Stephen Sawyer, et al., Respondents,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0577

Stephen Sawyer, et al.,
Respondents,

vs.

Trustee(s) of the Patricia A. Boland Revocable Trust Agreement
Dated June 4, 2012, et al.,
Appellants.

Filed January 6, 2025
Affirmed
Schmidt, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-CV-22-1987

Tamara O’Neill Moreland, Larkin Hoffman Daly & Lindgren , Ltd., Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for respondents/cross-appellants Stephen Sawyer, et al.)

Stuart T. Alger, Alger Property Law, P.L.L.C., Minneapolis, Minnesota; and

Timothy J. Prindiville, Prindiville Law, PA, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellants/cross-
respondents Trustee(s) of the Patricia A. Boland Revocable Trust Agreement Dated June
4, 2012, et al.)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Frisch, Judge; and
Schmidt, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SCHMIDT, Judge
In this appeal from a final judgment, appellants and cross-respondents, the Trustees
of the Patricia A. Boland Revocable Trust (Boland Trustees), argue the district court erred
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in determining that respondents and cross-appellants, Stephen and Wendy Sawyer (the
Sawyers), gained title to a portion of the Boland Trustees’ property through adverse
possession. The Boland Trustees further argue that the district court abused its discretion
by not granting their motion for a new trial and by granting the Sawyers costs and
disbursements. In a related appeal, the Sawyers argue that the district court abused its
discretion by not granting their motion for sanctions. Because we conclude the district
court neither erred nor abused its discretion, we affirm.
FACTS
The Sawyers and the Boland Trustees dispute ownership of an 8.5’ by 117’ strip of
land on the east side of the Boland Trustees’ property and the west side of the Sawyers’
property (the Adverse Possession Parcel). Depictions of the disputed area were introduced
as exhibits at trial:

Figure 1: Survey map with the Boland Parcel on the
left, the Sawyer Parcel on the right, and the Adverse
Possession Parcel in gray. Figure 2: Photograph of Adverse Possession Parcel.
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In 1966, the Boland family acquired property on Lake Marion (the Boland Parcel).
In 1973, a couple purchased the adjacent property to the east (the Sawyer Parcel). After
moving in, the couple planted spruce trees on the Sawyer Parcel, near the border of the
Boland Parcel. A neighbor east of the Sawyer Parcel testified that the branches of the
spruce trees “were down like they were touching the ground” and extended “5 feet on each
side.” Subsequent owners of the Sawyer Parcel testified that they put down mulch around
the base of the trees, picked weeds, trimmed branches, and planted a garden under the trees.
Witnesses for the Boland Trustees testified about the Bolands parking boats and cars
near a slope under the tree branches . In 2016, the Bolands built a boulder retaining wall
that bordered the garden space under the spruce trees’ branches on their property.
The Sawyers purchased the parcel in July 2018. The Sawyers added a trellis and
pavers in the area below the trees. The Sawyers also gardened the area. In May 2022,
Kathryn Boland Weston told Wendy Sawyer that the Adverse Possession Parcel belonged
to the Bolands. Kathryn Boland Weston asked that the trellis and pavers be removed from
the Adverse Possession Parcel.
The Sawyers sued the Boland Trustees, asserting claims of adverse possession and
trespass, and seeking an injunction. The Boland Trustees answered and asserted
counterclaims for a declaratory judgment, quiet title, ejectment, trespass, nuisance, slander
of title, and tortious interference with prospective business advantage. The Sawyers gave
the Boland Trustees notice that the Sawyers would be filing a motion for sanctions on the
nuisance, slander of title, and tortious interference counterclaims. The Boland Trustees
later withdrew their tortious interference claim.
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The Sawyers brought motions for summary judgment and for sanctions for the
allegedly frivolous claims of nuisance, slander of title, and tortious interference. The
district court granted the Sawyers’ motion for summary judgment on the slander of title
claim but denied the other motions for summary judgment and sanctions.
The district court held a bench trial in which the parties, surveyors, neighbors, and
prior owners of the Sawyer Parcel testified. At the end of the trial, the district court granted
the Boland Trustees’ motion to dismiss their counterclaims for nuisance and trespass.
In a written order with findings of fact and conclusions of law, the district court
found that the Sawyers—and the prior owners of the Sawyer Parcel—had adversely
possessed “an area at least 6 -feet wide and 104-feet long” (the Modified Adverse
Possession Parcel). The court determined that the adverse possession was open and actual
for at least 15 years, exclusive, and hostile. T he district court made numerous credibility
determinaitons against individuals who testified on behalf of the Boland Trustees and
found those who testified in support of the Sawyers to be credible.
The district court granted injunctive relief to the Sawyers and permanently enjoined
the Boland Trustees “from using, entering possessing, or otherwise interfering with the
Sawyers’ ownership of the” Modified Adverse Possession Parcel. The district court also
found in favor of the Sawyers on their trespass claim but did not award damages because
the Sawyers had presented no evidence of monetary damages.
The district court ruled in favor of the Boland Trustees on part of their ejectment
claim. The court found the claim included the boulder retaining wall and the southern part
of the Adverse Possession Parcel.
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The Boland Trustees moved for a new trial and amended findings. They argued that
the district court clearly erred in its findings about the spruce trees. They also sought a
new trial on whether the spruce trees constituted a boundary line between the properties.
After a hearing, the district court amended one factual sentence in its order and denied the
remaining Boland Trustees’ motions. The district court granted the Sawyers’ application
for $5,856.77 in costs and disbursements against the Boland Trustees.
The Boland Trustees appealed. The Sawyers filed a notice of related appeal.
DECISION
I. The district court did not err in determining the Sawyers proved their adverse
possession claim by clear and convincing evidence.

