State of Minnesota, Respondent,

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0592

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Michael Anthony Lee,
Appellant.

Filed May 19, 2025
Reversed and remanded
Larson, Judge

Carlton County District Court
File No. 09-CR-22-2121

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Lauri A. Ketola, Carlton County Attorney, Jeffrey L.H. Boucher, Chief Deputy County
Attorney, Carlton, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Leah C. Graf, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Slieter, Judge; and Larson,
Judge.
SYLLABUS
For purposes of permissive consecutive sentencing under the Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines 2.F.2.a(1)(i) (Supp. 2021), a “prior felony sentence” does not include a
conditional-release term.

2
OPINION
LARSON, Judge
Appellant Michael Anthony Lee challenges the district court’s decision to impose a
sentence consecutive to prison time served following revocation of conditional release for
a prior offense. Specifically, Lee challenges the district court’s interpretation of the phrase
“prior felony sentence” in Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.F.2.a(1)(i) as including a conditional-
release term. We conclude that the guideline language is ambiguous. But, after applying
the relevant canons of construction, we discern that the ph rase “prior felony sentence” in
this context does not include a conditional-release term. Accordingly, we reverse and
remand for resentencing.
FACTS
Lee is a civilly committed sex offender who is a patient in the Minnesota Sex
Offender Program (MSOP) at Moose Lake. At the time of the current offense, Lee had
served his term of imprisonment and supervised release in connection with a prior assault
of an MSOP employee but was still serving a term of conditional release. The current
offense occurred on June 30, 2022, when Lee struck an MSOP employee and made
intimidating statements. In response, the Minnesota Department of Corrections (DOC)
held a conditional-release-violation hearing on July 19, 2022, revoked Lee’s conditional
release, and returned Lee to a DOC facility for 365 days with the possibility of returning
to MSOP early for good behavior.
On December 5, 2022, while Lee was serving his revocation term at the DOC
facility, respondent State of Minnesota charged Lee with fourth-degree assault on a secure-
3
treatment-facility employee, under Minn. Stat. § 609.2231, subd. 3a(b)(1) (2020), and
threats of violence, under Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1 (2020), for the same conduct
underlying the revocation of his conditional release. At his plea hearing, pursuant to a plea
agreement, Lee pleaded guilty to assault and the state dismissed the threats-of-violence
charge. The parties agreed to discuss whether sentencing should be consecutive or
concurrent and any applicable jail credit for Lee’s incarceration due to the conditional -
release violation at the sentencing hearing. The district court held Lee’s sentencing hearing
approximately four months later. At the sentencing hearing, after listening to the parties’
arguments and accepting Lee’s guilty plea, the district court determined that the sentencing
guidelines allowed for permissive consecutive sentencing. Accordingly, the district court
sentenced Lee to one year and one day on the assault charge, to be served consecutively to
the time he served for his conditional-release violation.
Lee appeals.
ISSUES
For purposes of permissive consecutive sentencing under Minn. Sent’g
Guidelines 2.F.2.a(1)(i), does the phrase “prior felony sentence” include a conditional-
release term?
ANALYSIS
Lee challenges the district court’s decision to impose a permissive consecutive
sentence. Lee argues that the phrase “prior felony sentence” in guideline 2.F.2.a(1)(i)
plainly does not include a conditional-release term or, if the guideline is ambiguous, that
the canons of construction indicate that the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission
4
(the commission)1 did not intend to include a conditional-release term within the meaning
of this phrase. The state disagrees, arguing the phrase “prior felony sentence” in
guideline 2.F.2.a(1)(i) plainly includes a conditional-release term and, even if it does not,
the canons of construction show the commission intended to include a conditional-release
term. We review de novo the legal interpretation of the sentencing guidelines. State v.
Strobel, 932 N.W.2d 303, 306 (Minn. 2019).
To address this legal question, we begin with a broad explanation of the relevant
sentencing law and guidelines, and then proceed to interpret guideline 2.F.2.a(1)(i).
A.
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines govern sentences for felony offenses. Minn.
Stat. § 244.09, subd. 5; see also State v. Solberg, 882 N.W.2d 618, 623 (Minn. 2016) (“The
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines establish presumptive sentences for felony offenses.”).
The purpose of the guidelines “is to establish rational and consistent sentencing standards
that promote public safety, reduce sentencing disparity, and ensure that the sanctions
imposed for felony convictions are proportional to the severity of the conviction offense
and the [defendant’s] criminal history.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 1.A (Supp. 2021); see
also State v. Misquadace, 644 N.W.2d 65, 68 (Minn. 2002). “Accordingly, the primary

