The holding in the court’s own words
Because we conclude that the district court’s findings of fact regarding property distribution were not clearly erroneous and we discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s consideration of appellant’s posttrial motions, we affirm. Because we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that husband’s posttrial motion was, functionally, an unauthorized motion for reconsideration. 5 Because we conclude that the fourth Finden factor was not met, we need not analyze the remaining factors.
Quoted verbatim from the opinion — no paraphrase, nothing generated. Not yet human-reviewed. How we find the holding.
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- Landmark Cmty. Bank, N.A. v. Klingelhutz 927 N.W.2d 748
- 975 N.W.2d 502 not in our corpus
- Johnson v. Johnson 563 N.W.2d 77
- 963 N.W.2d 178 not in our corpus
- Lewis v. Lewis 572 N.W.2d 313
- State Ex Rel. Fort Snelling State Park Ass'n v. Minneapolis Park & Recreation Board 673 N.W.2d 169
- Szarzynski v. Szarzynski 732 N.W.2d 285
- 886 N.W.2d 2 not in our corpus
- Marriage of Baker v. Baker 753 N.W.2d 644
- Marriage of Kerr v. Kerr 770 N.W.2d 567
- Marriage of Olsen v. Olsen 562 N.W.2d 797
- Marriage of Doering v. Doering 385 N.W.2d 387
- Marriage of Griffith v. Griffith 415 N.W.2d 763
- Marriage of Sefkow v. Sefkow 427 N.W.2d 203
- Marriage of Haaland v. Haaland 392 N.W.2d 268
- Muschik v. Conner-Muschik 920 N.W.2d 215
- 971 N.W.2d 257 not in our corpus
- In re the Marria ge of: Marla Jean Knapp v. James Alan Knapp 883 N.W.2d 833
- Vangsness v. Vangsness 607 N.W.2d 468
- Marriage of Shirk v. Shirk 561 N.W.2d 519
- Finden v. Klaas 128 N.W.2d 748
- Ferdinand Leo Gams, Jr., Respondent/Cross-Appellant v. Steven Ronald Houghton, Appellant/Cross-Respondent. 884 N.W.2d 611
- Jerry Wayne Cole v. Alexander Allen Wutzke 884 N.W.2d 634
Opinion text
This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0648
A24-0675
In re the Marriage of:
Nicole Onori Hansen, petitioner,
Respondent,
vs.
Jay Ralph Hansen,
Appellant.
Filed March 3, 2025
Affirmed
Harris, Judge
Olmsted County District Court
File No. 55-FA-22-1920
Thomas R. Braun, Bruce K. Piotrowski, Restovich Braun & Associates, Rochester,
Minnesota (for respondent)
Kenneth R. White, Law office of Kenneth R. White, P.C., Mankato, Minnesota (for
appellant)
Considered and decided by Harris, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.
∗
∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
HARRIS, Judge
In these consolidated marriage-dissolution appeals, appellant challenges the district
court’s distribution of the parties’ property, specifically its determination that certain
investment assets purchased using appellant’s inheritance and the parties’ bank accounts
were marital property. Appellant also argues that the district court abused its discretion by
denying his posttrial motions and awarding respondent conduct-based attorney fees.
Because we conclude that the district court’s findings of fact regarding property
distribution were not clearly erroneous and we discern no abuse of discretion in the district
court’s consideration of appellant’s posttrial motions, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Jay Ralph Hansen (husband) and respondent Nicole Onori Hansen (wife)
were married in 1992 and have one adult child. Wife filed a petition for dissolution of
marriage in March 2022. The matter proceeded to a two-day court trial. At trial, the main
issues were spousal maintenance and husband’s nonmarital claims to property.1 Following
trial, the parties submitted written closing arguments and proposed orders. The district
court took the matter under advisement and filed a written order. The following is a
summary of the district court’s findings of fact.
