In Re the Marriage of:

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0637

In Re the Marriage of:

Tricia Margit Wilson, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Justin Arthur Wilson,
Respondent.

Filed March 31, 2025
Affirmed
Ede, Judge

Crow Wing County District Court
File No. 18-FA-17-1274

Elizabeth Polling, Justice North, Brainerd, Minnesota (for appellant)

Justin Wilson, Sacred Heart, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Considered and decided by Ede, Presiding Judge; Harris, Judge; and Bentley, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
EDE, Judge
In this modification-of -child-custody dispute, appellant mother challenges the
district court’s order granting respondent father sole physical custody of the children and
setting father’s home as the children’s primary residence. Mother argues that the district
court’s evidentiary rulings constitute an abuse of discretion and that the record does not
support the district court’s decision to modify physical custody and the children’s primary
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residence. Because we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in either
its evidentiary rulings or its modification order, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant mother Tricia Margit Wilson and respondent father Justin Arthur Wilson
are the parents of three children: child 1, born in 2009; child 2, born in 2011; and child 3,
born in 2013. The parties married in 2009 and divorced in 2017. Under the dissolution
order, the district court awarded joint legal custody of the children to both parents and sole
physical custody of the children to mother. The district court also awarded father parenting
time. In August 2022, father moved for a change of custody, seeking an order granting him
sole physical custody, equal parenting time, and primary residence for purposes of school
enrollment. In an affidavit supporting his motion, father claimed that mother refused him
parenting time. He further alleged that the children were unsafe in mother’s home and that
they were not receiving adequate medical, dental, or mental-health care. Father noted that
the children had switched schools several times in four years and had expressed a desire to
“attend[] one school for an entire academic year” in father’s school district.
After mother was later arrested for alleged child endangerment,1 father filed an ex
parte motion seeking temporary sole legal and temporary sole physical custody of the
children and permission to immediately enroll the children in father’s home school district.
The same day father filed his ex parte motion, the district court granted father’s requests
and filed an emergency ex parte order to that effect.

1 The state ultimately declined to file charges related to this arrest.
3
Mother filed a responsive motion for a change of custody seeking sole legal custody
and sole physical custody of the children. Following a hearing on these cross-motions, the
district court determined that father had made a preliminary showing that the current
custody arrangement in mother’s home “endanger[ed] the children” and that an evidentiary
hearing was warranted. The district court denied mother’s custody motion, but awarded
her visitation.
The parties later participated in mediation and entered into a binding mediated
settlement agreement that included the following terms: the parents would share joint legal
custody of the children; father would retain temporary physical custody of the children; the
children would temporarily remain in their current school in father’s district; and mother
would have temporary parenting time and visitation. The district court adopted this
settlement agreement as a temporary order, awarded the parents joint legal custody and
father temporary physical custody, ordered the children to remain in their current school
district, and granted visitation to mother.
The district court subsequently held a six- day evidentiary hearing to consider
father’s change-of-custody request. The following witnesses testified: the therapist for
child 1 and child 2; father; father’s partner; mother; the children’s maternal grandmother
and grandfather; and grandmother’s friend. Their testimony is summarized below.
The children’s therapist testified about the counseling services that she provided to
child 1 and child 2. She diagnosed child 1 with an “other specific trauma and stressor
related disorder.” The therapist opined that c hild 1 had “a trauma disorder” as a result of
“living with his mom and the experiences he had while living with her.” She stated that
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child 1 reported having “trauma” and depression from living with mother. Counsel asked
the therapist if child 1 expressed suicidal thoughts while living with his mother, and the
therapist responded that child 1 did. Child 1 shared with the therapist that he was “yelled
at,” that mother became “really angry very quickly,” that he could not anticipate her anger,
and that he felt scared and fearful of mother’s temper. He also stated that he took care of
his youngest sibling2 and “would get in trouble if he didn’t clean up after the baby as well
as hi[s] mom wanted him to.” Child 1 reported that mother’s second husband “was
physically abusive to him” and “beat” him. He felt stress from “moving to different
schools,” which, as was also the case for child 2, presented difficulties for child 1 in making
friends, playing sports, and participating in activities. Child 1 also received “hurtful” text
messages from mother, which upset him. The therapist testified that child 1 told her “he
does not feel safe when visiting his mother.”
The therapist also provided testimony about child 2, stating that the child had a
diagnosis of adjustment disorder with anxiety. When the therapist first met child 2, the
child “talked about trauma he experienced when living [with mother].” The therapist
explained that the word “trauma” was “the word that both [c hild 1 and child 2] first used
with [her]. They said that they needed to work through trauma . . . .” Child 2’s main
concerns related to “how often he started new schools,” which impeded child 2’s efforts to
form friendships. He also shared that there was “stress in the household” and that mother’s
second husband “was abusive towards [child 1].” Child 2 witnessed this abuse.

