State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0638

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

John Arland Kirst,
Appellant.

Filed April 14, 2025
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge

Nobles County District Court
File No. 53-CR-22-1088

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Braden M. Hoefert, Nobles County Attorney, Worthington, Minnesota; and

Travis J. Smith, Special Assistant County Attorney, Slayton, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jennifer Workman Jesness,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Bratvold, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRATVOLD, Judge
Before his jury trial, appellant pleaded guilty to fleeing a police officer in a motor
vehicle. He then proceeded to trial on two other charges. Appellant now challenges the
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final judgments of conviction entered after his jury trial for possession and sale of
controlled substances. Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by
admitting video evidence of appellant’s motor-vehicle flight from law enforcement. We
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the video evidence.
Thus, we affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant John Arland Kirst by complaint
with four counts for offenses committed in Nobles County on October 26, 2022: count
one—third- degree possession with intent to sell a controlled substance under Minn. Stat.
§ 152.023, subd. 1(1) (2022); count two—fleeing a peace officer in a motor vehicle under
Minn. Stat. § 609.487, subd. 3 (2022); count three—fifth- degree possession of a controlled
substance under Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2(1) (2022); and count four—driving after
cancellation under Minn. Stat. § 171.24, subd. 5 (2022).
On the first day of his jury trial, Kirst pleaded guilty to the driving offenses—counts
two and four—and trial proceeded on the controlled-substance crimes—counts one and
three. Also on the first day of trial, the district court considered motions in limine outside
the presence of the jury.
Kirst moved to exclude the squad-car video of his flight from law enforcement along
with other related evidence, arguing that it was inadmissible character evidence that did
not satisfy any exception under the rules of evidence. The prosecuting attorney responded
that, “[i]f the defense is objecting on relevance grounds,” the evidence is relevant because
it shows Kirst’s knowledge that controlled substances were in the vehicle. The district court
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granted the motion in limine in part after concluding that Kirst’s guilty plea to the fleeing
offense was inadmissible. But the district court also denied the motion in part after
determining that the squad-car video was relevant to the knowledge element of the
controlled-substance crimes and that its probative value was not outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice.
The following summarizes the evidence received during Kirst’s jury trial, including
the squad-car video and testimony from two law-enforcement officers—the arresting
officer and a chain-of-custody officer.
At around 1:00 a.m. on October 26, 2022, a law -enforcement officer from the
Worthington Police Department (arresting officer) was on patrol in a marked squad car on
Highway 60 near the junction of Interstate 90 . The arresting officer initiated a traffic stop
of Kirst’s pickup truck for nonfunctioning brake lights. As the arresting officer exited his
squad car and approached Kirst’s truck, Kirst sped away. The arresting officer returned to
his squad car and followed Kirst.
Kirst drove on the interstate from Nobles County into Rock County at speeds of 90
to 100 miles per hour. Kirst’s tires struck spike strips set out by law enforcement, but Kirst
kept driving. Kirst also drove down an embankment into a ditch, then turned back onto the
interstate. Kirst’s tires struck a second set of spike strips, after which Kirst’s truck lost both
front tires. Still, Kirst kept driving on the rims with sparks flying. Finally, Kirst’s truck
stopped, and the arresting officer took him into custody. The chase lasted about 25 minutes.
The arresting officer performed an inventory search of Kirst’s truck. During the
search, the arresting officer found a ziplock baggie containing a crystalline substance, a
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digital scale with residue on it, and $2,040 in cash. Most of the cash was evenly divided
into two clips, each containing $1,000. The Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension
tested the crystalline substance found in the ziplock baggie and determined that it was
methamphetamine weighing 8.431 grams. The arresting officer testified that, in his
experience, this amount of methamphetamine was a larger amount than a typical user
would possess at one time.
The jury found Kirst guilty of both controlled-substance crimes, counts one and
three. The district court imposed a sentence of 57 months’ imprisonment for count one.
Kirst appeals.
DECISION
Kirst argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting the squad-car
video because “its minimal probative value was substantially outweighed by its unfair
prejudice” under Minn. R. Evid. 403. The state argues that (1) Kirst forfeited the challenge
he makes on appeal to the admissibility of the squad-car video, (2) the district court did not
abuse its discretion by admitting the squad-car video, and (3) any alleged error by the
district court is harmless.
A. Kirst did not forfeit his arguments under Minn. R. Evid. 403.

