Christopher Humphrey, Relator,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0645

Christopher Humphrey,
Relator,

vs.

City of Minneapolis Civil Service Commission,
Respondent.

Filed March 17, 2025
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Minneapolis Civil Service Commission

Joseph A. Kelly, Rebecca L. Duren, Kelly & Lemmons, P.A., St. Paul, Minnesota (for
relator)

Kristyn Anderson, Minneapolis City Attorney, Mark Enslin, Assistant City Attorney,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Larson, Judge; and Cleary,
Judge.∗

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
By certiorari appeal, relator challenges respondent’s decision to remove him from a
certified promotion list maintained by respondent for the position of police sergeant.
Relator argues that the decision is not supported by substantial evidence and violates

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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relator’s due-process rights. Because substantial evidence in the record supports the
decision and relator does not have a constitutionally protected property interest in
remaining on the list, we affirm.
FACTS
The following facts are undisputed. Respondent Minneapolis Civil Service
Commission certifies qualified candidates for promotion to positions within the
Minneapolis Police Department. In March 2022, the City of Minneapolis sought
applications for the position of police sergeant. Relator Christopher Humphrey was
employed as a police officer with the city. Officer Humphrey applied and tested for the
position. At the time of the test, the Minneapolis Police Department Internal Affairs
Division and the Office of Police Conduct Review were investigating a complaint alleging
Officer Humphrey had engaged in misconduct. Despite the active investigation, the city
allowed Officer Humphrey to take the required test and placed him sixth on the list of
candidates eligible for promotion to sergeant in August 2022. The list was set to expire in
June 2024. Between August 2022 and July 2023, several persons on the list were promoted
but Officer Humphrey was not.
In September 2023, the city removed Officer Humphrey from the list pursuant to
Minneapolis Civil Service Rule 6.12.E. This rule allows the city to “remove from a list of
eligible candidates any individual [who] . . . [h]as a record of employment that has been
unsatisfactory in any position, public or private, for any cause, which could impair the safe,
efficient, and effective operation of City service.” Other than providing the language of
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the rule upon which the city relied, the city did not provide Officer Humphrey with any
further explanation for his removal from the list. Officer Humphrey filed a timely
administrative appeal of the city’s decision as provided for under the Minneapolis Civil
Service Rules.
Following an investigative review, the city’s director of human resource operations
(the HR director) provided a staff report to the commission. The report considered whether
Officer Humphrey was “appropriately removed” from the list pursuant to rule 6.12.E “due
to an unsatisfactory employment record.” The report noted that the labor agreement
between the city and the Police Officers Federation contains no specific language
governing removal of candidates from the list and therefore the civil-service rules govern.
The report also explained that Officer Humphrey was removed from the list primarily due
to the conduct being investigated and included exhibits from the open investigations —
sworn statements from Officer Humphrey and photographic evidence. That evidence
reflected misconduct involving alcohol and a weapon while at a police training event. The
report determined that removal pursuant to rule 6.12.E was appropriate, even though the
police department investigations were still open, because a preponderance of the evidence
supported removal based on Officer Humphrey’s “admission” in sworn testimony to the
misconduct. Consequently, the HR director denied Officer Humphrey’s appeal. The HR
director sent the report to Officer Humphrey’s attorney as well as to the commission.
In February 2024, the commission met to review the HR director’s denial of the
appeal as detailed in the report. One commissioner suggested that the commission take no
action to reverse the HR director’s denial of the appeal because the information included
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with the HR report showed that Officer Humphrey’s conduct involved “alcohol” and a
“weapon.” Another commissioner expressed concerns related to due process but ultimately
agreed that Officer Humphrey’s removal from the list was appropriate. After discussing
the matter, the commission decided to take no action on the HR director’s denial of Officer
Humphrey’s administrative appeal. As a result, per rule 2.04 of the civil-service rules, the
commission effectively upheld the city’s decision to remove Officer Humphrey from the
list.
Officer Humphrey appeals to this court by writ of certiorari.
DECISION
Officer Humphrey challenges the decision of the commission upholding his removal
from the list. Decisions of administrative agencies, including cities, generally “enjoy a
presumption of correctness.” CUP Foods, Inc. v. City of Minneapolis, 633 N.W.2d 557,
562 (Minn. App. 2001), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 13, 2001). A quasi-judicial decision
1 of
an agency that is not subject to the Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act “will be
upheld unless [it is] unconstitutional, outside the agency’s jurisdiction, procedurally
defective, based on an erroneous legal theory, unsupported by substantial evidence, or
arbitrary and capricious.” Cole v. Metro. Council HRA, 686 N.W.2d 334, 336 (Minn. App.
2004).