2 Mother has a fourth child with her second husband. She and her second husband no longer
reside together.
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The therapist testified that child 1 and c hild 2 had improved since moving in with
father. Child 1 reported that he was happier, had made progress in treatment, was getting
good grades in school, was participating in sports, and was making friends. His anxiety had
decreased, and he was experiencing stability at his new school and in father’s home. Child
2 had also made progress in therapy and was experiencing less stress. The therapist noted
that child 2 was “doing very well academically.”
Father testified that the children ha d been living with him since mother’s arrest in
September 2022 and that they were doing well in his care. According to father, the children
were exposed to domestic abuse in mother’s home. He also raised concerns about mother’s
mental health and her ability to care for the children’s medical, dental, therapeutic, and
educational needs. For example, father testified that child 1 and child 2 needed cavities
filled and child 3 needed six teeth removed. As to the children’s education, father testified
that he had to get records from multiple schools before enrolling the children in his school
district. He also stated that mother’s frequent relocations of the children resulted in school
tardies, extended absences of up to 15 missed days in one quarter, and poor grades. The
children enrolled in the school near father’s home in September 2022. According to father,
the children were doing well in school, getting good grades, playing sports, and had made
friends. Father maintained that the children were stable in his home and requested that the
children continue to live with him.
Father’s partner also testified. She described the children as “doing great” in the
home and noted that they were “doing really good in school,” had made friends, and
participated in sports. Father’s partner testified that she spent time with the children and
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helped get them to school, activities, and medical appointments. She also noted that the
children’s grades had improved over the past year and confirmed that they regularly
attended school and doctor’s appointments.
Mother urged the district court to return physical custody of the children to her. She
testified that she currently lives in a three-bedroom duplex where the children stay during
weekend visits. When questioned about the frequent relocations, mother explained that she
had lived in four cities since her divorce from father, requiring the children to change
schools with each move. But mother claimed that the children transitioned well between
the various schools, that they had good grades, and that their attendance had been fine. As
for the children’s health, mother acknowledged that she did not ensure that the children
received mental-health services. She also admitted being unaware that the children’s dental
needs were unmet. As for her own health, mother stated that she was attending therapy.
She acknowledged yelling at the children but asserted that the children were not visibly
upset by her behavior and did not cry. Mother conceded, however, that her second husband
had been “physical with the boys at times.”
Maternal grandmother expressed concern about mother’s mental health, her
tendency to skip taking her medications, and her drug use. She also described her worry
that the children were being abused while in mother’s care. At one point, grandmother
made a report to child protection services about mother and her second husband physically
and mentally abusing the children. She noted that mother “frequently move[d] around” and
that the condition of her homes was typically “unsafe” as a result of mold, broken windows,
and dangerous surroundings. Grandmother testified that she saw mother yell or scream at
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the children, sometimes “screaming erratically out of nowhere.” At times, grandmother
observed mother “scream at the baby” or scream at child 1 to change the baby’s diaper.
According to grandmother, mother blamed her anger on the fact that she had not taken her
medication. Grandmother noted that child 1 had to remind his mother to take her pills.
Grandfather’s testimony diverged from that of grandmother. He testified that the
children were doing well in school when they lived with mother. Grandfather was unaware
of any school absences. He reported that, before the temporary change in custody, he had
noticed no health concerns or dental concerns with the children, nor did he think mother’s
