a search, and found drugs
in the front seat of the vehicle, including a plastic bag containing methamphetamine and
fentanyl.
Appellant State of Minnesota charged White with one count of first -degree sale of
methamphetamine, under Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 1(1) (2022), and one count of
second-degree sale of fentanyl, under Minn. Stat. § 152.022, subd. 1(1) (2022). White
moved to suppress evidence of the drugs. He asserted that suppression was warranted
because the initial search and seizure of his vehicle was not supported by probable cause.
The district court held an evidentiary hearing at which the state presented testimon y from
Detective Wong and Officer Spies as well as the Milestone camera footage from this
incident. The district court granted White’s suppression motion.
This appeal follows.
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DECISION
I. Critical Impact
The state’s ability to appeal in a criminal case is limited. State v. Lugo, 887 N.W.2d
476, 481 (Minn. 2016). In the case of a pretrial order, the state must establish that, unless
the district court ’s ruling is reversed, the alleged error will have a “critical impact” on the
outcome of the trial. State v. Trei, 624 N.W.2d 595, 597 (Minn. App. 2001), rev. dismissed
(Minn. June 22, 2001) . Critical impact exists “where the lack of the suppressed evidence
significantly reduces the likelihood of a successful prosecution.” State v. Ault, 478 N.W.2d
797, 799 (Minn. App. 1991) (quotation omitted). Because the suppression of the state’s
evidence related to the controlled substances meets this requirement , we consider whether
the district court’s suppression order was erroneous.
II. Suppression of Evidence
When reviewing a district court’s pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence,
an appellate court “may independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law,
whether the district court erred in suppressing—or not suppressing—the evidence.” State
v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 98 (Minn. 1999). An appellate court reviews de novo the legal
issue of whether a search was justified and reviews findings of fact for clear error.
State v. Burbach, 706 N.W.2d 484, 487 (Minn. 2005). Where the facts are undisputed, as
they are here, “[an appellate court’s] review is entirely de novo.” Id.
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee the right of the people to
be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const.
art. I, § 10. This guarantee extends to the right of people to be secure in their vehicles.
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See, e.g., Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40 (1984); State v. Britton, 604 N.W.2d
84, 87 (Minn. 2000). Warrantless searches and seizures are unreasonable unless a
recognized exception to the warrant requirement applies. State v. Ortega, 770 N.W.2d 145,
149 (Minn. 2009).
One such exception permits a police officer to search a vehicle without a warrant if
there is “probable cause to believe the search will result in a discovery of evidence or
contraband.” State v. Lester , 874 N.W.2d 768, 771 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted).
Probable cause “ exists when there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a
crime will be found in a particular place.” State v. Torgerson, 995 N.W.2d 164, 169 (Minn.
2023) (quotation omitted). “This is a common-sense, nontechnical concept that involves
the factual and practical con siderations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent
people, not legal technicians, act.” Id. (quotations omitted).
Determining whether probable cause exists is an “objective inquiry that depends on
the totality of the circumstances in each case.” Id. (quotations omitted). In a totality-of-
the-circumstances analysis, “courts do not examine the ‘bits and pieces of a probable cause
showing in isolation,’” but instead must consider them in their entirety. State v. Lieberg ,
553 N.W.2d 51, 55 (Minn. App. 1996) ( quotation omitted). “[A] collection of pieces of
information that would not be substantial alone can combine to create sufficient probable
cause.” State v. Jones, 678 N.W.2d 1, 11 (Minn. 2004). This evaluation, moreover, may
be based on “reasonable inferences that police officers draw from facts, based on their
training and experience, because police officers may interpret circumstances differently
than untrained persons. Lester, 874 N.W.2d at 771. Accordingly, in reviewing a probable-
8
cause determination, “ an appellate court must give due weight to reasonable inferences
drawn by police officers and to a district court ’s finding that the officer was credible and
the inference was reasonable.” Id. (quotations omitted).
Here, based on prior observations, Detective Wong recognized White as the driver
of a vehicle parked in an area known for drug activity. Detective Wong observed that
White was backed into a space in a parking lot with his lights on for over 20 minutes — a
behavior that the detective identified as being associated with drug sales based on his
training and experience. See State v. Smith, 476 N.W.2d 511, 517 (Minn. 1991) (holding
that an officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant when “the location and
defendant’s conduct were consistent with [drug] dealing”). Additionally, Officer Spies
observed what he believed was a hand -to-hand transaction through the window of White’s
vehicle, after which the other man concealed something in his jacket pocket, wal ked back
to his own vehicle , and drove off. Officer Spies testified that this conduct was also
consistent with a narcotics sale.