1 The legislature provides the commission with the authority to “promulgate Sentencing
Guidelines for the district court.” Minn. Stat. § 244.09, subd. 5 (2024). Accordingly,
except for modifications to the sentencing-guidelines grid, the commission may modify the
guidelines in accordance with the commission’s procedural rules and without legislature
approval. Id., subd. 11 (2024). “Therefore, our objective when interpreting the Guidelines
is to effectuate the intent of the [commission].” State v. Woolridge Carter, 9 N.W.3d 839,
843 (Minn. 2024).
5
relevant sentencing criteria are the offense of conviction and the [defendant’s] criminal
history.” State v. Jackson, 749 N.W.2d 353, 357 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted).
Based on these two primary sentencing factors, the guidelines inform the district
court on appropriate presumptive sentences to impose. See Minn. Sent’g
Guidelines 1.B.13, 4.A-C (Supp. 2021); see also Minn. Stat. § 244.09, subd. 5. Some
guideline sentences provide for a “presumptive stayed sentence” that places the defendant
on probation.
2 See Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 1.B.13.a(2), 3.A, 4.A-C (Supp. 2021). Other
guideline sentences provide for a “presumptive commitment” to DOC, to serve an executed
sentence in a correctional facility. See Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 1.B.13.a(1), 4.A-C; see
also Minn. Stat. §§ 609.11, subd. 9, .135, subd. 1 (2024); State ex rel. Duncan v. Roy, 887
N.W.2d 271, 276 (Minn. 2016). When the guidelines provide a sentencing range, the
district court has discretion to pronounce any sentence within that range. State v. Soto, 855
N.W.2d 303, 308 (Minn. 2014) (quoting Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.1 (2012)).
When the district court imposes an executed sentence, the “sentence consists of two
parts: (1 ) a specified minimum term of imprisonment that is equal to two-thirds of the
executed sentence and (2) a specified maximum supervised release term that is equal to
one-third of the executed sentence.” Minn. Stat. § 244.101, subd. 1 (2024); see also Minn.
Sent’g Guidelines 1.B.7 (Supp. 2021) (defining “executed sentence” as “the total period of
time for which an inmate is committed to the custody of the [DOC]” and “consist[ing] of

2 “Probation” is supervision in the community subject to conditions imposed by the district
court when the defendant does not receive an executed sentence. See Minn. Stat. §§ 609.02,
subd. 15, .135, subd. 1(a)(2) (2024).
6
two parts: a minimum term of imprisonment and a maximum period of supervised
release”). Minnesota law requires DOC to “release [defendants] after they serve their term
of imprisonment” and to “supervise [defendants] during their period of supervised release.”
State ex rel. Marlowe v. Fabian, 755 N.W.2d 792, 795 (Minn. App. 2008); see also Minn.
Stat. §§ 243.05, subds. 2, 6, 244.05, subd. 1, .101, subds. 1-2 (2024); State v. Snyder, 984
N.W.2d 590, 593 (Minn. App. 2023), aff’d, 2 N.W.3d 302 (Minn. 2024). If a defendant
violates a condition of their supervised release, DOC may revoke supervised release and
reincarcerate the defendant for a period not to exceed the time remaining in the defendant’s
executed sentence. Minn. Stat. § 244.05, subd. 3 (202 4); see also Snyder, 984 N.W.2d
at 593.
Separate from a period of imprisonment and supervised release, certain offenses
require that the commissioner of corrections place the defendant on conditional release for
a specific time-period following their release from prison. See, e.g., Minn. Stat.
§§ 169A.276, subd. 1(d), 609.3455, subds. 6 -7 (2024); Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.E.3
(Supp. 2021). Although distinct from the supervised-release term, DOC “administers a
conditional-release term under the same provisions governing supervised release.” Snyder,
984 N.W.2d at 593. And “[a] violation of any conditional-release provision may result in
DOC reincarcerating the defendant for a time, up to and including the expiration of the
conditional-release term.” Id.; see also Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.276, subd. 1(d), 609.3455,
subd. 8(c) (2024).
In addition to providing guidance on the appropriate length of sentences, the
guidelines also provide detailed instructions for sentenc ing a defendant who is convicted
7
of multiple offenses. See Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.F (Supp. 2021). If a defendant has
convictions for multiple offenses, sentences are imposed concurrently or consecutively.
See id.; see also Minn. Stat. § 609.15 (2024) (providing, in part, that the district court “shall
specify whether the [multiple] sentences shall run concurrently or consecutively,” and
describing appropriate follow-up conditions based on the district court’s decision). “When
the [district] court orders sentences to be ‘concurrent,’ the [district] court is ordering that
multiple sentences be served at the same time.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 1.B.2 (Supp.
2021). “When the [district] court orders sentences to be ‘consecutive,’ the [district] court
is ordering that multiple sentences be served one after the other . . . .” Minn. Sent’g
Guidelines 1.B.3 (Supp. 2021); see also State v. Rannow, 703 N.W.2d 575, 577-79 (Minn.
App. 2005).
“Generally, when [a defendant] is convicted of multiple current offenses, or when
there is a prior felony sentence that has not expired or been discharged, concurrent
sentencing is presumptive.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.F ; see also Minn. Stat. § 609.15,
subd. 1(a) (stating that “sentences shall run concurrently” if district court does not specify
otherwise). But under limited circumstances, the district court may impose a consecutive
sentence. See Rannow, 703 N.W.2d at 577. “Consecutive sentences are a more severe
sanction because the intent is to confine the [defendant] for a longer period than under
concurrent sentences.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines cmt. 2.F.01. Because consecutive
sentences are a more severe sanction, the guidelines specify when consecutive sentencing
is required (presumptive), and when the district court has discretion to impose a
consecutive sentence (permissive). See Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.F.1-2. At issue in this
8
case is the guideline regarding permissive consecutive sentences .3 See Minn. Sent’g
Guidelines 2.F.2.
Functionally, when consecutive sentences are imposed, the service of the second
term of imprisonment begins at the end of imprisonment arising from the first sentence.
See Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.F. The comments to guideline 2.F provide the district court
with further guidance on how to implement consecutive sentences in various contexts. For
example, if the imposed “sentence is executed consecutively to another executed sentence
on the same day and before the same court, the [DOC] aggregates the separate durations
into a single fixed sentence.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines cmt. 2.F.02. If, however, the “two
sentences are executed on different days or before different courts, the second sentence is
consecutive to the first.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines cmt. 2.F.03. And if “the [defendant]
has not yet been placed on supervised release for the first sentence at the time the second
sentence is executed, then the terms of imprisonment will be aggregated” and the
supervised-release terms for both sentences “will run at the same time as each other” after
the second term of imprisonment is served. Id. But if a defendant “has already been placed
on supervised release by the time the second, consecutive sentence is executed, . . . the first
supervised release term stops running” while the defendant serves the second term of
imprisonment. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines cmt. 2.F.04. The remaining balance of the first
supervised-release term is then served at the same time as the second supervised-release
term, after the term of imprisonment is completed. Id.

