Chad Loran Siegel, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0594

Chad Loran Siegel,
Appellant,

vs.

Drew Evans,
Respondent.

Filed November 12, 2024
Affirmed
Larson, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CV-23-423

Bradford Colbert, Legal Assistance to Minnesota Prisoners, Timothy Stowell (certified
supervised practitioner), St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Angela Helseth Kiese, Assistant Attorney General,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Larson, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Bjorkman,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARSON, Judge
Appellant Chad L. Siegel filed a civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserting
that respondent Drew Evans, the Superintendent of the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension
(BCA), violated his constitutional and statutory rights when the BCA required him to
register as a predatory offender under Minn. Stat. § 243.166 (2022). On appeal, Siegel
2
challenges the district court’s decision to grant Evans’s motion for summary judgment on
the ground that a six-year statute of limitations barred Siegel’s claims. Evans argues, as an
alternative basis for affirmance,1 that the law requires Siegel to register. Because we agree
with Evans that Siegel is required to register, we affirm.
FACTS
The following facts are undisputed. On April 21, 2013, Siegel was charged with
one-count of attempted second-degree murder under Minn. Stat. § 609.19 (2012), one-
count of first-degree assault under Minn. Stat. § 609.221 (2012), and two-counts of
kidnapping under Minn. Stat. § 609.25 (2012). To support the charges, the state alleged
that the victim entered or was pushed into Siegel’s car, Siegel drove the victim to another
location, and Siegel and other men pulled the victim from the car and assaulted him. Based
on these facts, the district court “determined that probable cause exist[ed]” to support the
charges.
Siegel waived a reading of the complaint and an omnibus hearing. See Minn. R.
Crim. P. 11.02. The matter was tried before a jury. At the trial’s conclusion, Siegel moved
for judgments of acquittal on, as relevant here, the kidnapping charges pursuant to Minn.
R. Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 18(1)(a). The district court granted the motion, determining that

