State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0608

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Abigail Violet Hollingsworth,
Appellant.

Filed November 25, 2024
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Pipestone County District Court
File No. 59-CR-23-263

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Damain Sandy, Pipestone County Attorney, Pipestone, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Amy Lawler, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Cochran,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s decision to revoke her probation and
execute her prison sentence. Because we discern no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

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FACTS
In July 2023, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Abigail Violet
Hollingsworth with first-degree possession of a controlled substance in violation of Minn.
Stat. § 152.021, subd. 2(a)(1), (b) (2022). The complaint alleged that, during a search of
appellant’s apartment, law enforcement discovered “a homemade water bong” containing
7.5 fluid ounces of water. The complaint also alleged that the water in the bong field-tested
positive for methamphetamine.
Appellant pleaded guilty to the charged offense. Because appellant had a criminal-
history score of two, the presumptive sentence for appellant’s offense was 85 months in
prison. The district court sentenced appellant to the presumptive sentence of 85 mo nths,
but stayed execution of that sentence, placed her on probation for five years, and imposed
180 days of local confinement. As a condition of appellant’s probation, she was required
to complete Minnesota Cornerstone Treatment Court (MCTC).
In January 2024, a probation violation report was filed alleging that appellant
(1) failed to abstain from controlled substances; (2) failed to obtain permission to leave the
state; and (3) failed to successfully complete MCTC. A probation violation hearing was
then held at which appellant admitted to the violations. Specifically, appellant
acknowledged that she left treatment on December 23, 2023, on her “weekend pass for
Christmas,” went to South Dakota without her probation agent’s permission, and obtained
and used fentanyl. Appellant also acknowledged that, as a result of her use, she was
terminated from MCTC.
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The district court found that appellant violated the terms of her probation, that the
“violations were intentional and inexcusable,” and that “the need for confinement
outweighs the policies favoring continued probation.” The district court, therefore,
revoked appellant’s probation and executed her prison sentence. This appeal follows. 1
DECISION
Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion in revoking her
probation. “The [district] court has broad discretion in determining if there is sufficient
evidence to revoke probation and should be reversed only if there is a clear abuse of that
discretion.” State v. Austin , 295 N.W.2d 246, 249 -50 (Minn. 1980). A district court
“abuses its discretion when i ts decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is
against logic and the facts in the record.” Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Minn. 2012)
(quotation omitted).
Before a district court may revoke probation, it must: (1) identify the condition that
was violated; (2) find that the violation was intentional or inexcusable; and (3) find that the
need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation. Austin, 295 N.W.2d at
250. “[I]n making the three Austin findings, courts are not charged with merely conforming
to procedural requirements; rather, courts must seek to convey their substantive reasons for
revocation and the evidence relied upon.” State v. Modtland, 695 N.W.2d 602, 608 (Minn.
2005). We review de novo whether a district court made the required Austin findings. Id.
at 605.

