State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0619

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Oscar Elias Padilla Jovel,
Appellant.

Filed April 14, 2025
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-CR-21-1176

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kathryn M. Keena, Dakota County Attorney, Todd Zettler , Assistant County Attorney,
Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent)

Alyssa Nguyen-Schmitz, Nguyen Firm, LLC, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and
Wheelock, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of first-degree criminal sexual conduct under
Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(a) (2010), arguing that the district court (1) abused its
discretion by permitting respondent to amend the complaint, (2) erre d by denying his
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motion for judgment of acquittal, and (3) abused its discretion by denying his motion for a
new trial. We affirm.
FACTS
This appeal stems from a ppellant Oscar Elias Padilla Jovel ’s conviction of first-
degree criminal sexual conduct under Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(a). In May 2021,
respondent State of Minnesota filed the original complaint charging first-degree criminal
sexual conduct for sexual contact with a person under 13. The complaint alleged that “on
or about January 1, 2011 – December 31, 2013,” appellant made a juvenile complainant,
A.S., perform oral sex when A.S. was “approximately” eight years old. In August 2023,
the complaint was amended to reflect that the charge was for first -degree criminal sexual
conduct for penetration.
The case proceeded to a jury trial in October 2023. Respondent presented testimony
from five witnesses: A.S.; A.S.’s sister, J.S.; the police officer who took A.S.’s statement;
the police detective who interviewed appellant ; and respondent’s victim advocate.
Appellant presented testimony from seven witnesses : two members of A.S.’s family’s
church; A.S.’s mother; two of A.S.’s therapists; appellant; and appellant’s father.
A.S. was born in January 2005. Between 2011 and 2013, A.S. and his family
participated in “church gatherings” at a pastor’s home in Burnsville. Appellant’s father
was the pastor of the church. A.S. testified that , once when he was seven or eight years
old, he was at the home for a church gathering . At some point, he fell asleep and was
brought to a room. While he was lying on the ground, he felt “somebody’s leg” in the back
of his pants. Then, his pants were pulled down, appellant “grabbed [his] penis and started
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sucking it,” and appellant made him perform oral sex. A.S. explained that, after the assault
occurred, appellant went to another room, and he could see appellant masturbating through
a crack in the door.
In approximately October 2020, A.S. told his sister, J.S., about the assault . J.S.
eventually called police to report the allegation. During trial, J.S. described A.S. as “crying
and shaking” when he disclosed this information. J.S. further testified that when A.S. was
approximately seven or eight years old, she noticed changes in his behavior, including that
A.S. did not like sleeping with the lights off, slept holding his mom’s hand, and cried “a
lot.”
During a recorded interview that was played for the jury, A.S. told the responding
police officer that when he was “around eight” years old he fell asleep at a “church thing”
at night. He said he felt a leg in his pants. A.S. explained that appellant put his mouth over
A.S.’s penis and made A.S. do the same to him. A.S. also said that appellant told him to
get on the bed and then he started doing “stuff” to A.S. He said appellant went to another
room and he saw appellant masturbate. A police detective later interviewed appellant about
the allegation. He testified accurately as to appellant’s date of birth.
Two church members, including J.G.E., testified for the defense. Both members
testified that they attended church services and knew A.S. and A.S.’s family. J.G.E. and
his wife met with A.S. and A.S.’s family after A.S. had disclosed the assault . J.G.E.
testified that he said to A.S.: “Look at me. Don ’t look at your father; do not look at your
father. Look at me. [Appellant] abused you?” A.S. responded “no.”
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Appellant denied performing oral sex on A.S. or making A.S. perform oral sex. He
explained the church services were initially hosted at his parents’ home. Appellant’s father
testified that when he started the church in 2010, he held nighttime vigils at his home. In
December 2010, he leased rental space for the church and stopped holding the vigils at the
home. Appellant’s father denied that A.S. and his parents attended vigil at the house. On
cross-examination, the father indicated t hat A.S.’s parents were at the home for bible
studies and for his wife’s birthday party in December 2011.
At the conclusion of trial, the jury found appellant guilty of first -degree criminal
sexual conduct. After the verdict, appellant moved the district court for a judgment of
acquittal, or in the alternative, a new trial. The district court denied those motions and
entered a judgment of conviction for one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct for
penetration. Appellant received a stayed sentence of 144 months in prison.
DECISION
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by granting respondent’s motion
to amend the complaint.