3 Lee’s sentence does not qualify for presumptive consecutive sentencing. See Minn.
Sent’g Guidelines 2.F.1.
9
With this overview in mind, we analyze the guideline language at issue in this
appeal.
B.
The parties contest the meaning of guideline 2.F.2.a(1)(i) and whether it allowed the
district court to impose a permissive consecutive sentence in this case. To analyze this
issue, we apply the principles of statutory interpretation. See Woolridge, 9 N.W.3d at 843.
Our objective when interpreting the sentencing guidelines is to effectuate the intent of the
commission. Id. When interpreting the guidelines, we presume the commission acted with
“full knowledge of existing law, including the common law.” Id. (emphasis omitted)
(quoting Comm’r of Revenue v. Dahmes Stainless, Inc. , 884 N.W.2d 648, 656 (Minn.
2016)). “We also presume that plain and unambiguous language in the Guidelines
manifests the intent of the Commission.” Id. Only when the language is subject to more
than one reasonable interpretation may we “consider extrinsic sources and canons.” Id.
at 844.
To analyze whether a sentencing guideline is plain and unambiguous, we analyze
“the [guideline’s] text, structure, and punctuation” and use the canons of interpretation.
State v. Pakhnyuk , 926 N.W.2d 914, 921 (Minn. 2019); see also State v. Riggs, 865
N.W.2d 679, 682 n.3 (Minn. 2015) (distinguishing between preambiguity “canons of
interpretation” and postambiguity “canons of construction”). The preambiguity canons of
interpretation include the ordinary -meaning canon, see Riggs, 865 N.W.2d at 682, the
whole-statute canon, see Riggs, 865 N.W.2d at 683, the canon against surplusage, see State
10
v. Thompson, 950 N.W.2d 65, 69 (Minn. 2020), and the presumption of consistent usage,
see State v. Schmid, 859 N.W.2d 816, 822-23 (Minn. 2015).
As relevant here, guideline 2.F.2.a(1)(i) provides:
a. Criteria for Imposing a Permissive Consecutive
Sentence. Consecutive sentences are permissive (may be given
without departure) only in the situations specified in this
section.

(1) Specific Offenses; Presumptive
Commitment. Consecutive sentences are permissive if the
presumptive disposition for the current offense(s) is
commitment . . . and paragraph (i) . . . applies. . . .

(i) Prior Felony Sentence. A current
felony conviction for a crime on the list in section 6 of offenses
eligible for permissive consecutive sentences may be
sentenced consecutively to a prior felony sentence that has not
expired or been discharged if the prior felony conviction:
(a) is for a crime on the list in
section 6 of offenses eligible for permissive consecutive
sentences; or
(b) is from a jurisdiction other than
Minnesota and would be equivalent to a crime on the list in
section 6.

The presumptive disposition for the prior
offense(s) must also be commitment as outlined in section 2.C.

