Ariel, Inc., Appellant,

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0604

Ariel, Inc.,
Appellant,

vs.

State Farm Fire and Casualty Company,
Respondent.

Filed December 16, 2024
Reversed and remanded
Bratvold, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-22-8407

Edward E. Beckmann, Beckmann Law Firm, LLC, Bloomington, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Scott G. Williams, Lindsey A. Streicher, HAWS-KM, P.A., St. Paul, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Considered and decided by Bentley, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Frisch,
Judge.
SYLLABUS
An insured’s demand for an appraisal of its loss under a fire insurance policy is not
a “suit or action” on the policy. Therefore, the two-year time limit provided in Minn. Stat.
§ 65A.01, subd. 3 (2022), does not apply to a demand for an appraisal so long as the insured
may timely commence an action on the policy against the insurer.
2
OPINION
BRATVOLD, Judge
Appellant Ariel Inc. challenges the district court’s decision to grant summary
judgment to respondent State Farm Fire and Casualty Company and to deny Ariel’s motion
to compel appraisal of its loss.1
Ariel owns and manages a large commercial property in Minneapolis that was
damaged in a fire. Ariel sought to recover its losses under a fire insurance policy issued by
State Farm. State Farm paid some of Ariel’s claimed losses from the fire but denied Ariel’s
request for an additional $1.5 million in fire losses.2 Ariel sued, asserting breach of contract
and requesting a declaratory judgment.3 After commencing this litigation, Ariel demanded
an appraisal to determine the amount of loss under the policy. After discovery closed, the
district court decided State Farm’s motion for summary judgment and Ariel’s motion to
compel appraisal.
On appeal, Ariel raises two issues. First, Ariel contends that the district court erred
in determining that its motion to compel appraisal was untimely and that Ariel failed to
satisfy a prerequisite that the parties disagree on the amount of loss before it demanded an

1 Ariel brought its motion to compel appraisal as a partial-summary-judgment motion. The
district court also treated Ariel’s motion to compel appraisal as a
partial-summary-judgment motion. This reflects Minnesota practice.

2 The additional $1.5 million in dispute is for building-related losses. State Farm also paid
for other fire-related losses, such as lost profits, that are not included in this discussion
because these other insurance payments are not at issue on appeal.