1 Respondent did not file a brief in this matter, and this court issued an order stating that
the “case shall be determined on the merits as provided in Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 142.03.”
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Appellant’s challenge is limited to the third Austin factor: “whether the need for
confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation.” Id. at 606. When determining
whether to revoke probation, the district court “must balance the probationer’s interest in
freedom and the state’s interest in insuring [her] rehabilitation and the public safety.” Id.
at 606-07 (quotation omitted). The district court must bear in mind that “the purpose of
probation is rehabilitation and revocation should be used only as a last resort when
treatment has failed.” Id. at 606 (quotation omitted).
In balancing the probationer ’s and the state ’s interests, a district court should
consider (1) whether “confinement is necessary to protect the public from further criminal
activity by the offender,” (2) whether “the offender is in need of correctional treatment
which can most effectively be provided if he is confined,” or (3) whether “it would unduly
depreciate the seriousness of the violation if probation were not revoked. ” Id. at 607
(quotation omitted). Only one of these circumstances is necessary to establish the need for
confinement. See id. (using the disjunctive “or” in discussing the bas is for revocation);
State v. Smith, 994 N.W.2d 317, 320 (Minn. App. 2023) (“Only one Modtland subfactor is
necessary to support revocation.”), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 27, 2023).
Appellant argues first that the district court’s finding that confinement is necessary
to protect the public from further criminal activity is not supported by the record because
there “was no allegation that [appellant] drove while intoxicated,” and there is no finding
that she “hurt anyone, or that her treatment program’s plan to prevent future relapses would
be ineffective.” We disagree. The record reflects that the district court specifically asked
appellant’s attorney at the probation -violation heari ng if appellant was “in fact driving
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before and after —before she obtained the fentanyl, in order to obtain it, and after she
consumed fentanyl?” Counsel for appellant replied: “it is my understanding that that is
what happened, Your Honor.” As such, the record reflects that appellant placed the public,
and herself, in danger by driving under the influence of fentanyl.
Moreover, the record reflects that appellant has past convictions for controlled -
substance-related offenses. In referencing these past convictions, the district court found
that “[d]espite [her] failure in the past to follow probation, despite [her] failure to complete
drug court in the past, and despite [her] unwillingness to follow any pretrial conditions,”
she was given a second chance and opportunity in this case. The district court then found
that appellant failed to take advantage of this opportunity and, in fact, not only “continued
to use” during the time this case was pending, but also got “kicked out of one treatment.”
And the district court found that when appellant was out of treatment over the Christmas
holiday, she “[n]ot only . . . use[d], but [was] someone who placed the general public in
extreme danger by driving out of state, obtaining fentanyl, using fentanyl, and driving
back.” Although appellant did not “hurt anyone,” the district court found that appel lant
failed to recognize the “danger” of her actions. Thus, the record supports the district court’s
finding that confinement is necessary to protect the public from further criminal activity.
Appellant argues second that, “while the [district] court announced that [appellant]
was in need of correctional treatment which could most effectively be provided if she were
confined, this is not supported by the record.” But the district court emphasized appellant’s
history of using controlled substances and repeatedly referenced her inability and
“unwillingness” to take advantage of treatment options. The district court also noted that
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appellant was “sentenced as a departure [in this case] and w[as] given an opportunity to
complete probation,” but failed to take advantage of that opportunity by doing the very
thing she was on probation for—using controlled substances. And the district court found
that appellant “ barely even acknowledge[s]” that her violation was “tremendous.”
Although, as appellant points out in her brief, there appears to be some question if she
would be eligible for treatment while incarcerated, the law does not requi re consideration
of whether appellant is in need of treatment for controlled substances which can most
effectively be provided if she is confined. See Modtland, 695 N.W.2d at 607. Rather, the
law requires consideration of whether “the offender is in need of correctional treatment
which can most effectively be provided if he is confined .” Id. In light of appellant’s
violations, the record supports the district court’s finding that appellant is in need of
“correctional treatment,” and that treatment can only be effectively provided if she is
confined to prevent further use.
Third, appellant contends that the district court failed to adequately consider
whether it would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the violation if probation were not
revoked because the court “did not offer any analysis as to why [her] first violation, of a
single relapse, was sufficiently serious to require revocation,” and failed to conclude that
appellant “had exhausted options for chemical dependency treatment programming in the
community.” But appellant’s argument ignores the district court’s extensive findings on
the record related to the treatment opportunities provided to appellant. The district court
found that appellant was given “many, many chances” since she was released from prison
in March of 2022, and that despite her “failure to complete drug court in the past,” she was
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given another “chance and opportunity” in this case when she was placed on probation and
“accepted again into treatment court.” The district court also found that, despite again
being accepted into treatment court, appellant “disregarded that and failed to take
advantage of that opportunity.” And the district court found that appellant “continued to
use” during the pendency of this case, which further demonstrates her disregard for
treatment opportunities. Appellant’s continued drug use and repeated disregard for her
treatment opportunities supports the district court’s decision to revoke appellant’s
probation for her first violation.
Moreover, as addressed above, the district court emphasized the seriousness of
appellant’s violation. The district court found that appellant “placed the general public in
extreme danger by driving out of state, obtaining fentanyl, using fentanyl, and driving
back.” In fact, the record indicates that appellant drove after consuming the fentanyl. The
district court also found that “[i]t is unbelievable . . . how [she] do[es] not seem to recognize
any of [her] public safety risk,” and “what a danger she is.” And the district court found
that this was not a “reflexive or technical violation,” but was instead a “tremendous
violation” for her “to disregard all of the efforts that were made to get [her] to comply with
probation.” Therefore, the district court adequately considered whether it would unduly
depreciate the seriousness of the violation if appellant’s probation were not revoked.
Finally, appellant argues that the “nature of [her] underlying offense does not weigh
toward revocation.” To support her position, appellant points out that, in 2011, the
legislature amended the definition of mixture in the controlled-substance statute to exclude
the weight of the fluid in a water pipe in computing the weight of a mixture unless “the
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mixture contains four or more fluid ounces of fluid.” 2011 Minn. Laws, ch. 53, §§ 6-8, at
4-6. She contends that, because she was convicted of a first-degree drug offense based
solely on her possession of a water bong for personal use that had only a few more than
four ounces of water in the bong, it was improper for the district court to “repeatedly
reference[] the fact that [appellant] received a downward dispositional departure in its
decision to revoke probation.”
Appellant’s argument is unavailing. Appellant cites no authority to support her
position that it was improper for the district court to reference appellant’s receipt of a
downward dispositional departure under circumstances similar to those presented here.
Moreover, the law is clear and unambiguous that first-degree possession of a controlled
substance includes possession of 7.5 ounces of water in a bong which consists of a mixture
containing methamphetamine. See Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 2(b). Appellant pleaded
guilty to violating this law, received a downward dispositional departure, and then violated
the terms of her probation. Although appellant may feel that the law is unfair, it was not
improper for the district court to rely on the circumstances of the case when deciding to
revoke her probation.
In sum, the district court made the requisite findings established in Austin, and
balanced the considerations set forth in Modtland. After balancing the Modtland
subfactors, the district court found that need for confinement outweigh ed the policies
favoring probation. The district court’s findings are supported by the record. Accordingly,
the district court did not abuse its discretion in revoking appellant’s probation.
Affirmed.