home was unclean. Grandfather denied seeing mother exhibit any “extreme mood swings”
or other concerning behaviors. And while grandfather agreed that mother had struggled
with mental-health concerns, he did not believe that mother’s mental-health struggles
affected her parenting.
Finally, grandmother’s friend testified about an incident in the fall of 2022 when
she went to mother’s home with grandmother, child 1, child 2, and the children’s cousins.
The friend stated that mother’s home was “rundown” and “filthy.” She reported that the
floor looked like it was going to “cave in.” And the friend testified that, as she was driving
away, “[child 2] came running out of the house” crying, got into friend’s car, and said that
he had “come [to] say goodbye” because mother told him he would never see them again.
The friend explained that child 2 began “begging” her to take him back to grandmother’s
house and not to leave him with mother. According to the friend, mother came out of the
house, told the children to give grandmother a hug because they would never see
grandmother again, and accused grandmother of killing mother’s sibling—an experience
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that grandmother’s friend described as “very traumatic” and which resulted in everyone
crying. In her testimony, grandmother explained that mother’s sibling had died by suicide
and that mother blamed grandmother for this death.
Following the evidentiary hearing, the district court filed findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and an order granting father sole physical custody of the children and
setting father’s home as the children’s primary residence. The district court also awarded
mother parenting time with the children. Mother appeals.
DECISION
Mother raises two arguments on appeal. First, she claims that the district court
abused its discretion in several of its evidentiary rulings, which prejudiced her. Second,
mother maintains that the district court’s modification decision must be reversed because
it is not supported by the record evidence. For the reasons discussed below, we reject both
of mother’s contentions.
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion in its evidentiary rulings.
Mother asserts that the district court: improperly admitted evidence of statements
by the children that are set forth in their mental-health records, including child 1’s and
child 2’s initial intake interviews; abused its discretion in evidentiary rulings related to
testimony by father’s partner; and impermissibly permitted father to question mother about
a criminal charge. An appellate court reviews a district court’s evidentiary rulings for an
abuse of discretion. Olson ex rel. A.C.O. v. Olson, 892 N.W.2d 837, 841 (Minn. App.
2017). The party a sserting an evidentiary error is entitled to relief only if the party
establishes that the error was prejudicial. See Minn. R. Evid. 103(a) (providing that, among
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other requirements, “[e]rror may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes
evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected”).
A. Mental-Health Evidence
First, mother argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting
evidence of statements by the children that are set forth in their mental-health records,
including documentary exhibits of child 1’s and c hild 2’s initial intake interviews.
Although she does not identify specific statements by child 1 and child 2, mother generally
asserts that this evidence was inadmissible hearsay. We do not agree.
“‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at
the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Minn. R.
Evid. 801. Hearsay is not admissible unless an exception applies. Minn. R. Evid. 802.
Exceptions include “[s]tatements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment,”
Minn. R. Evid. 803(4), and the business- records exception, Minn. R. Evid. 803(6). In
particular, the business-records exception allows a district court to admit certain records if
a qualified witness—someone familiar with how a business compiles its documents—lays
a proper foundation. Minn. R. Evid. 803(6) (articulating the requirements for the business-
records exception); see also Nat’l Tea Co. v. Tyler Refrigeration Co., 339 N.W.2d 59, 61
(Minn. 1983).
The children’s therapist testified at the hearing about her observations of child 1 and
child 2. As part of her testimony, the therapist discussed child 1’s and child 2’s initial intake
interviews, which were completed by other therapists within the same health organization.