3 Ariel’s complaint also alleged that State Farm violated the Unfair Claims Practices Act,
Minn. Stat. §§ 72A.17-.32 (2022). Ariel later voluntarily dismissed that claim.
3
appraisal. Second, Ariel argues that the district court erred in determining that Ariel
submitted insufficient evidence of its loss to survive summary judgment on its
breach-of-contract claim.
Because the record demonstrates that Ariel’s motion to compel appraisal was timely
and that Ariel established that the parties disagreed on the amount of loss, we conclude that
the district court erred in denying Ariel’s motion to compel appraisal. We also conclude
that the district court erred by granting summary judgment to State Farm. Thus, we reverse
and remand to compel appraisal and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
FACTS
On May 29, 2020, a fire damaged Ariel’s Minneapolis property. The fire department
extinguished the fire, but several parts of the property were damaged, including the roof,
elevators, flooring, drywall, plaster, and electrical system.
At the time of the fire, Ariel’s property was insured under a “ Businessowners
Coverage Form” (the policy) issued by State Farm. The policy obligates State Farm to pay
for “accidental direct physical loss” to “covered property” resulting from a “covered cause
of loss,” including fire loss. In the event of fire loss, State Farm may be liable, as relevant
to this appeal, to “pay the cost of repairing or replacing the lost or damaged property.” It is
undisputed that the May 29, 2020 fire was a covered cause of loss.
Ariel worked with several businesses to handle its insurance claim with State Farm
for fire losses. Ariel hired a general contractor to assess the scope of the damage, to oversee
all necessary repairs, and to “handle [the insurance claim] entirely,” including to “manage
billing, the paperwork, [and] billing to State Farm.” Ariel’s owner testified in his deposition
4
that the “insurance company paid [Ariel], and frankly, we paid [the general contractor].”
Ariel also hired a public adjuster to help identify the property’s fire damage, write a scope
of work for the repairs, and negotiate with State Farm.
Ariel worked with a State Farm claims specialist assigned to handle Ariel’s claim.
The claims specialist communicated with Ariel, the general contractor, and the public
adjuster. The claims specialist sought to gather “supporting documentation that outline[d]
their actual expenses” for repairs, including invoices, and to discuss the scope of repair. In
May 2022, the public adjuster gave the claims specialist two documents that were identified
in deposition testimony as “scopes of work.” The public adjuster testified that the second
“scope of work” documented the “full scope” of the loss and that the first “scope of work”
was a “supplement” that showed the difference between all the repairs done by the general
contractor and the repairs for which State Farm had paid. In the end, State Farm paid Ariel
$3,344,526.24 for the loss, which it maintains represents the entire loss. Ariel argues that
the public adjuster’s first “scope of work” shows that it completed an additional
$1,534,331.57 in repairs covered under the policy that have not been reimbursed by State
Farm.
On May 24, 2022, the claims specialist spoke to the public adjuster, requesting
additional documentation of actual expenses that Ariel incurred for fire repairs and
informing the public adjuster that State Farm would not extend the policy’s two-year time
limit on bringing a legal action . The parties agree that the two-year time limit for Ariel’s
legal claims expired on May 29, 2022. The parties also agree that Ariel has completed its
fire repairs to the property.
5
On May 26, 2022, Ariel sued State Farm, claiming that State Farm breached the
policy when it failed to pay for some costs that Ariel incurred in repairing fire damage to
its property. Ariel also sought a declaratory judgment.
About four months later, Ariel sent State Farm a written demand for an appraisal to
determine “the amount and scope of loss.” Nothing in the record shows whether State Farm
responded to Ariel’s appraisal demand. In November 2022, Ariel reiterated its demand for
an appraisal in its answers to State Farm’s first set of interrogatories, stating that “[a]ny
dispute regarding the amount and cause of loss should be decided in appraisal, not
litigation, and without discovery.”
In October 2023, State Farm moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was not
liable to Ariel for any other payments under the policy because Ariel failed to document
additional losses with reasonable certainty and failed to satisfy conditions precedent for
loss payment under the policy. Meanwhile, Ariel moved to compel appraisal, which State
Farm opposed as untimely and failing required conditions.
On February 14, 2024, the district court filed an order denying Ariel’s motion to
compel appraisal and granting State Farm’s summary-judgment motion. As to Ariel’s
motion, the district court first determined that Ariel’s demand for an appraisal was untimely
because it was made four months after the two-year time limit had expired. Second, the
district court determined that Ariel failed to satisfy the relevant policy provisions for
making an appraisal demand because there was “no evidence of disagreement” between
the parties over the amount of Ariel’s loss. The district court also granted State Farm’s
summary-judgment motion, concluding that Ariel provided “no proof of damages” to a
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reasonable degree of certainty and that, therefore, no genuine issue of material fact
remained for trial.
Ariel appeals.
ISSUES
I. Did the district court err by denying Ariel’s motion to compel appraisal of its loss?

II. Did the district court err by granting State Farm’s motion for summary judgment on
Ariel’s claims under the policy?

ANALYSIS
I. The district court erred by denying Ariel’s motion to compel appraisal.