(Emphasis added.)
4
Lee argues that the phrase “prior felony sentence” unambiguously excludes a period
of conditional release. While acknowledging that the guidelines do not define the phrase
“prior felony sentence,” Lee points to two definitions to support his plain-language

4 Lee’s convictions for fourth-degree assault qualify for permissive consecutive sentencing
under Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 6 (Supp. 2021).
11
interpretation. First, Lee highlights that the guidelines define “[s]tayed sentences . . . as a
stay of imposition or a stay of execution.” See Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 1.B.19
(Supp. 2021). Second, Lee underscores that the guidelines define an “executed sentence
. . . as the total period of time for which an inmate is . . . (sent to prison). . . . [T]he sentence
consists of two parts: a minimum term of imprisonment and a maximum period of
supervised release.” See Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 1.B.7. According to Lee, because the
defined terms that contain the word “sentence” do not contemplate a conditional-release
term, the plain language of the phrase “prior felony sentence” does not include a
conditional-release term.
Lee further argues that application of the whole-statute canon demonstrates that the
phrase “prior felony sentence” does not include conditional release. See Woolridge, 9
N.W.3d at 845 (noting whole-statute canon is a preambiguity canon). The whole-statute
canon “provides that a [guideline] should be read and construed as a whole so as to
harmonize and give effect to all its parts.” State v. Johnson, 995 N.W.2d 155, 160
(Minn. 2023). Specifically, Lee points to the introduction of guideline 2.F to support his
interpretation:
Generally, when [a defendant] is convicted of multiple
current offenses, or when there is a prior felony sentence that
has not expired or been discharged, concurrent sentencing is
presumptive.

This section sets forth the criteria for imposing
consecutive sentences. Imposition of consecutive sentences in
any situation not described in this section is a departure. When
the court imposes consecutive sentences, the court must
sentence the offenses in the order in which they occurred.

12
If two or more sentences are consecutively executed at
the same time and by the same court, the Commissioner of
Corrections must aggregate the sentence durations into a single
fixed sentence. The aggregate term of imprisonment must be
served before the aggregate supervised release period.

If a sentence is executed consecutively to an earlier
executed sentence (executed at an earlier time or by a different
court), and the [defendant] has not yet been placed on
supervised release for the earlier executed sentence, the
Commissioner of Corrections must aggregate both terms of
imprisonment into a single, fixed term of imprisonment. The
[defendant] will serve the longer of the two supervised release
terms.

If a sentence is executed consecutively to an earlier
executed sentence after the supervised release date for the
earlier sentence, any remaining supervised release term from
the earlier executed sentence is tolled while the [defendant]
serves the consecutive term of imprisonment. The [defendant]
will serve what remains of the previously tolled supervised
release term or the supervised release term for the consecutive
sentence, whichever is longer.

Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.F (emphases added).
Lee highlights that guideline 2.F specifically references executed sentences and
supervised release numerous times but “makes no provision for the imposition of a
consecutive sentence while the defendant is subject only to a term of conditional release.”
According to Lee, this leads to only one reasonable interpretation, that a “prior felony
sentence” does not include conditional release.
The state offers a competing plain-language interpretation of “prior felony
sentence,” arguing that the phrase includes a conditional-release term. To support its plain-
language interpretation, the state relies on appellate-court decisions concluding that a
13
conditional-release term is a mandatory part of a “sentence” in other contexts. 5 For
example, in State v. Brown, the supreme court noted that “[t]he guidelines referred to the
requirement that an executed sentence for Brown’s offense include the conditional release
term,” when assessing whether Brown entered a voluntary and intelligent plea.
606 N.W.2d 670, 672, 673 n.3, 674-75 (Minn. 2000). And in Stone v. State, we described
conditional release as “a mandatory aspect of the sentence to be imposed by the district
court,” when deciding whether the imposition of a conditional-release term needed to be
submitted to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 675 N.W.2d 631, 634-35
(Minn. App. 2004) (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)).
We discern that both parties present reasonable interpretations of the phrase “prior
felony sentence.” Starting with the state’s proposed interpretation, it is reasonable that
“prior felony sentence” includes conditional release under the guidelines when we apply
the ordinary-meaning canon. See Riggs, 865 N.W.2d at 682 (noting the preambiguity
canon that we construe “words and phrases . . . according to rules of grammar and
according to their common and approved usage” (quoting Minn. Stat. § 645.08(1) (2014))).
Looking at the dictionary definition of the word “sentence,” a “sentence” broadly means
“the punishment imposed on a criminal wrongdoer.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1636 (11th
ed. 2019) (defining sentence); see also State v. Jama, 923 N.W.2d 632, 636 (Minn. 2019)

