In the Marriage of:

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0613

In the Marriage of:

Pamela Kristine Huyck, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Kevin Lee Huyck,
Appellant.

Filed February 24, 2025
Affirmed
Larson, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69DU-FA-18-431

Gerald K. Wallace, Wallace Law Firm, PLLC, Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent)

Benjamin Kaasa, Benjamin Kaasa Law Office, PLLC, Duluth, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larson, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARSON, Judge
Appellant-father Kevin Lee Huyck challenges the district court’s decision to modify
parenting time and child support. Father argues the district cour t: (1) made insufficient
findings of fact ; (2) abused its discretion when it failed to analyze all the best- interest
factors in Minn. Stat. § 518.17 (2024); (3) erred when it excluded vision insurance from
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the medical-support calculation; and (4) erred in its childcare-support calculation. Because
the district court did not abuse its discretion when modifying parenting time and child
support, we affirm.
FACTS
Father and respondent-mother Pamela Kristine Huyck were divorced in December
2018, pursuant to a stipulated judgment and decree (J&D). The parties have one joint
minor child born in March 2015. The J&D granted the parties joint legal and joint physical
custody of the child with a parenting-time schedule subject to father’s inconsistent work
schedule:
a. Tuesdays and Thursdays that [father], from after day
care until 7:00 p.m. unless [father] is working;
b. If [father] has two consecutive days off from work,
his parenting time shall be from after day care or 5:00 p.m. at
the end of [father]’s last work day, until 5:00 p.m. the day
before [father] returns to work;
c. If [father] has three consecutive days off from work,
parenting time shall be from the morning of his first day off
(no later than 10:00 a.m.) until 5:00 p.m. the day before [father]
returns to work.

For support obligations, the parties’ Parental Income for determining Child Support (PICS)
totaled $8,764, with mother’s gross monthly income equaling $2,446 and father’s gross
monthly income equaling $6,318. Based on this, father paid mother $602 per month in
child support, provided medical and dental insurance coverage for the child, paid for the
child’s healthcare costs not covered by insurance, and paid for work-related childcare
expenses. Father also agreed to pay $650 per month in spousal maintenance until October
31, 2023. The J&D also provided father the right to claim the child for tax benefits starting
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in 2019 and going forward, “if possible.” Since the J&D, the child has been diagnosed
with various special needs.
On October 13, 2023, the parties participated in unsuccessful mediation for
parenting-time and child-support modification. On November 23, 2023, father filed a
motion to modify the parenting-time schedule to equal parenting time and to modify child
support.1 Mother filed a responsive motion on December 1, 2023, asking the district court,
in part, to (1) grant her temporary sole legal and temporary sole physical custody of the
child; (2) grant her requested temporary parenting-time schedule; and (3) order an
evidentiary hearing to address permanent custody and permanent parenting time.
Each party’s motion included supporting affidavits and documents. For child
support, mother’s affidavit explained that she discontinued childcare as of December 1,
2023, due to the cost, after father stated he would no longer pay for his half. 2 Father’s
affidavit listed the child’s monthly expenses, including $284.33 for health insurance,
$24.79 for dental insurance, $14.51 for vision insurance, and $145 for childcare. For
parenting time, mother also submitted a letter from the child’s therapist that provided the
therapist’s custody recommendations.3 The therapist suggested that the best practice for
children with the child’s special needs “is as much consistency and structure as possible,”

