A24-0752

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0591
A24-0752

In re the matter of:

Tiffany Dust f/k/a Tiffany Dust-Chlebik, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Beau Kevin Wayne f/k/a Kevin Chlebik,
Appellant.

Filed November 25, 2024
Affirmed in part and remanded
Larkin, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-FA-15-1927

Tiffany Dust, Minnetonka, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Beau K. Wayne, Chanhassen, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Considered and decided by Harris, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARKIN, Judge
In these consolidated appeals, appellant-father challenges the district court’s denial
of his endangerment -based motion to modify custody and the district court’s sua sponte
order that father’s parenting time be supervised until he satisfies certain conditions.
2
Because the district court did not err in denying father’s motion for custody modification,
we affirm in part. But because the district court abused its discretion in modifying father’s
parenting time, we remand for a hearing on that issue.
FACTS
Appellant Beau Kevin Wayne (father) and respondent Tiffany Dust (mother) were
married in 2012 and are the parents of one child, DC, who was born that year. In 2015,
father and mother divorced (the family-law case). Mother was awarded sole legal and sole
physical custody of DC. DC has been diagnosed with several food allergies and has been
treated at the same clinic for several years. As of March 7, 2023, father had court-ordered
parenting time on Wednesday night s through Thursday morning s, as w ell as every other
weekend from Friday evening s through Monday morning s. As of September 25, 2023,
father also had parenting time on select holidays.
Father challenges two district court decisions regarding custody and parenting time.
In file A24-0752, father appeals the district court’s March 8, 2024 order denying his
endangerment-based motion to modify custody. In file A24-0591, father appeals the
district court’s April 9, 2024 order requiring that father’s parenting time be supervised
pending his compliance with certain conditions.
A24-0752
On January 23, 2024, father moved the district court to modify custody of DC,
requesting joint legal and joint physical custody. Father requested a custody change in
anticipation of an upcoming allergy appointment for DC, asserting that “the only way to
accept [father’s] input” in DC’s allergy care “is to either have a release of information on
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file, or a court order stating joint legal custody.” Father alleged that DC is in danger in
mother’s care and that “[w]ithout court intervention [DC] is at both physical and emotional
risk relating to the foods he is able to eat.” On February 12, 2024, t he district court held
an initial hearing on father’s motion, but it did not receive evidence at that hearing.1
The district court denied father’s motion, reasoning that his endangerment claims
were “ too remote and hypothetical” and were based on mother “following the
recommendations of the allergy doctors that [DC] has been seeing for many years.” The
court noted that father’s concerns were raised with DC’s current allergy providers and that
DC’s allergy doctors continue to test and update their diagnoses. The court
recognize[d] that [f]ather has difficulty communicating with
the minor child’s current allergy care provider, but
fundamentally that state of affairs is not something that can be
repaired by [c]ourt order [—]and the [c]ourt also note [d] that
taking the minor child to other medical care providers in order
to simply dodge that issue would be a violation of the standing
custody labels in this case.

A24-0591
On January 30, 2024, mother petitioned the district court for an order for protection
(OFP) against father on DC’s behalf and a harassment restraining order (HRO) against
father on her own behalf . That day, the district court granted a n ex parte OFP and an ex

1 A referee of the Fourth Judicial District Court presided over the hearing. Referees in the
family court division “hear and report all matters within the jurisdiction of the district court
judge, family court division, as may be directed to the referee by said judge,” and
“recommend findings of fact, conclusions of law, temporary and interim orders, and final
orders for judgment.” Minn. Stat. § 484.65, subd. 8 (2022). “All recommended orders and
findings of a referee shall be subject to confirmation by said district court judge.” Id., subd.
9 (2022).
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parte HRO. According to the district court, “[t]he core allegations involving [DC] were an
incident where [f]ather told [DC] he would ‘snap [DC’s] neck like a twig’ and another
incident where [f]ather snapped a belt at [DC], though no contact was made.” The district
court appointed a guardian ad litem in the OFP matter.
The district court held evidentiary hearings on mother’s OFP and HRO petitions,
denied those petitions, and vacated the ex parte OFP and ex parte HRO. The district court
denied mother’s OFP petition because she “did not prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that [father] committed domestic abuse.” However, the district court issued an
administrative order to address issues raised in the HRO and OFP cases , stating that they
“were best suited for being addressed here in the parties’ family court file.” But the district
court did not hold a hearing in the parties’ family -law case. 2 Instead, the district court
relied on the guardian ad litem’s report in the OFP case, as well as the evidence presented
at the OFP and HRO hearings, and ordered that f ather’s parenting time with DC be
supervised on a temporary basis, that father complete a parenting course, that DC continue
individual therapy , that DC and father begin family therapy before resuming father’s
unsupervised parenting time, and that both mother and father sign a safe-harbor agreement
for these therapists.
Father filed a notice of appeal in files A24-0752 and A24-0591, and we consolidated
the appeals. Mother did not file a brief in either of the consolidated appeals.3