Ariel makes two arguments in support of its position that the district court erred by
denying its motion to compel appraisal. First, Ariel contends that the district court erred in
concluding that its demand for an appraisal was untimely. Second, Ariel contends that the
district court erred in concluding that disagreement between the parties on the amount of
loss is a condition precedent to either party’s demand for an appraisal. In the alternative,
Ariel asserts that, if disagreement between the parties is a condition precedent to a demand
for an appraisal, undisputed facts in the record establish that Ariel and State Farm disagreed
on the amount of loss. Ariel contends that, therefore, State Farm must comply with Ariel’s
demand for an appraisal. We address each argument in turn.
A. Ariel’s demand for an appraisal was timely.
The district court determined that Ariel’s demand for an appraisal was untimely
after examining both the policy’s two-year time limit on legal actions and the two-year
time limit in Minnesota’s Standard Fire Insurance Policy (standard fire policy), Minn. Stat.
7
§ 65A.01 (2022). Ariel argues that the district court’s interpretation of the policy and the
standard fire policy is incorrect, while State Farm urges us to affirm the district court.
Appellate courts review interpretations of an insurance policy and statutory
language de novo. Nathe Bros. v. Am. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co., 615 N.W.2d 341, 344 (Minn.
2000). Appellate courts interpret an insurance policy as they do a contract. Midwest Fam.
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wolters, 831 N.W.2d 628, 636 (Minn. 2013); Thommes v. Milwaukee Ins.
Co., 641 N.W.2d 877, 879 (Minn. 2002). When the insurance -policy language is
unambiguous, it must be given its usual and accepted meaning. Wanzek Constr., Inc., v.
Emps. Ins. of Wausau, 679 N.W.2d 322, 324 (Minn. 2004). Similarly, “[w]hen a statute’s
language is unambiguous, our role is to give effect to the statute’s plain meaning.”
Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Second Chance Invs. , LLC, 827 N.W.2d 766, 771 (Minn. 2013).
Here, neither party contends that the relevant language in the policy or the standard fire
policy, both of which set out a two-year time limit, is ambiguous.
We begin by examining the relevant provision in the policy, which includes a
two-year time limit on legal actions against State Farm and states that “[n]o one may bring
a legal action against [State Farm] under this insurance” unless there has been “full
compliance with all of the terms” of the policy and “the action is brought within 2 years
after the date on which the accidental direct physical loss occurred” (policy’s two-year time
limit).
The policy’s two-year time limit must conform with the requirements of the
standard fire policy. The provisions of the standard fire policy “generally may not be
omitted, changed, or waived.” Else v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 980 N.W.2d 319, 324 (Minn.
8
2022) (quoting Watson v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 566 N.W.2d 683, 690 (Minn. 1997)).
A fire insurance policy may include “additional or different terms” if those terms “offer
more coverage than the statutory minimum.” Id. The Minnesota Supreme Court has
emphasized that it will uphold a provision in a fire insurance policy “only if it affords the
insured all the rights and benefits of the Minnesota standard fire insurance policy or offers
additional benefits which provide more coverage to the insured than the statutory
minimum.” Watson, 566 N.W.2d at 691.
The standard fire policy also includes a two-year time limit, which provision states
that “[n]o suit or action on this policy for the recovery of any claim shall be sustainable in
any court of law or equity . . . unless commenced within two years after inception of the
loss” (statute’s two-year time limit). Minn. Stat. § 65A.01, subd. 3. The parties do not
contend that there is a material difference between the policy’s two-year time limit and the
statute’s two-year time limit. We conclude that there is no material difference and focus
our analysis on the statute’s two-year time limit.
Ariel contends that the statute’s two-year time limit does not apply to appraisal
demands because it expressly applies to a “suit” or “action” and an appraisal is neither.
State Farm disagrees and relies on this court’s precedent to argue that the statute’s two-year
time limit applies to a demand for an appraisal.
9
Relying on Johnson v. Mutual Service Casualty Insurance Co., State Farm contends
that this court interpreted the statute’s two-year time limit4 and determined that it barred
an insured’s demand for an appraisal. 732 N.W.2d at 345. Johnson demanded an appraisal
of a fire loss after the statute’s two-year time limit had expired and then sued her insurer
for breach of contract. Id. at 342. When the insurer refused to participate in an appraisal,
Johnson moved to compel appraisal. Id. The district court granted summary judgment for
the insurer. Id. at 343.
On appeal, Johnson conceded that the lawsuit she had filed against her insurer was
barred by the statute’s two-year time limit. Id. at 342-43. We affirmed the district court’s
order granting summary judgment for the insurer and held that Johnson’s demand for an
appraisal was “governed by the two-year time limitation on suits or actions.” Id. at 346.
We acknowledge that some language in Johnson seems to favor a sweeping application of
the statute’s two-year time limit to all demands for an appraisal. But our reasoning in
Johnson provides more nuanced guidance for deciding whether the statute’s twoyear time
limit applies here.
In Johnson, we first considered the definitions of “suits” and “actions,” both of
which are covered by the statute’s two-year time limit. Id. at 345. We noted that this court
previously adopted a definition of “suit” as “any proceeding by a party or parties against
another in a court of law” and stated that an “action” is “confined to judicial proceedings.”

