State of Minnesota, Respondent,

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0555

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Dylan Stephen Gaul,
Appellant.

Filed February 3, 2025
Affirmed
Harris, Judge

Steele County District Court
File No. 74-CR-22-1882

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Robert J. Jarrett, Steele County Attorney, Connor B. Burton, Assistant County Attorney,
Owatonna, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Gina D. Schulz, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Harris,
Judge.
SYLLABUS
A criminal defendant does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in emails
knowingly sent to a student’s school-owned email account and received on a public
school’s server.

2
OPINION
HARRIS, Judge
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Dylan Stephen Gaul with fourth-
degree criminal sexual conduct based on emails Gaul exchanged with a 14-year-old public-
school student. Gaul filed a motion to suppress the evidence against him. Gaul argued that
the emails he sent to the student’s school- owned email account were subject to an
unconstitutional, warrantless search by the school when it used protective software to scan
the emails. In support of this argument, he asserts that he had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in email communications under the federal and state constitutions. After a
contested omnibus hearing, the district court denied his motion. Gaul stipulated to the
state’s case to obtain review of the pretrial ruling, and the district court found him guilty
of fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct. On appeal, Gaul argues that his conviction must
be reversed because (1) the district court’s finding that the search occurred after his emails
arrived on the school server was clearly erroneous, and (2) he had a reasonable expectation
of privacy in his email communications. Because we conclude that appellant did not have
a reasonable expectation of privacy in email communications addressed to a student’s
school-owned email account and received on a public school’s server, we affirm.
FACTS
The Owatonna School District is a public school district located in southern
Minnesota. The school district provides its students with an email account and an
associated email address to use while enrolled. Each email address issued by the school
3
district ends in “isd761.org.” Each student email account is hosted by Google servers. 1
The school district also uses a separate application called Bark that works in conjunction
with the Google servers to screen emails going to-and-from the students’ school- owned
email accounts. Its purpose is to monitor content indicating self-harm, violence, bullying,
sexual contact or content, or drugs. When Bark detects this type of content, it sends an
alert to the school’s information technology (IT) department along with a copy of the
alarming material. The software can also label certain alerts as “severe.” While Bark can
view everything, it alerts IT only when it detects concerning content in students’ email
accounts. IT will then forward the material to the school resource officer (SRO) for further
investigation.
In November 2022, the school’s IT department alerted the SRO that a 14-year-old
female student was exchanging emails of a sexual nature with an external email address.
After reviewing the correspondence, the SRO found that the communications were not only
sexual in nature, but also referred to drug exchanges. And after further investigation, the
SRO determined that the external email address was associated with Gaul, a former
Owatonna High School Student.
2 The SRO applied for a search warrant for Gaul’s
residence, phone, and person. 3 At a contested omnibus hearing, the SRO agreed that he

1 Google servers is an email-hosting service that provides server space to operate and
manage email accounts.
2 The SRO testified at a contested omnibus hearing that when he was initially contacted,
he was given some information about the external email address, including the screen name
associated with it. When the SRO conducted an internet search for the screen name, it
brought him to a YouTube page that included photos of Gaul, whom he recognized.
3 The search warrant was never executed because Gaul was arrested outside his residence.
But the SRO applied for and executed a second warrant for a search of Gaul’s phone.
4
would not have investigated Gaul but for the alert from IT. In a statement to the police,
Gaul admitted that he had communicated with the student and discussed exchanging THC
cartridges and vape pens for sex.4 Based on this evidence, the state charged Gaul with two
counts of criminal sexual conduct under Minnesota Statutes section 609.344,
subdivision 1a(b) and 609.345, subdivision 1a(b) (2022).
Gaul filed a motion to suppress all evidence and dismiss the criminal charges,
arguing that the school district’s use of the Bark software to screen his emails amounted to
an unlawful search while in transit and prior to delivery in the student’s inbox. 5 At a
contested omnibus hearing, Gaul called the school district’s IT director as a witness. The
IT director testified generally about the software applications, such as Google and Bark,
that the school district uses. Regarding when the search of the email occurred, the
following exchange was had:
GAUL’S ATTORNEY: And so it view -- it reviews the
electronic content of every e-mail sent to student e-mail
address, but then it only provides you an alert to look at
something with certain things then?

