State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0660

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Luther Boris Cousette,
Appellant.

Filed February 3, 2025
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-21-706

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Alexandra Meyer, Assistant County Attorney, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Evan A. Ottaviani, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bentley, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Slieter,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
In this direct appeal from the judgment of conviction of unlawful possession of a
firearm, appellant argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress
evidence because police did not have a legal basis to seize him. Because police had
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reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity, the district court properly denied
appellant’s suppression motion, and we affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Luther Boris Cousette with
unlawful possession of a firearm in violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2020).
Cousette moved to suppress the state’s evidence, arguing that his seizure by police was not
supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity.
At a hearing on the suppression motion, a law -enforcement officer testified that,
shortly before 1:00 a.m. on October 31, 2020, he observed a vehicle with three occupants
parked in a “high-crime area.” The officer also observed that the vehicle did not have
license plates. Because the vehicle was missing license plates and was parked in an area
which had a recent history of burglaries, the officer “initiated an investigatory stop.”
Cousette was sitting in the driver’s seat. A firearm was found during a subsequent search
of the vehicle. The officer’s report and footage from his body-worn camera were admitted
into evidence.
The district court denied Cousette’s suppression motion, reasoning that the vehicle’s
location next to a closed business, in an area with a history of burglaries, with missing
license plates, and in the “middle of the night,” together provided the officer with
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
Following a stipulated-facts trial, the district court found Cousette guilty of unlawful
possession of a firearm . The district court convicted Cousette and sentenced him to 60
months’ imprisonment.
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Cousette appeals.
DECISION
“When reviewing a pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence, [appellate
courts] review the district court’s factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard and
its legal determinations de novo.” State v. Gibson, 945 N.W.2d 855, 857 (Minn. 2020)
(quotation and citation omitted). Appellate courts “may independently review facts that
are not in dispute, and determine, as a matter of law, whether the evidence need be
suppressed.” State v. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted).
“We will not reverse a correct decision by the district court simply because we disagree
with its reasoning.” State v. Eichers, 840 N.W.2d 210, 216 (Minn. App. 2013) (citing Kahn
v. State, 289 N.W.2d 737, 745 (Minn. 1980) ), aff’d on other grounds, 853 N.W.2d 114
(Minn. 2014). “We may affirm the district court on any ground, including one not relied
on by the district court.” State v. Fellegy, 819 N.W.2d 700, 707 (Minn. App. 2012) (citing
Kafka v. O’Malley, 22 N.W.2d 845, 849 (Minn. 1946)), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 16, 2012);
see also Eichers, 840 N.W.2d at 216 (quoting this aspect of Fellegy in an appeal
challenging a district court’s order on a defendant’s motion to suppress).
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions protect individuals from
unreasonable searches and seizures by the government. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn.
Const. art. I, § 10. But “[n]ot all encounters between the police and citizens constitute
seizures.” State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 98 (Minn. 1999). Generally, a person is not
seized when “a police officer approaches him . . . in a parked car and begins to ask
questions.” Id.
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A seizure does occur, however, “when the officer, by means of physical force or
show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.” Id. at 98 (quotation
omitted). “In [considering] whether a seizure has occurred, the court determines whether
a police officer’s actions would lead a reasonable person under the same circumstances to
believe that [they were] not free to leave.” State v. Lopez, 698 N.W.2d 18, 21 (Minn. App.
2005). This determination is based on the totality of the circumstances “as applied to a
reasonable person.” Id. at 21-22. The Minnesota Supreme Court has “held that a passenger
of a car is considered seized ‘if a reasonable person, under the circumstances, would not
feel free to disregard the police questions or to terminate the encounter.’” State v. Sargent,
968 N.W.2d 32, 37 n.3 (Minn. 2021) (quoting State v. Fort, 660 N.W.2d 415, 418 (Minn.
2003)).
The district court rejected Cousette’s claim that he was seized when officers
approached his vehicle, noting that squad car lights were not activated, the vehicle was
already stopped, and the officer “only asked, ‘what’s going on?’” The district court
determined that Cousette was seized when officers later told him to stop moving and a
passenger was taken out of the backseat. Directing Cousette to restrain his movements is
a sufficient show of authority to turn the interaction into an investigative seizure. Harris,
590 N.W.2d at 98. We therefore consider whether the officer had reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity when Cousette was seized.
“Searches and seizures conducted without warrants are presumptively
unreasonable. An exception to the warrant requirement permits a police officer to conduct
a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that
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criminal activity is afoot.” State v. Lugo, 887 N.W.2d 476, 486 (Minn. 2016) (quotation
and citation omitted). “Reasonable, articulable suspicion must be present at the moment a
person is seized.” State v. Hunter, 857 N.W.2d 537, 543 (Minn. App. 2014) (quotation
omitted).
Cousette maintains that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity
at the time of seizure because they had only observed a parked vehicle, late at night, in a
high-crime area. The state responds that, at the time of seizure, the officers also knew that
Cousette’s vehicle did not have license plates which, together with all the other
circumstances, provides reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to support seizure. We
agree with the state.
The district court found that “[o]n October 31, 2020, shortly after midnight, [two
officers] . . . , while on patrol, observed a gold Buick Century idling in the parking lot of a
closed business.” It continued, “[t]he vehicle had its headlights illuminated, its engine was
running, and it had no license plates.” These findings are supported by the record.
The officer testified that he observed that the vehicle was missing license plates
before approaching.
Q: When you initially decided to approach the vehicle was
when you were passing by, correct?
A: I had passed by the vehicle at some point, yes.

Q: And you saw it didn’t have a license plate, right?
A: Yes, I did observe it had no license plate.

Q: And you had some concern about a potential burglary?
A: Correct.

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Q: That’s when you initially decided to approach and
investigate, correct?
. . . .
A: Once I observed occupants in the vehicle, yes.

The officer’s report, which was accepted into evidence, also indicates that officers
observed a vehicle “with no plates idling in the parking lot with lights [on].”
A vehicle that is missing license plates and parked in a high-crime area late at night
and after normal business hours, provides reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal
activity. See Lugo, 887 N.W.2d at 486 (“It is enough that a law enforcement officer can
articulate specific facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,
objectively support the officer’s suspicion.” ). Because the officer had reasonable,
articulable suspicion of criminal activity, the seizure did not violate Cousette’s Fourth
Amendment right against warrantless searches and seizures, and the district court,
therefore, properly denied his suppression motion.
Affirmed.