2 The record indicates that the “matter came administratively ” before the district court on
4/8/2024 and that “[n]o appearances were made.”
3 We ordered the consolidated appeals to be determined on the merits under Minn. R. Civ.
App. P. 142.03.
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DECISION
I.
We first address the appeal in file A24-0752, in which father challenges the district
court’s denial, without an evidentiary hearing, of father’s endangerment-based motion to
modify custody.
Under Minnesota law, a court shall not modify a prior custody order

unless it finds, upon the basis of facts . . . that have arisen since
the prior order or that were unknown to the court at the time of
the prior order, that a change has occurred in the circumstances
of the child or the parties and that the modification is necessary
to serve the best interests of the child.

Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d) (2022). The court shall retain the arrangement from the prior
custody order unless, for example, “the child’s present environment endangers the child’s
physical or emotional health or impairs the child’s emotional development and the harm
likely to be caused by a change of environment is outweighed by the advantage of a change
to the child.” Id. (d)(iv).
To obtain an evidentiary hearing on a motion to modify custody , the moving party
must make a prima facie showing that there has been:
(1) a change in the circumstances of the child or custodian;
(2) that a modification would serve the best interests of the
child; (3) that the child’s present environment endangers [the
child’s] physical or emotional health or emotional
development; and (4) that the harm to the child likely to be
caused by the change of environment is outweighed by the
advantage of change.

Geibe v. Geibe, 571 N.W.2d 774, 778 (Minn. App. 1997).
6
The moving party must submit an affidavit setting forth facts supporting the
requested modification. Minn. Stat. § 518.185 (2022). “[T]he court must accept the facts
in the moving party’s affidavits as true, and the allegations do not need independent
substantiation.” Geibe, 571 N.W.2d at 777; see Woolsey v. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 507
(Minn. 2022) (stating, in a custody dispute, that a party moving to modify custody makes
a prima facie case “by alleging facts that, if true, would provide sufficient grounds for
modification”). “While the district court must take the moving party’s allegations as true
and disregard contrary allegations by others, the district court may consider allegations by
others that . . . may put the moving party’s allegations in an appropriate context.”
Szarzynski v. Szarzynski, 732 N.W.2d 285, 292 (Minn. App. 2007).
A movant does not allege a prima facie case if the allegations are merely conclusory,
are “too vague to support a finding of endangerment,” or are “devoid of allegations
supported by any specific, credible evidence.” Id. (quotations omitted); see Miller v. Miller,
953 N.W.2d 489, 494 (Minn. 2021) (requiring the district court, when addressing a motion
to intervene, to accept the movant ’s allegations unless they are “frivolous on their face ”).
“Whether a party makes a prima facie case to modify custody is dispositive of whether an
evidentiary hearing will occur on the motion.” Szarzynski, 732 N.W.2d at 292.
When we review an order that denies a custody -modification motion without an
evidentiary hearing, we use a three-part process.
First, we review de novo whether the district court properly
treated the allegations in the moving party’s affidavits as true,
disregarded the contrary allegations in the nonmoving party’s
affidavits, and considered only the explanatory allegations in
the nonmoving party’s affidavits. Second, we review for an
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abuse of discretion the district court’s determination as to the
existence of a prima facie case for the modification or
restriction. Finally, we review de novo whether the district
court properly determined the need for an evidentiary hearing.