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The children’s therapist explained:
• her qualifications, education, training, and experience as a licensed
professional clinical counselor employed by the organization that provided
mental-health services to child 1 and child 2;

• that it is typical at her organization for other therapists to complete initial
intake interviews;

• that her organization has a policy for such interviews to be documented
within seven days;

• that the initial intake interview is “a requirement of . . . [her] agency’s
licensure”;

• that—as part of the organization’s process and normal procedure —the initial
intake interviews prepared by other therapists are incorporated into notes and
treatment plans that treating therapists use and rely on when working with
clients, as the children’s therapist did with child 1 and child 2;

• that child 1’s and child 2’s initial intake interviews were conducted by a
licensed psychologist and a licensed clinical social worker (LCSW),
respectively, who were employed with the therapist’s organization;

• that the licensed psychologist’s and LCSW’s main roles are to meet with
clients and complete initial intake interviews; and

• that the content of c hild 1’s and child 2’s initial intake interviews aligned
with what the therapist encountered in treating the children and “accurately
reflected” what the therapist determined to be the children’s needs.

Mother objected to the district court receiving evidence of statements by the
children—including documentary exhibits of child 1’s and child 2’s initial intake
interviews—that are set forth in their mental- health records. In arguing that the hearsay
rule bars admission of such evidence, mother noted that the testifying therapist did not
personally conduct the initial intake interviews. The district court overruled mother’s
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objection without identifying a specific hearsay exception. We discern no abuse of
discretion in this decision.
Mother’s generalized assertion that “[t]he statements of the children to the therapist
were inadmissible double hearsay” is unavailing. To the extent that mother challenges the
district court’s admission of testimony by the children’s therapist about statements that
child 1 and child 2 made to her in therapy, such evidence is admissible as “[s]tatements
made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment” under Minnesota Rule of Evidence
803(4). See, e.g., State v. Larson, 472 N.W.2d 120, 127 (Minn. 1991) (analyzing hearsay
statements by a child, including statements to a psychologist “during therapy,” and
concluding that “the least troubling [statements] . . . [were] the ones made to [the
psychologist] during therapy” because “[t]hose statements were for the purpose of therapy
. . . and were admissible under the ‘medical treatment’ exception, Rule 803(4), which is a
firmly-rooted hearsay exception”); In re Welfare of R.T., 364 N.W.2d 884, 886–87 (Minn.
App. 1985) (citing Rule 803(4) and concluding that “[t]he trial court did not err by
admitting reports and testimony which included references to statements made by the
children,” including “[s]tatements made to [a] psychologist”).
As for the district court’s admission of documentary exhibits summarizing child 1’s
and child 2’s initial intake interviews, Minnesota law recognizes that “[i]t is accepted
medical practice to use a team approach for psychological evaluations.” Murray v. Antell,
361 N.W.2d 466, 469 (Minn. App. 1985). And we have concluded that reports prepared by
staff members of a mental-health center are admissible under the business-records
exception, even though the staff members did not testify, when an organization’s
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psychologist “testified that the . . . reports were prepared in the regular course of business
by qualified personnel conducting a team evaluation.” Id. In light of this guidance and the
testimony of the children’s therapist about the initial intake interview process both
generally and specifically as to child 1 and child 2, we conclude that those mental-health
records were admissible per Minnesota Rule of Evidence 803(6), the business-records
exception to the hearsay rule. 3 Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by
admitting the above mental-health evidence.
But even assuming the documentary exhibits summarizing child 1’s and child 2’s
initial intake interviews were not admissible under the business-records exception, we
would nevertheless conclude that mother was not prejudiced by the admission of that
evidence. “A district court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence will only be reversed
if the court abused its discretion and the abuse of discretion prejudiced the objecting
party.” Melius v. Melius, 765 N.W.2d 411, 417 (Minn. App. 2009) (emphasis added). The
children’s therapist noted that initial intake interviews act only as a “baseline” and are “just
the first step to get [an individual] into services.” The therapist explained that she worked
with child 1 and child 2 over several months before the evidentiary hearing on father’s
change-of-custody request. She testified that, when formulating a comprehensive treatment

