State of Minnesota, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0623

State of Minnesota,
Appellant,

vs.

Bobby James Jackson,
Respondent.

Filed December 23, 2024
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-22-6228

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Anna R. Light, Assistant County Attorney, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Shauna Kieffer, Kieffer Law, LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Cleary,
Judge.∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
In this prosecution pretrial appeal, appellant argues that the district court erred by
dismissing criminal-sexual-conduct charges based on its determination that respondent’s
right to a speedy trial was violated. Because respondent’s right to a speedy trial was
violated, we affirm.
FACTS
On September 27, 2022, S.M.O. reported that she had been sexually assaulted by
respondent Bobby James Jackson. Three days later, Jackson was arrested and held for
questioning. On October 2, 2022, law enforcement questioned Jackson regarding the
allegation and released him from custody the following day.
On October 27, appellant State of Minnesota charged Jackson by complaint-warrant
with first-degree criminal sexual conduct in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 3(2)
(2022).
On November 3, 2023, Jackson was arrest ed pursuant to the October 2022
complaint-warrant. On December 4, Jackson demanded a speedy trial.
On January 11, 2024, Jackson moved to dismiss the charge against him based on a
violation of his speedy -trial right. On February 23, the district court held a hearing on
Jackson’s motion, set a briefing schedule, and took the motion under advisement. On April
10, the district court determined Jackson’s right to a speedy trial was violated and granted
his motion to dismiss.
The state appeals.
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DECISION
This is a prosecutorial appeal of the district court’s pretrial order granting Jackson’s
motion to dismiss for violating his right to a speedy trial. As a threshold matter, the state
must show that the order has a critical impact on its ability to prosecute the case. State v.
Osorio, 891 N.W.2d 620, 626-27 (Minn. 2017). We conclude, and Jackson concedes, that
the order dismissing the charge critically impacts the state’s ability to prosecute the case.
See State v. Varnado, 582 N.W.2d 886, 889 n.1 (Minn. 1998) (“As the district court
dismissed the complaint, the critical impact test is met in this case.”). We, therefore, turn
to the merits of this appeal.
The state argues that the district court erred by dismissing the charge against Jackson
based on its determination that the 12-month delay between charging and arrest violated
his right to a speedy trial.
Both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee criminal defendants
the right to a speedy trial. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6. The right
protects against “undue and oppressive” pretrial incarceration, reduces the “anxiety and
concern accompanying public accusation,” and avoids delay that may impair the accused’s
ability to present a defense. State v. Jones, 977 N.W.2d 177, 190 (Minn. 2022) (quotation
omitted). “Whether a defendant has been denied a speedy trial is a constitutional question
subject to de novo review.” Osorio, 891 N.W.2d at 627. If a defendant’s speedy-trial right
is violated, “‘the only possible remedy’ is dismissal of the case.” Id. (quoting Strunk v.
United States, 412 U.S. 434, 440 (1973)).
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“Because the right to a speedy trial attaches after a defendant is formally charged or
arrested, whichever comes first, defendants raise speedy -trial claims at different times.”
Id. There are two relevant timeframes. The first type of speedy-trial claim involves a delay
between the time of arrest and the time of trial. Id. The second, which is at issue in this
case, concerns a delay between charging the defendant and the defendant’s arrest. Id.; see
also Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 648 (1992) (recognizing this type of
speedy-trial violation).
To determine whether a delay violates a defendant’s right to a speedy trial,
Minnesota courts apply the four-factor balancing test set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S.
514 (1972). Osorio, 891 N.W.2d at 627. “The test provides that a court must consider:
(1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) whether the defendant asserted
his or her right to a speedy trial; and (4) whether the delay prejudiced the defendant.” State
v. Windish, 590 N.W.2d 311, 315 (Minn. 1999) (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-33). “None
of these factors is either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation
of the right of speedy trial. Rather, they are related factors and must be considered together
with such other circumstances as may be relevant.” State v. Taylor, 869 N.W.2d 1, 19
(Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted). We consider each factor in turn.
A. Length of Delay
“The length of delay is a ‘triggering mechanism’ which determines whether further
review is necessary.” Windish, 590 N.W.2d at 315 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 530). The
length of the delay “is calculated from the point at which the [S]ixth [A]mendment right
attaches: when a formal indictment or information is issued against a person or when a
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person is arrested and held to answer a criminal charge.” State v. Jones, 392 N.W.2d 224,
235 (Minn. 1986). When “the length of the delay is ‘presumptively prejudicial,’ there is a
necessity for inquiry into the remaining factors of the test.” Windish, 590 N.W.2d at 315
(quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-31 ). “[A] 6-month delay is presumptively prejudicial,
triggering an inquiry into the remaining Barker factors.” Osorio, 891 N.W.2d at 628.
Jackson was charged in October 2022 and arrested in November 2023. The
one-year delay triggers further inquiry into the Barker factors.
B. Reason for the Delay
Under the reason-for-the-delay factor, “the key question is whether the government
or the criminal defendant is more to blame for the delay.” Taylor, 869 N.W.2d at 19
(quotation omitted). We first consider which party caused the delay. See id. at 19-20;
Osorio, 891 N.W.2d at 629. We then evaluate the reason for that delay, assigning “different
weights . . . to different reasons.” Taylor, 869 N.W.2d at 20 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at
531). “For instance, a [d]eliberate delay to hamper the defense weighs heavily against the
prosecution, while neutral reason[s] such as negligence or overcrowded courts weigh less
heavily.” Id. (quotation omitted).
As the district court observed, law enforcement apprehended and questioned
Jackson regarding the incident in October 2022, and there is nothing in the record
suggesting that Jackson took any action to delay his apprehension or otherwise hamper law
enforcement thereafter. In fact, the record indicates that, when Jackson was arrested in
2023 pursuant to the warrant, he was living at the same address he had previously provided
to law enforcement. The government is, therefore, to blame for the delay. See Osorio, 891
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N.W.2d at 629 (noting that the state has “a responsibility to diligently pursue and prosecute
the defendant”).
The record is silent regarding why the state failed to execute the complaint-warrant
for one year, but there is no evidence that the state’s failure to act on the warrant was aimed
at hampering Jackson’s defense. We, therefore, agree with the district court that the delay
was likely due to the state’s negligence. Id. Thus, this factor weighs against the state but
“less heavily than if the delay were intentional.” Id.
C. Assertion of Speedy-Trial Right
The third Barker factor—whether and how the defendant asserted the right to a
speedy trial—“is closely related to the other factors.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. In the
context of a delay between the time of charging and arrest, “when a defendant knows of
the charges against him long before his arrest but fails to assert his right to a speedy trial
until after his arrest, Barker’s third factor weighs heavily against the defendant.” Osorio,
891 N.W.2d at 629 (citing Doggett, 505 U.S. at 653). But “a defendant ‘is not to be taxed
for invoking his speedy trial right only after his arrest’ if he did not have knowledge of the
charges against him prior to arrest.” Id. (quoting Doggett, 505 U.S. at 654).