“The district court has broad discretion to grant or deny leave to amend a complaint,
and its ruling will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of that discretion.” State v. Baxter,
686 N.W.2d 846, 850 (Minn. App. 2004). “A district court abuses its discretion when its
decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the
record.” State v. Vangrevenhof, 941 N.W.2d 730, 736 (Minn. 2020) (quotation omitted).
The rules of criminal procedure provide:
Pre-trial proceedings may be continued to permit a new
complaint to be filed and a new warrant or summons issued if
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the prosecutor promptly moves for a continuance on the ground
that:
(a) the initial complaint does not properly name or
describe the defendant or the offense charged . . . .

Minn. R. Crim. P. 3.04, subd. 2. The Minnesota Supreme Court interpreted rule 3.04,
subdivision 2, to apply to amendments made before jeopardy attaches. See State v. Bluhm,
460 N.W.2d 22, 24 (Minn. 1990) (discussing rule 3.04 and holding that “since jeopardy
had not attached the [district] court was free to allow an amendment”). Jeopardy attaches
once the jury is empaneled and sworn. State v. Large, 607 N.W.2d 774, 778 (Minn. 2000).
As noted above, appellant was charged by complaint with one count of first-degree
criminal sexual conduct under Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(a) . The initial complaint
listed the charge as: Criminal Sexual Conduct in the 1st Degree (Contact) (Victim Under
13) (Actor More Than 36 Months Older). (Emphasis added .) And the charge was
described as:
On or about January 1, 2011 - December 31, 2013, in the
County of Dakota, Minnesota, OSCAR ELIAS PADILLA
JOVEL, did engage in sexual contact with a person under 13
years of age as defined in M.S. 609.341, subd. 11(c), and the
actor is more than 36 months older than the complainant.

(Emphasis added.)
The probable-cause section of the complaint alleged that A.S. “told law enforcement
that he had been awoken by [appellant] and made to perform oral sex on him. He further
described how [appellant] then masturbated in front of him while smirking.”
On July 31, 2023, respondent filed a motion to amend the complaint, requesting that
the word “contact” be changed to “penetration” in the charge and its description. On
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August 1, 2023, the parties appeared in court to begin jury selection and respondent argued
its motion . The district court granted the motion and filed an order amending the
complaint. The amended charge read: Criminal Sexual Conduct in the 1st Degree
(PENETRATION). And the amended description of the charge read:
On or about January 1, 2011 – December 31, 2013, in the
County of Dakota, Minnesota, OSCAR ELIAS PADILLA
JOVEL did engage in sexual penetration with a person under
13 years of age, and the actor is more than 36 months older
than the complainant.

Appellant argues the district court abused its discretion by permitting respondent to
amend the complaint because the motion was not “prompt” or “timely .” We are not
persuaded. Rule 3.04 “does not make timeliness [of the amendment] paramount,” but
“recognizes the importance of timeliness by stating that proceedings may be continued to
permit the issuance of a new complaint, provided the prosecution ‘promptly’ moves for a
continuance.” Baxter, 686 N.W.2d at 853.
Since respondent filed its motion the day before jury selection was to begin, the
amendment was made before a jury was empaneled and the district court was within its
discretion when it granted the motion. And after the parties argued the motion, the district
court granted appellant’s request to continue the trial. In granting the motion to amend,
the district court relied on Baxter and concluded the facts of this case are distinguishable
from Baxter. In Baxter, the defendant was originally charged with three counts of third -
degree criminal sexual conduct. Id. at 850. On the morning of trial, the state moved to
amend the complaint to charge three counts of first -degree criminal sexual conduct and
two counts of second -degree criminal sexual conduct. Id. The district court denied the
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state’s motion for untimeliness . Id. at 852. On appeal, this court affirmed the district
court’s denial and noted that the defendant made a speedy trial demand, the case had been
continued several times, and the delay in requesting to amend the complaint was due to the
state’s failure to interview the victim until a month after the victim was located. Id. at 853.
In addition, the proposed amendment to charge first -degree criminal sexual conduct
“would require that additional elements of a crime be prove n, would permit the
presentation of additional defenses, and would allow for a greater penalty.” Id.
We agree that Baxter is distinguishable . Appellant did not make a speedy trial
demand before respondent’s motion was filed, and although the trial appears to have been
continued twice, appellant requested a continuance at the August 2023 trial date.
More importantly, respondent’s amendment did not add additional charges, instead
it amended the charge consistent with the facts that were alleged. First -degree criminal
sexual conduct requires that sexual penetration or sexual contact with a person under 13
years old occurred. Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1. The statutory definition of sexual
penetration includes “fellatio.” Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 12(1) (2010). Sexual contact
of a person under 13 years old involves the “intentional touching of the complainant’s bare
genitals or anal opening by the actor’s bare genitals or anal opening with sexual or
aggressive intent or the touching by the complainant’s bare genitals or anal opening of the
actor’s or another’s bare genitals or anal opening with sexual or aggressive intent.” Minn.
Stat. §§ 609.342, subd. 1, .341, subd. 11(c) (2010). Because the allegation in the probable-
cause section of the original complaint was that appellant made the victim perform “oral
8
sex,” the only applicable provision of the statute was sexual penetration. Moreover, the
degree of the charge and the potential punishment did not change.
In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion by granting respondent’s
motion to amend the complaint.
II. The district court did not err by denying appellant’s motion for judgment of
acquittal.