4 This court in Johnson observed that the applicable insurance policy conformed with the
statute’s two-year time limit. 732 N.W.2d 340, 344 (Minn. App. 2007), rev. denied (Minn.
Aug. 21, 2007).
10
Id.; accord Vaubel Farms, Inc. v. Shelby Farmers Mut., 679 N.W.2d. 407, 411-12 (Minn.
App. 2004). We also pointed out that an insurer’s liability under an insurance policy
“depends on a judicial determination” and “[i]t is well settled that appraisal does not
determine liability under a policy.” Johnson, 732 N.W.2d at 346.
We therefore reasoned that, “even if Johnson succeeded in determining the amount
of the loss through appraisal, she would have to bring an action to determine [the insurer’s]
liability, and she concedes that such an action is barred by the limitation on actions
contained in the policy.” Id. In concluding that Johnson’s demand for an appraisal was
untimely, we emphasized that an insured cannot compel appraisal if the statute’s two-year
time limit has expired without the insured filing a legal action because the insurer’s liability
“can only be determined by a court action, which is barred by the two-year limitation on
suits or actions.” Id.
Ariel contends that Johnson’s reasoning does not support applying the statute’s
two-year time limit to the demand for an appraisal made here. Ariel points out that, six
years after our decision in Johnson, a Minnesota federal district court, in an unpublished
opinion, addressed a similar issue on similar facts to those here when it granted a motion
to compel appraisal of a fire insurance claim. Amro v. Liberty Ins. Corp., No. 12-2753
(DWF/JSM), 2013 WL 12149250 (D. Minn. Apr. 15, 2013). 5 While federal decisions

5 During district court proceedings, Ariel first referenced Johnson in its motion to compel
appraisal to support the general statement that appraisal is a statutorily mandated,
nonjudicial method to resolve disputes over the amount of an insured’s loss. In its response
opposing appraisal, State Farm cited Johnson to contend, as it does on appeal, that any
demand for an appraisal made after the statute’s two-year time limit is barred. In reply,
Ariel contended that Johnson “[does] not include a deadline to demand appraisal” but sets
11
involving state law are not binding precedent, they may be persuasive. Moreno v.
Crookston Times Printing Co., 610 N.W.2d 321, 330 (Minn. 2000).
We consider the facts and reasoning of the federal decision cited by Ariel. Amro,
the insured, commenced litigation within the statute’s two-year time limit and then
demanded an appraisal after the two-year time limit expired. Amro, 2013 WL 12149250,
at *2. After analyzing Johnson, the federal district court concluded that the statute’s two-
year time limit6 did not bar Amro’s demand for an appraisal. Id. at *7-8.
In reaching this conclusion, the federal district court explained that Johnson “stands
for the proposition” that “the insured cannot side-step” the statute’s two-year time limit by
bringing an untimely legal action and then pursuing appraisal. Id at *7. The federal district
court reasoned that, when an insurer’s liability must be determined by a district court and
the insured does not either commence suit or demand an appraisal within the statute’s
two-year time limit, a subsequent demand for an appraisal is untimely. Id. On the other
hand, when the insured timely commences suit within this two-year time limit and demands
an appraisal after the two years has expired, the subsequent demand for an appraisal is
timely. Id. Thus, the federal district court granted the insured’s motion to compel appraisal.
Id. at *8.

a deadline for liability determinations such as filing suit. The district court’s
summary-judgment decision did not discuss Johnson, Amro, or the parties’ arguments
about how to interpret either the policy’s or the statute’s two-year time limit.