The Boland Trustees argue that the district court’s order finding in favor of the
Sawyers on their adverse possession claim following a bench trial should be reversed. “In
an appeal from a bench trial, we do not reconcile conflicting evidence.” Porch v. Gen.
Motors Acceptance Corp., 642 N.W.2d 473, 477 (Minn. App. 2002), rev. denied (Minn.
June 26, 2002). “We give the district court’s factual findings great deference and do not
set them aside unless clearly erroneous.” Id. “When evidence relevant to a factual issue
consists of conflicting testimony, the district court’s decision is necessarily based on a
determination of witness credibility, which we accord great deference on appeal.”
Alam v. Chowdhury, 764 N.W.2d 86, 89 (Minn. App. 2009).
The Boland Trustees assert three reasons for reversing the district court’s ruling in
favor of the Sawyers on their adverse possession claim: (1) the Sawyers did not establish
open and actual possession for fifteen years; (2) the Sawyers’ use of the area was not
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exclusive; and (3) the Sawyers did not establish the requisite hostility needed to prove their
claim. A plaintiff allegeding adverse possession “must show, by clear and convincing
evidence, an actual, open, hostile, continuous, and exclusive possession for the requisite
period of time[.]” SSM Invs. v. Siemers, 291 N.W.2d 383, 384 (Minn. 1980). Adverse
possession requires that “the plaintiff, the plaintiff’s ancestor, predecessor, or grantor was
seized or possessed of the premises in question within 15 years before the beginning of the
action.” Minn. Stat. § 541.02 (2022). The “fact -intensive adverse-possession
determinations rely largely on the credibility of witnesses and the weight, if any, to be
given to their testimony.” Ganje v. Schuler, 659 N.W.2d 261, 269 (Minn. App. 2003).
A. Open and actual possession
The Boland Trustees argue that the Sawyers failed to prove their possession was
open and actual. We have construed “open” within the adverse possession context to mean
“visible from the surroundings, or visible to one seeking to exercise his rights.”
Hickerson v. Bender, 500 N.W.2d 169, 171 (Minn. App. 1993). The manner of “actual ”
possession “must give unequivocal notice to the true owner that [someone] is in possession
in hostility to his title.” Ganje, 659 N.W.2d at 266 (quotation omitted).
The district court found that the Modified Adverse Possession Parcel was openly
and actually possessed from the time the first owners purchased the Sawyer Parcel through
when the Sawyers purchased the property. First, the court found a neighbor’s testimony
credible that the first owners of the Sawyer Parcel maintained the area around the trees.
Second, the district court found credible the second owner’s testimony that he trimmed the
tree branches and put mulch around the trunks. Third, the court found credible the third
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owner of the Sawyer Parcel’s testimony that she gardened the Modified Adverse
Possession Parcel. Fourth, the district court found credible the testimony from various
witnesses that the Bolands did not maintain the Modified Adverse Possession Parcel.
Finally, the court did not find the Bolands’ testimony about their maintenance or gardening
in the Modified Adverse Possession Parcel to be credible. Our standard of review requires
us to defer to the district court’s credibility findings. Alam, 764 N.W.2d at 89. The district
court’s factual findings in this “fact-intensive adverse-possession” analysis are not clearly
erroneous because the record evidence supports the findings. Ganje, 659 N.W.2d at 269.
The Boland Trustees cite Romans v. Nadler in arguing for reversal. 14 N.W.2d 482
(Minn. 1944). In Romans, the supreme court determined that occasionally and sporadically
entering a property was insufficient for adverse possession. Id. at 485. The Boland
Trustees equate the “occasional and sporadic” trespasses from Romans to the use of the
disputed parcel by the prior owners of the Sawyer Parcel. Id. at 486.
But Romans is distinguishable from this case because the district court found that
the tree branches prevented the Bolands from being in actual possession of the Modified
Adverse Possession Parcel. In addition, the district court made detailed factual findings
and credibility determinations that the prior owners of the Sawyer Parcel established actual
possession by maintaining and improving the Modified Adverse Possession Parcel in a
manner that was both “open” and “actual.” Unlike in Romans, this use was neither
occasional nor sporadic. The district court did not clearly err in finding that the Sawyers’
possession was open and actual.
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B. Exclusive use of the area
The Boland Trustees argue the district court erred in finding that the Sawyers and
their predecessor s exclusively used the Modified Adverse Possession Parcel. “The
exclusivity requirement of adverse possession is satisfied if the disseizor possesses the land
as if it were his own with the intention of using it to the exclusion of others.” Ganje,
659 N.W.2d at 267 (quotations omitted); see also Ehle v. Prosser, 197 N.W.2d 458, 462
(Minn. 1972) (holding adverse possessor must “intend to exclude all others”).
The district court found that the planting of the spruce trees created an exclusive use
of the Modified Adverse Possession Parcel because the branches made the area below them
“of almost no utility and largely unreachable[.]” The court found that the trees prevented
the Bolands from using the Modified Adverse Possession Parcel and that the current and
previous Sawyer Parcel owners maintained the area by trimming the branches, mowing the
lawn, and gardening the area. As the district court found, the evidence of the Sawyers’ and
previous owners’ use of the area constitute d a visible indication of the “intention of
permanent occupation and appropriation.” In re Reg. Title in St. Louis County,
147 N.W. 655, 657 (Minn. 1914). The district court did not clearly err in finding that the
use of the Modified Adverse Possession Parcel was exclusive.1