“If the jury returns a verdict of guilty . . . a motion for a judgment of acquittal may
be brought within 15 days after the jury is discharged. ” Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03, subd.
18(3)(a). A motion for judgment of acquittal presents a question of law that we review de
novo. State v. McCormick, 835 N.W.2d 498, 506 (Minn. App. 2013), rev. denied (Minn.
Oct. 15, 2013). Such a motion “is properly denied where the evidence, viewed in the light
most favorable to the state, is sufficient to sustain a conviction.” State v. DeLaCruz, 884
N.W.2d 878, 890 (Minn. App. 2016).
The standard of review we apply when evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence
depends on whether direct or circumstantial evidence supports the conviction. See State v.
Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 39 (Minn. 2016) (stating that “when a disputed element is
sufficiently proven by direct evidence alone, as it is here, it is the traditional standard, rather
than the circumstantial -evidence standard, that governs ”). Direct evidence “is based on
personal knowledge or observation and . . . if true, proves a fact without inference or
presumption.” State v. Harris , 895 N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted).
Circumstantial evidence is “evidence from which the [jury] can infer whet her the facts in
9
dispute existed or did not exist” and thus, “always requires an inferential step to prove a
fact that is not required with direct evidence.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Appellant argues that respondent’s evidence was circumstantial, and this court
should use the two-step analysis to evaluate his claims. See State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d
594, 598 -99 (Minn. 2013) (stating that when an appellate court reviews the state’s
circumstantial evidence, an appellate court first identifies the circumstances proved and
second, determines whether the circumstances proved are consistent wit h guilt and
inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt) (quotations and citations
omitted). We disagree. To prove its case, respondent presented testimony from the victim
and his sister. Witness testimony is direct evidence when it is “based on personal
knowledge or observation and that if true, proves a fact without inference or presumption.”
State v. Epps , 949 N.W.2d 474, 487 (Minn. App. 2020) (quoting Harris, 895 N.W.2d at
599), aff’d (Minn. Sept. 15, 2021). And in prosecutions for criminal sexual conduct, such
as here, a victim’s testimony generally “need not be corroborated.” Minn. Stat. § 609.347,
subd. 1 (2010); see also State v. Cao, 788 N.W.2d 710, 717 (Minn. 2010) (stating that “it
is settled law that when we engage in appellate review for the sufficiency of the evidence,
it may be sufficient to convict on the uncorroborated testimony of a complainant”). If
corroboration is necessary, testimony about the victim’s demeanor, emotional condition,
and change in behavior after the sexual assault “is strong corroborative evidence.” State v.
Wright, 679 N.W.2d 186, 190 (Minn. App. 2004) , rev. denied (Minn. June 29, 2004).
Testimony about the victim’s emotional condition at the time of the complaint also
corroborates the victim’s testimony. State v. Reinke, 343 N.W.2d 660, 662 (Minn. 1984).
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Accordingly, we apply the direct-evidence standard. Under this standard, appellate
courts carefully examine the record to determine whether the facts and the legitimate
inferences drawn from them would permit the jury to reasonably conclude that the
defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense of which he was convicted.
State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257, 263 (Minn. 2016) (quotations omitted).
To obtain a conviction for first -degree criminal sexual conduct for penetration,
respondent was required to prove that appellant engaged in sexual penetration with a person
under 13 years old and that appellant was more than 36 months older. 1 Minn. Stat.
§ 609.342, subd. 1(a).
Appellant argues the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction because the
complainant “told many lies” and there was no corroborating evidence that the assault
occurred. Specifically, appellant takes issue with A.S.’s testimony that the assault occurred
at a church event held at appellant’s home when A.S. was seven or eight years old between