M.H.: Correct.

GAUL’S ATTORNEY: And does Bark read the e-mails prior
to the e-mail landing in the student’s actual account, or does it
do it once the e-mail’s physically in the account?

M.H.: That’s a good question. I don’t know that I’ve got an
answer that I could give you at this time.

4 The 14-year-old student also gave a statement that she and Gaul communicated to arrange
sexual favors for THC cartridges and vape pens mostly through email.
5 Minn. Stat. § 609.352, subd. 2(a)(1); Minn. Stat. § 609.324, subd. 1(b)(2) (2022).
5
GAUL’S ATTORNEY: So it is – it’s possible then that Bark
is screening each e-mail prior to it actually hitting the student’s
e-mail drive or account I should say?

M.H.: It’s not – it’s not impossible. I don't know. My answer
to that is I don’t know.

During cross-examination, the IT director agreed that outgoing emails from students
contain a disclaimer indicating that the email account and its contents are managed by the
Owatonna School District and subject to the district’s policies. Students are also made
aware that school policy limitations—such as discussing the sale or purchase of drugs and
acts of a sexual nature—apply to their student email accounts.
The district court denied Gaul’s motion to suppress, finding that “[t]he messages
arrived at the server before the software initiated a search” and, therefore, Gaul had no
reasonable expectation of privacy. Gaul waived his right to a jury trial and stipulated to
the prosecution’s case under Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.01, subdivision 4,
preserving his suppression issue for appellate review. The state dismissed all charges but
fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct and agreed that the pretrial issue was dispositive.
The district court found Gaul guilty.
Gaul appeals.
ISSUES
I. Did the district court clearly err by finding that the search of Gaul’s emails occurred
after the emails were delivered?

II. Did Gaul have a reasonable expectation of privacy or property interest in emails
sent to a student’s school-owned email account and received on a public school’s
server?

6
ANALYSIS
I. The district court did not clearly err by finding that the search of Gaul’s emails
occurred after they were received on the school district’s server.

Gaul argues that the district court clearly erred in finding that the search of his
emails occurred after they reached the school district’s server. He contends that the timing
of the search is critical because if the search occurred while the email was in transit it was
an illegal search within the Minnesota and United States constitutions. Gaul asks us to
reverse his conviction because the state did not carry its burden to prove the search of his
emails occurred after it was received on the school district’s server, and that he had a
private property interest and a reasonable expectation of privacy in his email
communications before they reached the school’s server. We disagree.
“For pretrial motions to suppress, we review the district court’s factual findings for
clear error and its legal determinations de novo.” State v. Leonard, 943 N.W.2d 149, 155
(Minn. 2020). “Findings of fact are clearly erroneous if, on the entire evidence, we are left
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake occurred.” State v. Anderse n, 784
N.W.2d 320, 334 (Minn. 2010). “If we find reasonable evidence to support the district
court’s findings of fact, we will not disturb those findings.” State v. Evans, 756 N.W.2d
854, 870 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted).
The district court found that the search took place after Gaul’s emails to the student
arrived on the school’s server and therefore were no longer within his control. It stated
that “Gaul’s communications were received by a school district email server as he intended.
It was only upon receipt of those communications that the student’s email was subject to
7
the school’s privacy policy and monitoring system.” Gaul asserts this finding was clearly
erroneous because the state presented no evidence that the emails were searched after
delivery. We disagree.
Although M.H. could not definitively state when Bark screens the student’s emails,
other evidence in the record supports a reasonable inference that Gaul’s emails were
screened only after they arrived on the school’s server. M.H. testified that Bark was a
program used in conjunction with the Google hosting system and that Bark is a separate
program connected to Google Gmail that screens student emails. There was testimony that
Bark monitors only student accounts, not staff accounts, and those emails sent and received
by students. Therefore, the record does not reasonably support Gaul’s assertion that Bark
could have screened Gaul’s emails before they arrived on the school district’s server.
Under these circumstances, we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that the
district court’s finding was clearly erroneous.
II. Gaul did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy or property interest in
emails sent to a student’s school-owned email account and received on the
school’s server.

