A24-0862

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0602
A24-0862

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Hollis John Larson,
Appellant.

Filed March 3, 2025
Affirmed
Bentley, Judge

Carlton County District Court
File Nos. 09-CR-23-1332, 09-CR-22-986

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Lauri A. Ketola, Carlton County Attorney, Jeffrey L.H. Boucher, Chief Deputy County
Attorney, Carlton, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Roy G. Spurbeck, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bentley, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Slieter,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BENTLEY, Judge
While confined under a civil commitment order pursuant to statutes regulating the
Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP), appellant Hollis John Larson was charged on
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two separate occasions with damage to property under Minn. Stat. § 609.595, subd. 1(4)
(2020). During the pendency of those criminal matters, MSOP staff placed Larson on
administrative-restriction status and housed him for periods in a high-security area (HSA).
He ultimately pleaded guilty to one count of damage to property with the understanding
that the other count would be dismissed but that he may have to pay restitution on both
counts.
The district court sentenced Larson to 13 months’ imprisonment on the convicted
count and stayed execution for three years, and also ordered Larson to pay restitution on
both originally charged counts. On appeal, Larson argues that the district court erred by
denying him custody credit for the time he spent on administrative-restriction status and in
the HSA in connection with both charges. Larson also filed a self-represented supplemental
brief arguing that the district court erred in several ways. We see no grounds for reversal
and therefore affirm.
FACTS
The following summarizes the relevant facts in the record before the district court
at the time of sentencing.
At all times relevant to this appeal, Larson has been civilly committed to an MSOP
facility in Moose Lake as a sexually dangerous person . In August 2021, Larson broke a
window in his room at MSOP and refused to move to another room . As a result, MSOP
employees placed Larson on administrative-restriction status1 and in the HSA, which is a

1 “Administrative restriction” is a measure used by MSOP staff “to maintain safety and
security, protect possible evidence, and prevent the continuation of suspected criminal
3
more secure, segregated housing unit. In October 2021, while Larson was still on
administrative restriction but no longer in the HSA, he again damaged a window in his
room. After spending two days in the HS A, Larson was moved to a new room, where he
broke another window, and was placed back in the HSA. The following year, in August
2022, while still on administrative restriction, Larson broke a metal shelving unit off a wall
and used it to damage 16 windows in his unit. He was moved to the HSA again.
In June 2022, respondent State of Minnesota charged Larson under Minnesota
Statutes section 609.595, subdivision 1(4) (damage to property that reduced the value of
the property by more than $1,000) for the conduct that occurred in August and October
2021. Then, in August 2023, the state charged Larson with violating the same provision
for the conduct that occurred in August 2022. The two cases were consolidated in the
district court.2
Larson waived his right to counsel and, representing himself, brought a mental-
illness defense and moved the court for expert-witness fees. The district court ordered an
examination and written report of Larson’s mental condition, pursuant to Minn. R. Crim.
P. 20.02, subd. 2, and reserved ruling on the issue of expert-witness fees. Then, before the
district court ruled on th e fee motion, Larson entered into a plea agreement with the state

acts.” Minn. Stat. § 253D.02, subd. 2 (2024). It applies to “committed persons in a secure
treatment facility who,” as relevant here, “are suspected of committing a crime or charged
with a crime” or “are the subject of a criminal investigation.” Id. It may include “separation
of a committed person from the normal living environment,” such as in the HSA. Id.