During the marriage, husband worked outside the home and provided for the family
financially while wife primarily focused on raising the child and managing the home. Prior
1 Spousal maintenance is not an issue on appeal.
3
to the valuation date, the parties sold their marital homestead and received $373,275.77 in
sale proceeds. The proceeds were divided equally between the parties. The district court
found that it did not “receive any testimony from husband about where the proceeds from
the sale of the marital homestead were deposited.” The district court received complete
bank statements from wife but did not receive complete bank statements from husband.
Husband testified that he had a separate account at PNC bank that he used to access cash
via ATMs, but the district court noted that, because it did not receive a statement or other
notification of husband’s bank account(s), husband’s share of the proceeds could have been
deposited into this separate PNC account. Based on this evidence, the district court
determined that the total marital value of the parties’ bank accounts was $231,848.67 and
ordered husband to pay wife a $91,142.98 equalization payment.
2
Husband also claimed that the inheritance he received from his father’s estate and
appreciation related to the investments made using funds from a joint savings account
during the marriage were nonmarital assets. A total of $457,544.44 from husband’s
father’s estate was deposited in the parties’ joint savings account, which had a previous
marital money balance of $10,125.12. The money was commingled for over half a year.
Then, the parties invested the money to plan for retirement. The parties invested $13,000
in a TD Ameritrade Roth IRA for husband, $13,000 in a TD Ameritrade Roth IRA for wife,
$2,000 in an account for their adult child, and purchased $350,000 worth of shares in the
Fidelity Minnesota Municipal Income Fund. The parties later sold their interest in the
2 When accounting for the parties’ vehicles, husband’s total equalization payment was
$98,104.48.
4
Fidelity Minnesota Municipal Income Fund and used the proceeds to purchase Fidelity
Contrafund mutual funds. The account was titled in the names of both parties with rights
of survivorship. The Contrafund paid monthly dividends, which were reinvested in the
Contrafund and the Minnesota Tax Free Municipal Income Fund.
The district court determined that these investments were purchased using funds
from the joint savings account and were marital assets. The district court found that
husband intended to use his knowledge of financial investment tools to maximize the
retirement benefits for both parties and that husband used efforts on behalf of the marriage
to research the investments purchased. The district court also found that husband
“commingle[d] the inheritance monies with marital monies as he moved the money from
one account to another to another,” and that husband “failed to meet his burden in tracing
the money of the inheritance once it was deposited into the parties’ joint Think Bank
savings account.”
Husband filed a motion for amended findings, and a motion under what is now
Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2 (2024) to reopen and be relieved of the judgment. Husband
filed a motion for a new trial in the alternative. Husband requested to introduce additional
exhibits to demonstrate that the house sale proceeds were deposited in his Think Bank
savings account. Husband argued that he should be relieved of the judgment due to
“mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect,” because the division of the house
sale proceeds was not in dispute at trial and because counsel did not foresee the need for
the additional evidence. He also requested several amended findings related to his
nonmarital claims to his inheritance and the parties’ investments. The district court noted
5
that husband’s requested amendments were identical to the findings in his proposed order
following trial. The district court denied husband’s motion as an unauthorized request for
reconsideration, denied husband’s motion for a new trial, and granted wife $13,000 in
conduct-based attorney fees incurred by responding to husband’s posttrial motions.
Husband appeals.3
ANALYSIS
Husband argues that the district court (1) abused its discretion by denying his
motion for amended findings as an improper motion for reconsideration and awarding wife
conduct-based attorney fees incurred by responding to the motion; (2) erred by determining
that assets purchased using his inheritance were marital assets because husband failed to
meet his burden to adequately trace assets commingled with marital assets to a nonmarital
source; (3) erred by determining that appellant’s savings account was a marital asset when
calculating the equalization payment; and (4) abused its discretion by denying his motion
to reopen the judgment based on counsel’s failure to introduce evidence about where
husband’s portion of the house sale proceeds were deposited. We address each issue in
turn.
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying husband’s motion for
amended findings and granting wife’s request for conduct-based attorney fees.