1 Father also asked the district court to reaffirm the J&D’s grant of tax benefits to him, but
only for odd tax years. The district court determined there was insufficient information to
make a ruling and reserved the issue, specifying that the prior J&D provision relating to
taxes remained in effect.
2 The record does not explain when or why the parties started sharing childcare costs.
3 Mother untimely submitted t his letter two days before the motion hearing. T he district
court determined the information was important for analyzing the best interests of the child
and granted father additional time to file a response as the remedy.
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meaning the parenting schedule should be “consistent in both times and days for transition
from one household to the other” with both parents having time with the child.
The district court held a motion hearing on December 14, 2023. In a February 29,
2024 order, the district court determined the parties’ PICS totaled $10,925, with father’s
gross monthly income equaling $8,458.40, mother’s gross monthly income averaging
$2,466.98, and their respective PICS shares being 77% and 23%. The district court then:
(1) modified parenting time, providing father “three overnights consecutively” and mother
“six overnights consecutively”; (2) modified child support, requiring father to pay $846
per month for basic child support, $52 per month for childcare support, and $0 for medical
support ($898 total), and mother to pay $0 for basic child support, $0 for childcare support,
and $71 for medical support ($71 total); and (3) denied all other requests. The child-
support calculation included health and dental insurance in the medical-support obligation
but excluded the $14.51 for vision insurance and allocated a $145 childcare expense to
mother.
Father appeals.
DECISION
Father challenges the district court’s decision to modify parenting time and child
support. We review both decisions for an abuse of discretion. See Suleski v. Rupe, 855
N.W.2d 330, 334 (Minn. App. 2014) (parenting-time modification); Haefele v. Haefele,
837 N.W.2d 703, 708 (Minn. 2013) (child-support modification). A district court abuses
its discretion if its decision is based on a misapplication of the law or is “against logic and
the facts [in the] record.” Shearer v. Shearer, 891 N.W.2d 72, 75, 77 (Minn. App. 2017).
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In doing so, we review legal questions de novo and the district court’s factual findings for
clear error. See Hansen v. Todnem, 908 N.W.2d 592, 596 (Minn. 2018) (legal questions);
Griffin v. Van Griffin, 267 N.W.2d 733, 735 (Minn. 1978) (factual findings). A district
court has broad discretion when deciding parenting-time and child-support questions.
Suleski, 855 N.W.2d at 334; see also Shearer, 891 N.W.2d at 77. We address each decision
in turn below.
I.
We first address father’s arguments related to the district court’s decision to modify
parenting time. Parenting-time modification is governed by Minn. Stat. § 518.175 (2024).
As relevant here, Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 5(b), provides: “If modification would serve
the best interests of the child, the court shall modify the decision-making provisions of a
parenting plan . . . if the modification would not change the child’ s primary residence.
Consideration of a child’s best interest includes a child’s changing developmental needs.”
Father first argues the district court made inadequate findings when it modified
parenting time, relying on Dean v. Pelton. 437 N.W.2d 762 (Minn. App. 1989). In Dean,
we reversed and remanded a district court’s child-support modification for insufficient
findings. Id. at 764-65. In doing so, we stated, “Although these decisions are within the
[district] court’s discretion, the [district] court must make appropriate findings to indicate
it considered all the appropriate factors in making its decisions.” Id. at 764. We explained,
“Reciting the parties’ claims may be helpful in understanding what the [district] court
considered in making its findings; however, the findings themselves must be affirmatively
stated as findings of the [district] court.” Id.
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Here, while father is correct that the district court’s order recites statements from
the parties and affiants, the district court did not err by restating this information. Rather,
Dean provides that reciting this information is allowed and even helpful for understanding
the district court’s decision. Id. Further, in contrast to Dean, the district court did
affirmatively state its findings. The district court made over a dozen statements prefaced
with the phrase “the Court finds” or “the Court does not find,” before reaching its
conclusion that it was appropriate to modify parenting time. We, therefore, conclude that
the district court complied with the standard set forth in Dean.
Second, father argues the district court erred when it analyzed some, but not all, of
the 12 best-interest factors found in Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a), before modifying
parenting time. We are not persuaded.
The law is somewhat unsettled regarding what best-interest findings are required
when deciding a motion to modify parenting time under Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 5(b).
In Hansen, the supreme court held that “Minn. Stat. § 518.17 applies to the creation and
initial approval of parenting plans, but Minn. Stat. § 518.175 . . . governs parenting time
modifications.” 908 N.W.2d at 596 (emphasis added) . There, the supreme court
interpreted Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 8. Id. at 597-98. Under Minn. Stat. § 518.175,
subd. 8, “[t]he court may allow additional parenting time to a parent to provide child care
while the other parent is working if this arrangement is reasonable and in the best interests
of the child, as defined in section 518.175, subdivision 1.” (E mphasis added. )4 The

4 Hansen interpreted the 2016 statutes. The relevant statutory language has not changed
since Hansen.
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supreme court held that, while Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 8, required the district court to
apply the Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1 definition, it did not compel the district court to
make “detailed findings” on each factor. Hansen, 908 N.W.2d at 598. Thus, the supreme
court directed that a district court need only consider “the relevant best-interest factors”
when modifying parenting time under Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 8. Id. at 599.
The Hansen court explicitly did not extend its holding to other subdivisions in Minn.
Stat. § 518.175. See id. at 597 (concluding that this court’s reliance on Minn. Stat.
§ 518.175, subd. 5, was “misplaced” because Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 8, “is specific
to requests for ‘additional parenting time . . . to provide child care while the other parent is
working’”). But in a series of nonprecedential cases we have been asked to decide whether
Hansen applies to Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 5(b). See Robbins v. Robbins, No. A22-
1061, 2023 WL 2960917, at *3 (Minn. App. Apr. 17, 2023); Cook v. Cook, No. A23-0584,
2023 WL 8888154, at *5 (Minn. App. Dec. 26, 2023); Guardia v. Mattson, No. A19-1692,
2020 WL 3172836, at *6-7 (Minn. App. June 15, 2020).5 In each case, we concluded that
Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 5(b), does not require the district court to specifically
reference the Minn. Stat. § 518.17 best-interest factors. See Robbins , 2023 WL 2960917,
at *3; Cook, 2023 WL 8888154, at *5; Guardia, 2020 WL 3172836, at *6-7. Instead, to
evaluate whether a district court made sufficiently particularized findings to evaluate the
best interests of the child, we have applied the more general rule that a “district court must
make sufficient findings to enable appellate review.” Guardia, 2020 WL 3172836, at