3 To be clear, as much as mother’s generalized double-hearsay argument may refer to
statements by child 1 and child 2 to the licensed psychologist and the LCSW that are in the
documentary exhibits summarizing the initial intake interviews, we conclude (1) that the
children’s statements to the licensed psychologist and the LCSW were admissible under
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 803(4) and (2) that the documentary exhibits were admissible
under Rule 803(6).

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plan for the children, she relied more heavily on the information she received directly from
child 1 and child 2 as the therapy appointments progressed. And the therapist used notes
from her ongoing, individual sessions with child 1 and child 2 to draft her report. In other
words, the therapist’s testimony about the children’s mental-health needs was based on her
ongoing meetings with the children in the eight months before the evidentiary hearing—
not solely on the initial intake interviews. Mother does not identify in the district court’s
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order any prejudicial reliance by the court on the
initial intake interviews versus the therapist’s testimony. Nor do we discern any. We
therefore conclude that any assumed error in the admission of the documentary exhibits
summarizing child 1’s and child 2’s initial intake interviews was not prejudicial.
B. Witness Testimony from Father’s Partner

Next, mother contends that the district court abused its discretion in its evidentiary
rulings related to testimony from father’s partner. She claims that the district court abused
its discretion by: (1) allowing partner to invoke her constitutional right against self-
incrimination; and (2) excluding evidence of an unrelated child-protection matter. We
reject both arguments.
Mother asserts that the district court improperly allowed father’s partner to decline
to testify about a criminal matter on Fifth Amendment grounds. Specifically, mother’s
counsel asked partner about a criminal charge that was pending against her. In response,
father’s partner asserted her right to remain silent and declined to answer other questions
on that issue. Mother argues that partner’s invocation of her Fifth Amendment right
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unfairly prejudiced mother because mother maintains that the criminal charge is relevant
to whether father’s house is a proper primary residence.
The Fifth Amendment right against self -incrimination may be invoked if the
testimony or information “sought would tend to incriminate the witness.” Minn. State Bar
Ass’n v. Divorce Assistance Ass’n, Inc., 248 N.W.2d 733, 737 (Minn. 1976). This right can
be invoked in both criminal and civil proceedings. Parker v. Hennepin Cnty. Dist. Ct.,
Fourth Jud. Dist., 285 N.W.2d 81, 82 (Minn. 1979). In a civil case, a fact-finder may draw
an adverse inference from a party’s or witness’s invocation of the right. Wartnick v. Moss
& Barnett, 490 N.W.2d 108, 111 n.1 (Minn. 1992).
The district court acknowledged the se principles and advised father’s partner that,
while she had the right to remain silent, the court could “draw a negative inference[]
regarding the circumstances outlined in [the] complaint.” Based on the record as a whole,
and even with this adverse inference, the district court ultimately determined that a
modification of physical custody was warranted and therefore designated father’s home as
the children’s primary residence. The district court’s decision necessarily incorporated the
court’s credibility findings, including its assessment of partner’s credibility as a witness,
to which this court defers. See Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988)
(noting that a reviewing court defers to the district court’s assessment of witness
credibility). We discern no abuse of discretion or resulting prejudice in the district court’s
decisions about evidence of partner’s pending criminal charge.
Mother also argues that the district court improperly excluded evidence of a prior
child-protection case involving partner’s children and their biological father. Father’s
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partner acknowledged the existence of that case. But, as mother’s counsel conceded in her
offer of proof to the district court, partner was not the perpetrator of the conduct underlying
the child-protection matter. Based on that concession, the district court concluded that the
collateral matter involving partner’s children was not relevant to this proceeding involving
child 1, child 2, and c hild 3. Again, we agree with the district court. “Rulings on the
admissibility of evidence lie within the district court’ s discretion.” Aljubailah v. James ,