Here, the record shows that Jackson was interviewed by law enforcement regarding
the September 27, 2022 incident, which suggests that he knew he was under investigation.
There is nothing in the record, however, demonstrating that Jackson knew that he had been
charged in relation to that incident.
The district court determined that this factor weighed strongly in Jackson’s favor
because he asserted his right to a speedy trial soon after being arrested. However, caselaw
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does not suggest that, in the charging-to-arrest delay context, this factor weighs strongly in
a defendant’s favor simply because the right was asserted soon after arrest. Th us, the
district court’s finding that this factor weighs strongly in Jackson’s favor is clearly
erroneous.
Here, the delay was between the time of charging and the time Jackson was arrested.
Jackson asserted his right to a speedy trial after arrest. However, and in contrast to the
facts in Osorio in which Osorio was aware of the charge against him yet he failed to
demand a speedy trial for nearly two years, 891 N.W.2d at 629-31, there is nothing in the
record to suggest that Jackson knew that he had been charged. Thus, he should not be
penalized for asserting the right after arrest, Doggett, 505 U.S. at 654, and we determine
that this factor is neutral.
D. Prejudice
The final Barker factor is whether Jackson suffered prejudice due to the delay.
Windish, 590 N.W.2d at 318 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 532). We consider three interests
when assessing prejudice: “(i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize
anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be
impaired.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 532. The third interest is the “most serious” because “the
inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case ske ws the fairness of the entire
system.” Id. But “[p]rejudice must be more than minimal to weigh in favor of a
defendant.” State v. Paige, 977 N.W.2d 829, 841 (Minn. 2022). And “the prejudice a
defendant suffers must be due to the delay.” Oso rio, 891 N.W.2d at 631 (quotation
omitted).
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A defendant may demonstrate actual prejudice or presumptive prejudice as a result
of a delay. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655-56. Actual prejudice is an “affirmative showing that
the delay weakened his ability to raise specific defenses, elicit specific testimony, or
produce specific items of evidence.” Id. at 655. Prejudice may be presumed if there has
been an excessive delay. Id.
The district court rejected Jackson’s actual- prejudice claim. Jackson does not
challenge the district court’s actual-prejudice determination on appeal. The district court,
instead, determined that prejudice could be presumed based on the excessive delay of one
year between charging and arrest. The state argues that the district court’s
presumptive-prejudice finding is clearly erroneous. We are not persuaded.
The Osorio court adopted the United States Supreme Court’s reasoning for
considering whether a defendant has been prejudiced based upon an excessive delay:
[E]xcessive delay presumptively compromises the reliability
of the trial in ways that neither party can prove or, for that
matter, identify. While such presumptive prejudice cannot
alone carry a Sixth Amendment claim without regard to the
other Barker criteria . . . it is part of the mix of relevant facts,
and its importance increases with the length of delay.