1 Because the commission considered and weighed evidence regarding whether Humphrey
should be removed from the list, applied the facts to the standards set out in the civil-service
rules, and its decision was binding, the commission acted in a quasi-judicial capacity.
Minn. Ctr. for Env’t Advoc. v. Metro Council, 587 N.W.2d 838, 841-42 (Minn. 1999).
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Officer Humphrey contends that the city’s decision requires reversal because (1) the
decision is not supported by substantial evidence and (2) the city deprived him of a
constitutionally protected property interest in remaining on the list without due process of
law. We address each argument in turn.
I. The commission’s decision to uphold the removal of Officer Humphrey from
the list is supported by substantial evidence.

“The substantial-evidence standard addresses the reasonableness of what the agency
did on the basis of the evidence before it.” In re A.D., 883 N.W.2d 251, 259 (Minn. 2016)
(quotation omitted). Substantial evidence is “(1) such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion; (2) more than a scintilla of
evidence; (3) more than some evidence; (4) more than any evidence; or (5) the evidence
considered in its entirety.” Cannon v. Minneapolis Police Dep’t, 783 N.W.2d 182, 189
(Minn. App. 2010) (quoting Minn. Ctr. for Env’t Advoc. v. Minn. Pollution Control Agency,
644 N.W.2d 457, 464 (Minn. 2002)).
“The substantial evidence test requires a reviewing court to evaluate the evidence
relied upon by the agency in view of the entire record as submitted. ” Cable Commc’ns
Bd. v. Nor-West Cable Commc’ns P’ship, 356 N.W.2d 658, 668 (Minn. 1984). “If [the
commission] engage[d] in reasoned decisionmaking, the court will affirm, even though it
may have reached a different conclusion had it been the factfinder.” Id. at 669.
Officer Humphrey argues that the commission’s decision to remove him from the
list is unsupported by substantial evidence because the decision “was not reasonable based
on the entirety of the evidence.” We are not persuaded.
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The record reflects that the commission removed Officer Humphrey pursuant to
rule 6.12.E. That rule provides the commission may remove an employee who “ha s a
record of employment that has been unsatisfactory in any position, public or private, for
any cause, which could impair the safe, efficient, and effective operation of City service.”
The city supported its decision with evidence that Officer Humphrey engaged in
misconduct involving alcohol and a weapon while at a work training event. This evidence
includes sworn testimony from Officer Humphrey admitting that he was intoxicated while
on duty, as well as photographic evidence showing Officer Humphrey asleep next to a can
of beer and with his weapon on his person while at the training event. Such conduct by
Officer Humphrey “could impair the safe, efficient, and effective operation of City service”
within the meaning of rule 6.12.E. Substantial evidence supports the commission’s
decision to uphold the removal of Officer Humphrey from the list pursuant to the rule.
To convince us otherwise, Officer Humphrey contends that at the time he was
removed from the list, he “did not have a record of employment that was unsatisfactory.”
He notes that the police department did not complete its investigations or impose any
discipline on him for this conduct until after he was removed from the list. But rule 6.12.E
does not require discipline before the city can remove a candidate from the list. It only
requires that the employee “has a record of employment that has been
unsatisfactory . . . which could impair the safe, efficient, and effective operation of City
service.” Here, Officer Humphrey’s employment record shows that he engaged in the
conduct in question prior to his removal from the list. As a result, this argument is
unavailing.
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Officer Humphrey also argues that the city’s decision to remove him from the list is
not supported by substantial evidence , when viewing the record as a whole, because the
HR director’s report references the 2023 job posting for sergeant instead of the 2022 job
posting for sergeant — the posting in effect when Humphrey took the promotional test.
According to Officer Humphrey, the reference to the 2023 job posting “misled” the
commission because the posting contains information detailing how formal discipline by
the police department can impact an officer’s eligibility for a promotion, which was not
included in the 2022 job posting. But the city’s decision was not based on the 2023 job
posting. Instead, the decision was based on the Minneapolis Civil Service Rules. And, as
discussed above, there is substantial evidence to support Officer Humphrey’s removal from
the list pursuant to rule 6.12.E. Therefore, we reject Officer Humphrey’s argument that
the record, viewed in its entirety, lacks substantial evidence to support the commission’s
decision to uphold removal of Officer Humphrey from the list.
II. The commission’s decision to uphold the removal of Officer Humphrey from
the list did not violate his right to due process.