903 N.W.2d 638, 644 (Minn. App. 2017). We conclude that the district court did not abuse
its discretion by excluding evidence of the unrelated child-protection matter.
C. Mother’s Theft Charge
Finally, mother argues that the district court impermissibly allowed father’s counsel
to ask mother about a theft conviction. During cross-examination, father’s counsel asked
mother: “[Y]ou have a theft conviction[,] don’t you?” Mother’s counsel objected to the
question on relevance grounds. Father’s counsel argued that the conviction was relevant
because it showed “[a]ctive dishonesty” by mother. The district court overruled mother’s
objection and ordered mother to answer the question. Mother acknowledged that she had a
prior criminal record for theft. On appeal, mother argues that the crime is not a crime
involving dishonesty or a false statement.
Evidence that a witness has been convicted of a crime may be admitted to impeach
the witness if the crime “involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the
punishment.” Minn. R. Evid. 609(a)(2). The parties disagree about whether mother’s
previous conviction is a crime involving dishonesty or a false statement. Assuming without
deciding that mother’s prior offense was inadmissible, we conclude that any error in the
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admission of this evidence was harmless. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 61 (noting that if a district
court erroneously admits or excludes evidence, the party may receive a new hearing unless
the error was harmless); Goldman v. Greenwood, 748 N.W.2d 279, 285 (Minn. 2008)
(applying this rule to an appeal from a custody-modification order). To show that an error
was prejudicial and therefore not harmless, an appellant must show that the error “might
reasonably have influenced the fact-finder and changed the result of the proceeding.”
Olson, 892 N.W.2d at 842. Here, ample evidence in the record supports the district court’s
custody-modification decision. Thus, mother is not entitled to relief on the basis of this
argument.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by modifying custody.
Mother challenges the district court’s modification decision. “A district court has
broad discretion to provide for the custody of children.” In re M.R.P.-C., 794 N.W.2d 373,
378 (Minn. App. 2011). “A district court abuses its discretion by making findings of fact
that are unsupported by the evidence, misapplying the law, or delivering a decision that is
against logic and the facts on record.” Woolsey v. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn.
2022) (quotation omitted). “[W]e review the [district court’s] findi ngs [of fact] for clear
error, giving deference to the district court’s opportunity to evaluate witness credibility and
reversing only if we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
made.” Thornton v. Bosquez, 933 N.W.2d 781, 790 (Minn. 2019) (quotations omitted).
Minnesota Statutes section 518.18 (2024) governs custody modifications and allows
a district court to modify custody under certain circumstances. If the movant alleges facts
that would allow the district court to grant the relief sought, the district court must hold an
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evidentiary hearing to determine whether those allegations are, in fact, true. 4 M.J.H., 913
N.W.2d at 440; Crowley, 897 N.W.2d at 294 (noting that a district court may not modify
custody without holding an evidentiary hearing in which it determines the facts that permit
modification). Following the hearing, a district court shall not grant an endangerment-
based motion to modify custody unless it finds that: a change has occurred in the
circumstances of the child or the parties; modification would serve the best interests of the
child; the child’s present environment endangers the child’s physical or emotional health
or emotional development; and the harm to the child likely to be caused by the change of
environment is outweighed by the advantage of change. Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d)(iv). The
party requesting modification bears the burden of showing endangerment—in this case,
father. Szarzynski v. Szarzynski, 732 N.W.2d 285, 292 (Minn. App. 2007).
With these principles in mind, we turn to the record before us. The district court
held a six-day evidentiary hearing at which the court heard testimony from several
witnesses and received multiple exhibits. “ Based upon the evidence presented at [the]
hearing,” the district court determined that father had “met his burden to show that the
custody arrangement in the 2017 judgment and decree should be modified.” Given the
following analysis of the four factors outlined in Minnesota Statutes section 518.18(d)(iv),