1 Notably, the district court did not give the Sawyers the entire portion of the parcel that
they sought. For example, the court excluded the boulder retaining wall, which accounts
for the Boland Trustees’ arguments about their parking boats and cars alongside the slope.
The district court appropriately considered the Boland Trustees’ contentions and evidence
about exclusive use of the parcel—or lack thereof—and modified the parcel accordingly.
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C. Requisite hostility
The Boland Trustees argue the district court should be reversed as to the hostility
finding. Hostility does not require animosity between the parties, but instead requires that
the adverse possessor have the intention “to claim exclusive ownership as against the world
and to treat the property in dispute in a manner generally associated with the ownership of
similar type property in the particular area involved.” Ehle, 197 N.W.2d at 462. Hostility
may be demonstrated through “a great variety of acts,” such as “by cultivation, by the
erection of buildings, or by other improvements, or by any visible, open use, clearly
indicating an actual appropriation of the land to the permanent and exclusive dominion and
benefit of the invader[.]” Costello v. Edson, 46 N.W. 299, 301 (Minn. 1890).
The Boland Trustees argue that the tree branches did not demonstrate an adverse
claim of right. But the district court’s hostility finding was not limited to the trees. The
court did find that the trees occupied the Modified Adverse Possession Parcel and
prevented the Bolands from accessing that area. But the court also found that the Sawyers
and their predecessors maintained and improved the parcel, which, the court found, was
sufficient to meet the hostility element. The district court noted that “[e]ven in their
answers to the interrogatories, the Bolands describe no activity in the Adverse Possession
Parcel prior to July 2016 .” The district court did not clearly err in its findings, including
that the requisite hostility for adverse possession was satisfied.
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II. The district court acted within its discretion in denying the Boland Trustees’
motion for a new trial.

The Boland Trustees argue the district court abused its discretion by not granting
their posttrial motion because a new trial—or allowing new testimony—was warranted to
determine whether the trees constituted a boundary line between the properties. The
Boland Trustees assert that as a boundary line, owned by the Bolands and Sawyers as
tenants-in-common, the trees could not constitute a hostile use by the prior owners of the
Sawyer Parcel. “We review a district court’s decision to grant or deny a new trial for an
abuse of discretion.” Christie v. Est. of Christie, 911 N.W.2d 833, 838 (Minn. 2018).
But the Boland Trustees did not raise the boundary-line-tree argument until after
trial. The Boland Trustees forfeited this argument by raising it for the first time in a
posttrial motion after years of discovery and after a lengthy trial. See Antonson v. Ekvall,
186 N.W.2d 187, 189 (Minn. 1971) (“The claim came too late when suggested for the first
time by plaintiff’s motions for a new trial.”). In addition, the Boland Trustees cited no
authority on appeal to support their argument that the district court abused its discretion in
denying their posttrial motion. See Scheffler v. City of Anoka, 890 N.W.2d 437, 451 (Minn.
App. 2017), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 26, 2017) (noting a party forfeits a claim by failing to
support it with authority); Schoepke v. Alexander Smith & Sons Carpet Co., 187 N.W.2d
133, 135 (Minn. 1971) (“An assignment of error based on mere assertion and not supported
by any argument or authorities in appellant’s brief is waived.”). Because the Boland
Trustees asserted the claim too late and failed to cite any authority to support their argument
on appeal for reversal, we deem the argument forfeited.
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III. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it ruled that the Sawyers
were the prevailing party entitled to costs and disbursements.