The parties agree that the district court’s decision regarding husband’s motion for
amended findings is directly related to its decision to award wife conduct-based attorney
3 Husband appealed both the marital dissolution judgment and the attorney fee judgment.
This court consolidated the appeals in the interests of judicial economy because both
appeals arose from the same dissolution proceeding.
6
fees. First, husband challenges the district court’s denial of his posttrial motion for
amended findings. “We review the district court’s decision whether to grant a motion for
amended findings for an abuse of discretion.” Landmark Cmty. Bank, N.A. v. Klingelhutz,
927 N.W.2d 748, 754 (Minn. App. 2019). “A district court abuses its discretion by making
findings of fact that are unsupported by the evidence, misapplying the law, or delivering a
decision that is against logic and the facts on the record.” Woolsey v. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d
502, 506 (Minn. 2022). Husband argues that the district court abused its discretion because
it did not consider his motion for amended findings, but determined the motion was an
unauthorized request for reconsideration.
Upon a party’s motion, the district court “may amend its findings or make additional
findings, and may amend the judgment accordingly.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.02. “The
purpose of a motion for amended findings is to permit the [district] court a review of its
own exercise of discretion.” Johnson v Johnson, 563 N.W.2d 77, 78 (Minn. App. 1997)
(quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. June 30, 1997). In contrast, “m otions for
reconsideration play a very limited role in civil practice, and should be approached
cautiously and used sparingly.” Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 115.11, 1997 adv. comm. cmt.
Motions to reconsider have a limited role because motions to reconsider “are prohibited
except by express permission of the court, which will be granted only upon a showing of
compelling circumstances” and cannot be used to introduce new evidence. Minn. R. Gen.
Prac. 115.11; State v. Allwine, 963 N.W.2d 178, 190-91 (Minn. 2021).
A motion for amended findings is proper if it “both identif[es] the alleged defect in
the challenged findings and explain[s] why the challenged findings are defective.” Lewis
7
v. Lewis, 572 N.W.2d 313, 315 (Minn. App. 1997). The district court determined that
husband’s motion did not meet these requirements and was “a veiled motion for
reconsideration.” The district court noted that husband’s motion failed to identify alleged
defects and explain why the challenged findings are defective, and that husband requested
that the court “make findings that are identical to those found in husband’s proposed
findings.” The district court also stated:
The Court is surprised and frustrated that Husband has
asked the Court to change findings regarding Husband’s
credibility and make new findings that an argument is credible.
This Court is specifically and uniquely tasked with making
credibility findings regarding the parties, witnesses, and the
evidence, which the Court did during trial as is required. The
Court carefully listened to and observed each party testify. The
Court took notice of and paid specific and particular attention
to the credibility of both Wife and Husband during their
testimony. Following that, the Court made findings [] in the
Decree as to who and what the Court found credible and not
credible. In addition, an argument may or may not be
persuasive, but an argument is not offered evidence and as such
is unlikely to be found to be credible.
The district court’s findings are supported by the record. While husband did request
specific amendments and then connect the proposed amendments to record evidence and
the law in his memorandum, husband’s requested changes are disagreements with the
district court’s findings of fact and legal conclusions. It is notable that some of husband’s
requested changes are identical to his proposed order. See State ex rel. Fort Snelling State
Park Ass’n v. Minneapolis Park & Rec. Bd. , 673 N.W.2d 169, 178 (Minn. App. 2003)
(stating that if there is conflicting evidence, a court is not compelled to amend), rev. denied
8
(Minn. Mar. 16, 2004). Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying
husband’s motion for amended findings.
Second, husband argues the district court abused its discretion when it imposed
$13,000 in attorney-fee on the sole basis that his motion for amended findings was an
improper motion for reconsideration. Since we affirm the district court's findings of fact
and conclusions of law regarding husband’s motion for amended findings, husband's sole
argument for reversal of the award of conduct-based attorney fees falls short.