5 The state relies, in part, on our previous decision in State v. Bissell, that focused its
interpretation on the phrase “discharge from or expiration of the sentence.” No. A17-1804,
2018 WL 4690065 (Minn. App. Oct. 1, 2018), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 18, 2018); see also
Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.B.1(c) (2016). But Bissell is not binding and did not interpret
the phrase “prior felony sentence.”
14
(“In determining the plain and ordinary meaning of a word or phrase, we may consider
dictionary definitions.”). And, as the state points out, appellate courts have specifically
applied this broader conception of a “sentence” to conditional release in contexts outside
the sentencing guidelines. See State v. Jones, 659 N.W.2d 748, 752-53 (Minn. 2003)
(concluding district court’s imposition of mandatory-conditional release term does not
require any additional fact finding); State v. Calmes, 632 N.W.2d 641, 648-49 (Minn. 2001)
(holding defendant’s due-process rights were not violated when district court amended
defendant’s sentence to include conditional-release term) ; State v. Jumping Eagle, 620
N.W.2d 42, 44-45 (Minn. 2000) (determining that sentencing court must either modify
sentence or allow guilty plea to be withdrawn when defendant is subject to mandatory
conditional release that effectively increases their sentence beyond court-accept ed plea
agreement); Kubrom v. State, 863 N.W.2d 88, 92 (Minn. App. 2015) (“When a statute
mandates a period of conditional release, any sentence that omits the conditional -release
period is unauthorized.”); Stone, 675 N.W.2d at 634-35 (concluding conditional-release
period is part of a defendant’s maximum penalty, and does not unlawfully extend a
sentence past crime’s statutory maximum sentence).
6

6 To support its proposed interpretation if the statute is ambiguous, the state also relies on
Engquist v. Loyas, 803 N.W.2d 400, 404-05 (Minn. 2011), for the proposition that “ [t]he
prior construction canon provides that the Court’s prior interpretations of a statute guide
the Court in determining its meaning.” But in Engquist, and the cases it cites, the supreme
court relied on prior interpretations of the same statute, not the meaning of the same words
in different contexts. See id. at 404-06; see also Riverview Muir Doran, LLC v. JADT Dev.
Grp., LLC, 790 N.W.2d 167, 172 (Minn. 2010) (interpreting statutory phrase “without
notice” consistent with prior caselaw regarding same statute); Sandal v. Tallman Oil Co.,
214 N.W.2d 691, 692- 93 (Minn. 1974) (analyzing prior interpretations of same statutory

15
But, as the supreme court has noted, “the dictionary is not foolproof or failsafe.”
State v. Scovel, 916 N.W.2d 550, 555 (Minn. 2018). And, in our precedential caselaw, we
have specifically observed that the word “sentence” can have different meanings. In
Pageau v. State, we addressed “whether ‘stacked’ probationary periods automatically
result when a district court pronounces a stayed consecutive sentence.” 820 N.W.2d 271,
275 (Minn. App. 2012). To resolve this question, we had to decide “whether the term
‘sentence’ is clearly defined as including a probationary period imposed as a condition of
a stayed sentence, so that a district court’s designation of the sentence as consecutive
applies to both the period of incarceration and the period of probation.” Id. at 276. Like
here, the state argued that we could rely on “the commonly -understood definition” that a
“sentence” includes probation and other conditions. Id. We disagreed, observing that the
legislature does not have a consistent definition of the word “sentence.” Id. at 276-77. We
specifically noted that the legislature, at times, includes probation in its usage of the word
“sentence,” and, in other circumstances, excludes probation. Id. Therefore, we concluded
that the statute did not clearly define the word “sentence.” Id. at 277.

