A24-0593

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0556
A24-0593

Demetreious Anderson Baldwin, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed January 21, 2025
Affirmed
Ross, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-20-26727

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Gina D. Schulz, Assistant Public
Defender, Amy Bakkum (certified supervised practitioner), S t. Paul, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Nicole Cornale, Assistant County Attorney,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Harris, Judge; and Halbrooks,
Judge.∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
ROSS, Judge
The complaint that charged Dametreious Baldwin 1 with criminal vehicular
homicide alleged that he drunkenly crashed his car and then fled the scene, leaving one of
his passengers dead and dangling from the wreckage. Baldwin pleaded guilty to criminal
vehicular homicide and received the presumptive sentence. Two years later he successfully
petitioned for postconviction relief to be resentenced to correct an erroneous criminal-
history score, but he failed to convince the district court that he was entitled to a lesser
sentence. He argues on appeal that the district court should have granted his request for a
downward sentencing departure based on his mental- health diagnoses and other factors.
He argues alternatively that he should have been sentenced at the bottom of the
presumptive range. Because the district court acted within its discretion to sentence
Baldwin within the presumptive guidelines range, we affirm.
FACTS
The relevant facts are not in dispute. In December 2020, Dametreious Baldwin
crashed a car that he was driving after he had consumed alcohol, drugs, or both, killing his
passenger. According to the criminal complaint, roadway markings indicated that
Baldwin’s car left the road several times, went airborne, crashed into a parking lot, and
came to rest on its side. Officers found a dead child hanging upside down from the car’s

1 The case caption in district court spells Baldwin’s first name “Demetreious.” Baldwin’s
appellate brief spells his name, “Dametreious.” The caption of this opinion conforms to the
caption used in the district court. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 143.01. But we use appellant’s
preferred spelling in the body of the opinion.
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shattered rear window, his lower body trapped in the wreckage. The dead boy was
Baldwin’s cousin. Baldwin later admitted that he and the car’s other passenger fled the
crash scene without summoning help for his cousin. The state charged Baldwin with one
count of criminal vehicular homicide, and he pleaded guilty.
Baldwin argued at sentencing for a downward dispositional or durational departure
from the presumptive guidelines sentence of 111 months in prison. He based his request
on, among other things, his alleged serious mental-health issues that began during his
difficult childhood, including post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), his resulting chemical
dependency, and his need and suitability for extended treatment outside prison. The district
court imposed the presumptive prison sentence.
Baldwin timely petitioned for postconviction relief about two years later. He failed
in his renewed departure request but argued successfully that the district court had
calculated his sentence based on an erroneous criminal-history score (eight points instead
of seven) and was entitled to be resentenced. The corrected score did not alter his
presumptive sentence, and the district court resentenced Baldwin to the same sentence,
rejecting his request to be resentenced at the bottom of the presumptive range rather than
the presumptive 111-month term.
Baldwin appealed from both the resentencing order and the partial denial of his
postconviction petition separately. We consolidated and now decide both appeals.
DECISION
We are not persuaded by Baldwin’s two arguments on appeal, which are that the
district court improperly reaffirmed its prior denial of his downward-departure request and
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that it improperly reimposed a middle-of-the-box sentence. The district court enjoys “great
discretion” in sentencing decisions, and we will reverse a sentencing decision only if the
district court abuses that discretion. State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 307–08 (Minn. 2014)
(quotation omitted). The record here reveals no abuse of discretion.
Baldwin argues specifically that the district court in the postconviction proceeding
erroneously affirmed its prior conclusion that his mental-health issues and other factors did
not provide a substantial and compelling reason to depart from the presumptive sentence.
A district court may depart from a Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines presumptive sentence
only if “there exist identifiable, substantial, and compelling circumstances to support a
departure.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.1 (2020). One circumstance that can mitigate an
offender’s conduct is that he, “because of physical or mental impairment, lacked substantial
capacity for judgment when the offense was committed.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines
2.D.3.a(3) (2020). For mental impairment to be a mitigating factor, “a defendant’s
impairment must be extreme to the point that it deprives [him] of control over his actions.”
State v. McLaughlin, 725 N.W.2d 703, 716 (Minn. 2007) (quotation omitted). Voluntary
use of alcohol or drugs is not a mitigating factor in this context. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines
2.D.3.a(3). We do not suggest that PTSD is not a serious impairment. But the record does
not indicate that Baldwin’s mental-health diagnoses, including PTSD, left him without
substantial capacity for judgment regarding his vehicular-homicide offense. We have
considered, and find unconvincing, his attempt to liken his circumstance to those addressed
in State v. Martinson , 671 N.W.2d 887 (Minn. App. 2003), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 20,
2004), and State v. Barsness, 473 N.W.2d 325 (Minn. App. 1991), rev. denied (Minn. Aug.
5
29, 1991). Put bluntly, the record provides no reason suggesting that the district court was
compelled to determine that his mental-health issues had any bearing on the decisions that
led him to drive impaired, cause the collision, and abandon his cousin without providing
or seeking aid. The district court acted within its discretion by refusing to depart
durationally.
Baldwin also argues that his remorse, young age, support of family and friends,
motivation to change, cooperation with the state, and respectful attitude in court should
have led the district court to grant him a downward dispositional departure. A downward
dispositional departure may be justified when an offender demonstrates “particular
amenability” to treatment on probation. State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982).
But the district court retains the discretion to impose a presumptive prison sentence even
if factors supporting a departure are pres ent. Wells v. State, 839 N.W.2d 775, 781 (Minn.
App. 2013), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 18, 2014). The district court reviewed the record
before sentencing and concluded that, because Baldwin had been on probation for two
other felonies when he committed the present offense, he was not entitled to a dispositional
departure. We are satisfied that the district court properly exercised its discretion when it
refused to grant a downward dispositional departure in the postconviction proceeding.
We are likewise unconvinced by Baldwin’s contention that the district court was
bound to reimpose a middle-of-the-box prison term at resentencing. The sentences
recommended by the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines “are presumed to be appropriate.”
Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.1; State v. Reece, 625 N.W.2d 822, 824 (Minn. 2001). We
will affirm the imposition of a presumptive sentence when the record informs us that the
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“sentencing court carefully evaluated all the testimony and information” presented to it.
State v. Johnson, 831 N.W.2d 917, 925 (Minn. App. 2013), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 17,
2013). The record here so informs us. Baldwin’s corrected criminal- history score left his
presumptive sentence unchanged. The district court at resentencing expressly considered
the information before it, including Baldwin’s rehabilitative work while in prison. And it
acted well within its discretion when it refused to grant a bottom-of-the-box sentence.
Affirmed.