We review the district court’s decision to award conduct-based attorney fees for an
abuse of discretion. Szarzynski v. Szarzynski , 732 N.W.2d 285, 295 (Minn. App. 2007).A
district court has discretion to award conduct-based attorney fees and costs against a party
“who unreasonably contributes to the length or expense of the proceedings.” Minn. Stat.
§ 518.14, subd. 1(a) (2022). Generally, conduct-based fees are based on conduct occurring
during the course of litigation. Baertsch v. Baertsch, 886 N.W.2d 2 35, 238 (Minn. App.
2016). The district court must make findings that explain the basis for an award of conduct-
based attorney fees. Brodsky v. Brodsky, 733 N.W. 2d. 471, 477 (Minn. App. 2007). The
party moving for attorney fees has the burden to show that the conduct of the other party
warrants an award. Baertsch, 886 N.W. 2d. at 238.
Here, the district court determined that husband unreasonably contributed to the
length and expense of the proceeding. To support its finding, the district court cited to
husband's “failure to conform to the statutory and Rule requirements for the Motions,” and
because of husband’s “request for the Court to change its credibility findings.” These
examples support the finding husband unreasonably contributed to the length and expense
9
of the proceeding. The record further reflects that the district court independently reviewed
wife's attorney's billing statements requesting $26,551.58 and discounted items that were
administrative, duplicative, lacking sufficient explanation, and relating to unnecessary
work, ultimately reducing wife's request to $13,000 due to husband's conduct. Supporting
this conclusion are an affidavit and billing statements from wife's counsel and, as discussed
above, record evidence showing husband improperly filed a motion for reconsideration.
Because we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by
determining that husband’s posttrial motion was, functionally, an unauthorized motion for
reconsideration. And because the district court's award is supported by the evidence in the
record, and because the district court made specific findings in support of the award, we
discern no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to award conduct-based
attorney fees.
II. The district court did not clearly err by determining that husband did not meet
his burden to trace his commingled inheritance assets.
Next, husband challenges the district court’s determination that he did not meet his
burden to trace adequately his inheritance that was com mingled with marital assets in a
joint bank account. “We independently review the issue of whether property is marital or
nonmarital, giving deference to the district court’s findings of fact.” Baker v. Baker, 753
N.W.2d 644, 649 (Minn. 2008). “When marital and nonmarital assets have been
commingled, the party asserting the nonmarital claim must adequately trace the nonmarital
funds in order to establish their nonmarital character. Whether a nonmarital interest has
10
been traced is also a question of fact.” Kerr v. Kerr, 770 N.W.2d 567, 571 (Minn. App.
2009) (citation omitted).
“All property obtained by either spouse during the marriage is presumed to be
marital property, regardless of the form of ownership.” Olsen v. Olsen, 562 N.W.2d 797,
800 (Minn. 1997); see Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3b (2022). “To overcome the
presumption that property is marital, a party must demonstrate by a preponderance of the
evidence that the property is nonmarital.” Olsen , 562 N.W.2d at 800. Property acquired
as “inheritance made by a third party to one but not to the other spouse” is nonmarital
property. Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3b(a). “For nonmarital property to maintain its
nonmarital status, it must either be kept separate from marital property or, if commingled
with marital property, be readily traceable.” Olsen, 562 N.W.2d at 800.
“A spouse seeking to trace an asset to a nonmarital source is not held to a strict
tracing standard, but need only show by a preponderance of the evidence that the asset was
acquired in exchange for nonmarital property.” Doering v. Doering, 385 N.W.2d 387, 390
(Minn. App. 1986) (quotation omitted).
Husband claimed that the inheritance held in a joint savings account and various
investments purchased using funds from the joint savings account were his nonmarital
property. To trace the various investments of a nonmarital source, husband provided the
district court with an exhibit and testimony describing each transaction from the joint
savings account between August 2017 and January 2022. The exhibit included husband’s
tracing analysis and explanations for each transaction.