Officer Humphrey next argues that the commission violated his constitutional right
to due process when it removed him from the list without proper notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard. The commission responds that Officer Humphrey did not have a
protected property interest in remaining on the list and, as a result, there can be no
due-process violation. We agree with the commission.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution prohibits the states from depriving “any person of life, liberty, or property,
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without due process of law.” U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1. “[T]he due process protection
provided under the Minnesota Constitution is identical to the due process guaranteed under
the U.S. Constitution.” In re Individual 35W Bridge Litig., 806 N.W.2d 820, 829 (Minn.
2011). To establish a due-process violation, Officer Humphrey must show that he has a
constitutionally protected property interest in remaining on the list. Hall v. State,
908 N.W.2d 345, 358 (Minn. 2018). If he establishes a constitutionally protected interest,
we then analyze whether he was deprived of that interest without due process of law. Id.
A person can have a property interest in employment, but the person must have
“more than a unilateral expectation of it.” Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564, 577-78 (1972). To have a constitutionally protected property interest, the person must
“have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” Town of Castle Rock. v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756 (2005). “[A]n applicant’s expectation of promotion based on test
ranking or prior employment fails to rise to the level of a property interest entitled to
constitutional protection” if the “employer may consider subjective and objective factors
in making promotion decisions.” Meyer v. City of Joplin, 281 F.3d 759, 762 (8th Cir.
2002).
2 Similarly, there is no “legitimate claim of entitlement” to a government benefit if
the government “may grant or deny it in their discretion.” Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 756.
Moreover, property interests are not created by the constitution; they are instead created by
independent sources such as state law or the terms of employment. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.

2 “Although not binding on Minnesota state courts, Eighth Circuit caselaw can be
persuasive.” State v. Eichers, 840 N.W.2d 210, 216 (Minn. App. 2013), aff’d on other
grounds, 853 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 2014).
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Officer Humphrey does not contend that the city’s labor agreement with the Police
Officers Federation gives him a protected property interest in remaining on the list.
Instead, he argues that the civil-service rules provide him with a constitutionally protected
property interest in remaining on the list. To support his argument, he emphasizes that the
purpose of the rules are “to ensure a fair and effective system of human resource
management.” He also notes that the civil-service rules provide that a candidate can be
removed from the list “[o]nly when certain criteria are met.” This argument is unavailing.
The plain language of the civil-service rules demonstrates that the rules do not create
“a legitimate claim of entitlement” to remain on the list. Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 756.
Instead, the civil-service rules unambiguously provide the city’s HR director with the
discretion to remove a candidate from the list. Specifically, rule 6.12 states that:
[T]he Human Resources Department . . . may remove from a
list of eligible candidates any individual to whom one or more
of the following criteria for disqualification apply:

. . . .

E. Has a record of employment that has been
unsatisfactory in any position, public or private, for any cause,
which could impair the safe, efficient, and effective operation
of City service;

. . . .

H. For any good and sufficient reason related to the
[candidate’s] ability to carry out the duties of the job and in the
judgment of the Human Resources Department and Civil
Service Commission, is undesirable as a public employee.

(Emphasis added.) Because the city had the discretion to remove Officer Humphrey from
the list under rule 6.12.E or 6.12.H, Officer Humphrey did not have a “legitimate claim of
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entitlement” to remain on the list. He only had an “expectation” that he would remain on
the list. See Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 756 (explaining that a person must have more than a
“unilateral expectation” to have a constitutionally protected property interest). We
therefore conclude that the civil-service rules do not provide Officer Humphrey with a
constitutionally protected property interest in remaining on the list.3 And because Officer
Humphrey has no constitutionally protected property interest in remaining on the list, there
is no basis upon which to conclude that his due-process rights were violated when he was
removed from the list.4
In sum, we conclude substantial evidence supports the commission’s decision and
the commission did not violate Officer Humphrey’s constitutional due-process rights.
Affirmed.

3 Further, Officer Humphrey does not dispute that the city had discretion to deny him a
promotion.

4 While we conclude that Officer Humphrey has not demonstrated a due-process right to
remain on the list, we acknowledge Officer Humphrey’s concerns regarding the city’s
administrative-appeal process. According to Officer Humphrey, he was not given an
opportunity to submit any information into the record after he filed his appeal letter.
Officer Humphrey also maintains that the HR director who prepared the staff report for the
commission never contacted him. The record leaves unanswered why the city did not
provide such procedures to Officer Humphrey in the interest of fairness.