Daniel John Wyatt, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0674

Daniel John Wyatt, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed December 30, 2024
Affirmed
Larson, Judge

Scott County District Court
File No. 70-CR-19-15840

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Eva F. Wai les, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Ronald Hocevar, Scott County Attorney, Elisabeth M. Johnson , Assistant County
Attorney, Shakopee, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Larson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARSON, Judge
Appellant Daniel John Wyatt challenges the district court’s decision to deny his
petition for postconviction relief, arguing he entered an unconstitutional guilty plea due to
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a mutual mistake over his criminal-history score. Because we conclude Wyatt entered a
voluntary and intelligent guilty plea, we affirm.
FACTS
In January 2020, respondent State of Minnesota charged Wyatt with three felony
counts of violating a domestic-abuse- no-contact order after “two or more domestic
violence related offenses within the past 10 years.” See Minn. Stat. § 629.75, subd. 2(d)(1)
(2018). Wyatt discharged his attorney and proceeded to represent himself.
In April 2020, Wyatt signed a petition to plead guilty to one count in exchange for
the state dismissing the remaining two counts and dismissing a separate charge in another
court file. Moreover, the state agreed “to a bottom of the box, 21 month sentence, with
credit for any local jail time served up to the date of sentencing.” At his plea hearing,
Wyatt acknowledged that he understood the terms of the agreement, the factual basis for
his plea, and the rights he was waiving by pleading guilty.
In May 2020, the district court held a sentencing hearing. Consistent with the plea
agreement, the district court executed a 21-month sentence—14 months in prison, 7 months
on supervised release, and credit for 348 days served. The district court also dismissed the
two remaining charges in the same court file and the charge in the separate court file.
A year later, in May 2021, Wyatt moved to correct his sentence. Wyatt argued that
the state miscalculated his criminal-history score, and based on the correct calculation, he
was entitled to a stayed probationary sentence of 21 months rather than an executed 21 -
month prison term. In June 2021, the district court granted Wyatt’s motion and changed
the disposition to a 21-month stayed sentence.
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In May 2022, after he received his corrected sentence, Wyatt petitioned for
postconviction relief, seeking to withdraw his guilty plea on the basis that he entered an
involuntary and unintelligent guilty plea. The district court denied the motion without an
evidentiary hearing. We reversed the district court’s summary denial and remanded for an
evidentiary hearing. Wyatt v. State, No. A22-1598, 2023 WL 3939490, at *3 (Minn. App.
June 1, 2023), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 19, 2023).
On remand, the district court held an evidentiary hearing. At the hearing, Wyatt
testified that, at the time he pleaded guilty, he believed he was “amenable to probation and
. . . that was where the misunderstanding was.” Wyatt also stated that he “wanted a
probationary sentence,” and that if he had the chance, he would have signed a plea
agreement to go to probation “instead of signing a plea to go to prison.” He argued the
state induced him to sign the plea under the false pretense of “having four-and-a-half points
which was illegal.” In February 2024, the district court denied Wyatt’s petition for
postconviction relief on the grounds that Wyatt entered a voluntary and intelligent guilty
plea.
Wyatt appeals.
DECISION
Wyatt challenges the district court’s decision to deny his petition for postconviction
relief on the ground that he entered an unconstitutional plea. We review a district court’s
decision to deny a petition for postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion. Riley v.
State, 819 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Minn. 2012). We will not reverse the district court unless it
has “exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an
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erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings.” Brown v. State,
863 N.W.2d 781, 786 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted).
“A defendant may withdraw a guilty plea after sentencing upon a timely motion and
proof to the satisfaction of the court that withdrawal of the plea is necessary to correct a
manifest injustice.” State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 715-16 (Minn. 1994) (quotation
omitted) (applying Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1, in context of postconviction challenge
to the validity of guilty plea). A manifest injustice exists if a guilty plea is not valid. State
v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 646 (Minn. 2007). To be valid, a guilty plea must be “accurate,
voluntary and intelligent.” Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 716. “A defendant bears the burden of
showing [their] plea was invalid.” State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010). We
review de novo whether a defendant entered a valid guilty plea. Id.
Here, Wyatt challenges the validity of his guilty plea on the grounds that he
entered: (1) an involuntary plea because the criminal-history-score miscalculation induced
his guilty plea and (2) an unintelligent plea because the criminal-history-score
miscalculation demonstrated that he did not understand the consequences of his plea. We
address each argument in turn below.
I.
Wyatt argues that he entered an involuntary plea because his mistaken belief that he
had a higher criminal-history score induced his plea. Whether a guilty “plea is voluntary
is determined by considering all relevant circumstances.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 96. To
determine whether a guilty plea is voluntary, we examine “ what the parties reasonably
understood to be the terms of the plea agreement.” Id. The state “cannot induce a guilty
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plea based on a promise that goes unfulfilled or was unfulfillable from the start.” Dikken
v. State, 896 N.W.2d 873, 877 (Minn. 2017).
The supreme court has decided three cases evaluating whether a defendant has the
right to withdraw a guilty plea when the guilty plea was entered under the mistaken belief
that the defendant faced a less-severe sentence than was correct under the law. See State
v. Jumping Eagle, 620 N.W.2d 42, 43 (Minn. 2000) (defendant pleaded guilty without
awareness that there would be additional period of conditional release after incarceration);
State v. DeZeler, 427 N.W.2d 231, 233 (Minn. 1988) (defendant pleaded guilty based on
lower criminal-history score than was correct); State v. Benson, 330 N.W.2d 879, 880
(Minn. 1983) (same). In each case, the supreme court concluded that the defendant was
entitled to a remedy. See Jumping Eagle, 620 N.W.2d at 45; DeZeler, 427 N.W.2d at 235;
Benson, 330 N.W.2d at 880-81. In DeZeler, the supreme court required plea withdrawal
when “[t]he agree ment to plead guilty was based entirely on the assumption that the
presumptive sentence was a stayed sentence” and “ there were no grounds for an upward
departure from the stayed sentence.” 427 N.W.2d at 235. However, the supreme court has
also indicated that, in some instances, resentencing rather than plea withdrawal is the
appropriate remedy. See Jumping Eagle, 620 N.W.2d at 45 (concluding that, on remand,
state should be allowed to present argument to district court as to whether plea withdrawal
or sentence modification was most appropriate remedy); Benson, 330 N.W.2d at 880-81
(holding that guilty plea entered under mistaken belief that defendant had lower criminal-
history score could be withdrawn or district court could resentence defendant).
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We have applied this caselaw in two nonprecedential decisions where the defendant
entered a guilty plea under the mistaken belief that the defendant had a higher criminal-
history score. In Peterson v. State, a defendant sought to withdraw her guilty plea because
she had a lower criminal-history score than contemplated by the plea agreement— meaning
she was entitled to a shorter, stayed sentence. No. A19-1660, 2020 WL 4280017, at *1-2
(Minn. App. Jul 27, 2020), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 20, 2020).1 Applying the supreme court
caselaw cited above, w e concluded that resentencing rather than plea withdrawal was the
appropriate remedy. Id. at *2-3. And in State v. Howard, the defendant pleaded guilty to
a single-count indictment under the mistaken belief that his criminal-history score would
yield a presumptive executed sentence. No. A03-180, 2004 WL 235805, at *1 (Minn. App.
Feb. 10, 2004). After learning his criminal-history score would yield a presumptive stayed
sentence, the defendant moved for plea withdrawal on the basis that “he would have had
no incentive to plead guilty to avoid an executed prison sentence” if he knew he faced a
presumptive stayed sentence. Id. at *4. We agreed with the defendant that plea withdrawal
was the appropriate remedy. Id.
Here, Wyatt entered his guilty plea under the mistaken belief that he faced a
presumptive executed sentence. However, unlike in Howard, Wyatt did not testify that he
would have proceeded to trial if he had known his criminal-history score yielded a
presumptive stayed sentence. To the contrary, Wyatt admitted at the evidentiary hearing