Boland v. Murtha, 800 N.W.2d 179, 185 (Minn. App. 2011). Father challenges the district
court’s decisions at each step of that process. Father also complains that the district court
erred by not appointing a guardian ad litem to represent the interests of the minor child.
We address each issue in turn.
A.
Father contends that the district court did not treat his allegations as true and
erroneously relied on contrary allegations. Again, we review this issue de novo. Id. at 184.
Father argues that the district court did not treat the following allegations as true:
DC has never gone to a dentist, mother has denied father parenting time in accordance with
the court -approved holiday schedule, mother misled the Washburn Center for Children
regarding DC’s PTSD diagnosis, DC was refused food in the school lunch line due to his
allergy plan, and mother has failed to reintroduce foods into DC’s diet at the
recommendation of DC’s allergist. Father also argues that the district court improp erly
relied upon mother’s contrary allegations in determining that father could have a “two-way
conversation” with DC’s allergy clinic, questioning father’s “statements regarding
anything resembling a medical opinion,” and repeatedly asking about allergic reactions
other than anaphylaxis.
In its order denying father’s motion to modify custody , the district court
acknowledged that it “must take the moving party’s allegations as true and disregard any
8
contrary allegations, instead considering the non-moving party’s claims only to the extent
that they either explain or contextualize the moving party’s allegations.” The order
specifically notes father’s assertion that mother refuses to share medical information with
him and that she has not reintroduced foods into DC’s diet, despite his allergist’s
recommendation.
Although the district court acknowledged several of mother’s arguments, those
arguments provided context for father’s allegations. For example, the court noted mother’s
testimony that DC has been going to the same allergy specialist office for several years,
that the doctor overseeing DC’s allergy care has seen the report from the allergist father
took DC to see, and that mother’s position was to follow the recommendations of the
providers DC has seen for years.
In sum, the record indicate s the district court neither failed to treat father’s
allegations as true nor erroneously relied on contrary allegations in denying father’s motion
for modification of custody.
B.
Father contends that the district court erred by ruling that he did not establish a prima
facie case of endangerment. We review this issue for an abuse of discretion. See id. at
185.
“Endangerment requires a showing of a significant degree of danger . . . .” Geibe,
571 N.W.2d at 778 (quotation omitted). “A finding of present endangerment must be based
on the particular facts of each case.” Lilleboe v. Lilleboe , 453 N.W.2d 721, 724 (Minn.
App. 1990); see Kimmel v. Kimmel, 392 N.W.2d 904, 908 (Minn. App. 1986) (affirming
9
district court’s endangerment finding and custody modification because “findings
document a history of physical abuse, [ the child’s] poor school performance, behavioral
problems, and lack of personal hygiene”), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 29, 1986); Clark v.
Bullard, 396 N.W.2d 41, 44 -45 (Minn. App. 1986) (upholding district court’s
endangerment-based modification of custody because the child was harmed by denial of
visitation with his father for six months and by being transferred between schools during
the first part of the year); Smith v. Smith, 508 N.W.2d 222, 227 (Minn. App. 1993) (ruling
that the mother’s act of examining a fallen clock before examining the well -being of the
child did not constitute endangerment).
“Normally . . . the conduct or circumstance of a parent . . . does not establish danger
to the welfare of children without evidence of actual adverse effects.” Dabill v. Dabill ,
514 N.W.2d 590, 595-96 (Minn. App. 1994). “[T]o establish danger to a child’s welfare,
a parent’s conduct must be shown to result in an actual adverse effect on the child .” In re
Weber, 653 N.W.2d 804, 811 (Minn. App. 2002).
The concept of “endangerment” is unusually imprecise.
In fact, endangerment is not a quantitative but a qualitative
standard. Any threat of harm to a child might arguably
constitute endangerment. On the other hand, we agree . . . that
according to the u sage of this concept in the context of child
custody, the legislature likely intended to demand a showing
of a significant degree of danger.