Gaul also challenges the district court’s determination that he did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in email communications that he sent to the student’s
school-owned email account and that were delivered to the school’s server. This court
reviews the district court’s pretrial legal rulings de novo. State v. Bourke, 718 N.W.2d 922,
927 (Minn. 2006). Gaul bears the burden to establish that he has a protected right under
the United States and Minnesota constitutions. Leonard, 943 N.W.2d at 156.
8
Both the United States and Minnesota constitutions require that government
searches and seizures of people’s “persons, houses, papers, and effects” be reasonable.
U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. “A seizure of property occurs when there
is some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property.”
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). Warrantless searches are per se
unreasonable subject to only a few specifically delineated exceptions. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009); State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 846 (Minn. 2011).
A search or seizure within the Fourth Amendment occurs when the [government]
either “physically occupy[s] private property for the purpose of obtaining information,”
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012), or invades a constitutionally protected
privacy interest to gather information. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967).
Gaul argues that both occurred here. We address each argument in turn and conclude that
neither is persuasive.
A. Property Trespass
Relying on United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292 (10th Cir. 2016), Gaul argues
that the government trespassed on his papers and effects when it searched his emails while
in transit. In Ackerman, the defendant sent an email containing child pornography. 831
F.3d at 1294. However, before the email reached its intended recipient, the defendant’ s
Internet Service Provider (ISP), AOL, using an automated filter designed to stop its users
from transmitting child pornography, stopped its delivery. Id. The Tenth Circuit applied a
property-rights analysis articulated in Jones to hold that the government violates the Fourth
Amendment when it trespasses upon emails sent to a third party. Id. at 1307-08.
9
Ackerman is distinguishable from this case. Unlike in Ackerman where the email
never reached the intended recipient, the district court here found that Gaul’s emails arrived
in the student’s inbox, at which point he relinquished his control and any property interest
of his correspondence and, as discussed above, we concluded that this finding was not
clearly erroneous. Because Gaul relinquished control of his emails when they successfully
arrived at the school district’s server, the school district did not “physically occup[y] private
property for the purpose of obtaining information” and thus did not conduct a search within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
B. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
The district court concluded that Gaul did not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy because he relinquished control of his emails, which were searched after they were
received by the school server. Gaul maintains that the district court erred, arguing that he
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his sent emails, an expectation that was not
eliminated just because they were sent to a student’s school-owned email account. To
contest a government search, a person must demonstrate (1) that, by his conduct, he
“exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy” (subjective prong); and (2) that society
recognizes such an expectation as objectively reasonable (objective prong). Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (quotation omitted); In re Welfare of B.R.K., 658
N.W.2d 565, 571 (Minn. 2003). The subjective prong evaluates the circumstances and
conduct of the individual and whether that person demonstrated that “he seeks to preserve
something as private.” Smith, 442 U.S. at 740 (quotation omitted). The objective prong
10
considers whether the person’s expectation was “justifiable under the circumstances.” Id.
(quotation omitted).
Turning first to the subjective prong, Gaul did not exhibit a subjective expectation
that his emails would remain private. See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 107, 119
(1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (recognizing a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy
“turns in large part” on their “ability to exclude others from the place searched”). Here,
Gaul engaged in private communications of a sensitive nature over a series of emails using
a password-protected unique email with a screenname presumably designed to further
conceal his connection to the email exchange. While Gaul insists that the highly sensitive
nature of his emails, coupled with the fact that he communicated with just one student,
demonstrates that he likely believed they would remain private, we are not convinced.
Gaul emailed a student at their school-district- provided email address. The school’s head
of IT, M.H., testified that when students send emails, there is a disclaimer in the footer of
the email that states that the email account is owned and managed by the school district
and is subject to the school district ’s policies. M.H. additionally testified that there are
policies that discuss the proper use of emails and affirmed that student emails are accessible
by IT “just by virtue of them being school e-mail[s].” And according to the student, Gaul
knew how old she was and that they “had talked about it.”6 For these reasons, we conclude
that Gaul did not have a subjective expectation of privacy in the emails addressed to a
student’s school-owned email account.