phrase to determine if circumstances warranted an exception under same statute in
immediate case); Zochrison v. Redemption Gold Corp., 274 N.W. 536, 540 (Minn. 1937)
(distinguishing case from other caselaw that interpreted and applied same statute); Allen v.
Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 17, 216 N.W. 533, 534 (Minn. 1927) (relying on stare decisis to apply
same construction of statute that court previously interpreted in a different case). Here, the
cases the state relies upon to assist our court in interpreting the phrase “sentence” did not
interpret the phrase in the context of the guidelines. And because there are no prior
decisions interpreting the guideline language at issue here, we do not apply the prior-
construction canon.
16
After applying the whole-statute canon, we reach a similar determination in this
case. The introductory language in guideline 2.F indicates that the guideline describes “the
criteria for imposing consecutive sentences” and notes that the “[i]mposition of consecutive
sentences in any situation not described in this section is a departure.” Thereafter,
guideline 2.F explains the process a district court should use when imposing consecutive
sentences, including specific examples for how a district court should impose consecutive
sentences when a person is on supervised release. But it provides no guidance on how a
district court should impose a sentence when the person is only serving a conditional-
release term. See Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.F. Given that guideline 2.F only explains the
application of a consecutive sentence with regard to supervised release and not conditional
release, we conclude that Lee presents a reasonable interpretation that “prior felony
sentence” in the context of guideline 2.F.2.a(1)(i) does not include a period of conditional
release.
In response to our request for supplemental briefing, the state argues that Lee’s
interpretation is not reasonable if we apply two preambiguity canons of interpretation: the
presumption of consistent usage and the canon against surplusage. See Thompson, 950
N.W.2d at 69-70 (analyzing these canons as “intrinsic canons” to determine whether phrase
at issue was plain and unambiguous in light of entire statute). We are not persuaded that
either makes Lee’s interpretation unreasonable.
Beginning with the presumption of consistent usage, “when different words are used
in the same context, we may assume the words have different meanings.” State v.
Culver, 941 N.W.2d 134, 139 (Minn. 2020); see also Transp. Leasing Corp. v. State, 199
17
N.W.2d 817, 819 (Minn. 1972) (“Distinctions of language in the same context must be
presumed intentional and must be applied consistent with that intent.”). The state argues
that Lee’s interpretation of “prior felony sentence” conflicts with this canon because it
requires the phrase to have the same meaning as “executed sentence” and “term of
imprisonment.” We disagree. As Lee asserted at oral argument, under Lee’s proposed
interpretation, “prior felony sentence” does not encompass conditional release, but it might
encompass other situations, such as when a person has a stayed sentence. See Minn. Sent’g
Guidelines 1.B.19. In fact, at least one guideline specifically contemplates a circumstance
where this might occur. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.F.2.a(2)(i) (allowing permissive
consecutive sentencing when a defendant “is convicted of felony escape from lawful
custody . . . and the [defendant] did not escape from an executed term of imprisonment,
disciplinary confinement, or reimprisonment”). Thus, the presumption of consistent usage
does not aid our evaluation of the plain meaning.
Moving to the canon against surplusage, it “favors giving each word or phrase in a
statute a distinct, not an identical, meaning.” Thompson, 950 N.W.2d at 69 (quotation
omitted). The state argues that Lee does not present a reasonable interpretation because
applying his proposed meaning of “prior felony sentence” to exclude conditional release
makes the phrase “expired or been discharged” in guideline 2.F.2.a(1)(i) superfluous. We
disagree. As both parties admit, a sentence is not “expired or discharged” when a defendant
remains on supervised release because DOC may revoke supervised release and
reincarcerate the defendant for the time remaining on the executed sentence if the defendant
violates a supervised-release term. See Minn. Stat. § 244.05, subd. 3; Snyder, 984 N.W.2d
18
at 593. Thus, Lee’s interpretation does not make the phrase “expired or been discharged”
superfluous.
Because both Lee and the state present reasonable interpretations of
guideline 2.F.2.a(1)(i), we conclude that the phrase “prior felony sentence” is ambiguous.
See Woolridge, 9 N.W.3d at 844.
C.
Having determined that guideline 2.F.2.a(1)(i) is ambiguous, we now turn to the
canons of construction to discern the commission’s intent. See State v. Stewart, 923
N.W.2d 668, 677, 679-80 (Minn. App. 2019) (looking to canons of construction to interpret
an ambiguous sentencing guideline in accordance with commission’s intent), rev. denied
(Minn. Apr. 16, 2019). In the context of the guidelines, we may consider the circumstances
of the guidelines’ enactment, prior versions of the guidelines, the guidelines’ purpose, and
the consequences of a particular interpretation to ascertain the commission’s intention. See
Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2024) (listing factors to consider for determining legislature’s
intention “[w]hen the words of a law are not explicit”); Pakhnyuk, 926 N.W.2d at 924
(listing factors to consider to ascertain legislature’s intent); Scovel, 916 N.W.2d at 556
(explaining that we may consider circumstances of guidelines’ enactment and “former law”
if guidelines are ambiguous). We may also consider “legislative history,” including
publicly available documents regarding the commission’s deliberations, Scovel, 916
N.W.2d at 557-58, 557 n.12, and commission policy and official interpretations, State v.
Campbell, 814 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. 2012). Upon considering these sources, we conclude
that the “better” interpretation of the phrase “prior felony sentence” in the context of
19
guideline 2.F.2.a(1)(i) is the one advanced by Lee: that a “prior felony sentence” does not
include a conditional-release term. See State v. Hayes, 826 N.W.2d 799, 804- 05 (Minn.
2013) (resolving ambiguity by determining which interpretation of ambiguous language is
“better”); see also In re Civ. Commitment of Benson, 12 N.W.3d 711, 716-17 (Minn. 2024)
(assessing the “better” interpretation of an ambiguous statute).
We begin by evaluating the circumstances of enactment. The guidelines were first
enacted in 1980 and contained a consecutive sentencing provision. Minn. Sent’g
Guidelines 2.F (1980). The 1980 version of the guidelines stated that a district court could
impose a consecutive sentence only in limited circumstances, including “[ w]hen a prior
felony sentence for a crime against a person ha [d] not expired or been discharged and one
or more of the current felony convictions [was] for a crime against a person, and when the
sentence for the most severe current conviction [was] executed according to the
guidelines.” Id. (emphasis added). The 1980 version of the guidelines also provided that
“service of the sentence for the current conviction shall commence upon the completion of
any incarceration arising out of the prior sentence” for defendants “who, while on
probation, parole, or supervised release, commit[ted] a new offense for which a consecutive
sentence [was] imposed.” Id.
Thus, the 1980 version of the guidelines contained the “prior felony sentence”
language and contemplated permissive consecutive sentencing when the defendant was on
“probation, parole, or supervised release,” but made no mention of conditional release. Id.
Indeed, it was not until 1992 that the legislature first enacted a law requiring a conditional-
20
release term.7 See Brown, 606 N.W.2d at 672 n.2 (discussing codification history).
Consequently, at the time the commission originally used the phrase “prior felony
sentence,” it could not have encompassed a conditional-release term because that concept
did not exist in Minnesota law. Said another way, in 1980 when the commission originally
used the phrase “prior felony sentence,” it did not intend to include a “then-nonexistent”
conditional-release term. See State v. Willis, 898 N.W.2d 642, 646 n.5 (Minn. 2017)
(reasoning that, because statutory right to restitution hearing did not exist when rule of
evidence was promulgated, it was “unlikely that the drafters” of the rule “intended” a term
within the rule to “encompass the then-nonexistent” hearing). The lack of change to the
language once the legislature imp osed conditional-release obligations therefore indicates
that the commission did not intend to refer to conditional release when it used that phrase.
Cf. Engquist, 803 N.W.2d at 406 (reasoning that, when the legislature fails to act following
a court’s interpretation of a statute, “we assume that the Legislature has acquiesced in our
interpretation”).
We next consider the history of the consecutive sentencing provision, specifically
that the commission has historically identified conditional release as something different
than a “prior felony sentence” within guideline 2.F in prior versions of the guidelines. In
2008, the commission amended Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.F.1 (2008) to add a defendant’s