Ross v. Ross, 477 N.W.2d 753, 756 (Minn. App. 1991).
Father argues that he alleged a prima facie case of endangerment because he asserted
“that without court intervention [DC] is at both physical and emotional risk relating to the
foods he is able to eat.” Father also asserted that during periods when DC spent no time
10
with him, DC’s “list of allergens grew to include so many foods on the list that a healthy
diet was simply not possible.” He asserted that DC’s growth was stunted because of DC’s
allergy list and that DC’s height and weight were at the median on growth charts as a result
of father providing him with a healthy diet. Father claimed that “[DC]’s lengthy allergy
list perfectly illustrates the danger of [mother] having total authority” and that “[t]he less
time [DC] is with [father], the more time [DC] eats a substandard diet that has over the
years excluded wheat, soy, egg, tree nuts, shellfish, apples, bananas, carrots, chocolate, and
more.”
The district court concluded that father’s “claims of endangerment here are too
remote and hypothetical to support [f]ather’s motion ,” reasoning that “[t]he core fact
underlying [f]ather’s claims is that [m]other is following the recommendations of the
allergy doctors that the minor child has been seeing for many years.” As the district court
noted, father’s own evidence demonstrate d that DC’s current allergist re -evaluates and
updates DC’s allergy list, and mother testified that the current allergist is aware of father’s
concerns and of the report from the competing allergist.
In sum, f ather’s assertions raised a difference of medical opinion regarding the
child’s allergy treatment. But father’s competing medical opinion was not ignored by
mother—she shared it with the child’s physician. And there is no specific, credible
evidence that the child is endangered under his current physician’s care. See Axford v.
Axford, 402 N.W.2d 143, 145 (Minn. App. 1987) (stating that the district court may deny
an evidentiary hearing if an affidavit is “devoid of allegations supported by any s pecific,
11
credible evidence”). Father simply has not alleged a significant degree of danger, which is
necessary to make a prima facie case of endangerment.
On this record , the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that
father did not make a prima facie case of endangerment.
C.
Father contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion
without an evidentiary hearing. The issue of “[w]hether a party makes a prima facie case
to modify custody is dispositive of whether an evidentiary hearing will occur on the
motion.” Szarzynski, 732 N.W.2d at 292. Because the court did not abuse its discretion in
ruling that father failed to establish a prima facie case of endangerment, the district court
did not err by determining that there was no need for an evidentiary hearing.
D.
Father contends that the district court erred by not appointing a guardian ad litem to
represent the interests of the minor child in his custody -modification proceeding. Father
argues that the district court should have appointed a guardian ad litem to “investigate
father’s allegations of mother’s neglect.” Father cites the district court’s January 30, 2024
finding that both parties were “making emergency filings alleging harassment, abuse, child
endangerment, and failure to follow court orders.” But father did not raise this issue in his
motion for custody modification or at the February 12 hearing on that motion, even though
the district court stated, “With respect to the order for protection that is on behalf of your
child, I will be issuing an order for a guardian ” and appointed a guardian ad litem in the
OFP case.
12
“A reviewing court must generally consider only those issues that the record shows
were presented [to] and considered by the [district] court in deciding the matter before it.”
Thiele v. Stich , 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (quotation omitted). Because father
did not request appointment of a guardian ad litem in the custody-modification proceeding
in district court, we do not address that issue.
II.
We next address father’s appeal in file A24-0591, in which he challenges the district
court’s administrative order modifying his court -ordered parenting time in the parties’
family-law case. Father contends that (1) the district court changed his parenting time sua
sponte, misapplied the law, and abused its discretion , (2) the district court prejudiced his
rights when it did not return to the unsupervised parenting time provided for in the parties’
family-law case , (3) the district court’s order was barre d by res judicata , and (4) the
reunification-therapy issue was barred by collateral estoppel.
“The district court has broad discretion in determining parenting -time issues and
will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion.” Dahl v. Dahl, 765 N.W.2d 118,
123 (Minn. App. 2009). “A district court abuses its discretion by making findings of fact
that are unsupported by the evidence, misapplying the law, or delivering a decision that is
against logic and the facts on record.” Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d at 506 (quotation omitted).
Parenting time determinations are governed by Minn. Stat. § 518.175 (2022), which
provides:
In all proceedings for dissolution or legal separation,
subsequent to the commencement of the proceeding and
continuing thereafter during the minority of the child, the court
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shall, upon the request of either parent, grant such parenting
time on behalf of the child and a parent as will enable the child
and the parent to maintain a child to parent relationship that
will be in the best interests of the child.

Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 1(a). Minn. Stat. § 518.17 (2022) provides that, in evaluating
the best interests of the child for parenting-time purposes, the district court “must consider
and evaluate all relevant factors” including twelve statutory factors:
(1) a child’s physical, emotional, cultural, spiritual, and
other needs, and the effect of the proposed arrangements on the
child’s needs and development;
(2) any special medical, mental health, developmental
disability, or educational needs that the child may have that
may require special parenting arrangements or access to
recommended services;
(3) the reasonable preference of the child, if the court
deems the child to be of sufficient ability, age, and maturity to
express an independent, reliable preference;
(4) whether domestic abuse, as defined in section
518B.01, has occurred in the parents’ or either parent’s
household or relationship; the nature and context of the
domestic abuse; and the implications of the domestic abuse for
parenting and for the child’s safety, well -being, and
developmental needs;
(5) any physical, mental, or chemical health issue of a
parent that affects the child’s safety or developmental needs;
(6) the history and nature of each parent’s participation
in providing care for the child;
(7) the willingness and ability of each parent to provide
ongoing care for the child; to meet the child’s ongoing
developmental, emotional, spiritual, and cultural needs; and to
maintain consistency and follow through with parenting time;
(8) the effect on the child’s well-being and development
of changes to home, school, and community;
(9) the effect of the proposed arrangements on the
ongoing relationships between the child and each parent,
siblings, and other significant persons in the child’s life;
(10) the benefit to the child in maximizing parenting
time with both parents and the detriment to the child in limiting
parenting time with either parent;
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(11) except in cases in which domestic abuse as
described in clause (4) has occurred, the disposition of each
parent to support the child’s relationship with the other parent
and to encourage and permit frequent and continuing contact
between the child and the other parent; and
(12) the willingness and ability of parents to cooperate
in the rearing of their child; to maximize sharing information
and minimize exposure of the child to parental conflict; and to
utilize methods for resolving disputes regarding any major
decision concerning the life of the child.

Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a). In addition, “[t]he court must make detailed findings on
each of the factors . . . based on the evidence presented and explain how each factor led to
its conclusions and to the determination of custody and parenting time.” Id., subd. 1(b)(1).
The district court cited Minn. Stat. § 518.175 and Minn. Stat. § 518.131 in its
administrative order modifying father’s parenting time and stated that “[f]ather reverting
back to unsupervised parenting time would endanger the child’s physical/emotional health
or impair the child’s emotional development.” See Minn. Stat. §§ 518.175, subd. 1(a)
(generally governing parenting time “during the minority of the child ”), .131, subds. 1, 5
(governing temporary orders in “a proceeding brought for custody, dissolution, or legal
separation” and providing that such orders may remai n in effect until “entry of a final
decree of dissolution or legal separation”) (2022). In doing so, the district court heavily
relied on the guardian ad litem’s report in the OFP proceeding.
Although the district court denied mother’s requests for an OFP and an HRO, it
noted that the issues raised in those proceedings “were best suited for being
addressed . . . in the parties’ family court file .” Then, the district court modified father’s
parenting time in the family -law case without holding a hearing or otherwise providing
15
father an opportunity to address the modification . Father complains that “[t]he district
court made no reference to any authority . . . permitting the district court [to] change
parenting time on its own motion.”
The statute that governs modification of a parenting -time order states: “If
modification would serve the best interests of the child, the court shall modify . . . an order
granting or denying parenting time, if the modification would not change the child ’s
primary residence.” Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 5(b). “ Consideration of a child’s best
interest includes a child’s changing developmental needs.” Id. Although the statute does
not expressly authorize a district court to raise the issue of modificat ion of parenting time
sua sponte, we discern no obvious reason why a judge who is familiar with a family’s
current circumstances as a result of presiding over a related hearing cannot raise the
possibility of modification, so long as the district court provides notice and an opportunity
to be heard. We note that t he supreme court has allowed the district court to raise issues
on its own in other contexts, so long as it provides notice and an opportunity to be heard .
See Weitzel v. State, 883 N.W.2d 553, 554 (Minn. 2016) (providing that if the state fails to
raise certain time limits as an affirmative defense in a postconviction proceeding, the
postconviction court has discretion to raise those limits on its own motion , but “the
postconviction court must give the parties notice and afford them an opportunity to be
heard”).
Thus, we cannot say that the district court in this case erred by raising the parenting-
time issue on its own motion . However, the district court should not have modified the
order granting father unsupervised parenting-time in the parties’ family -law case without
16
first giving father an opportunity to be heard in that case. And, for the reason that follows,
the OFP hearing regarding the child was not an adequate substitute.
Although the district court relied on evidence presented at the OFP and HRO
hearings and father participated in those hearings, the focus on the child’s best interests in
those contexts was much more limited tha n it would have been at a hearing to determine
parenting time in the family -law context. Indeed, “[c]ompliance with the [statutory]
requirements for particularized ‘best interests’ findings is not required when making
temporary custody determinations under the Domestic Abuse Act.” 4 Baker v. Baker, 494
N.W.2d 282, 282 -83 (Minn. 1992) ; see Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 6(a)(4) (2022)
(providing that an OFP may establish “temporary parenting time” and may “condition or
restrict parenting time as to time, place, duration, or supervision, or deny parenting time
entirely, as needed to guard the safety of” children).
As the Baker court noted, hearings in an OFP proceeding are generally expedited
and such expedited proceedings provide
wholly inadequate time for the parties to prepare testimony and
other evidence in support of a best interests analysis, or for
county personnel to conduct custody evaluations to assist the
court.