6 Gaul denies that he knew the student was a minor, but he did tell police that he met the
student in a class that they had together in high school.
11
Even if we assume that Gaul had a subjective expectation of privacy in the emails,
the next inquiry is whether that expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable. See New Jersey v. T.L.O. , 469 U.S. 325, 338 (1985) (stating that “the Fourth
Amendment does not protect subjective expectations of privacy that are unreasonable”).
“Letters and other sealed packages are in the general class of effects in which the public at
large has a legitimate expectation of privacy; warrantless searches of such effects are
presumptively unreasonable.” Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 114. While letters and packages are
in transit to the intended recipient, law enforcement generally cannot intercept and examine
them without a warrant. Id. This is true for email messages and content. City of Ontario
v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 762 (2010) (implying that “a search of [an individual’s] personal
e-mail account” would be just as intrusive as “a wiretap on his home phone line”); United
States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 511 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that “[t]he privacy interests
in [mail and email] are identical”). The question remains, however, whether the contents
of Gaul’s email messages receive Fourth Amendment protections once received by the
student’s email account on the school server.
Here, the district court determined that Gaul relinquished any expectation of privacy
once the emails were received by the intended recipient. See United States v. Lifshitz, 369
F.3d 173, 190 (2nd Cir. 2004) (stating that individuals may not enjoy “an expectation of
privacy in transmissions over the Internet or e-mail that have already arrived at the
recipient”) (citing Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 333 (6th Cir. 2001)); United States v.
Barber, 184 F. Supp. 3d 1013, 1017 (D. Kan. 2016) (“[A] legitimate expectation of privacy
in an email is lost once the email reaches the recipient.”) (citing Guest, 255 F.3d at 333);
12
United States v. Lustyik, 57 F. Supp. 3d 213, 223 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“A person has no
expectation of privacy in another person’s email account.”). 7 We agree with the district
court.
Under the third- party doctrine, “a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy
in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.” Smith , 442 U.S. at 743-44; see
also Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 117 (“It is well settled that when an individual reveals private
information to another, he assumes the risk that his confidant will reveal that information
to the authorities, and if that occurs the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit governmental
use of that information.”); Katz , 389 U.S. at 351 (“What a person knowingly exposes to
the public is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”); State v. Carter, 697 N.W.2d
199, 207 (Minn. 2005) (stating that a person has no Fourth Amendment protection in
anything knowingly disclosed to the public). The school district did not search Gaul’s
computer containing the email, but rather searched a current student’s school-provided
email account and found an email sent to that student by Gaul after it was delivered to the
school’s email server. Under the third-party doctrine, Gaul relinquished any expectation
of privacy in his email communications once they were sent and received by the student’s
school-provided email account.
Gaul asserts that the third-party doctrine is an “open question” and does not
immediately destroy the sender’s expectation of privacy in one-way transmissions of