4 Before an evidentiary hearing is held, the moving party must make a prima facie case for
modification. In re Custody of M.J.H., 913 N.W.2d 437, 440 (Minn. 2018). In this case,
the district court determined as an initial matter that father alleged a prima facie case for
custody modification based on endangerment. Mother does not specifically challenge the
district court’s prima facie determination on appeal.
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we are satisfied that the district court acted well within its discretion in ordering the custody
modification.
A. Change in Circumstances
The first factor requires the district court to find that a “significant” change of
circumstances has “occurred since the original custody order.” Geibe v. Geibe, 571 N.W.2d
774, 778 (Minn. App. 1997). The district court determined that there was sufficient
evidence of a change in circumstances here. In particular, the district court reasoned that
father “had limited to no contact with his sons” after the original order and that mother’s
second husband “likely contributed to the lack of contact.” A parent’s interference or denial
of “a duly established parenting time schedule” is a valid basis for a custody modification.
Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d). The record supports the district court’s determination that father
was denied parenting time with the children. Indeed, mother acknowledged that, despite
the parenting-time schedule in place, father only had “[s]ix visits total[]” with the children
following their 2017 divorce. The district court further ruled that there was a change in
circumstances because mother and the children were living “under the shadow of domestic
abuse” by her second husband. Again, the record supports this determination because
mother admitted that the children were physically abused by her second husband. We
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding that the first factor
supports modification of the custody arrangement.
B. Best Interests of the Children