11
On appeal, husband argues that the district court failed to consider the issue of
tracing using the proper legal construct and requests that we “either direct the decision on
tracing, or in the alternative, remand for the [district court] to undertake tracing using the
proper legal standard.” Husband argues that the district court did not use the proper legal
construct because the district court “relied upon the joint nature of the accounts, the time
the funds were in joint accounts, and the intent of the parties.” He further argues that “no
witness disputed that the inheritance funds went from one account to another ,” and that
“tracing is not dependent on the credibility of any witness.”
The record supports husband’s argument that the district court relied on the joint
nature of the accounts and the intent of the parties when determining that the property was
nonmarital. For example, the district court found that:
Husband failed to meet his burden in tracing the money
of the inheritance once it was deposited into the parties’ joint
Think Bank savings account that had previously had a balance
of over $10,000 before the inheritance was deposited. The
funds were commingled for a significant period of time, in this
case almost 8 (eight) months.
The district court also noted that husband’s actions of depositing the inheritance
funds into a joint account and then transferring the inheritance into another joint account
undermined his argument that he intended for the property to be nonmarital. Instead, it
found that “[ h]usband continued to comm ingle the inheritance monies with the marital
monies as he moved the money from one account to another to another.”
While jointly titling assets and routing funds through a joint account alone does not
transform nonmarital property into marital property, the record also demonstrates that the
12
district court determined that husband’s evidence was insufficient to meet his burden to
demonstrate that the property was nonmarital. Griffith v. Griffith, 415 N.W.2d 763, 766
(Minn. App. 1987), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 12, 1988). In particular, the district court made
multiple findings of fact that husband was not credible and found that his arguments were
motivated by the dissolution process. We must defer to these credibility determinations.
Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988). For example, regarding the Fidelity
Contrafund Investment, the district court found:
Husband’s testimony that he spent merely a few hours
over a couple of days to choose which fund would best suit the
parties is not credible. This Court specifically finds that
Husband’s fastidious nature as testified to by Wife, and in
many respects observed by the Court in Husband’s testimony,
lead this Court to find that Husband’s testimony was
unfortunately seeking to reduce the time spent in contradiction
to the truth solely to advance Husband’s claim that the gains
were non-marital in nature. This Court does not find Husband
credible in his testimony.
Regarding the parties’ joint savings account in which the i nheritance was initially
deposited, the district court found:
During the pendency of this litigation, Husband
restricted Wife’s access to the joint Think Bank savings
account in a claimed attempt to preserve his inheritance.
Husband testified that the account had been depleted and he
was just seeking to protect the value. The Court does not find
Husband credible. The vast majority if not entirety of
withdrawals were done by Husband. The restriction of Wife’s
access by Husband was in direct response to potential
dissolution of marriage.
This finding demonstrates that the district court had reason to doubt husband’s
tracing analysis, as husband’s credibility and almost sole control of the parties’ joint
13
savings account are directly tied to whether husband’s evidence was sufficient to
demonstrate that the nonmarital property was readily traceable. Additionally,
commingling of nonmarital and marital funds may convert all funds in the account into
marital property in cases in which the bank account was used to pay ordinary living
expenses and nonmarital funds were withdrawn but not traced to another asset. See
Haaland v. Haaland, 392 N.W.2d 268, 272 (Minn. App. 1986) (concluding that a
nonmarital property’s character was lost when it was commingled with the general family
account to pay for living expenses). Even if credible, h usband’s explanations for the
transactions that occurred after the inheritance was deposited in the joint savings account
include various family expenses in addition to the purchase of investment assets, a vehicle
for the parties’ adult son, bills, vehicle tires, and multiple payments on a marital credit card.
Therefore, the district court’s findings supporting the district court’s determination that the
nonmarital character of the property was lost by commingling the inheritance with marital
funds and that husband did not meet his burden to trace the various investments to a
nonmarital source were not clearly erroneous. Therefore, we affirm its ultimate
determinations that husband failed to adequately trace his nonmarital inheritance, and
hence that husband was not entitled to prevail on his asserted nonmarital claim.
