State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0629

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Carlos Raul Orellana Duta,
Appellant.

Filed April 14, 2025
Affirmed
Wheelock, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-23-10172

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Mark V. Griffin, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Eva F. Wailes, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and
Wheelock, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WHEELOCK, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm, arguing
that the law-enforcement officers did not have reasonable, articulable suspicion for the
2
underlying stop of his vehicle, unlawfully expanded the stop, and lacked probable cause to
seize the firearm. We affirm.
FACTS
Approximately 11 officers and six squad cars responded, shortly before 10:00 on a
morning in May 2023, to a 911 call reporting a suspicious vehicle parked on a residential
street in Minneapolis. The squad cars surrounded the parked vehicle, officers approached
the occupants, and an officer placed a tire-deflation device on one of the vehicle’s tires to
ensure that the occupants could not flee. The caller had described the suspicious vehicle
as a dark-colored Kia without license plates and occupied by three or four people wearing
masks. The sergeant responding to the call knew that Kias are frequently and easily stolen
and that it is common for their license plates to be removed and for the stolen vehicles then
to be used to commit other crimes. While en route to the scene, the sergeant called the 911
caller to collect more information, and the caller reported that one of the vehicles that was
near the Kia had left. When the sergeant arrived on the scene, he observed a dark-colored
Kia without license plates that had a temporary license plate affixed to the rear windshield.
From outside the vehicle, the sergeant observed two people in the front seat who were not
wearing masks; the individual in the driver’s seat was later identified as appellant Carlos
Raul Orellana Duta.
The sergeant walked around the vehicle and observed, through the passenger-side
windows, “marijuana shake . . . on the rear floorboard of the vehicle . . . an open beer can
. . . a digital scale in the driver’s door panel, and then a clear plastic [baggie].” From his
experience and training, the sergeant knew that individuals who sell controlled substances
3
use digital scales and clear plastic baggies like those he observed in the vehicle. Given
these items, the sergeant believed that criminal activity involving controlled substances
was taking place. While the sergeant made these observations, other officers on the scene
determined that the vehicle was not stolen and that neither occupant had outstanding
warrants. Once the sergeant learned of these updates, he informed the other officers present
that he intended to continue the traffic stop because of the items he observed inside the
vehicle.
Returning to the vehicle, the sergeant informed Duta that he would open the door to
the vehicle, but that Duta should not step out until directed. Duta nodded that he understood
and began moving a sweatshirt around inside of the vehicle. The sergeant believed that
Duta may have been attempting to conceal a weapon and ordered Duta to stop moving
around, ultimately taking the sweatshirt from Duta through the partially opened driver’s
window and throwing it to the ground. The sergeant instructed Duta, who was still sitting
in the driver’s seat with the door closed, to put his hands behind his head and interlace his
fingers. The sergeant reiterated that he would open the door, but that Duta should not get
out of the vehicle; however, Duta began to step out of the vehicle with his hands still behind
his head. The door opened enough for the sergeant to see a firearm under the driver’s seat,
wedged between the driver’s seat and the driver’s door, and he yelled, “Gun!” Immediately
after the sergeant identified a firearm, several officers removed Duta from the vehicle, held
him on the ground, and handcuffed him. After Duta was standing up, the sergeant asked
him whether he had a permit for the firearm, and Duta indicated that he did not.
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Officers ascertained that Duta was prohibited from possessing firearms, and
respondent State of Minnesota charged him with unlawful possession of a firearm in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2022). Duta filed a motion to suppress
evidence of the firearm, and the district court denied his motion. The parties agreed that
our review of the order denying Duta’s suppression motion would be dispositive of the
matter, and Duta stipulated to the state’s evidence, maintained his not-guilty plea, an d
waived his right to a jury trial under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4. The district court
entered a judgment of conviction. The district court granted a downward durational
departure and sentenced Duta to 57 months in prison.
Duta appeals.
DECISION
Duta asserts that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress the
evidence of the firearm for three reasons: first, the officers lacked reasonable, articulable
suspicion to conduct the traffic stop; second, they did not have reasonable, articulable
suspicion to expand the stop; and third, they lacked probable cause to search him and seize
the firearm under either the automobile exception or the search-incident-to-arrest exception
to the constitutional prohibition against warrantless searches and seizures.
1 The United
States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit “unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S.

1 Duta also asks that we consider whether the officers breached the March 2023 consent
decree between the City of Minneapolis (for the Minneapolis Police Department) and the
Minnesota Department of Human Rights; the decree outlines procedures for reporting
police misconduct to the city. Because Duta has not identified any authority for us to do
so, we do not address this argument.