6 The federal district court in Amro determined that the insurance policy conformed with
the statute’s two-year time limit. Id. at *5.
12
Ariel argues that the facts here are more akin to those in Amro than to those in
Johnson. We agree. Like Amro, Ariel did not side-step the statute’s two-year time limit by
demanding an appraisal after it filed suit because Ariel filed suit within the two-year time
limit. See id. at *7. In contrast, Johnson sued her insurer after the statute’s two-year time
limit had expired and, as noted in the opinion, if appraisal had been compelled, Johnson
could not have sought a judicial determination of her insurer’s liability. Johnson,
732 N.W.2d at 345-46.
Ariel’s demand for an appraisal is like the demand for an appraisal in Amro and
unlike the demand for an appraisal in Johnson. It is undisputed that Ariel timely sued State
Farm within the statute’s two-year time limit; in fact, Ariel commenced this action within
two days of learning that State Farm would not toll the time limit. If Ariel’s motion to
compel appraisal is granted and the amount of fire loss covered by State Farm’s policy is
determined in an appraisal, Ariel then may seek a judicial determination of State Farm’s
liability.
In sum, we rely on the plain meaning of “suit” and “action” to conclude that the
statute’s two-year time limit applies to judicial proceedings. We also hold that the statute’s
two-year time limit does not apply to a demand for an appraisal so long as the insured may
timely commence an action on the policy against the insurer. We therefore conclude that
Ariel’s demand for an appraisal is not barred by the statute’s two-year time limit. Ariel
sued State Farm within the two-year time limit provided in Minn. Stat. § 65A.01, subd. 3,
and as stated in the policy. The district court thus erred in determining that Ariel’s motion
to compel appraisal was untimely.
13
B. Ariel’s demand for an appraisal satisfied the prerequisite that the
parties failed to agree on the amount of loss.

Ariel argues that the district court erred in determining that an actual disagreement
over the amount of loss is a condition precedent to demanding an appraisal. In the
alternative, Ariel contends that the district court erred in concluding that the record
included no evidence of disagreement between the parties over the amount of loss.
Once again, we consider the relevant provisions in the policy and in the standard
fire policy. The policy describes the appraisal process and provides that either party may
demand an appraisal under certain circumstances, specifically, “If we and you disagree on
the value of the property or the amount of loss, either may make written demand for an
appraisal of the loss.” (Emphasis added.) The policy also states that, if there is an appraisal,
State Farm “will still retain [its] right to deny the claim.”
This policy language conforms with the provision on appraisals found in the
standard fire policy, which states in relevant part:
In case the insured and this company, except in case of total loss
on buildings, shall fail to agree as to the actual cash value or the
amount of loss, then, on the written demand of either, each shall
select a competent and disinterested appraiser and notify the other
of the appraiser selected within 20 days of such demand.
Minn. Stat. § 65A.01, subd. 3 (emphasis added). The parties do not contend that there is a
material difference between the policy’s appraisal provision and the statute’s appraisal
provision. We conclude that there is no material difference and focus our analysis on the
statute’s appraisal provision. With the statute’s appraisal provision in mind, we consider
14
Ariel’s challenges to the second reason for which the district court refused to compel
appraisal.
1. The insurer and insured must fail to agree on the amount of loss,
and this disagreement is a prerequisite to a demand for an
appraisal.

The district court relied on the statutory appraisal provision and ruled that appraisal
is appropriate only when the “insured and the insurer fail to agree as to the actual cash
value or the amount of loss and make a written demand for appraisal .” The district court
reviewed relevant caselaw and concluded that “the function of appraisal is to determine the
amount it will cost to repair a loss when the parties disagree on this value.”
Ariel appears to contend that the district court erred by conditioning Ariel’s right to
demand an appraisal on disagreement over the amount of loss, but this argument conflicts
with the plain language of the statute’s appraisal provision. Minn. Stat. § 65A.01, subd. 3
(“In case the insured and this company . . . shall fail to agree as to the actual cash value or
the amount of loss . . . .” (emphasis added)). The language in the policy similarly provides:
“If [Ariel] and [State Farm] disagree on the value of the property or the amount of loss ,
either may make a written demand for an appraisal of the loss.” (Emphasis added).
The phrase “in case” and the word “if,” when used in this context, both indicate that
the right to demand an appraisal is conditional and disagreement between the parties is a
prerequisite to making a demand for an appraisal. See Second Chance, 827 N.W.2d at 771
(interpreting the standard fire policy’s appraisal provision as including as “a prerequisite
to the application of the appraisal provision . . . that a dispute must exist between the
parties”). For these reasons, we conclude that the district court did not err in determining
15
that Ariel and State Farm must fail to agree on the amount of loss before either party may
demand an appraisal.
2. Ariel’s demand for an appraisal satisfied the prerequisite that the
parties failed to agree on the amount of loss.