1 We note that the pattern jury instruction, as cited by respondent, indicates the elements
of first -degree criminal sexual conduct for penetration includes that “the defendant
intentionally sexually penetrated the victim.” 10 Minnesota Practice , CRIMJIG 12.07
(2015) (emphasis added). Intent is generally proved circumstantially. State v. Jones,
4 N.W.3d 495, 501 (Minn. 2024). But pattern instructions are “not precedential or binding”
legal authority, State v. Gunderson , 812 N.W.2d 156, 162 (Minn. App. 2012) (quotation
omitted), and Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(a) does not contain a separate intent
requirement, making it a general intent crime , State v. Hart, 477 N.W.2d 732, 736 (Minn.
App. 1991) (analyzing intent required for first -degree criminal sexual conduct in the
context of erroneous jury instruction and concluding it is a general intent crime), rev.
denied (Minn. Jan. 16, 1992). Thus, first -degree criminal sexual conduct requires the
“general intent to sexually penetrate the victim.” State v. Bookwalter , 541 N.W.2d 290,
296 (Minn. 1995). Accordingly, a victim’s testimony, and the reasonable inferences that
can be drawn from it, may provide sufficient evidence that the sexual conduct was
intentional. State v. Balsley , 999 N.W.2d 880, 886 (Minn. App. Dec. 4, 2023), aff’d, 10
N.W.3d 671 (Minn. 2024).
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the years 2012 and 2013. He contends that appellant’s father proved that church vigils
were no longer held in the home after December 2010. Appellant’s argument is essentially
a challenge to A.S.’s credibility. But the jury determines witness credibility and the weight
to be given such testimony. State v. Pendleton, 706 N.W.2d 500, 512 (Minn. 2005).
Based on our careful review of the record, there was sufficient direct evidence for
the jury to reasonably conclude that appellant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of
first-degree criminal sexual conduct. As to the element of sexual penetration, A.S.
repeatedly testified that appellant performed oral sex on him, and that appellant made him
perform oral sex on appellant. As to the element of A.S. being under 13 years old when
the assault occurred, A.S. testified that he was seven or eight years old whe n the events
occurred. And as to the element of appellant being more than 36 months older than A.S.,
testimony established that appellant’s date of birth is in 1996 and A.S. was born in 2005.
Therefore, appellant is 36 months older than A.S.
We also conclude that, although A.S.’s testimony is sufficient on its own to support
the jury’s conviction, there is corroborating evidence here. A.S.’s sister’s testimony about
changes in A.S.’s behavior in the time after the assault occurred, including that A.S. did
not like to sleep with the lights off and cried a lot, corroborates A.S.’s testimony. And his
sister described how A.S. was “crying and shaking” when A.S. disclosed the assault to her.
In sum, the district court did not err in its denial of appellant’s motion for judgment
of acquittal because sufficient evidence supports the conviction.

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III. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s motion
for a new trial.