1 Siegel filed a motion to strike the portion of Evans’s brief arguing that Siegel is required
to register. We denied Siegel’s motion, concluding that this argument asserts an alternative
basis for affirmance that did not require Evans to file a notice of related appeal. See Hunt
ex rel. Hunt v. Sherman, 345 N.W.2d 750, 753 n.3 (Minn. 1984) (“[A] respondent may,
without taking a cross -appeal, urge in support of a decree any matter appearing in the
record, even though the argument may involve an attack upon the reasoning of the lower
court or an insistence upon matters overlooked or ignored by it.”).
3
the state presented insufficient evidence for any reasonable trier of fact to find Siegel guilty
of kidnapping. The jury thereafter found Siegel not guilty of second-degree attempted
murder and guilty of first-degree assault.
The district court sentenced Siegel to 172 months in prison. At the sentencing
hearing, the district court informed Siegel that he would need to register as a predatory
offender and included this instruction in the sentencing order . On direct appeal, Siegel
challenged his conviction and sentence, but did not challenge whether he was required to
register as a predatory offender. See State v. Siegel, No. A14-0669, 2015 WL 1608762
(Minn. App. Apr. 13, 2015), rev. denied (Minn. June 26, 2015). Siegel first registered as
a predatory offender on March 14, 2014, and his registration term is set to expire on
November 8, 2032—ten years after his most recent release from incarceration.
In August 2022, Siegel sued Evans in his official capacity, alleging, as relevant here,
that requiring Siegel to register as a predatory offender violates Minn. Stat. § 243.166. The
parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. The district court granted Evans’s
motion for summary judgment, concluding Siegel’s claim was barred by a six-year statute
of limitations. See Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(5) (2022).
Siegel appeals.
DECISION
Siegel challenges the district court’s decision that a six-year statute of limitations
bars his claims. Evans argues, as an alternative basis for affirmance , that Siegel’s claim
4
fails on its merits because he is required to register as a predatory offender under Minn.
Stat. § 243.166.
“We review the grant of summary judgment de novo to determine ‘whether there
are genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court erred in its application of
the law.’” Montemayor v. Sebright Pro ds., Inc., 898 N.W.2d 623, 628 (Minn. 2017)
(quoting Stringer v. Minn. Vikings Football Club, LLC, 705 N.W.2d 746, 754 (Minn.
2005)). In doing so, “[w]e view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against
whom summary judgment was granted.” STAR Ctrs., Inc. v. Faegre & Benson, L.L.P., 644
N.W.2d 72, 76-77 (Minn. 2002).
For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that Siegel is required to register as a
predatory offender and decline to reach Siegel’s argument regarding the statute of
limitations. See State v. Williams, 862 N.W.2d 701, 702 n.4 (Minn. 2015) (declining to
decide a statute-of-limitations issue where appellant’s claims failed on the merits). To
explain our decision, we briefly describe Minnesota law related to predatory -offender
registration before addressing Siegel’s claim on its merits.
A.
Under Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1b(a)(1), an individual must register as a
predatory offender if:
the person was charged with . . . a felony violation of or
attempt to violate, or aiding, abetting, or conspiracy to commit,
any of the following, and convicted of . . . that offense or
another offense arising out of the same set of circumstances:
. . .
(ii) kidnapping under section 609.25 . . . .
5
(Emphasis added.) This statute is unique to Minnesota: “Minnesota appears to be the only
state in the nation . . . that requires registration . . . if an offender is merely charged with a
predatory offense and then convicted of any other offense—no matter how minor —that
arises from the same set of circumstances . . . .” State v. Berry, 959 N.W.2d 184, 187 n.3
(Minn. 2021) (quotations omitted).
To require registration, the charge implicating registration must be supported by
probable cause. State v. Haukos, 847 N.W.2d 270, 274 (Minn. App. 2014). “Probable
cause exists where the facts would lead a person of ordinary care and prudence to entertain
an honest and strong suspicion that the person under consideration is guilty of a crime.”
State v. Carlson, 267 N.W.2d 170, 173 (Minn. 1978). “The evidence necessary to support
a finding of probable cause is significantly less than that required to support a conviction.”
State v. Harris, 589 N.W.2d 782, 790 (Minn. 1999). “Unlike proof beyond a reasonable
doubt or preponderance of the evidence, probable cause requires only a probability or
substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity.” Id. at 790-
91 (quotation omitted); cf. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 245 n.13 (1983) (“[I]nnocent
behavior frequently will provide the basis for a showing of probable cause.”). And it is the
judiciary’s determination that a charge is supported by probable cause, not the prosecutor’s
decision to bring the charge, that triggers registration. Haukos, 847 N.W.2d at 273.
6
Here, Siegel would be required to register as a predatory offender if probable cause
existed to support the kidnapping charges. 2 Minnesota’s appellate courts have issued a
series of decisions analyzing when probable cause exists to require registration.
The Minnesota Supreme Court first addressed this question in State v. Lopez. 778
N.W.2d 700, 703-04 (Minn. 2010). There, the defendant moved to dismiss the charges that
required registration for lack of probable cause. Id. at 703. The district court determined
the charges were supported by probable cause and denied the defendant’s motion, but the
state ultimately dismissed the charges that required registration before trial. Id. On appeal,
the defendant challenged the district court’s probable-cause determination. Id. at 703-04.
The supreme court held that a district court should deny a motion to dismiss for lack of
probable cause “where ‘the facts appearing in the record, including reliable hearsay, would
preclude the granting of a motion for a [judgment] of acquittal if proved at trial.’” Id.
(quoting State v. Florence, 239 N.W.2d 892, 903 (Minn. 1976)). The supreme court then
applied that standard and determined that the state had presented sufficient evidence to
support the district court’s probable-cause determination. Id. at 704. Because the charge
was supported by probable-cause at the time the district court made its decision, 3 the
defendant was required to register even though the state later dismissed the charge. Id.