1 We note this opinion is nonprecedential and, therefore, not binding. We cite
nonprecedential opinions as persuasive authority only. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01,
subd. 1(c).
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that, at the time he pleaded guilty, he “wanted a probationary sentence,” and that if he had
the chance, he would have signed a plea agreement to go to probation “instead of signing
a plea to go to prison.” Further, unlike in Howard, Wyatt faced a greater risk had he
proceeded to trial because, as part of the plea agreement, the district court dismissed three
additional charges.
Under these facts, we conclude the appropriate remedy to correct the mistake in
Wyatt’s criminal-history score was resentencing. Wyatt received this remedy when the
district court granted his motion to correct his sentence and changed the disposition to a
21-month stayed sentence. For this reason, the district court did not abuse its discretion
when it denied Wyatt’s petition for postconviction relief on the ground that he entered an
involuntary plea.
II.
Wyatt next argues that he entered an unintelligent plea because the criminal-history-
score miscalculation made him misunderstand “the true and correct consequences of the
plea,” or “the alternative courses of action available to him.” A guilty plea is intelligent
when “a defendant understands the charges against him, the rights he is waiving, and the
consequences of his plea.” Nelson v. State, 880 N.W.2d 852, 858 (Minn. 2016).
We have previously concluded in a nonprecedential opinion that a plea based on an
incorrect criminal-history score did not render the plea unintelligent. See Mullins v. State,
No. A23-0841, 2024 WL 3024666, at *5 (Minn. App. June 17, 2024), rev. denied (Minn.
Oct. 15, 2024). We reasoned that: (1) the “criminal-history score was not part of the plea
agreement”; (2) the initial sentence the defendant received was within the presumptive
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range for his correct criminal-history score; (3) at the plea hearing, the defendant
demonstrated an understanding of “the charges against him, the rights he waived, and the
consequences of the plea”; (4) and he ultimately received a sentence that reflected his
correct criminal-history score. Id. at *7.
We find Mullins persuasive and, likewise, conclude that Wyatt entered an intelligent
plea. Wyatt’s written plea agreement does not mention his criminal-history score, and the
initial executed sentence that Wyatt received was the same duration (21 months) as the
subsequent stayed sentence that he received after he moved to correct his sentence.
Moreover, at the plea hearing, Wyatt demonstrated that he understood the charges against
him, the rights he waived, and the basic terms of the plea agreement. And, like in Mullins,
Wyatt eventually received a sentence that reflected his correct criminal-history score.
Therefore, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied
Wyatt’s petition for postconviction relief on the basis that he entered an unintelligent plea.
Affirmed.