Appellant next contends the district court abused its discretion when it denied
appellant’s motion for a new trial. “We review the denial of a motion for a new trial for
an abuse of discretion.” State v. Green, 747 N.W.2d 912, 917 (Minn. 2008). Minnesota
Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.04, subdivision 1, provides that a district court may grant a
new trial on the basis of the interests of justice, irregularity in the proceedings that deprived
the defendant of a fair trial, prosecutorial misconduct, or errors of law.
Appellant argues four grounds for a new trial: (1) prosecutorial misconduct ; (2)
errors of law; (3) irregularity in the proceedings; and (4) the interests of justice required a
new trial. We address each argument in turn.
Prosecutorial Misconduct
We review unobjected -to prosecutorial misconduct under a modified plain -error
standard. State v. Ramey , 721 N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn. 2006). The defendant bears the
burden of establishing error that is plain, but upon doing so the burden shifts to the state to
prove that there is no reasonable likelihood that the absence of the misconduct would have
had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict. Id.
Appellant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct in three ways:
(1) misrepresenting facts and vouch ing for witness credibility during closing arguments ,
(2) offering false testimony, and (3) providing transcripts that were incorrectly transcribed.
First, appellant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing
argument by (1) inferring the assault may have happened at a birthday party, rather than at
13
a church vigil; (2) misstating testimony about how many people were present at the
birthday party, how long the church vigils lasted, and how A.S. got to the bedroom where
the assault occurred; (3) describing a witness as “aggressive” and “huge and burly”; and
(4) vouch ing for the credibility of the state’s witnesses by prefacing a comment about
witnesses clarifying questions with “I submit to you—or the state submits to you.”
When analyzing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument, we
review the argument “as a whole,” not “selected phrases and remarks.” State v. Smith, 876
N.W.2d 310, 335 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). The argument must be “based on the
evidence or reasonable inferences from that evidence.” State v. Jones, 753 N.W.2d 677,
691-92 (Minn. 2008). Based on our careful review of the prosecutor’s entire closing
argument, we conclude that none of the challenged remarks amount to plain error. The
prosecutor accurately described the evidence , proposed inferences the jury could draw
from it, and suggested reasons to credit or discredit witness testimony.
Second, appellant contends respondent offered false testimony when a police officer
testified about speaking with prosecutors and when A.S.’s sister testified that she noticed
changes in A.S.’s behavior after the assault occurred. Appellant has not met his burden to
show plain error on these issues, because he does not demonstrate any basis for concluding
that the witnesses testified falsely at trial. For example, appellant argues the sister’s
testimony was false because the sister was in Mexico when the assault occurred . But the
sister testified that she “wasn’t there at that time where [the assault] happened,” and that
she “used to come in and out from Mexico .” Moreover, she did testify as to her
observations of A.S.’s behavior in the relevant time period. Assessing this testimony
14
constitutes a jury determination of her credibility, which we defer to. Pendleton, 706
N.W.2d at 512.
Third, appellant argues respondent “knew [] transcripts were translated wrong” and
this misconduct deprived him of a fair trial. Based on the record, the parties agreed during
pretrial proceedings that there were translation issues with certain transcribed witness
statements that were disclosed to defense. Respondent “bears responsibility for . . .
inaccurate transcription” of interviews and for the “failure to discover” inaccuracies before
they are provided to defense counsel. Green, 747 N.W.2d at 919. But these transcribed
statements were not used during trial. In fact, the only transcribed statement used during
trial was offered by appellant while the jury watched the body -camera footage of A.S.’s
interview with a police officer. And that document was a “revised” transcription of the
body-camera footage. On this record, any errors in transcription did not impact the verdict.
Errors of Law
Appellant next contends the district court made errors of law in its evidentiary
rulings and motion-in-limine ruling.
Appellant contends respondent violated discovery rules and, as a result, the district
court should have excluded respondent’s exhibits and witness testimony. Appellant argues
respondent failed to disclose, in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), its
conversations with witnesses and appellant’s own driver’s license. Respondent’s
intentional or unintentional suppression of “material evidence favorable to the defendant
violates the constitutional guarantee of due process.” Zornes v. State , 903 N.W.2d 411,
417 (Minn. 2017). For a Brady violation to exist, three elements must be present:
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(1) the evidence must be favorable to the defendant because it
would have been either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the
evidence must have been suppressed by the prosecution,
intentionally or otherwise; and (3) the evidence must be
material—in other words , the absence of the evidence must
have caused prejudice to the defendant.