2 Siegel does not contest that the kidnapping charges arose out of the same set of
circumstances as the assault offense for which he was convicted.
3 The supreme court explicitly refused to consider an exculpatory statement that was made
after the district court made the probable-cause determination. Lopez, 778 N.W.2d at 704
(“We therefore conclude that although J.S. later gave an exculpatory statement and the
charge of aiding and abetting kidnapping was eventually dismissed, the district court did
not err in concluding that the charge was supported by probable cause.”).
7
We then addressed this question in Haukos. 847 N.W.2d at 273-75. There, the
defendant did not file a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of probable cause, but the
district court acquitted the defendant of the registrable offense after a bench trial. Id. at
272. On appeal, the defendant challenged whether the registrable offense was supported
by probable cause. Id. at 274-75. We evaluated the claim based on the face of the
complaint. Id. at 274-75, 274 n.4 (noting that defendant “waived his opportunity to provide
an evidentiary basis to supplement the information found in the complaint for purposes of
a probable-cause challenge” when he failed to challenge probable cause before trial). The
defendant argued the charge lacked probable cause because the state did not address all the
elements in the complaint and the defendant’s “ultimate acquittal of that charge [must]
compel the finding that the charge was not supported by probable cause.” Id. at 274. We
disagreed, reiterating that “the evidence necessary to support a finding of probable cause
is significantly less than that required to support a conviction.” Id. (quoting Harris, 589
N.W.2d at 790). And, after reviewing the complaint, we concluded that the allegations
were “sufficient to lead a person of ordinary care and prudence to entertain an honest and
strong suspicion that [the defendant] was guilty.” Id. at 275.
Most recently, in State v. Munger, we addressed the defendant’s argument that he
should not be required to register as a predatory offender when a jury acquitted him of the
charge that required registration. 858 N.W.2d 814, 822-23 (Minn. App. 2015), rev. denied
(Minn. Mar. 25, 2015). We disagreed, concluding that such a decision would be
inconsistent with Haukos, where the defendant was required to register even after the
factfinder acquitted the defendant of the charge. Id. In doing so, we directly rejected the
8
defendant’s argument that we should apply the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, rather
than the probable-cause standard, to determine whether the defendant must register. Id.
From this line of cases, we discern two principles important to this case: (1) we
apply the probable-cause standard to evaluate whether the charged offense requires
registration irrespective of the final disposition of that charge, see id., and (2) when the
defendant fails to file a motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause, we review the
complaint—not the evidence presented at trial—to evaluate whether the charge was
supported by probable cause, see Haukos, 847 N.W.2d at 274-75, 274 n.4. With these
principles in mind, we turn to Siegel’s argument that he is not required to register.
B.
On appeal, Siegel argues that he is not required to register as a predatory offender
because the district court entered judgments of acquittal on both kidnapping charges—the
offenses requiring registration. See Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1b(a)(1)(ii) (listing
“kidnapping under section 609.25” as an offense that requires registration). According to
Siegel, entering a judgment of acquittal is akin to a finding that the complaint was not
supported by probable cause and he is, therefore, not required to register.
Under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 18(1)(a), “[a]t the close of evidence for either
party, the defendant may move for . . . a judgment of acquittal on one or more of the charges
if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction.” To grant this motion, the district
court must determine whether “the evidence is sufficient to present a fact question for the
jury’s determination.” Allwine v. State, 994 N.W.2d 528, 537 (Minn. 2023) (quoting State
v. Slaughter, 691 N.W.2d 70, 74-75 (Minn. 2005)). Becau se a motion for a judgment of
9
acquittal challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the district court must assess “whether
the facts in the record and the legitimate inferences drawn from them would permit the jury
to reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt . . . .” See
State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Minn. 2010) (emphasis added) (quotation