The district court determined that Ariel was not entitled to an appraisal because the
record provided “no evidence of a disagreement over the amount of loss.” The district court
reasoned that an appraisal
would be futile because the building repair is finished and there
is no disagreement over the amount of loss. The evidence
shows that the dispute arises out of Ariel’s claim that it is owed
more money by State Farm, but it does not support this
contention with invoices or amounts “actually spent” on
repairs. It supports its claim with estimates that differ from
estimates created by State Farm.

Relying on the policy’s loss-payment provisions,7 the district court determined that Ariel
“must show that there is a specific amount expended for necessary repairs, that Ariel
actually spent money on such repairs, and that the repairs are complete. Once it meets this
requirement, if State Farm disagrees with the amounts, that is when appraisal would be
proper.”

7 The policy includes several provisions under the title “property loss conditions,” one of
which is the loss- payment provision, which states that, when paying replacement costs,
State Farm is obligated to pay “not more than the least of the following amounts”: the
policy limit, the cost to replace the lost or damaged property with “other property of
comparable material, quality and used for the same purpose,” or “the amount [the insured]
actually spend[s] that is necessary to repair or replace the lost or damaged property.” The
loss-payment provision also states that State Farm “will not pay on a replacement cost basis
for any loss: (1) until the lost or damaged property is actually repaired or replaced; and
(2) unless the repairs or replacement are made as soon as reasonably possible after the
loss.”
16
Ariel argues that the district court erred by determining that the record contains “no
evidence” of Ariel and State Farm’s disagreement on the amount of loss. State Farm
contends that the evidence provided by Ariel is insufficient because the policy implicitly
requires that the insured provide invoices or proof of payment for any repairs. State Farm
appears to rely on the policy’s loss-payment provisions, which state in relevant part that it
is obligated to pay for only the amount an insured “actually spend[s] that is necessary to
repair or replace the lost or damaged property.” Neither State Farm nor the district court
cites legal authority to support its claims that the loss-payment provision is incorporated
into the statute’s appraisal provision.
State Farm cites a nonprecedential opinion from this court, Zulfe Enterprises v. State
Farm Fire & Cas ualty Co., in support of its argument that “more than a disagreement as
to the amount of loss” is required “to invoke appraisal.” 8 No. A20-0063, 2020 WL
7491266 (Minn. App. Dec. 21, 2020). In Zulfe Enterprises, this court relied on supreme
court precedent interpreting policy language that required a failure to agree on the amount