5
Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. “Generally, if evidence is seized in violation
of the constitution, it must be suppressed.” State v. Taylor, 965 N.W.2d 747, 752 (Minn.
2021). We review each of Duta’s arguments de novo because the facts are not in dispute.
See State v. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008).
A. Initial Stop
Duta first argues that the facts do not support the district court’s determination that
the officers possessed reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct the initial investigatory
stop. H e points out that third-party observations of suspicious activity do not always
support reasonable suspicion and that there were sufficient differences between the 911
caller’s report and the scene officers observed when they arrived such that the officers
could not have had reasonable, articulable suspicion to initiate the stop. Specifically, he
asserts the following differences: the 911 caller reported that there were three vehicles in a
row, but officers found Duta’s vehicle parked alone; the 911 caller reported that there were
three or four individuals in the vehicle, but the officers found only two individuals in the
vehicle; the 911 caller reported that the individuals were all wearing masks, but the officers
found no one wearing a mask; and the first officers on the scene believed Duta’s vehicle
was not the vehicle the 911 caller identified. The state argues that the officers’
observations, even without the 911 call, would have justified a stop because Duta’s vehicle
was missing a front license plate and details at the scene corroborated the 911 call ,
including the location of Duta’s vehicle and the presence of another vehicle parked near
Duta’s.
6
An officer may conduct a brief stop and investigation only if they have reasonable,
articulable suspicion of criminal activity, meaning that the stop cannot be “the product of
mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity.” State v. Pike, 551 N.W.2d 919, 921-22 (Minn.
1996). To have reasonable, articulable suspicion for an investigatory stop, the officer must
be able to point to “specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)). An initial stop is lawful if officers “had a particularized and
objective basis for suspecting the particular persons stopped of criminal activity.” State v.
Kvam, 336 N.W.2d 525, 528 (Minn. 1983) (quotation omitted). To determine whether
officers had such a basis, “the court should consider the totality of the circumstances and
should remember that trained law- enforcement officers are permitted to make inferences
and deductions that might well elude an untrained person.” Id. (quotation omitted).
An anonymous tip may have “sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable
suspicion to make an investigatory stop.” Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 397
(2014) (quotation omitted). Appellate courts “presume that tips from private citizen
informants are reliable . . . when informants give information about their identity so that
the police can locate them if necessary.” Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d at 394 (quotations
omitted). A tip may be reliable if it is based on “[r]ecent personal observation of
incriminating conduct,” which is typically “the preferred basis for an informant’s
knowledge.” State v. Ward, 580 N.W.2d 67, 71 (Minn. App. 1998). When an officer’s
personal observations can corroborate some details of the anonymous tip, the tip may be
sufficiently reliable to provide a basis for an initial stop. Navarette, 572 U.S. at 398.
7
Here, officers responded to a 911 call reporting a suspicious vehicle. The caller
reported that they had seen a dark-colored Kia without license plates in which there were
three or four people wearing masks. When the sergeant called them to collect more
information, the caller reported that one of the vehicles that was near the Kia had left.
Because the caller ’s phone number was available to the sergeant and the caller provided
real-time reporting of their personal observations, the tip was reliable. See Timberlake,
744 N.W.2d at 394; Ward, 580 N.W.2d at 71. When officers arrived, they identified a
dark-colored Kia with missing license plates on the street where the tip reported it would
be.
Duta relies on the inconsistencies between the details reported by the 911 caller and
the officers’ observations to challenge that reasonable, articulable suspicion supported the
stop, but the inconsistencies do not negate the tip’s reliability and the officers’ on-scene
observations were of a vehicle that matched the vehicle described by the 911 caller—a
dark-colored Kia without license plates. While we acknowledge that there were some
differences between the 911 caller’s description and Duta’s vehicle, we must look at the
totality of the circumstances. Because the tip was presumptively reliable, the vehicle was
a dark-colored Kia, two people were inside the vehicle, and the vehicle did not have a front
license plate and was parked where the caller said it was, we conclude that the totality of
the circumstances was sufficient to support reasonable, articulable suspicion for the initial
stop.
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B. Expansion of the Stop
Duta next argues that, when the officers surrounded the vehicle, requested
identification from the occupants, looked inside the vehicle, and asked Duta to step out of
the vehicle, the officers unlawfully expanded the stop because the expansion was not
related to the original purpose of the stop, supported by independent probable cause, or
reasonable. The state responds that reasonable, articulable suspicion was present, given
that officers observed marijuana shake, a digital scale, an open beer can, and a clear plastic
baggie in the vehicle, and that this supported the expansion of the stop.