III. The district court did not clearly err in considering the entirety of husband’s
bank accounts as marital property when calculating the equalization payment.
Husband argues that the district court clearly erred by considering the entirety of his
Think Bank savings account as a marital asset when calculating the equalization payment.
Husband contends that the only reasonable inference from the evidence is that husband’s
14
portion of the house sale proceeds was deposited into his individual Think Bank savings
account in April 2022.
“Whether property is marital or nonmarital is a question of law, but a reviewing
court must defer to the district court’s underlying findings of fact.” Muschik v. Conner-
Muschik, 920 N.W.2d 215, 223 (Minn. App. 2018) (quotation omitted). An appellate court
may determine that district court findings are clearly erroneous if the appellate court is “left
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made . . . notwithstanding the
existence of evidence to support such findings.” Olsen, 562 N.W.2d at 800 (quotation
omitted). But a district court finding is not defective simply because the record may
support a different finding. Muschik, 920 N.W.2d at 223.
Wife testified that the proceeds from the house sale were deposited into an escrow
account at husband’s attorney’s law firm. She testified that she received her portion of the
funds in April 2022 and that husband received his portion of the funds sometime before
her. Evidence admitted at trial showed that the balance of husband’s Think Bank savings
account at the end of January 2022 was $35,648.55. The balance was $202,731.29 at the
end of May 2022. Husband also agreed during his testimony that the exhibit reflecting the
balance of his Think Bank savings account as of May 31, 2022, included $35,573.55, plus
50% of the house sale proceeds. He testified that the money from the house sale was wired
to him directly from his attorney’s trust account. Therefore, one possible inference is that
husband’s portion of the house sale proceeds was deposited into his Think Bank savings
account because the balance increased by $186,637.88, an amount similar to husband’s
portion of the house sale proceeds.
15
However, because the district court did not receive husband’s complete, detailed
bank statements and husband testified to having a PNC bank account, another possible
inference is that husband’s Think Bank savings account balance increase was from another
source, and the evidence in the record dies not account for his portion of the house sale
proceeds. The district court made the following findings:
Of the total, $186,637.88 of that may be from the
proceeds of the house, but the Court did not receive any
detailed statements, nor did the Court receive any testimony
from Husband about where the proceeds from the sale of the
marital homestead were deposited.
The Court was made aware of a bank account Husband
testified to in trial at PNC Bank, but did not receive a statement
or other notification of Husband’s bank account(s). For all the
Court knows, the proceeds from the marital homestead could
have been deposited in this account.
The Court cannot and will not assume facts that are not
in evidence, therefore the Court will use the totals of the bank
accounts that the Court has received in evidence and/or
testimony.
On this record, we do not have a definite and firm conviction that the district court’s
findings are clearly erroneous. The record reflects a lack of evidence, such as bank
statements and testimony about what husband did with the house sale proceeds once
deposited, and also includes the district court’s finding s that husband was not credible.
Therefore, the district court did not clearly err by finding that the entirety of husband’s
bank accounts was marital property when calculating the equalization payment.
IV. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying husband’s motion for
relief from judgment.
Lastly, husband argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his
posttrial motion for relief from judgment. We review the district court’s decision whether
16
to reopen a dissolution judgment for an abuse of discretion. Bender v. Bernhard, 971
N.W.2d 257, 262 (Minn. 2022). “A district court abuses its discretion by making findings
of fact that are unsupported by the evidence, misapplying the law, or delivering a decision
that is against logic and the facts on record.” Id. (quotation omitted). We defer to the
district court’s credibility determinations and will not set aside a district court’s findings
of fact unless clearly erroneous. Knapp v. Knapp, 883 N.W.2d 833, 835-837 (Minn. App.
2016). “That the record might support findings other than those made by the trial court
does not show that the court’s findings are defective.” Vangsness v. Vangsness, 607
N.W.2d 468, 474 (Minn. App. 2000).