Walen v. State , 777 N.W.2d 213, 216 (Minn. 2010). Evidence is material “if there is a
reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of
the proceeding would have been different.” Zornes, 903 N.W.2d at 41 8 (quotations
omitted). And a “reasonable probability is one that is sufficient to undermine confidence
in the outcome” of trial. Id. “Because a Brady materiality analysis involves a mixed issue
of fact and law, we review a district court’s materiality determination de novo.” Walen,
777 N.W.2d at 216.
Appellant generally argues that respondent failed to disclose all the meetings it had
with their witnesses because witness testimony concerning the number of meetings they
had with the prosecutor was inconsistent. He specifically argues that respondent a ltered
the date on a disclosure made in March 2023. Appellant’s arguments fail on the materiality
element. The record indicates that respondent did not immediately disclose a meeting its
victim advocate had with A.S. five days before trial began, and the topic of the meeting
concerned the upcoming trial, including confirming that A.S. received notice of the trial
date. As to the March 2023 disclosure, the prosecutor’s statements indicate there was a
discrepancy in the victim -advocate’s report that showed the report was generated on a
different date than when the meeting was held. In its order denying the motion for a new
trial, the district court concluded that no violation occurred and appellant “failed to provide
16
any evidence that [he] was prejudiced by [respondent] for not including records of these
conversations with witnesses.” The district court’s conclusion is supported by the record,
and we discern no error in its decision. Moreover, appellant has not identified how
evidence of certain meetings respondent held with witnesses would have changed the result
of the trial. Based on our careful review of the record, the district court did not err in its
conclusion that no disclosure violation occurred.
Appellant also contends respondent failed to disclose his own driver’s license. The
record reflects that d efense counsel argued at trial that she had not received the driver’s
license exhibit, but respondent indicated it was disclosed. The district court permitted
respondent to enter appellant’s driver’s license into evidence. Appellant has not shown
how he was prejudiced by the admission of his own driver’s license, because testimony in
the record also established his date of birth.2 The district court did not err in its decision to
admit the driver’s license record.
Appellant next contends the district court abused its discretion by ruling he could
not cross -examine A.S. about a memory deficit diagnosis that was identified in A.S.’s
therapy records . Under Minnesota law, a person’s therapy records are privileged, and
disclosure is prohibited. See Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 1(g) (2024); see also In re State
v. Ramirez, 985 N.W.2d 581, 585-86 (Minn. 2023) (concluding that Minn. Stat. § 595.02,

2 Appellant also notes that the state failed to disclose a drawing of appellant’s home. He
has not argued how the state failed to disclose the drawing or how he was prejudiced by
this drawing. An inadequately briefed issue is not properly before an appellate court.
McKenzie v. State , 583 N.W.2d 744, 746 n.1 (Minn. 1998) (applying the rule that
arguments not briefed are waived in an appeal in which the appellant “allude[d] to” an
issue but “fail[ed] to address them in the argument portion of his brief”).
17
subd. 1(g) sets forth a statutory privilege prohibiting disclosure of records maintained by
mental-health professionals unless an exception applies) . Expert testimony is admissible
if it “will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”
Minn. R. Evid. 702. An expert’s opinion “must have foundational reliability.” Id. The
decision to admit expert testimony is within the discretion of the district court. State v.
Obeta, 796 N.W.2d 282, 294 (Minn. 2011).
Even though A.S.’s therapy records are privileged, appellant received the therapy
records.3 At trial, appellant wanted to cross-examine A.S. about the records and an alleged
memory impairment, but the district court determined testimony of a medical expert would
be required to offer evidence of a memory impairment . After A.S. testified, the district
court ruled that it would allow appellant to offer the therapy records to show A.S. made
inconsistent statements to his therapists compared to his testimony, but only if foundation
was laid by the “appropriate [person] to authenticate the records.” The district court also
required any hearsay in the records to be redacted. Appellant subsequently called two