Under the Minnesota Constitution, “each incremental intrusion during a stop must
be strictly tied to and justified by” one of the following: (1) the original legitimate purpose
of the stop, (2) independent probable cause, or (3) “reasonableness to justify that particular
intrusion.” State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 364 (Minn. 2004) (quotations omitted).
The expansion is reasonable if, objectively, “the facts available to the officer at the moment
of the seizure warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was
appropriate.” Id. (quotations omitted).
As stated above, when determining whether an investigation is reasonable, a
reviewing court may consider officers’ inferences and deductions made in light of their
training and experience. Kvam, 336 N.W.2d at 528. The expansion of a stop may be
reasonable if there is an open alcohol container in addition to other facts. Taylor,
965 N.W.2d at 753-54 (concluding that the presence of an open case of alcohol and
concerns that the driver had a license cancelled as inimical to public safety allowed the
officer to expand the stop to determine whether the driver was under the influence of
9
alcohol). And, when expanding a stop, an officer may ask an individual to step out of the
vehicle for officer safety. Askerooth , 681 N.W.2d at 367 (citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms ,
434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977)).
Here, the sergeant’s observation of marijuana shake, an open beer can, a digital
scale, and a clear plastic baggie inside Duta’s vehicle provided new facts that supported
the stop’s expansion because, as the district court found, these items were visible to officers
from where they were lawfully positioned outside the vehicle. Based on his training and
experience, the sergeant suspected that there may have been criminal activity related to
controlled substances because digital scales and tear-off plastic baggies like th ose he saw
in the vehicle are often connected to narcotics use and sale. These facts, when combined
with the presence of an open alcohol container and marijuana shake, provided a reasonable
basis to justify the expansion of the stop, including a request that Duta exit the vehicle.
C. Probable Cause
Duta finally argues that the officers’ subsequent search of his vehicle was unlawful
because they did not obtain a warrant and neither the automobile exception nor the
search-incident-to-arrest exception applied. Duta claims that the officers gave confusing
instructions about exiting the vehicle and then based their belief that criminal activity was
afoot on this confusion. He also asserts that he was de facto under arrest at the moment he
was stepping out of the vehicle and before officers saw the firearm. The state points out
that the officers did not use any force until they discovered the firearm and that, once Duta
admitted he did not have a permit to carry the firearm, probable cause existed for his arrest.
10
“Generally, searches conducted outside of the judicial warrant process are per se
unreasonable.” State v. Munson, 594 N.W.2d 128, 135 (Minn. 1999). One exception to
this rule allows officers to “search an automobile without a warrant if they have probable
cause for believing that the vehicles are carrying contraband or illegal merchandise.” Id.
(quotation omitted). Probable cause for a search “exists when there is a fair probability
that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. ” State v.
Torgerson, 995 N.W.2d 164, 169 (Minn. 2023) (quotations omitted). Whether an officer
has probable cause is “an objective inquiry” that “must be based on objective facts that
could justify the issuance of a warrant.” Id. (quotations omitted). The determination of
probable cause includes reasonable inferences that officers may make based on their
training and experience. State v. Koppi, 798 N.W.2d 358, 362 (Minn. 2011).
Another exception to the warrant requirement is for searches incident to a lawful
arrest. State v. Bernard, 859 N.W.2d 762, 766 (Minn. 2015). An arrest is lawful if it is
supported by probable cause, which requires the objective facts to be “such that under the
circumstances a person of ordinary care and prudence would entertain an honest and strong
suspicion that a crime has been committed.” State v. Johnson, 314 N.W.2d 229, 230
(Minn. 1982) (quotation omitted). If a person is lawfully arrested, then officers may
conduct a search of the person and the area within the person’s control incident to that
arrest. State v. Bradley, 908 N.W.2d 366, 369 (Minn. App. 2018). The
search-incident-to-arrest exception permits a limited search of a vehicle if “it is reasonable
to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.” Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S.
332, 351 (2009).
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Here, once the driver’s door was opened, the sergeant immediately saw the firearm
and called out, “Gun!” to the other officers, and officers removed Duta from the vehicle
for officer safety. Officers then confirmed that Duta did not have a permit to possess the
firearm. The firearm was beneath the driver’s seat, between the driver’s seat and the
driver’s door. We have already determined that the officers lawfully expanded the stop,
which allowed them to ask Duta to step out of the vehicle, and we are not persuaded by
Duta’s argument that he was “de facto under arrest” at that moment. We determine that,
after Duta stated that he did not have a permit to possess the firearm, officers had probable
cause to arrest Duta and to search the vehicle under either the automobile exception or the
search-incident-to-arrest exception.
In sum, at every step in the stop and arrest of Duta and the discovery and seizure of
the firearm, the officers had reasonable, articulable suspicion or probable cause that
justified each incremental intrusion.
Affirmed.