7 The legislature later enacted additional conditional-release periods. See 2006 Minn. Laws
ch. 260, art. 1, §§ 38, at 729-30; 39, at 730 (use of minors in a sexual performance and
child pornography); 2005 Minn. Laws c h. 136, art. 17, § 11, at 1128-29 (fourth-degree
assault); 2005 Minn. Laws ch. 136, art. 3, § 8 , at 947-48 (failure to register); 2001 Minn.
Laws 1st Spec. Sess. ch. 9, art. 19, § 9, at 2699-2700 (felony DWI).
21
status on “conditional release” as a circumstance that triggered a presumptive consecutive
sentence. In doing so, the commission demonstrated its specific intent that consecutive
sentences should apply in the context of conditional release by explicitly using that phrase
within the guideline. This language remained until 2015 . Minn. Sent’g
Guidelines 2.F.1.a(1)(iv) (Supp. 2015). In 2016, the commission removed this language
from guideline 2.F.1 and added the current language that contemplates consecutive
sentences to an earlier executed sentence only when the defendant is serving the earlier
term of imprisonment or when the defendant is on supervised release. Minn. Sent’g
Guidelines 2.F & 2.F.1.a(1) (2016). 8 This evolution of the guidelines as they relate to
consecutive sentences demonstrates that when the commission stated that a felony sentence