8 State Farm does not support its position by citing the standard fire policy, and Zulfe
Enterprises did not consider the standard fire policy. State Farm instead cites unpublished
opinions from federal district courts that denied an insured’s motion to compel appraisal
because there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the insured had provided
the insurer with adequate evidence of the amount of loss. See, e.g., Darmer v. State Farm
Fire & Cas. Co., No. 17-4309 (JRT/KMM), 2018 WL 3325908, at *5-6 (D. Minn. July 6,
2018) (“A genuine issue of material [fact] exists with respect to whether Darmer has
reasonably complied with his ‘duties after loss’ and whether he has satisfied all reasonable
requests made by State Farm.”); St. Panteleimon Russian Orthodox Church v. Church Mut.
Ins. Co., No. 13-1977 (SRN/JJK), 2013 WL 6190400, at *6-7 (D. Minn. Nov. 27, 2013)
(“[W]e cannot determine whether the Church provided sufficient information about the
claim to create the conditions where a disagreement on the amount of loss could even
occur.”).
17
of loss before making a demand for appraisal of windstorm damage. Id. at *5 (citing Boston
Ins. Co. v. A. H. Jacobson Co., 33 N.W.2d 602, 604 (Minn. 1948)).9 This court concluded
that, while an insured need not follow a “proof-of-loss process” as provided in the
applicable policy, the parties “must each assert a position as to the amount of loss that
provides sufficient information for comparison and a determination whether they agree.”
Zulfe Enters., 2020 WL 7491266, at *5.
We need not decide whether the standard set out in Zulfe Enterprises applies to the
statute’s appraisal provision. Even if a party is obligated to assert a position on the amount
of loss along with sufficient information for comparison with the other party’s position
before it may demand an appraisal, Ariel did so. It is undisputed that, before Ariel
demanded an appraisal, it submitted to State Farm a “scope of work” from the public
adjuster detailing repair work for which State Farm had not yet paid ; an unpaid invoice
from the general contractor to Ariel totaling $1,534,331.57 for the “remaining balance for
fire damage repairs”; and claims notes from State Farm’s claim specialist stating that Ariel
performed repairs beyond the agreed- upon scope of repairs. Later, Ariel also submitted
deposition transcripts in which Ariel’s owner and the general contractor testified that State
Farm owes between one and two million dollars for repairs and an affidavit from the
general contractor stating that Ariel owes the general contractor $1,534,331.57 for
building-related fire repairs.

9 While nonprecedential opinions of this court are not binding, they may be persuasive.
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
18
The district court appears to have determined that Ariel provided insufficient
evidence of loss after examining Ariel’s submissions in response to State Farm’s motion
for summary judgment and concluding that Ariel provided only “estimates that differ from
estimates created by State Farm.” The public adjuster’s affidavit, according to the district
court, “does not create a disagreement necessitating appraisal because it fails to provide a
real amount with which State Farm can disagree.” In contrast, the district court pointed out
that State Farm offered testimony from the claims adjuster stating that “State Farm did not
receive the requisite documentation to continue to pay for repairs.” The district court also
noted that “State Farm paid $3.3 million . . . on this claim [which] shows that both parties
agreed on the amount of loss when provided the correct invoicing and documentation of
expenditures.”
The district court’s reasoning overlooked the general contractor’s affidavit, which
specifically discussed the public adjuster’s scope of work and attested that this scope of
work “show[s] the total amount actually and necessarily spent for repairs to the property.”
The general contractor averred that this scope of work is reflected in “an invoice that shows
the amounts owed for finishing the project” and that $1,534,331.57 is “the balance owed.”
If we compare the information Ariel submitted to State Farm using the standard set
out in Zulfe Enterprises, Ariel “assert[ed] a position as to the amount of loss” and
“provide[ed] sufficient information for comparison” with State Farm’s position that it had
fully paid the fire losses. Id. Even if we also assume that Ariel needed to provide
information or evidence of “amount[s] actually and necessarily spent for repairs to the
property,” as the district court assumed and as stated in the policy’s loss- payment
19
provision, we easily conclude based on the record already discussed that the parties
“fail[ed] to agree as to” the amount of loss.
State Farm and Ariel’s failure to agree on the amount of loss is also shown by State
Farm’s denial of liability in response to Ariel’s lawsuit. In State Farm’s answer to Ariel’s
complaint, State Farm generally denied liability for any additional costs that Ariel incurred
in making repairs. While Ariel’s complaint asserts its position that State Farm is obligated
under the policy to pay additional costs for fire repairs, State Farm’s answer contends it
has already fully paid the loss. Thus, either party may demand an appraisal.
In sum, we conclude that the district court erred by denying Ariel’s motion to
compel appraisal. First, the statute’s two-year time limit applies to the commencement of
an action on the policy but does not apply to a demand for an appraisal so long as the
insured may timely commence an action against the insurer. Second, the record shows,
even when viewed favorably to State Farm as the nonmoving party, that there is no genuine
issue of material fact related to whether Ariel timely sued State Farm within the statute’s
two-year time limit, Ariel’s complaint sought to recover additional payments for fire
repairs under the policy, State Farm denied liability for more payments under the policy,
and Ariel demanded an appraisal after stating its position on the amount of the loss along
with information in support of its position. Thus, we conclude that the parties failed to
agree on the amount of loss. Ariel has therefore satisfied the prerequisite for appraisal under
the policy, and we reverse and remand for the district court to compel an appraisal.
20
II. The district court erred in granting summary judgment to State Farm.
Appellate courts “review a district court’s summary judgment decision de novo. In
doing so, we determine whether the district court properly applied the law and whether
there are genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment.” Riverview Muir
Doran, LLC v. JADT Dev. Grp., LLC, 790 N.W.2d 167, 170 (Minn. 2010) (citation
omitted). Appellate courts view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party. Henry v. Indep. Sch. Dist. #625, 988 N.W.2d 868, 880 (Minn. 2023). A genuine issue
of material fact exists if a rational trier of fact, considering the record as a whole, could
find for the nonmoving party. Frieler v. Carlson Mktg. Grp., Inc., 751 N.W.2d 558, 564
(Minn. 2008).
Because we reverse and remand for the district court to compel an appraisal, we
need not address the second issue raised by the parties in any detail. As discussed above,
we conclude that Ariel submitted sufficient evidence of the parties’ dispute about the
amount of loss not paid by State Farm and sufficient information of its position in the
dispute. Based on the same record viewed favorably to Ariel as the nonmoving party, we
also conclude that Ariel has shown that a genuine issue of material fact exists on its claims
for declaratory judgment and breach of contract.
10