2 The cases were also consolidated with a third charge that was subsequently dismissed and
is not relevant to the issues on appeal.
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and pleaded guilty to the August 2023 charge. As part of the agreement, the state agreed to
dismiss the June 2022 charge but reserved the right to request restitution on that charge.
At sentencing in January 2024, Larson argued that he was entitled to custody credit
for the time he served on administrative restriction and in the HSA “while the[] charges
were pending.” He stated that he was in the HSA , which was “more punitive, more
restricted than Carlton County Jail,” for 514 days. 3 The district court denied Larson’s
request for custody credit because Larson’s “confinement at Moose Lake was unaffected
by the charges.” The district court sentenced Larson to 13 months in prison and stayed
execution for three years, during which time Larson would be placed on unsupervised
probation.
In April 2024, the district court held a hearing to determine the amount of restitution
Larson would have to pay. Larson objected to restitution, arguing in an affidavit prior to
the hearing that he has “absolutely no income and does not expect any income for the
foreseeable future.” (Emphasis omitted.) At the hearing, Larson argued that restitution is
not appropriate because “MSOP incurred no out-of-pocket loss, no economic loss.” The
district court ordered Larson to pay $5,508.20 for the June 2022 charge and $28,220 for
the August 2023 charge.
Larson appealed both the January 2024 sentencing order and the April 2024
restitution order. He then filed a motion with this court to consolidate the appeals, which
we granted.

3 Based on the record on appeal, we cannot independently verify the number of days Larson
spent in the HSA.
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DECISION
We first address Larson’s argument that he is entitled to custody credit for the time
he spent on administrative-restriction status and in the HSA. We then address the
arguments Larson raises in his self-represented supplemental brief.
I
A defendant bears the burden of establishing that they are entitled to custody credit
“for time spent in custody ‘in connection with the offense or behavioral incident being
sentenced.’” State v. Roy, 928 N.W.2d 341, 344-45 (Minn. 2019) (quoting Minn. R. Crim.
P. 27.03, subd. 4(B)). Whether to award credit is a mixed question of fact and law that
requires the district court to “determine the circumstances of the custody the defendant
seeks credit for, and then apply the rules to those circumstances.” State v. Johnson, 744
N.W.2d 376, 379 (Minn. 2008). An award or denial of custody credit is “governed by
principles of fairness and equity, and a reviewing court can only ‘address this issue on a
case-by-case basis.’” State v. Razmyslowski, 668 N.W.2d 681, 683 (Minn. App. 2003)
(quoting State v. Dulski, 363 N.W.2d 307, 310 (Minn. 1985)). In undertaking that review,
appellate courts review the district court’s interpretation of the rules of criminal procedure
de novo and “will not reverse a district court’s factual findings unless they are clear ly
erroneous or contrary to law.” Johnson, 744 N.W.2d at 379.
As a general matter, the Minnesota Supreme Court has held that placement in civil
commitment or in a treatment facility may qualify for c ustody credit in certain
circumstances. In Asfaha v. State, for example, the supreme court concluded that a
defendant was entitled to custody credit for time spent in an intensive treatment program
6
as a condition of his probation, because the restrictions imposed were the “functional
equivalent” of those in a juvenile correctional facility. 665 N.W.2d 523, 524 (Minn. 2003).
And in Razmyslowski , this court concluded that the “restrictions and the confinement
imposed” at an intensive treatment program, which were required as a condition of the
defendant’s sentence, were “substantially similar” to those in Asfaha and, therefore, the
defendant was entitled to custody credit for the time he spent at the program. 668 N.W.2d
at 684.
However, Asfaha and Razmyslowski do not guide our analysis because the issue here
is not whether Larson was placed in custody in connection with that offense. Larson was
already in custody, through civil confinement, at the Moose Lake MSOP facility at the time
of the August 2023 charge for which he was sentenced. Rather, the question is whether
Larson is entitled to custody credit for some of the time spent at the Moose Lake facility
during the pendency of the criminal proceedings because the conditions of his confinement
changed in connection with the offense.
The supreme court touched on this issue in Johnson. 744 N.W.2d 376. There, the
court held that civil confinement under the MSOP, although the functional equivalent of a
jail, does not qualify for custody credit if the individual is civilly committed prior to the
charges and there is “no evidence in the record that the terms of [the individual’s]
confinement under civil commitment have been altered because of the criminal charges.”
Id. at 380. On the facts of that case, which are also true here, the supreme court noted that
the defendant’s sentence without custody credit did not “prolong [his] confinement”
because the defendant was under civil commitment for an “indefinite” period. Id. And for
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that reason, the supreme court concluded that the defendant was not entitled to custody
credit for time spent in civil confinement during the pendency of the criminal charges. Id.
Larson argues that his circumstances are different from those in Johnson because,
even if the criminal charges here did not prolong his confinement in civil commitment, he
was placed on administrative restriction and spent time in the HSA in connection with the
offenses underlying the two charges. He maintains that the terms of his confinement
therefore had changed. We agree that the court in Johnson did not directly address the
question of whether placement on administrative restriction or in a facility’s HSA in
connection with criminal charges for which an individual is eventually sentenced could
qualify for custody credit. 4 But we need not reach that issue here because, even assuming
without deciding that a defendant could get custody credit for time spent in civil
confinement if the charges materially change d the conditions of confinement but not the
duration, Larson has not met his burden to establish that the August 2023 charges changed
the conditions of his confinement.5
Larson argues that he is entitled to custody credit for the time spent on
administrative restriction and in the HSA between August 2021 (the date of the first offense