8 The commission’s deliberative process when making this change to the guidelines also
supports Lee’s proposed interpretation. While discussing consecutive sentencing, the
commission referred to “conditional release” as “a third period of time at issue,” and one
proposal considered “eliminat[ing] presumptive consecutive sentencing for offenses
committed on supervised or conditional release” because of the speculation it invited.
Minn. Sent’g Guidelines, Consecutive Supervised Release Presentation 2, 14 (Oct. 16,
2014), https://mn.gov/sentencing-guidelines/assets/Consecutive%20Supervised%20
Release%20Presentation_tcm30-31712.pdf [https://perma.cc/8646-LFVQ]
. Later, in its
modification report to the legislature, the commission explained that they “adopted uniform
standards establishing how consecutive supervised release terms are to be served” and
resolved the speculation issue by “eliminating presumptive consecutive sentencing for
[defendants] on supervised release or conditional release.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines
Comm’n, Report to the Legislature 18-19 (Jan. 15, 2016), https://mn.gov/sentencing-
guidelines/assets/MN%20Sentencing%20Guidelines%20Comm%202016%20Report%20
to%20the%20Legislature1_tcm30-114326.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R5VH-BBQT]. The
commission noted that “[t]he [district] [c]ourt may sentence permissively under qualifying
conditions,” id. at 82, but did not add conditional-release language to guideline 2.F.2, id.
at 89-90. Therefore, the commission’s deliberative process shows the commission was
aware of the issues conditional release posed to implementing consecutive sentences, and
yet added no language to address the issue in their attempt to create “uniform standards”—
further supporting the conclusion that they did not intend to include conditional release
within guideline 2.F.2.a(1)(i).
22
could be executed consecutively to a prior offense if the “prior felony sentence . . . has not
expired or been discharged,” and did so without any reference to a conditional-release term,
the commission did not intend to apply the guideline to conditional release. Minn. Sent’g
Guidelines 2.F.2.a(1)(i).
Reviewing the full sentencing guidelines, we also discern that the commission
specifically uses the phrase “conditional release” when it intends a particular guideline to
apply. For example, in the section regarding custody-status points, the guidelines
specifically discuss the impact of “conditional release following release from an executed
prison sentence.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.B.2.a(1). The guidelines also describe the
“mandatory” nature of imposing “conditional release terms.” Minn. Sent’g Gu idelines
2.E.3; see also Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 4.B (Supp. 2021) (noting that “conditional release
terms” are “controlled by law”). But no such language is present in guideline 2.F,
bolstering the conclusion that the commission did not intend to apply permissive
consecutive sentences to conditional release.
Finally, the comments to guideline 2.F support Lee’s interpretation. Throughout
the comments, the commission provides thorough examples of different sentencing
scenarios that might occur when imposing a consecutive sentence. See generally Minn.
Sent’g Guidelines 2.F cmts.9 Conspicuously absent from the comments are any examples
in which the individual is currently on conditional release. The absence of such examples
amid a clear attempt to provide illustrative guidance to district courts under various

9 Some of these comments are illustrated above in Part A.
23
circumstances further demonstrates that Lee’s interpretation is the “better” interpretation.
See Hayes, 826 N.W.2d at 804-05.
The state makes only one argument to assert that its interpretation is “better.”
Relying on Heilman v. Courtney, the state contends that because “[f]unctionally,
conditional release is identical to supervised release,” the better interpretation is to give the
phrases “supervised release” and “conditional release” the same meaning. 926 N.W.2d
387, 394 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted). We acknowledge that there are strong
structural similarities between conditional release and supervised release. See id.; see also
Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.276, subd. 1(d) (stating that supervised release provisions govern
DOC’s administration of conditional-release terms, unless an exception applies), 609.3455,
subd. 8(a) (2024) (providing that “conditional release of sex offenders is governed by
provisions relating to supervised release,” unless an exception applies). But the two are
legally separate requirements. Compare Minn. Stat. § 244.05, subd. 1 (2024) (outlining
that “every inmate shall serve a supervised release term upon completion of the inmate’s
term of imprisonment,” unless an exception applies (emphasis added)), with Minn. Stat.
§ 169A.276, subd. 1(d) (requiring commissioner of corrections to place defendant on
conditional release if they were committed to DOC “under this subdivision” (emphasis
added)), and Minn. Stat. § 609.3455, subds. 6-7 (requiring commissioner of corrections to
impose conditional release when defendant was committed to DOC for violations of
specified statutes).
Moreover, the guidelines define supervised release without referencing conditional
release. See Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 1.B.7.b. And the guidelines identify conditional
24
release as a mandatory term “that must be served by certain offenders once they are
released from prison” without reference to supervised release. See Minn. Sent’g
Guidelines 2.E.3. This indicates that the commission means different things when they use
the two phrases. 10 Further, as set forth in detail above, the history of the guidelines
demonstrates that the commission has consistently referred to supervised release and
conditional release as separate concepts. See, e.g., Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.B.2.a(1)
(Supp. 2021) (separately listing supervised release and conditional release). Because our
charge is to determine the commission’s intent when it used the phrase “prior felony
sentence” in guideline 2.F.2.a(1)(i), see Woolridge, 9 N.W.3d at 843, we are not persuaded
that caselaw assessing legislative intent in a separate context provides the “better”
interpretation.
For these reasons , we conclude that, for the purposes of permissive consecutive
sentencing under guideline 2.F.2.a(1)(i), the phrase “prior felony sentence” does not
include a conditional-release term. Therefore, the district court erred when it imposed a
consecutive sentence in this case, as Lee’s “prior felony sentence” had expired at the time
of sentencing because he had served his term of imprisonment and supervised release.
DECISION
The district court erred when it imposed a permissive consecutive sentence to the
time Lee served for revocation of his conditional-release term . The phrase “prior felony
sentence” as used in guideline 2.F.2.a(1)(i) does not include a conditional-release term and

10 It would also be inconsistent with the canon against surplusage to give the two phrases
the same meaning. See Thompson, 950 N.W.2d at 69.
25
Lee’s prior felony sentence had “expired or been discharged” after he served his term of
imprisonment and supervised release. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for
resentencing consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.