The Boland Trustees argue that the Sawyers do not qualify as the prevailing party
because some of the district court’s dispositions favored the Boland Trustees. We review
a district court’s decision as to which party, if any, qualifies as the prevailing party for an
abuse of discretion. Benigni v. County of St. Louis, 585 N.W.2d 51, 54-55 (Minn. 1998).
In making that determination, the court should consider the general result and “who has, in
the view of the law, succeeded in the action.” Haugland v. Canton , 84 N.W.2d 274, 280
(Minn. 1957) (quotation omitted).
In awarding costs and disbursements to the Sawyers, the district court
acknowledged the claims that each side had succeeded on in the action and the claims that
each side had lost. The district court found that the Sawyers “obtained more property than
the [Boland Trustees] retained,” and that the court ruled in favor of the Sawyers on their
declaratory judgment, ejectment, and trespass claims. The district court concluded that
“Under the applicable law, [the Sawyers] have succeeded in the action.”
The Boland Trustees assert that the Sawyers cannot be the prevailing party because
the Sawyers did not prevail on their entire adverse possession claim. But the Boland
Trustees cite no case to support the proposition that a party must prevail on the entire claim
before it can be considered to have prevailed. Further, the Boland Trustees started the
litigation with seven claims and were partially successful on three. Whereas, the Sawyers
started with three claims and succeeded, at least in part, on all three. The district court did
not abuse its discretion in ruling that the Sawyers were the prevailing party.
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IV. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the sanctions motion.

In the related appeal, t he Sawyers argue the district court abused its discretion by
denying their motion for sanctions because the Boland Trustees’ claims for tortious
interference, slander of title, and nuisance were frivolous. We review an order denying a
motion seeking sanctions for an abuse of discretion. Leonard v. Nw. Airlines, Inc.,
605 N.W.2d 425, 432 (Minn. App. 2000), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 18, 2000).
Minnesota law requires an attorney to certify that “to the best of the person’s
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the
circumstances:” (1) a document is not presented to the court for an improper purpose;
(2) the “legal contentions are warranted by existing law” ; and (3) the allegations and
factual contentions have—or will after reasonable discovery have—evidentiary support.
Minn. Stat. § 549.211, subd. 2 (2022). A district court may sanction an attorney for
violating one of the above provisions. Id., subd. 3. “Sanctions should not be imposed
when counsel has an objectively reasonable basis for pursuing a factual or legal claim or
when a competent attorney could form a reasonable belief a pleading is well-grounded in
fact and law.” Leonard, 605 N.W.2d at 432 (quotation omitted).
Although the district court did not analyze the merits of the motion for sanctions,
we conclude that the court acted within its discretion in denying the motion. See State
Fund Mut. Ins. v. Mead, 691 N.W.2d 495, 502-03 (Minn. App. 2005) (affirming a district
court’s decision to summarily deny a motion for sanctions “without discussion in its
opinion”). Our review of the record reveals that the attorney for the Boland Trustees had
a reasonable basis for pursuing each claim. First, Kathryn Boland Weston claimed that she
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planned to sell the property—and if she could not find a buyer, she would purchase the
property. This provided a reasonable basis for the attorney to bring a tortious interference
with prospective business advantage claim. After investigating the claim, 2 the attorney
voluntarily dismissed it early in the litigation process.
Second, although the Boland Trustees did not prevail on the merits of their slander
of title claim, it does not mean that the district court was mandated to impose sanctions.
Radloff v. First Am. Nat’l Bank, 470 N.W.2d 154, 157 (Minn. App. 1991), rev. denied
(Minn. July 24, 1991). Although the district court determined that the undisputed facts
produced at summary judgment were enough to disprove the malice factor of the claim,
the Boland Trustees were not unreasonable for asserting the claim.
Finally, the Boland Trustees raised a nuisance claim, which survived summary
judgment. Although at trial the Boland Trustees’ attorney dismissed the claim, it was not
unreasonable to pursue the claim through trial. The district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying the motion for sanctions.
Affirmed.

2 The Sawyers also served the attorney with notice of their intent to seek sanction s if the
Boland Trustees continued to pursue the claim. The fact that the Boland Trustees and their
lawyer did not dismiss the claim until after the safe-harbor time expired, see Minn. Stat.
§ 549.211, subd. 4 (2022), did not require the district court to sanction them.