The state argues that Kirst forfeited any rule 403 argument because the “only basis
[Kirst] gave at trial for his objection” was Minn. R. Evid. 404(b). The state also argues that
Kirst waived plain-error review by failing to argue that standard in his principal brief. Kirst
argues in his reply brief that he did not forfeit his argument under rule 403 because “the
district court ruled the video was admissible . . . under Rules 401 and 403.”
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The Minnesota Rules of Evidence provide that “[e]rror may not be predicated upon
a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is
affected,” Minn. R. Evid. 103(a) (emphasis added), and, with admitted evidence, the party
claiming error has made “a timely objection or motion to strike . . . stating the specific
ground of objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the context.” Minn. R.
Evid. 103(a)(1). “A defendant’s objection to the admission of evidence preserves review
only for the stated basis for the objection or a basis apparent from the context of the
objection.” State v. Vasquez, 912 N.W.2d 642, 649 (Minn. 2018).
Our review of the transcript leads us to conclude that Kirst preserved the argument
he makes on appeal. During the hearing on motions in limine, Kirst objected to the
admission of evidence of the fleeing offense and, specifically, the squad-car video. Kirst’s
attorney argued that “any reference to the act of fleeing, any reference to a crime of fleeing
would be considered evidence of prior bad acts which is not admissible under Rule of
Evidence 404(b).”
Although Kirst objected to the squad-car video under rule 404(b), the district court
stated its ruling in three steps. First, it determined that the squad-car video was relevant
under rule 401 to the “specific element[]” that Kirst “knowingly possessed the illegal
drugs.” Second, the district court ruled that evidence of Kirst’s guilty plea for the fleeing
offense would “result in confusion of the issues” and “should not be admitted ” under
rule 403. Third, the district court determined that “the actual facts,” as shown in the
squad-car video, had probative value that was “not outweighed by the danger of unfair
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prejudice.” The district court added that “it’s a very fine hairline cut here but the actual
facts, [Kirst’s] actual conduct, and evidence of that would be admissible for this trial.”
Vasquez instructs that a party preserves for review “the stated basis for the objection
or a basis apparent from the context of the objection.” Id. The district court’s analysis of
the squad-car video’s admissibility under rule 403 provided the “context of the objection.”
Id. Also, to the extent that we assume Kirst is limited to the stated basis for his objection—
rule 404(b)—that rule requires the district court to exclude the evidence unless, among
other things, the probative value of the evidence is not outweighed by its potential for unfair
prejudice to the defendant. Minn. R. Evid. 404(b)(2)(c). This portion of rule 404(b) is
substantively the same as the rule 403 argument Kirst is making on appeal. We therefore
conclude that Kirst did not forfeit his argument about the admission of the squad-car video
on rule 403 grounds and that the issue is properly before us.
B. The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the squad-car
video.
Kirst argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting the squad-car
video because the evidence was not relevant to any contested issue and its unfair prejudice
substantially outweighed its “minimal probative value.” The state argues that the district
court did not abuse its discretion because the squad-car video was highly relevant to the
elements of knowledge and venue, the video’s probative value was not substantially
outweighed by any danger of unfair prejudice, and the state “has a right to prove its case
by evidence of its own choosing.”
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The district court has broad discretion to determine whether evidence is relevant.
State v. Schulz, 691 N.W.2d 474, 477 (Minn. 2005). We will not reverse a district court’s
evidentiary ruling absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Hanks, 817 N.W.2d 663, 667
(Minn. 2012). “A district court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an
erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” State v. Hallmark,
927 N.W.2d 281, 291 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted). “On appeal, the defendant has the
burden of proving that the district court abused its discretion and that the defendant was
thereby prejudiced.” State v. Thiel, 846 N.W.2d 605, 615 (Minn. App. 2014), rev. denied
(Minn. Aug. 5, 2014).
Generally, relevant evidence is admissible. Minn. R. Evid. 402. Evidence is relevant
if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.” Minn. R. Evid. 401. Relevant evidence may be excluded, however, if “its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Minn. R. Evid. 403.
Additionally, “[e]vidence of a person’s character or a trait of character” is generally
not admissible to prove action in conformity with that character or trait on a particular
occasion. Minn. R. Evid. 404(a). Similarly, “[e]vidence of another crime, wrong, or act is
not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity”
with that bad character. Minn. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). A prior bad act “may, however, be
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admissible for other purposes”; the rule lists several such purposes, including intent and
knowledge. Id.
The district court determined that the squad-car video was relevant to prove Kirst’s
knowledge that he had contraband in his truck. The district court’s ruling is supported by
applicable law. The state had the burden to prove Kirst’s knowledge as an element of both
controlled-substance crimes—possession and intent to sell. Minn. Stat. § 152.01,
