In re the Marriage of:

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0603

In re the Marriage of:

Mary Ellen Rice (FKA) Block, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

William Ray Block,
Appellant.

Filed February 10, 2025
Affirmed
Halbrooks, Judge*

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-FA-10-2043

Jack W. Hicks, Hellmuth & Johnson, PLLC, Edina, Minnesota (for respondent)

Dennis B. Johnson, Chestnut Cambronne PA, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Wheelock, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and
Halbrooks, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
HALBROOKS, Judge
Appellant-husband challenges a post-dissolution-judgment order, arguing the
district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion (1) for reimbursement of an

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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alleged overpayment to respondent-wife with respect to the property division determined
in the dissolution judgment and (2) to terminate his spousal-maintenance obligation. 1 We
affirm.
FACTS
Appellant William Ray Block (husband) and respondent Mary Ellen Rice (wife)
married in October 1985 and share two adult daughters. During their marriage, husband
worked as a successful businessman, owning and co-owning multiple real-estate
enterprises collectively worth more than $30 million. Wife maintained the marital home
and raised their two daughters. The parties ’ marriage was terminated, and their property
was divided in a dissolution judgment that was entered in February 2013 (the original
judgment) and amended in July that same year (the amended judgment). 2
Among husband’s extensive business portfolio at the time of the dissolution were
three companies wholly owned by husband: White Eagle GC LLC, Preservation
Development LLC, and MH Mortgage Corp. As was typical in husband’s business
practice, he personally loaned these companies funds. White Eagle—a golf course located
in Wisconsin, across the St. Croix River from Stillwater, Minnesota—owed husband

1 In his brief to this court, husband describes his spousal-maintenance motion as “a motion
for termination and/or modification.” But review of the record reveals that he solely
characterized his motion as a “motion to terminate” before the district court. Because we
consider “only those issues that the record shows were presented and considered by the
[district] court,” we construe his spousal-maintenance motion as a motion to terminate.
Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988).

2 This case spans more than a decade and involves extensive posttrial motion proceedings
that have involved multiple judges. Here, we focus only on the facts relevant to the issues
presented on appeal.
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$4,079,091 but lacked sufficient cash flow to meet its operating expenses. Preservation
Development, which owns residential golf course lots surrounding White Eagle, owed
husband $2,014,2 39. Finally, MH Mortgage is a pass- through company whose “sole
significant asset” was an additional $2.6 million note from White Eagle. Together, the
three companies formed an interrelated business plan designed to capitalize on the then-
unrealized construction of a new bridge between Stillwater and Wisconsin.
The White Eagle, Preservation Development, and MH Mortgage interests
(collectively “the receivables”) were found to be “speculative” in nature by the district
court. Because it was unclear whether these receivables would ever be repaid, the district
court determined that the “fair and equitable resolution” was to divide them equally
between husband and wife. That way, both parties would have “incentive to collect” and
would “bear equally the substantial risk associated with these assets.” Accordingly, the
amended judgment awarded husband and wife a one-half interest in the debts owed by
White Eagle and Preservation Development and equal shares in MH Mortgage, to be
distributed pro rata as payments on the receivables are made.3
In addition to dividing the receivables, the amended judgment required husband to
pay wife a $1,273,111 cash equalizer. Notably, the value of the cash equalizer was

3 The district court divided only the notes owed by White Eagle and Preservation
Development—not the businesses themselves—equally between husband and wife.
Ownership of White Eagle and Preservation Development was awarded solely to husband
because the district court believed such a division would “most assuredly” allow for
continued cash flow, given husband’s demonstrated business acumen. In contrast, husband
and wife were each awarded a one-half interest in the business entity of MH Mortgage.

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significantly reduced from the $3,310,946 payment required in the original judgment. This
change was the result of a reduction in the district court’s overall valuation of the marital
estate in the amended judgment.
In light of the reduced cash equalizer, wife filed a motion seeking spousal
maintenance—a matter that the amended judgment had reserved for determination. In May
2014, the district court filed an order (the spousal-maintenance order), finding that the cash-
equalizer reduction had “render[ed] the reservation of spousal maintenance unreasonable
and unfair” because wife could no longer meet her needs through her earnings and interest
on her share of the marital estate. The district court then ordered husband to
pay temporary spousal maintenance to [wife] of $8,000 per
month . . . until such time that this matter is further reviewed
following final payment of the property equalizer, realization
of [wife’s] share of MH Mortgage, Preservation Development,
LLC, and White Eagle G[C], LLC, or both.