omitted); see also State v. Sam, 859 N.W.2d 825, 830 (Minn. App. 2015) (concluding the
Al-Naseer standard applies to a motion for a judgment of acquittal).
To support his argument that a judgment of acquittal equates to a determination that
the complaint lacked probable cause, Siegel relies on the language in Lopez that probable
cause exists “where ‘the facts appearing in the record, including reliable hearsay, would
preclude the granting of a motion for a [judgment] of acquittal if proved at trial.’” 778
N.W.2d at 703-04 (quoting Florence, 239 N.W.2d at 903). According to Siegel, because
the supreme court equated the probable-cause determination with the standard for granting
a motion for a judgment of acquittal, it follows that when a district court grants a motion
for a judgment of acquittal it means the complaint lacked probable cause. We are not
persuaded for three reasons.
First, Siegel’s argument misconstrues Lopez. In Lopez, the supreme court indicated
that when a defendant files a motion to dismiss for lack probable cause, the district court
must evaluate whether the state supported the complaint with enough facts to “preclude the
granting of a motion for a [judgment] of acquittal if proved at trial” at the time the district
court decides the motion to dismiss . Id. (quotation omitted). The supreme court did not
say that if, after a trial on the merits, the state ultimately fails to prove the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt, the complaint necessarily lacked probable cause. In fact, when
10
evaluating the probable-cause determination, the supreme court explicitly refused to
consider exculpatory statements that were made after the probable- cause determination.
See id. at 704.
Second, we are bound by our decision in Haukos that when a defendant does not
file a motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause, he “waive[s] his opportunity to provide
an evidentiary basis to supplement the information found in the complaint for purposes of
a probable-cause challenge.” 847 N.W.2d at 274 n.4. And consequently, even when a
defendant is ultimately acquitted of the charge that requires registration, we evaluate
whether probable cause existed on “the face of the complaint.” Id. at 274. Therefore,
because the district court necessarily considered the evidence presented at trial to decide
the motion for a judgment of acquittal, see Minn. R. Crim. P. 2 6.03, subd. 18(1)(a),
equating the district court’s decision on such a motion with a probable-cause determination
contravenes our prior precedent that we do not look beyond the four corners of the
complaint when a defendant does not separately challenge probable cause, see Haukos, 847
N.W.2d at 274-75.
Last, Siegel’s argument equating a probable-cause determination and a decision to
enter a judgment of acquittal is in direct conflict with our decision in Munger that—even
when a defendant is acquitted of the charge that requires registration—we apply the
probable-cause standard to evaluate whether a defendant must register. 858 N.W.2d at
822-23. As set forth above, to decide a motion for a judgment of acquittal under rule 26.03,
subdivision 18(1)(a), the district court must evaluate “whether the facts in the record and
the legitimate inferences drawn from them would permit the jury to reasonably conclude
11
that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt . . . .” See Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d
at 473 (emphasis added) (quotation omitted). Because the district court applies the beyond-
a-reasonable-doubt standard in this context, equating its decision to enter a judgment of
acquittal with a probable-cause determination directly contradicts Munger. See 858
N.W.2d at 822-23; see also Haukos, 847 N.W.2d at 274 (concluding that we evaluate
whether probable cause supports an offense by asking whether evidence shows “a
probability or substantial chance of criminal activity,” a significantly lower standard than
“beyond a reasonable doubt” (quotation omitted)).
Here, at the time the state filed the complaint, the district court determined the
kidnapping charges were supported by probable cause. And Siegel did not challenge that
determination or make any factual record for us to review apart from the four corners of
the complaint. To support the kidnapping charges, the state alleged that the victim entered
or was pushed into Siegel’s car, Siegel drove the victim to another location, and Siegel and
other men pulled the victim from the car and assaulted him. We conclude that these facts
would lead a person of ordinary care and prudence to entertain an honest and strong
suspicion that Siegel was guilty of kidnapping. For this reason, we affirm the district
court’s decision to grant summary judgment.
Affirmed.