10 The district court’s discussion of the record for State Farm’s summary-judgment motion
included the same evidence it considered for Ariel’s motion to compel appraisal with one
addition. In deciding whether Ariel submitted sufficient evidence of damages on the
breach-of-contract claim to survive summary judgment, the district court noted that, in the
depositions of Ariel’s owner, general contractor, and public adjuster, each witness testified
that they “did not know” when asked “how much State Farm owed Ariel for completed
work.” While this testimony may or may not affect the credibility of each witness, it does
not alter our legal conclusion that a genuine issue of material fact exists in Ariel’s suit
21
But perhaps more importantly, because an appraisal is compelled, the appraisal will
determine “the amount of loss,” which “necessarily includes the determination” of, among
other things, “the amount it would cost to repair that loss.” Quade v. Secura Ins.,
814 N.W.2d 703, 70 6 (Minn. 2012). To the extent that any questions about State Farm’s
liability also arise, “the decision of the appraiser will be subject to review by the district
court.” Id. at 707-08.11 For these reasons, we reverse summary judgment for State Farm.
DECISION
We conclude that the district court erred in denying Ariel’s motion to compel
appraisal. First, the two-year time limit set out in Minn. Stat. § 65A.01, subd. 3, does not
apply to a demand for an appraisal so long as the insured may commence a timely suit
against the insurer. Because Ariel timely commenced litigation against State Farm within
the statute’s two-year time limit, Ariel’s demand for an appraisal is timely, even though it
was made four months after this two-year time limit expired. Second, Ariel’s demand for
an appraisal is proper because the parties failed to agree on the amount of loss and Ariel
submitted its position on the amount of loss along with sufficient information. Because the

against State Farm. See Kenneh v. Homeward Bound, Inc., 944 N.W.2d 222, 228-34 (Minn.
2020) (reversing a district court’s decision to grant summary judgment for a defendant and
noting that a court, on summary judgment, does “not weigh facts or make credibility
determinations”).

11 We also note that Minnesota has a “strong public policy . . . favoring appraisals.” Id. at
707. Appraisals, like other methods of alternative dispute resolution, provide for “a plain,
speedy, inexpensive and just determination of the extent of the loss.” Kavli v. Eagle Star
Ins. Co., 288 N.W. 723, 725 (Minn. 1939). While appraisals are “generally intended to take
place before suit is filed,” the supreme court has noted that, even after an insured has
commenced litigation, an “appraisal at this stage of the process must go forward” but may
receive judicial review. Quade, 814 N.W.2d at 708.
22
district court erred in denying Ariel’s motion to compel appraisal, we conclude that it also
erred in granting State Farm’s motion for summary judgment. Thus, we reverse and remand
for the district court to compel an appraisal and for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
Reversed and remanded.