“The sole relief from a dissolution judgment and decree lies in meeting the
requirements of Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2.” Knapp, 883 N.W.2d at 835 (quoting Shirk
v. Shirk, 561 N.W.2d 519, 522 (Minn. 1997)). A district court may relieve a party from a
dissolution judgment for “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” Minn.
Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2(1) (2020). The party moving to reopen a dissolution judgment has
the burden to prove at least one statutory ground by a preponderance of the evidence.
Knapp, 883 N.W.2d at 835.
Husband sought relief from the portion of the dissolution judgment finding that the
entirety of the $207,067.31 in husband’s bank accounts was marital property, resulting in
in a $91,142.98 equalization payment to wife. In his motion, husband requested to reopen
the record to introduce three exhibits. Husband argued that these exhibits would
demonstrate that his bank accounts contained his nonmarital portion of the house sale
proceeds. Husband argued that counsel’s failure to introduce these exhibits at trial was
17
mistake, inadvertence, surprise and/or neglect because accounting for the house sale
proceeds was never in controversy and counsel neglected to foresee that additional
evidence on this issue would be necessary.
In analyzing husband’s motion, the district court applied the four Finden factors and
determined that husband did not meet his burden to be relieved of judgment.4 See Finden
v. Klaas, 128 N.W.2d 748, 750 (Minn. 1964) (outlining four factors for court to consider
when determining whether a defendant should be granted relief from judgment under rule
60.02). The four factors are: (1) a reasonable defense on the merits or a debatably
meritorious claim; (2) a reasonable excuse for his/her failure or negligent act; (3) the
movant acted with due diligence after learning of the error or omission; and (4) no
substantial prejudice will result to the other party. Id.
For husband to be entitled to relief for mistake or excusable neglect, he was required
to meet all four Finden factors. Gams v. Houghton, 884 N.W.2d 611, 619-20 (Minn. 2016).
The district court denied husband’s motion, finding that only the third factor was met
because husband filed his motion within the statutory timelines.
4 We note that parties seeking relief from dissolution judgments must meet the
requirements of Minnesota Statutes section 518.145, subdivision 2, not the requirements
of Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02, because rule 60.02 expressly excludes marital
dissolution decrees. See Knapp, 883 N.W.2d at 838 n.3 (concluding that district court did
not abuse its discretion by not addressing rule 60.02 when considering appellant’s motion
to vacate the dissolution judgment under section 518.145, subdivision 2(1), and suggesting
that considering rule 60.02 on a motion to vacate a dissolution judgment may be an abuse
of discretion). However, because both parties applied the Finden factors and neither argued
it was a misapplication of law for the district court to do so, we review the district court’s
application of the Finden factors for an abuse of discretion. See Bender, 971 N.W.2d at
263 (“Because Rule 60.02 and section 518.145 are virtually ’ identical,’ we use cases
evaluating Rule 60.02 when addressing the application of section 518.145.”).
18
Husband argues that the district court abused its discretion because it did not
properly analyze the first, second, and fourth Finden factors. Regarding the fourth factor—
that no substantial prejudice to wife would result by granting the motion—the district court
determined that husband did not meet this factor because substantial prejudice would result
to wife. The district court noted that reopening the judgment would cause delay in wife
receiving needed funds, as the parties have lived separately for approximately two years
and that wife is in need of spousal maintenance to meet her monthly needs. Husband argues
under Finden, that the district court did not properly analyze the fourth factor because delay
and having to defend litigation are not prejudice. Finden, 128 N.W.2d at 751. While it is
correct that prejudice cannot be inferred from delay alone, “the movant bears the burden
of demonstrating that the delay resulting from his or her error or omission has not resulted
in a real or particular harm to other party.” Cole v. Wutzke, 884 N.W.2d 634, 639 (Minn.
2016). And here the district court’s finding that delay would cause particular financial
harm to wife is supported by the record. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its
discretion by denying husband’s motion for relief from judgment.5
Affirmed.
5 Because we conclude that the fourth Finden factor was not met, we need not analyze the
remaining factors.