4Although Baker has been superseded by statute, the statutory changes are not inconsistent
with Baker. See Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 6(a)(4) (stating that “the court may consider
particular best interest factors that are found to be relevant” and “[f]indings under section
257.025, 518.17, or 518.175 are not required with respect to the particular best interest
factors not considered by the court”) (2022).

17
494 N.W.2d at 290. Thus, the supreme court held that “[b]ecause the application of
a . . . ‘best interests’ analysis [requirement] is impossible to execute in the context of a
hearing on a domestic abuse order for protection, . . . it does not apply here.”5 Id.
Again, when modifying parenting time in the context of a family -law proceeding,
the district court must analyze all of the statutory best-interests factors; but the district court
is not required to do so when temporarily modifying child custody or parenting time in the
context of an OFP proceeding.6 See Baker, 494 N.W.2d at 289-90. Although an allegation
of domestic violence towards a child is highly relevant when conducting a best -interests
analysis in a family -law context, all of the best -interests factors must be considered ,
especially in a case in which the district court did not find domestic abuse.
To be clear, the district court acted within its discretion in concluding that although
it had not found domestic abuse justifying an OFP on DC’s behalf, it would be appropriate
to further address the issues raised at the OFP and HRO hearings in the context of the
parties’ family-law case. But we are not aware of any authority that allowed the district
court to modify the father’s parenting time in the family-law case without first giving the
father an opportunity to be heard in that context. The district court abused its discretion by
doing so.

5 Although the OFP statute has been modified since Baker was decided, the current version
continues to require expedited hearings. See, e.g. , Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subds. 5(a)
(requiring “a hearing which shall be held not later than 14 days”), (c) (stating, “a hearing
must be held within seven days”), (d) (stating, “the hearing shall be held within ten days”),
(e) (“Unless otherwise agreed by the parties and approved by the court, [a] continuance
shall be for no more than five days.”) (2022).
6 For that reason, the district court’s reliance on the guardian ad litem’s report in the OFP
proceeding to modify father’s parenting-time order in the family-law case was problematic.
18
In conclusion, because the district court did not err in denying father’s request for
custody modification, we affirm in part. But we remand for a hearing in the parties’ family-
law case—with notice and an opportunity to be heard —at which the district court shall
reconsider its parenting-time modification after analyzing the best-interest factors.7 The
district court shall promptly schedule a hearing on remand for this purpose, without the
need for a motion from either party. The hearing on remand will be limited to the
parenting-time issue in this appeal, unless the district court authorizes consideration of
additional issues under the authorities governing motion practice in the family-law context.
The district court retains discretion to appoint a guardian ad litem in the proceeding on
remand.
Finally, b ecause t he parenting -time determination must be based on DC’s best
interests and we cannot assess the child’s best interests on appeal, and because it is possible
that the district court will continue its order for supervised visitation after analyzing the
statutory best-interests factors, we do not disturb the district court’s order for supervised
parenting time pending the hearing on remand.
Affirmed in part and remanded.

7 For this reason, we do not address father’s res judicata and collateral estoppel arguments
except to note that “the availability and application of res judicata and collateral estoppel
in family matters is limited.” Maschoff v. Leiding , 696 N.W.2d 834, 838 (Minn. App.
2005); see Loo v. Loo , 520 N.W.2d 740 , 743 -44, 744 n.1 (Minn . 1994 ) (discussing
applicability of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel in family cases).