In 2015, this court affirmed both the district court’s award of spousal maintenance and the
division of the parties’ property— including the division of the receivables —in a
nonprecedential opinion. Block v. Block, No. A14-1096, 2015 WL 4611907, at *2-6
(Minn. App. Aug. 2, 2015).
Since this court’s opinion, the parties have been locked in a repetitive cycle of
litigation in which husband fails to meet his obligations, leading wife to seek judicial
enforcement. Over the last five years, wife has filed multiple contempt motions due to
husband’s refusal to pay spousal maintenance and, as a result, the district court has twice
found husband in constructive civil contempt. Indeed, husband has spent time in jail for
failure to pay maintenance despite having the means to do so.
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Similarly, husband has evaded paying wife her share of the property division,
necessitating the appointment of a special master/receiver to ensure that the receivables are
divided as outlined in the amended judgment. The special master/receiver’s role has
largely been to ensure that wife receives her pro rata share of the proceeds from the sale of
Preservation Development lots, which have begun to sell more readily following the
opening of the St. Croix River bridge in 2017.
In October 2023, wife filed yet another contempt motion asserting that husband has
failed to pay her spousal maintenance since July 2022, accruing $120,000 in arrears.
Husband filed a responsive motion asking the district court to deny wife’s motion for
contempt. He moved the district court to (1) find that wife was overpaid for her interest in
the Preservation Development receivable and to apply that overpayment to any spousal
maintenance arrearage, returning the remaining amount to husband and (2) terminate
wife’s spousal maintenance on the basis of her receipt of the cash equalizer and her interest
in Preservation Development.
After holding a hearing where it heard extensively from both parties’ counsel, the
district court issued an order denying husband’s motions for reimbursement and spousal-
maintenance termination, granting wife’s motion related to the enforcement of the
maintenance obligation, and reserving wife’s motion for contempt.
This appeal by husband follows.

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DECISION
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied husband’s motion
for reimbursement related to the Preservation Development receivable.

Absent fraud or mistake, property divisions are final and may not be modified.
Graff v. Graff, 472 N.W.2d 882, 883 -84 (Minn. App. 1991), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 13,
1991). “While a district court may not modify a final property division, it may issue orders
to implement, enforce, or clarify the provisions of a decree, so long as it does not change
the parties’ substantive rights.” Nelson v. Nelson, 806 N.W.2d 870, 871 (Minn. App. 2011)
(quotation omitted). An order does not affect the parties’ substantive rights when the
original division of marital property is not increased or decreased. Id. We will not disturb
a such an order absent an abuse of discretion. Id.
“A court has jurisdiction to interpret and clarify a judgment which is ambiguous or
uncertain on its face, even after the time for appeal has passed.” Halverson v. Halverson,
381 N.W.2d 69, 71 (Minn. App. 1986). Whether a provision in a judgment is clear or
ambiguous is a legal question, which we review de novo. Suleski v. Rupe, 855 N.W.2d
330, 339 (Minn. 2014); Stewart v. Stewart, 400 N.W.2d 157, 158-59 (Minn. App. 1987).
And “[a] district court’s determination of the meaning of an ambiguous [judgment]
provision is a fact question,” which we review for clear error. Suleski, 855 N.W.2d at 339.
Husband contends that the amended judgment unambiguously allocates wife a one-
half interest in the $2,014,239 receivable from Preservation Development, meaning that
wife is owed $1,007,119.50 of Preservation Development proceeds—and no more.
Similarly, he asserts that the amended judgment unambiguously states that the White Eagle
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and MH Mortgage receivables are only to be paid to wife after they have been collected,
which has not occurred. It is undisputed that the special master/receiver has paid wife
$1,430,164.60 in proceeds from Preservation Development lot sales. Accordingly,
husband maintains that wife’s share of the Preservation Development receivable has been
overpaid by $423,045.10. He argues that the district court’s denial of his motion for the
reimbursement of this amount (less any spousal-support arrearage) is a modification of the
parties’ marital-property division because it effectively pre -pays wife a portion of her
speculative interests in the White Eagle and MH Mortgage receivables, thereby assigning
more of the risk to him.
Wife presents an alternate interpretation of the amended judgment’s property
division. She argues that Preservation Development, White Eagle, and MH Mortgage were
considered “part[s] of a whole.” In short, wife contends that the amended judgment
aggregated the value of the receivables. Under the aggregation theory, there can be no
overpayment until wife’s interest in all three receivables is satisfied.
The district court accepted the parties’ invitation to engage in what it characterized
as a “historical review and interpretation” of the amended judgment and, after a very
thorough examination of the record, agreed with wife’s interpretation. We read the district
court’s order as regarding the receivables as a single, aggregate value. In its order, the
district court noted that while it is in dispute whether wife has received her share of
Preservation Development, husband “has not demonstrated that [wife] has realized her
share of MH Mortgage, or White Eagle.” Accordingly, the district court found “that there
has been no overpayment to [wife].”
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After our own careful review of the amended judgment, we conclude that its
provision addressing the division of the receivables is ambiguous but discern no error in
the district court’s resulting factual determination that the amended judgment related the
receivables in the aggregate. Although the language of the amended judgment does not
expressly state whether the receivables should be considered in the aggregate, it
consistently refers to them in a joint manner. First, the division of all three assets are
handled in a single conclusion of law, which states, “[t]he parties are each awarded a one-
half interest in the following business entity and receivables,” and then lists MH Mortgage,
Preservation Development, and White Eagle. Following this allocation, every reference
made to the receivables is made to all three in list format: “MH Mortgage, Preservation
Development, LLC, and White Eagle G[C], LLC.” The consistent grouping of all three
receivables supports the district court’s interpretation that the amended judgment intended
the receivables to be aggregated.
Because the district court did not clearly err in its interpretation of the amended
judgment, its order did not modify the property division between the parties. And because
husband has not demonstrated that wife has received more than her pro rata share of the
Preservation Development proceeds, he has failed to prove that she has been overpaid.
Therefore, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying husband’s
motion for reimbursement related to the Preservation Development receivable.