subd. 15a(3) (2022) (defining “sell” to include “possess[ing] with intent” to sell); see State
v. Papadakis, 643 N.W.2d 349, 354 (Minn. App. 2002) (explaining that knowledge is an
element of a crime of controlled-substance possession). Caselaw has recognized that
evidence of fleeing law enforcement is “a circumstance to be considered . . . as suggestive
of a consciousness of guilt.” State v. McTague, 252 N.W. 446, 448 (Minn. 1934)
(discussing McTague’s flight after arrest as relevant evidence supporting the jury’s
verdict).
Kirst makes two arguments. First, Kirst contends that the squad-car video was not
relevant because Kirst’s “knowledge was not the focus of this trial.” Kirst argues that his
defense focused on whether he possessed the drugs “with the intent to sell” or whether he
possessed them “for personal use.” We are not convinced this argument shows that the
district court abused its discretion. The state “must prove each and every element of the
offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Kuhlmann, 780 N.W.2d 401, 404
(Minn. App. 2010), aff’d, 806 N.W.2d 844 (Minn. 2011). This burden applies to the
knowledge element of the controlled- substance offenses. Minnesota Rule of
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Evidence 404(b) recognizes that intent and knowledge are appropriate limited purposes for
the admission of prior-bad-act evidence.
The record supports the state’s argument that Kirst contested the knowledge
element. Kirst’s attorney stated during closing argument that the state had “no evidence
that [Kirst] knew it was a controlled substance.” The squad-car video was probative of
Kirst’s knowledge of controlled substances in his truck along with his “consciousness of
guilt.” McTague, 252 N.W. at 448. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that the squad-car video was relevant.
Second, Kirst argues that, even if the squad -car video was relevant, its relevance
was outweighed by unfair prejudice because it was improper character evidence under
rule 404(b). Unfairly prejudicial evidence “is not merely damaging evidence, even severely
damaging evidence,” but evidence “that persuades by illegitimate means, giving one party
an unfair advantage.” Schulz, 691 N.W.2d at 478. Kirst contends that the squad-car video
made it more likely that the jury would view Kirst “as a dangerous criminal and convict
him because of the behaviors the video depicted.”
Kirst cites State v. Clark, in which the Minnesota Supreme Court determined that
evidence of Clark’s previous bank-robbery conviction was properly admitted to show
absence of mistake or identity, but should not have been admitted to prove Clark’s intent.
755 N.W.2d 241, 260-61 (Minn. 2008). The supreme court reasoned that the prior
bank-robbery conviction was not probative of Clark’s intent for the offense charged at
trial—killing a police officer. Id. at 261. The supreme court added that, when evidence of
a prior bad act is a “close call,” the district court should exclude the evidence. Id. at 260-61.
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Even so, while the supreme court found error in the district court’s reasoning, it did not
conclude that the district court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of Clark’s prior
conviction. Id.
The district court’s evidentiary ruling here is distinguishable from the ruling
discussed in Clark. The district court excluded evidence of Kirst’s guilty plea for fleeing
from police officers, reasoning that it would “result in confusion of the issues” and was
unfairly prejudicial under rule 403. Thus, the district court differentiated the guilty plea
from the squad-car video, which, it concluded, was probative of “the issue of whether or
not [Kirst] knew that he had contraband in the car that he was attempting to hide or prevent
law enforcement from discovering.” Unlike the disputed evidence in Clark, in which the
supreme court noted that it did not see “how the intent involved in the bank robbery proves
intent in killing an officer,” 755 N.W.2d at 261, the squad-car video of Kirst’s flight goes
directly toward his knowledge of contraband in the truck and his “consciousness of guilt”
for the controlled-substance crimes. McTague, 252 N.W. at 448. The district court
concluded that the squad -car video’s probative value was not “outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice” under rule 403. Based on this record, we cannot say that the district
court abused its discretion in admitting the squad-car video.1

1 The state also argues , in the alternative, that the squad-car video was admissible as
“immediate-episode” and “intrinsic” evidence. Under the immediate -episode rule, “[t]he
state may prove all relevant facts and circumstances which tend to establish any of the
elements of the offense with which the accused is charged, even though such facts and
circumstances may prove or tend to prove that the defendant committed other crimes.”
State v. Wofford, 114 N.W.2d 267, 271 (Minn. 1962). Under the rule of intrinsic evidence,
“a rule 404(b) analysis is unnecessary if the evidence of another crime is intrinsic to the
crime charged.” State v. Hollins, 765 N.W.2d 125, 131 (Minn. App. 2009). Because we
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In sum, the squad-car video showing Kirst’s flight from law enforcement was
relevant evidence of his knowledge that he had contraband in his pickup truck and his
consciousness of guilt, and its probative value was not substantially outweighed by unfair
prejudice. We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by
admitting the squad-car video under rule 403. Because we conclude that the district court
did not abuse its discretion by admitting the squad-car video, we need not reach the state’s
argument about harmless error.
Affirmed.

conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the squad-car video,
however, we need not reach this alternative argument.