3 Appellant also argues the district court abused its discretion by denying his Paradee
motion, which is a motion that seeks in camera review of confidential records, such as
medical records, to determine whether disclosure of the records is required. State v.
Paradee, 403 N.W.2d 640, 641-42 (Minn. 1987). In-camera review of confidential records
is a discovery option, not a right; thus, a defendant must make a “plausible showing” that
the records sought will be both “material and favorable to his defense.” State v. Hummel,
483 N.W.2d 68, 72 (Minn. 1992) (quotations omitted). Appellant requested that the district
court order additional disclosure of A.S.’s mental health records. As noted above,
respondent had already disclosed some records. The district court denied appellant’s
motion, reasoning in its order that appellant did not provide sufficient evidence to show
that such records “exist and are material and favorable to his defense.” The appellate record
does not contain a transcript of the hearing at which appellant argued his motion. Based
on the available record, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
appellant’s Paradee motion.
18
therapists to testify who had treated A.S., and the district court admitted heavily redacted
portions of the records into evidence. While testifying, t he first therapis t confirmed that
A.S.’s medical record indicated that A.S. reported his memory is impaired. And the second
therapist confirmed that A.S.’s record stated A.S. “has a memory issue.”
During oral argument, appellant argued that evidence in the record indicates that
A.S. fabricated the allegation. Our review of the record , including the redacted records
that were shown to the jury, reveals no evidence of fabrication, a diagnosis of memory
impairment, or an abuse of the district court’s discretion. The district court appropriately
considered appellant’s request to cross -examine A.S. about his medical records, required
appellant to redact hearsay from the records, and permitted appellant to offer the medical
records containing inconsistent statements through the appropriate witnesses who could
lay foundation to those records . Moreover, appellant has not established how he was
prejudiced by being allowed to call A.S.’s therapists as witnesses after he was not permitted
to cross-examine A.S. about records written by his therapists.
Appellant contends the district court abused its discretion by denying appellant’s
motion in limine to cross-examine A.S. about a U-Visa as a potential motive for fabricating
the allegation of sexual misconduct . Generally, “[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible”
unless otherwise provided by law. Minn. R. Evid. 402. Evidence is relevant if it tends to
make the existence of any fact of consequence more or less probable than it would be
without the evidence. Minn. R. Evid. 401. Evidence of bias is admissible “[f]or the
purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness.” Minn. R. Evid. 616. But relevant
evidence, including evidence of bias, “may be excluded if its probative value is
19
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury.” Minn. R. Evid. 403. As with other evidentiary rulings, a district
court has “discretion in balancing the probative value of evidence against its prejudicial
effect.” State v. Gassler, 505 N.W.2d 62, 70 (Minn. 1993).
During arguments on appellant’s motion in limine, appellant argued that A.S.
fabricated the allegation to obtain legal status for his father. The district court denied
appellant’s request, concluding that defense counsel’s offer of proof as to a U-Visa motive
was not sufficient to establish that the information was relevant. The district court reasoned
that appellant did not offer “any evidence that the father was in the U.S. illegally, that he
was interested in obtaining a U-Visa, that he had applied for a U-Visa or that his motivation
to obtain a U-Visa caused him to induce his son to make a false allegation of abuse.” The
district court’s reasoning is supported by the record , and it did not abuse its discretion in
excluding evidence of immigration status based on bias when the proponent of the evidence
failed to make an offer of proof that the witness was given consideration for their testimony.
See State v. Larson, 787 N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn. 2010) (concluding the district court did
not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of a witness’s immigration status as bias
evidence because the witness was not given consideration for his testimony); see also
State v. Agudo , A22 -1151, 2023 WL 4199168 , at *6 -7 (Minn. App. June 26, 2023)
(concluding the district court did not abuse its discretion by limiting cross -examination
20
regarding witness’s immigration status after the defendant offered proof that the witnesses
knew about U-Visas), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 17, 2023).4
Irregularities in Proceedings
Appellant next contends there were irregularities in the proceedings because A.S.
and his sister attended a hearing on appellant’s motion in limine. A ppellant objected to
their presence because defense counsel planned to offer proof of the U -Visa motive .
However, the record reflects that the district court reserved the issue relating to the U-Visa
and counsel did not make arguments that day. Accordingly, appellant has not established
how the witnesses’ presence during the hearing was prejudicial , and we discern no abuse
of the district court’s discretion to deny appellant’s motion to dismiss on these grounds.
Interests of Justice
Appellant contends that based on the totality of the arguments above, he should be
granted a new trial in the interest of justice. We may consider a number of factors when
analyzing “the interests of justice,” such as whether appellant suffered fundamental
unfairness. Green, 747 N.W.2d at 918. Appellant’s argument on this issue is based on the
entirety of the issues addressed above. Because appellant has not identified error in the
numerous issues he raises on appeal, we conclude he is not entitled to a new trial.
In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion in its denial of appellant’s
motion for a new trial on any of the grounds asserted by appellant.
Affirmed.

4 We cite nonprecedential cases for persuasive authority only. See Minn. R. Civ. App.
P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).