7 Though not binding on Minnesota courts, authorities from other states or federal courts
can be persuasive. State v. McClenton, 781 N.W.2d 181, 191 (Minn. App. 2010), rev.
denied (Minn. June 29, 2010).
13
information. He analogizes emails to one- sided phone conversations. It is true that
disclosing information to a third- party does not automatically eliminate the person’s
expectation of privacy in that information. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (holding that a person
retains an expectation of privacy for conversations in a public telephone booth); see also
Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296, 309 (2018) (holding that cell-site location
information stored on a wireless carrier’s server does not render an individual’s expectation
of privacy unreasonable). However, even if we accept the premise that emails are more
like phone calls, “the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information
revealed to a third party and conveyed by [the third party] to Government authorities.”
United States v. Miller , 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). A person assumes the risk that what
they communicate to a third party, whether verbally or electronically, may be disclosed to
another person, including the government. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 117. Whether the
recipient verbally relays to police what the speaker told him, brings law enforcement the
sender’s letter, or forwards his email to police, the risk remains the same.
To persuade us otherwise, Gaul again relies on Ackerman to argue that he had a
reasonable expectation of privacy for emails in transit. As discussed above in Ackerman,
AOL detected the child pornography in the defendant’s email, stopped the emails delivery,
and reported the emails to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children
(NCMEC), as required by federal law. Id. at 1294. The defendant alleged that an unlawful
search under the Fourth Amendment occurred because the NCMEC included the emails
and each attachment, which an NCMEC agent could open and view. Id. at 1307-08. The
court held that NCMEC’s actions clearly amounted to a search when it opened and
14
examined private correspondence. However, the court did not decide whether Ackerman
had a subjective or objective expectation of privacy because the district court had made no
factual findings as to his subjective or objective expectations. Id. at 1305. The Tenth
Circuit also expressly noted that the defendant’s reasonable expectations of privacy could
be constrained by “the parties’ dealings,” including Ackerman’s acquiescence to the
service provider’s policies regarding child pornography. Id. at 1305. The court remanded
the case for further analysis, as these were “[f]acts that could well impact the legal
analysis.” Id.
This is true for Gaul’s argument as well. Similar to Ackerman, any reasonable
expectation of privacy Gaul may have had in emails sent to the student was constrained by
the parties’ dealings because the school district did not guarantee or offer that the electronic
“property” stored on its servers would be private. To the contrary, the school district
expressly warns users that the email account, or contents of the email, are managed by the
district and its policies. The school district’s warning that the contents of the email are
managed by the district and its policies is inconsistent with a reasonable expectation of
privacy.
Gaul additionally relies on Leonard, 943 N.W.2d at 149, to assert that he has a
reasonable expectation of privacy because the Minnesota Constitution provides greater
protections than the United States Constitution. While it is true that state constitutions may
provide more protections than the federal constitution, Gaul’s reliance on Leonard is
misguided. There, Leonard voluntarily shared certain private information with a hotel he
checked into, as required by statute. Id. at 153. Police used this information to develop
15
individualized suspicion of criminal activity and conducted an arrest. Leonard argued that
he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in information disclosed to a hotel’s guest
registry. Id. The supreme court agreed and held that “some third- party institutions are
generally considered private (e.g., a doctor’s examination room or a lawyer’s office)” and,
therefore, “sharing private information in these spaces does not destroy someone’s
reasonable expectation of privacy, but rather contributes to its private character.” Id. at
159.
A student’s school-owned email account, however, cannot be one of those third-
party institutional spaces contemplated by the supreme court. Ordinary people reasonably
expect that their lawyers and physicians will keep their information confidential, but it is
unlikely that this expectation would extend to a student’s school-owned email account. To
this end, students have a reduced expectation of privacy because of the school’s interest in
“the preservation of order and a proper educational environment.” T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339.
Gaul contends that, because he is not a student, he maintains the full scope of Fourth
Amendment protections. Again, we are not persuaded. While he may not be a student,
Gaul was emailing a current student at her school-owned email account, which should have
alerted him that his communications were not private and likely to be monitored. As M.H.
testified, emails from the student accounts included a disclaimer that expressly stated that
the email is owned or managed by the school district thus communicating that the recipient
of the email should have a diminished expectation of privacy in email communications
with that email account. Gaul knew or should have known this because he exchanged
multiple emails with the victim.
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DECISION
Because the district court did not clearly err in finding that Gaul’s emails were
searched after they reached the school’s server, and because Gaul did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in email communications sent to a school-ow ned email server and
delivered to a student’s email account, we affirm the district court’s pretrial ruling denying
Gaul’s motion to dismiss and suppress the evidence.
Affirmed.