In concluding that these circumstances did not establish probable cause for a search
of White’s vehicle, t he district court credited Officer Spies’s testimony that he believed
that he saw a hand-to-hand drug transaction but concluded that the officer “did not actually
observe two hands meeting,” which suggested that there could have been an innocent
explanation for White’s conduct. The district court acknowledged that White and the other
man “may have exchanged an item,” but concluded that “there is not probable cause to
believe that item [was] contraband.” T he state argues —and we agree —that the district
9
court erred by determining that the possibility of innocent conduct defeated probable cause
for a search of White’s vehicle.
This court’s decision in State v. Hawkins, 622 N.W.2d 576 (Minn. App. 2001) , is
instructive on this point. There, the defendant was arrested after an officer saw him riding
a bike in an area for about 15 minutes, waving at vehicles, and engaging in hand -to-hand
exchanges that the officer deemed consistent with drug transactions. Id. at 578. The district
court determined that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest Hawkins because his
conduct “could have been perfectly benign.” Id. We reversed on appeal, concluding that
the circumstances were sufficient to permit the reasonable belief that Hawkins was engaged
in drug sales. Id. at 581. In reaching this decision, the Hawkins court reasoned:
In explaining its conclusion that there was not probable cause
to arrest Hawkins, the district court stated that Hawkins ’s
conduct “could have been perfectly benign.” The court also
stated that “making ‘hand to hand exchanges,’ without more,
does not necessarily mean that [ he] was engaging in illegal
activities.” This explanation demonstrates that the district
court applied the wrong standard for determining whether there
was probable cause to arrest Hawkins and by doing so, required
a greater showing than was needed to establish probable cause.
The fact that there might have been an innocent explanation for
Hawkins’s conduct does not demonstrate that the officers
could not reasonably believe that Hawkins had committed a
crime.
Id. at 580.
We noted that, when assessing probable cause, the ultimate question “is not whether
there is some hypothesis of innocence which is reasonably consistent with the
circumstances shown ,” which is more appropriate “to the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’
standard used on the merits.” Id. Instead, a probable -cause determination requires “far
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less evidence.” Id. (quotation omitted). Here, the district court erred in its legal analysis
by applying a higher standard of proof than is required when determining whether the
officers’ observations and inferences —which the district court credited —supported a
finding of probable cause. As Hawkins instructs, the possibility of an innocent explanation
does not necessarily preclude a finding of probable cause. 622 N.W.2d at 580-81; see also
State v. Martinson, 581 N.W.2d 846, 852 (Minn. 1998) (noting that , while each factor was
consistent with innocent behavior, factors taken together justified reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity); State v. Anderson, 439 N.W.2d 422, 426 (Minn. App. 1989)
(determining that an officer’s observation of apparently innocent acts can be significant to
a trained officer and the officer is entitled to assess probable cause in light of that
experience), rev. denied (Minn. June 21, 1989).
We also disagree with the district court’s conclusion that the information provided
by the CI—that he had personally observed White selling methamphetamine in the past —
was “not sufficient, when combined with the totality of circumstances available to the
officers on March 22, 2023, to create a fair probability that Mr. White was selling drugs
and that evidence of this crime would be found in his car.”
Generally speaking, an evaluation of probable cause includes consideration of “the
‘veracity’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ of persons supplying hearsay information. ”
State v. McCloskey, 453 N.W.2d 700, 702 (Minn. 1990) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.
213, 238 (1983) ). To this end, an informant who ha s an established track record of
providing reliable information in the past is generally considered reliable for purposes of
determining probable cause. State v. Mosley, 994 N.W.2d 883, 890-92 (Minn. 2023). And
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when the information provided is based on the informant’s personal observations rather
than hearsay, “corroboration of minor details is enough to ‘lend credence’ to an informant’s
tip.” Id. at 892 (quoting State v. Wiley, 366 N.W.2d 265, 269 (Minn. 1985) ).
Here, Officer Wong’s testimony established both that the CI had a record of
reliability and that his information concerning White was based on personal observation.
In addition, as the district court found, the observation of a suspected hand -to-hand
transaction corroborated generally “that Mr. White sells drugs.” Although we agree that
this tip is insufficient to independently establish probable cause for a search of the vehicle
because it does not directly relate to White’s conduct in the parking lot , we conclude that
it is sufficiently reliable to be considered in examining the reasonableness of Officer
Wong’s inferences regarding that conduct . In light of the fact that White was credibly
connected to prior drug sales, the officers’ observations of a continuous series of behaviors
that were each consistent with a current drug sale were collectively adequate “to permit a
prudent person to reasonably believe ” that White was in fact engaged in the sale of drugs.
Hawkins, 622 N.W.2d at 581.
We are therefore satisfied that the totality of the circumstances, including the tip
from the CI and all the direct observations of the officers, were sufficient to establish “a
fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime” would be found in White’s vehicle.
Torgerson, 995 N.W.2d at 169 (quotation omitted) . Because the search of White’s vehicle
was supported by probable case, the district court erred in suppressing the evidence
discovered pursuant to that search.
Reversed and remanded.