4 The court did, however, conclude that a delay in treatment in connection with criminal
charges would not warrant custody credit. Johnson, 744 N.W.2d at 380.

5 We acknowledge that a nonprecedential decision of this court reads Johnson as limiting
the availability of custody credit to confinements that extend the duration of a civil
confinement. See State v. Roblero -Barrios, No. A09-1009, 2009 WL 3575222 , at *3- 4
(Minn. App. Nov. 3, 2009). Nonprecedential opinions are not binding authority but may
be cited for their persuasive value. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c). We do not
consider the persuasiveness of Roblero-Barrios here because we do not reach the
underlying question at issue in that case.
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relating to the June 2022 charge) and December 2023 (the date of his guilty plea on the
August 2023 charge, which resulted in the dismissal of the June 2022 charge). His
arguments are unpersuasive for two key reasons.
First, Larson is not eligible for custody credit for time spent in custody in connection
with the June 2022 charge. Custody credit is only available for time “in custody in
connection with the offense or behavioral incident being sentenced.” Minn. R. Crim. P.
27.03, subd. 4(B) (emphasis added). Larson is not entitled to custody credit for time spent
in the HSA in connection with the June 2022 charge because he was not sentenced for that
charge.
Second, at the time of the offense in August 2022, which led to the August 2023
charge, Larson was already on administrative -restriction status and was thus subject to
placement in the HSA, see Minn. Stat. §§ 253D.02, subd. 2, .18(b) (2024); and he had
indeed been moved in and out of the HSA in connection with the various behavioral
incidents that resulted in the June 2022 charge. The August 2023 charge, therefore, did not
materially alter “the terms of [Larson’s] confinement under civil commitment. ” Johnson,
744 N.W.2d at 380. During the entire pendency of the August 2023 charge, the only charge
for which Larson was sentenced, he was already subject to administrative restriction and
associated housing separation as a result of the June 2022 charge. Larson acknowledges as
much, by arguing at sentencing and in his briefing on appeal that he seeks custody credit
for the time “while [both] charges were pending,” beginning in August 2021.
Considering that the “policy behind giving custody credit is to ensure fairness and
proportionality in sentencing,” id. at 379, we conclude that those purposes would not be
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served by granting custody credit here because Larson was subject to the same restrictive
conditions in civil confinement before and after the incident relating to the charge for which
he was sentenced. His placement on administrative restriction and in the HSA during the
relevant period do not reflect a de facto double sentence on the August 2023 charge that
would warrant custody credit to ensure fairness or proportionality in his sentence. See id.
at 380.
In his counseled brief, Larson requests that we remand for an evidentiary hearing to
determine whether and how much credit he should receive. But Larson had the burden at
sentencing to establish he was entitled to custody credit. See Roy, 928 N.W.2d at 345. And
on the record before us, there is no way to disentangle any changes to the conditions of his
confinement as between the June 2022 and August 2023 charges. That holds true even
though the June 2022 charge was ultimately dismissed because administrative restriction,
and associated housing restrictions, may extend “until [a] charge is disposed of.” Minn.
Stat. § 253D.18(e) (2024). There is no indication in the record that Larson was removed
from administrative restriction with respect to the June 2022 charge before he pleaded
guilty, which disposed of that charge.
For these reasons, we discern no basis to reverse the district court’s decision
declining to award custody credit.
II
In a self-represented supplemental brief, Larson makes several arguments for
reversal, none of which are persuasive. In addition to the issue of custody credit discussed