891 N.W.2d at 632 (quoting Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655-56).
This reasoning applies to these facts. It is impossible to determine how Jackson was
prejudiced by the one-year delay. The state notes, in claiming this delay was not excessive,
that it is not uncommon for criminal cases to take a few years to resolve. But that misses
the point when considering a prearrest speedy-trial situation. When a defendant is
promptly charged and arrested, the defendant learns of the charges against him and he,
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through appointed counsel if he is indigent, begins investigating and developing a defense.
In contrast, the delay between charging and arrest prevented Jackson from being able to
investigate the charge against him and develop a defense for over a year.
The state notes that the one-year delay for Jackson falls short of the 21-month delay
found in Osorio in which the supreme court said Osorio’s right to speedy trial was not
violated. 891 N.W.2d at 631-32. However, Osorio was found to have acquiesced to the
delay because he had received a summons and complaint, which ameliorated the presumed
prejudice he suffered due to the delay. Id. at 632. Here, there is nothing in the record
demonstrating that Jackson knew that he had been charged to have acquiesced to the delay.
We therefore agree with the district court that the one-year delay was excessive and
presumptively prejudiced Jackson.
E. Balancing of Factors
The length of delay — one year between charging and Jackson’s arrest—requires
additional inquiry into the remaining Barker factors. Osorio, 891 N.W.2d at 628. The
reason-for-delay factor weighs against the state because the delay was due to its negligence.
Taylor, 869 N.W.2d at 20. Jackson asserted his right to a speedy trial soon after being
arrested, so this factor is neutral. Osorio, 891 N.W.2d at 629. Jackson has presumptively
suffered prejudice and this factor weighs against the state. In sum, three of the four factors
weigh against the state and one factor is neutral. We therefore agree with the district court
that the one-year delay between charging and arrest violated Jackson’s right to a speedy
trial.
Affirmed.