5 These opinions are nonprecedential and, therefore, not binding. We cite nonprecedential
opinions for their persuasive value only. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
8
*7 (quoting Hansen, 908 N.W.2d at 597 n.2); see also Robbins, 2023 WL 2960917, at *3;
Cook, 2023 WL 8888154, at *5.6
We find our previous nonprecedential decisions persuasive and apply the same test.
Here, the district court made explicit findings on several of the best-interest factors listed
in Minn. Stat. § 518.17, determining they were the most “relevant.” The district court then
provided a thorough analysis to explain why its decision was in the child’s best interests.
Cf. Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01 (noting that a district court’s findings of fact may be included
in its memorandum). Contrary to father’s argument, the district court provided robust
findings to support its reasons for why modifying parenting time was in the child’s best
interest.
For these reasons, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion when it
issued its decision to modify parenting time, and we affirm.
II.
Father also challenges the district court’s decision to modify child support. A
district court may modify child support upon a showing of substantially changed
circumstances that make the original order “unreasonable and unfair.” Minn. Stat.
§ 518A.39, subd. 2(a) (2024). “The party who moves to modify an existing child-support

6 These decisions are consistent with Minn. R. Civ. P. 61, which requires courts to ignore
harmless error. These decisions are also consistent with the related idea that, if a remand
will not alter the result reached by the district court, a remand is not required. See Grein
v. Grein, 364 N.W.2d 383, 387 (Minn. 1985) (refusing to remand for missing findings of
fact when “from reading the files, the record, and the court’ s findings, on remand the
[district] court would undoubtedly make findings that comport with the statutory
language”); see also Tarlan v. Sorensen, 702 N.W.2d 915, 920 n.1 (Minn. App. 2005)
(applying this aspect of Grein).
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order has the burden of demonstrating both a substantial change in circumstances and the
unfairness and unreasonableness of the order because of the change.” Rose v. Rose, 765
N.W.2d 142, 145 (Minn. App. 2009). As applicable here, it is presumed that a substantial
change in circumstances has occurred and the terms of the current support order are
“unreasonable and unfair” when “the application of the child support guidelines in [Minn.
Stat. § 518A.35 (2024 )] to the current circumstances of the parties results in a calculated
court order that is at least 20 percent and at least $75 per month higher or lower than the
current support order.” Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2(b)(1) (2024).
Father first argues the district court abused its discretion when it issued its decision
to modify child support because it failed to include the cost for the child’s vision insurance.
Father notes that the district court acknowledged that he paid $14.51 per month for the
child’s vision insurance but failed to include that cost in the support calculator.
We agree with father that the district court appears to have erroneously excluded the
cost for the child’s vision insurance. But the effect of this error is de minimis. See Wibbens
v. Wibbens, 379 N.W.2d 225, 227 (Minn. App. 1985) (refusing to remand for a de minimis,
technical error with approximately $120 at stake); Minn. R. Civ. P. 61 (requiring harmless
error to be ignored). Here, if the cost for the vision insurance—$14.51 —is divided between
the parties according to their PICS shares, mother would pay father approximately $3.34
each month or $40.05 a year. This is a mere technical error, and we decline to remand on
this basis. See Duffney v. Duffney, 625 N.W.2d 839, 843 (Minn. App. 2001) (failing to
include $25 per month of income was de minimis error); Risk ex rel. Miller v. Stark, 787
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N.W.2d 690, 694 n.1 (Minn. App. 2010) (failing to account for $400 total in marital
property was de minimis error), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 16, 2010).
Second, father argues the district court abused its discretion when it attributed $145
in childcare-support costs to mother because mother admitted the child was no longer in
childcare. But it is clear from the district court’s order that it intended to allocate childcare-
support costs to allow the child to return to childcare. Thus, we do not discern that the
district court abused its discretion when it allocated $145 to mother for childcare costs.
For these reasons, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion when it
issued its decision to modify child support, and we affirm.
Affirmed.