above, Larson argues that the district court erred by (1) refusing to grant default judgment
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in his favor, (2) denying his request for expert-witness fees , (3) denying his motion to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, (4) ordering him to pay restitution , (5) charging him by
complaint rather than indictment, (6) accepting his guilty plea when he is mentally ill, and
(7) subjecting him to double jeopardy. We have considered each of these arguments and
conclude that Larson is not entitled to relief.
First, Larson does not support his arguments regarding default judgment with legal
authority. A reviewing court “will not consider pro se claims on appeal that are unsupported
by either arguments or citations to legal authority.” State v. Bartylla, 755 N.W.2d 8, 22
(Minn. 2008); see also State v. Krosch, 642 N.W.2d 713, 719 (Minn. 2002) (dismissing
appellant’s arguments because the self-represented brief contained “no argument[s] or
citation[s] to legal authority in support of the allegations”); see State v. Andersen, 871
N.W.2d 910, 915 (Minn. 2015) (“An assignment of error based on mere assertion and not
supported by any argument or authorities in appellant’s brief is waived and will not be
considered on appeal unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection.” (quotation
omitted)). Because Larson cites no legal authority to support his argument for default
judgment, we decline to consider this argument.
Second, Larson’s arguments regarding his motion for expert witness fees are also
not properly before this court. “A reviewing court must generally consider only those issues
that the record shows were presented [to] and considered by the [district] court in deciding
the matter before it.” Thiele v. Stich , 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (quotation
omitted). Larson entered a guilty plea before the district court made a final ruling on his
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motion for expert witness fees. Because the district court did not fully consider and decide
the issue as a result of Larson’s guilty plea, it is not properly before us.
Third, Larson’s arguments relating to jurisdiction are “sovereign-citizen-type
arguments,” as the district court properly stated. This court has stated that “the
sovereign-citizen jurisdictional defense has ‘no conceivable validity in American law.’”
State v. Winbush, 912 N.W.2d 678, 686 (Minn. App. 2018) (quoting United States v.
Schneider, 910 F.2d 1569, 1570 (7th Cir. 1990)), rev. denied (Minn. May 29, 2018).
Therefore, Larson is not entitled to relief on this issue.
Larson’s remaining arguments are also foreclosed by precedent. First, the district
court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Larson to pay restitution after considering
testimony by MSOP employees and evidence of Larson’s income, resources, and
obligations, as required by statute. See Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 1(a) (2024); see also
State v. Cloutier, 971 N.W.2d 743, 748 (Minn. App. 2022) (noting the statutory factors for
the district court to consider in determining whether to order restitution), aff’d, 987 N.W.2d
214 (Minn. 2023). Second, the district court properly charged Larson by complaint rather
than indictment because Larson’s offense was not punishable by life imprisonment. See
Minn. R. Crim. P. 17.04, subd. 1. Third, the district court did not err in accepting Larson’s
plea as “accurate, voluntary, and intelligent” based on Larson’s mental examination and
Larson’s responses to the district court’s questions. See State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90,
94 (Minn. 2010). Fourth, and finally, Larson’s conviction does not violate double jeopardy
because his commitment at MSOP is civil in nature, not criminal. See Hudson v. United
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States, 522 U.S. 93, 95 (1997) (differentiating between civil and criminal sanctions for
purposes of double jeopardy). None of these arguments provide grounds for reversal.
Affirmed.