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II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying husband’s motion to
terminate spousal maintenance.

A district court has broad discretion in matters related to spousal maintenance, and
we will reverse only upon a clear abuse of discretion. Sinda v. Sinda, 949 N.W.2d 170,
174 (Minn. App. 2020). A district court abuses its discretion when it “makes findings of
fact that are not supported by the record, misapplies the law, or resolves the matter in a
manner that is contrary to logic and the facts on the record.” Madden v. Madden, 923
N.W.2d 688, 696 (Minn. App. 2019). When a spousal-maintenance decision rests on
factual determinations, this court applies a clear-error standard of review to those findings
of fact. Id.
Spousal maintenance may be modified when a substantial change in circumstances
has occurred, making the existing award “unreasonable and unfair.” Minn. Stat.
§ 518A.39, subd. 2(a) (Supp. 2023). A substantial change may include an increase or
decrease in the gross income or need of the obligor or the obligee. Id., subd. 2(a)(1), (2).
The party moving for the modification bears the burden of demonstrating that (1) a
substantial change has occurred which (2) renders the original spousal-maintenance award
unreasonable and unfair. Hemmingsen v. Hemmingsen, 767 N.W.2d 711, 716 -17 (Minn.
App. 2009).
Husband argues that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion
to terminate spousal maintenance because it “ignore[d]” wife’s ability to realize additional
income from her receipt of the cash equalizer and payments for the Preservation
Development receivable. He submits that the thrust of the spousal-maintenance order was
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to permit maintenance until wife gained the ability to meet her needs by generating income
from her share of the marital estate—something that he contends she is currently able to
do. In support of his claim, husband offered an affidavit of a certified financial planner
that provided expected rates of return.
Contrary to husband’s assertions, the district court directly addressed his contention
that wife can support herself from the share of the marital estate that she has received. But
the district court determined that husband had failed to provide any evidence of wife’s
actual “liquid assets” and, instead, was asking it to “presume that [wife] has sufficient
potential income.” Without evidence establishing wife’s ability to generate income, the
district court concluded that husband had failed to meet his burden of demonstrating a
substantial change of circumstances sufficient to warrant spousal-maintenance termination.
Our examination of the record supports the district court’s determination. Husband
offered no documentation of wife’s financial circumstances. Instead, his primary source
of support for the status of wife’s wealth appears to be his own affidavit, in which he lists
payments he has made to her, speculates as to the cash value she obtained from selling her
home, and suggests that she may have received an inheritance from her parents. And,
although husband provided documentation of a few email exchanges between his attorney
and the special master/receiver detailing payments made to wife, we recognize that these
payments do not necessarily reflect the liquid assets currently available to her—particularly
when those assets have very likely been diminished due to husband’s consistent refusal to
pay spousal maintenance.
Because we conclude that husband has failed to provide
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evidence demonstrating a substantial change in circumstances, we discern no abuse of
discretion in the district court’s denial of his motion to terminate spousal maintenance.
Affirmed.