The second factor considers whether modification of a custody order “serve[s] the
best interests of the child.” Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d). “A child ’s best interests are the
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fundamental focus of custody decisions.” Vangsness v. Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d 468, 476
(Minn. App. 2000). The district court’s factual findings “regarding the best-interest factors
are reviewed for clear error,” Hansen v. Todnem, 908 N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn. 2018),
which precludes an appellate court from weighing the evidence or engaging in factfinding,
In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221– 22 (Minn. 2021). Instead,
appellate courts “fairly consider[ ] all the evidence” and determine whether “the evidence
reasonably supports the [district court’s] decision.” Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 222.
The district court concluded that it was in the best interests of the children for their
parents to share joint legal custody and for father to have sole physical custody. Mother
does not challenge the district court’s best- interests determination, and we decline to
consider issues that were neither raised nor briefed on appeal. See In re Welfare of M.D.O.,
462 N.W.2d 370, 379 (Minn. 1990). We furthermore note that the district court made
factual findings in its memorandum bearing on the best-interests factors and that these
findings are supported by the record. See Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a) (2024) (setting
forth best-interests factors). For example, the district court discussed the children’s
physical, emotional, and educational needs, as well as the effect of the proposed custody
arrangements on the children. It also found that domestic abuse occurred in mother’s home
and that mother’s mental health affected her ability to parent the children. By comparison,
the district court found that “the children have had their needs met, and have prospered”
while living with father. And the district court found that father can provide stability to the
children, which mother has been unable to provide. We discern no abuse of discretion by
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the district court as to the second factor because the record reasonably supports the court’s
findings, which are not clearly erroneous.
C. Endangerment
Under the third factor, custody modification may be warranted if “the child’s present
environment endangers the child’s physical or emotional health or impairs the child’s
emotional development.” Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d)(iv). The district court made several
findings bearing on physical and emotional abuse that affected the children while in
mother’s custody. As to child 1, the district court found that he suffered “traumatic events”
while living with mother. The district court credited testimony from the therapist that
child 1 met the statutory definition of “Severe Emotional Disturbance” and “was noted [as
having] a risk of self-harm.” In addition, the district court found that Child 2 also met the
criteria for “Emotional Disturbance” and reported experiencing “frequent body aches,”
which “were a stress-related physical symptom.” Moreover, the district court found that
child 1 and child 2 lived in an abusive environment with mother because child 1 was
physically abused by mother’s second husband and child 2 witnessed that abuse. The
district court also found that the children attended up to eight schools before September
2022, “causing instability and a feeling of never being connected.” And it observed that
mother’s own mental- health struggles affected her ability to provide stability for the
children.
Mother does not challenge these findings on appeal. Instead, she maintains that
other aspects of the record weigh against modifying custody. As an example, mother claims
that she is engaging in therapy, obtained employment, and secured housing. But even
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taking these assertions as true, mother’s argument that her evidence could support an
opposite result does not establish a basis for reversal. “When the record reasonably
supports the findings at issue on appeal, it is immaterial that the record might also provide
a reasonable basis for inferences and findings to the contrary.” Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 223
(quotation omitted); see also Bayer v. Bayer , 979 N.W.2d 507, 513 (Minn. App. 2022)
(applying Kenney in a family-law appeal); Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d at 474 (“That the record
might support findings other than those made by the trial court does not show that the
court’s findings are defective.”). And we will not reweigh evidence or engage in fact-
finding on appeal. Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 221–22. Thus, even if the record could have
supported alternative findings, we will not reverse the district court’s endangerment
determination, which is amply supported by the record.
Mother also challenges the district court’s decision to comment on her arrest for
child endangerment. She notes that the state declined to file charges related to this offense
and asserts that the state’s decision weighs against an endangerment finding. But we are
unconvinced. The district court’s statements about mother’s arrest related to events that
occurred at the pre-hearing stage, before the evidence had been presented to the court. See
Amarreh v. Amarreh, 918 N.W.2d 228, 231 (Minn. App. 2018) (noting that a movant
making a prima facie case of endangerment “need not establish anything” and “need only
make allegations which, if true, would allow the district court to grant the relief” sought).
And the district court’s well-reasoned endangerment determination is based on witness
testimony and exhibits presented at the hearing. We discern no basis in the district court’s
modification order for mother’s contention that the court relied on mother’s arrest in
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deciding to modify custody. Rather, we conclude that the district court’s decision rests on
its findings related to the children’s mental health, their frequent relocations and school
changes, and the presence of domestic abuse in mother’s home. The district court’s
endangerment determination is supported by the evidence.
D. Advantages of Modification to the Children
When evaluating the fourth factor, the district court must determine that “the harm
likely to be caused by a change of environment is outweighed by the advantage of a change
to the child.” Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d)(iv). In this case, the district court acknowledged that
Child 2 and Child 3 had “strong bonds” with mother. But it found that the children
“benefitted from having stability” provided by father, which mother could not afford them.
The district court explained:
In [father’s] primary care, the children have had their needs
met, and have prospered. The children have benefitted from the
simple concept of stability. Stability has provided them with
academic access, athletic opportunity, and social interaction
with friends. These benefits were derived from stability they
were lacking when they attended up to eight different schools
while with [mother].
Mother faults the district court for failing to “sufficiently address present
circumstances at the time of modification.” She does not, however, identify any evidence
in the record supporting this claim. “An assignment of error based on mere assertion and
not supported by any argument or authorities” is forfeited “unless prejudicial error is
obvious on mere inspection.” Schoepke v. Alexander Smith & Sons Carpet Co., 187
N.W.2d 133, 135 (Minn. 1971) ; see also Braith v. Fischer, 632 N.W.2d 716, 725 (Minn.
App. 2001) (applying Schoepke in a family-law appeal), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 24, 2001).
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Our mere inspection of the record reveals no prejudicial error in the district court’s
balancing of the harm likely to be caused by a change of environment against the advantage
of that change. Because mother does not provide any legal authority or citations to the
record in support of her conclusory assertion, and because prejudicial error is not otherwise
obvious, we conclude that mother’s argument is forfeited. On this record, the district court
did not abuse its discretion in determining that the advantages of a custody change for the
children outweighed any potential harms.
In sum, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting
father’s motion to modify physical custody and the children’s primary residence.
Affirmed.