A24-0681 Precedential Affirmed Processed

Dan Murphy, Appellant,

Minnesota Court of Appeals · Filed April 7, 2025

The holding in the court’s own words

22 We therefore hold that the MPA authorizes municipalities to provide concurrent authority to planning agencies pursuant to section 462.354, subd ivision 1, and boards of adjustments and appeals pursuant to section 462.354, subdivision 2 , to hear and decide requests for variances.

Quoted verbatim from the opinion — no paraphrase, nothing generated. Not yet human-reviewed. How we find the holding.

Authorities cited

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Opinion text

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0681

Dan Murphy,
Appellant,

vs.

City of Minneapolis,
Respondent,

Beard Manager, LLC,
Respondent.

Filed April 7, 2025
Affirmed
Wheelock, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-23-3705

Thomas F. DeVincke, Patrick B. Steinhoff, Malkerson Gunn Martin, LLP, Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for appellant)

Kristyn Anderson, Minneapolis City Attorney, J. Haynes Hansen, Tracey N. Fussy,
Assistant City Attorneys, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent City of Minneapolis)

Kyle E. Hart, Richard G. Jensen, Fabyanske, Westra, Hart & Thomson, P.A., Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for respondent Beard Manager, LLC)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Wheelock, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
SYLLABUS
The Minnesota Municipal Planning Act (MPA), Minn. Stat. §§ 462.351-.365
(2024), authorizes municipalities to provide concurrent authority to planning agencies
pursuant to section 462.354, subdivision 1, and boards of adjustments and appeals pursuant
to section 462.354, subdivision 2, to hear and decide requests for variances.
OPINION
WHEELOCK, Judge
Appellant Dan Murphy sought review in district court of respondent City of
Minneapolis’s approval of respondent developer Beard Manager LLC’s variance
applications, alleging that (1) the MPA preempts the portion of the city’s zoning code that
grants the city’s planning agency and board of adjustments concurrent authority to review
applications for zoning variances and (2) the city lacked a reasonable basis to approve the
variance applications. The district court determined that the preemption argument failed
and that the city had a reasonable basis to approve the variance applications. Murphy
sought further review by appealing to our court. Applying the appropriate standards, we
first review the district court’s determination of preemption and affirm on that issue and
then consider the variance grants, concluding that one variance is void and affirming the
grant of the other.
3
FACTS1
Murphy, a Minneapolis homeowner, challenges the city’s decisions to grant two
zoning variances for a project on the northwest corner of West 50th Street and Beard
Avenue South in the Fulton neighborhood. The project is a proposal to construct a
mixed-use building with 63 residential units, roughly 1,500 square feet of commercial
space on the ground level, and a two-floor parking garage with one floor below ground and
one at ground level. Murphy’s home is located on the same block as the project site.2 The
neighborhood is composed primarily of single-family and two-family homes. A large
senior-living complex is located nearby on West 50th Street, and two commercial centers
are within walking distance of where West 50th Street intersects with Xerxes Avenue South
and with France Avenue South. Property within the city is subject to state and local law,
including the city’s zoning code and its current comprehensive plan.
The 2040 Comprehensive Plan and Minneapolis Zoning Code
City officials may guide a municipality’s development toward priorities established
in the city’s “comprehensive municipal plan.” Minn. Stat. § 462.353, subd. 1.3 A

1 We take the facts from the municipal record. See Swanson v. City of Bloomington,
421 N.W.2d 307, 311 (Minn. 1988).

2 We use the term “project” to refer to the developer’s proposal to construct a mixed-use
building with a parking garage and the term “project site” to refer to the developer’s lot on
West 50th Street and Beard Avenue South.

3 We cite the most recent version of the MPA because, although the legislature amended
certain provisions of the MPA in 2024, it has not been amended in relevant part. See
Interstate Power Co. v. Nobles Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 617 N.W.2d 566, 575 (Minn. 2000)
(stating that, generally, “appellate courts apply the law as it exists at the time they rule on
4
comprehensive plan is a “compilation of policy statements, goals, standards, and maps for
guiding the physical, social and economic development” of a municipality. Minn. Stat.
§ 462.352, subd. 5. The Minneapolis 2040 Plan is the city’s current comprehensive plan
and was enacted pursuant to the MPA. City of Minneapolis Dep’t of Cmty. Plan. & Econ.
Dev., Minneapolis 2040—The City’s Comprehensive Plan 6 (2020) [hereinafter 2040
Plan], https://minneapolis2040.com/media/2018/pdf_minneapolis2040_updated-june-
2024.pdf [https://perma.cc/H8EF-TNNP
]. The 2040 Plan designates parts of the city as
“goods and services corridors.” Id. at 61. Goods and services corridors serve two related
purposes:
• To indicate where commercial uses should front[ 4] in
relation to properties guided for commercial future land
uses.

• . . . [To] identify where the establishment or expansion
of commercial uses can be considered. Properties
immediately adjacent to a Goods and Services Corridor
may be considered for commercial activity, allowing for
uses similar in scale and scope to the Neighborhood and
Corridor Mixed Use categories.

Id. at 59. West 50th Street—the location of the project site—is a goods and services
corridor.

a case”). For the same reason, we also cite the current versions of other statutes and
ordinances discussed in this opinion unless otherwise noted.

4 Zoning laws sometimes use “front” as a verb, but it generally means “[t]he side or part of
a building or lot that is open to view, that is the principal entrance, or that faces out to the
open.” Black’s Law Dictionary 807 (12th ed. 2024) (defining “front” as a noun). Here,
the 2040 Plan explains that, when developers build along goods and services corridors,
they should place the main entrances of their buildings along the street designated as a
goods and services corridor rather than a side street. 2040 Plan, supra, at 59 fig.T1.2.
5
The 2040 Plan also divides the city into 14 “Built Form” districts that guide “the
scale of development for every parcel in the city, independent of the uses allowed on the
site.” Id. at 67. The 2040 Plan provides that “[t]he built form of all new and remodeled
buildings must be consistent with the guidance of the Built Form Map.” Id. The project
site is in a Corridor 4 District, which the 2040 Plan says “should reflect a variety of building
types on both small and moderate-sized lots.” Id. at 69.
The city adopted its zoning code for numerous reasons, including to “implement the
policies of the comprehensive plan,” “promote and protect public health,” and “encourage
the most appropriate use of land.” Minneapolis, Minn., Code of Ordinances (MCO)
§§ 520-570 (2023).5 The city’s zoning code generally requires that landowners maintain
setbacks, which are yards along lot lines that are unobstructed to a specified depth or width.
MCO § 565.260. The zoning code sets forth the policy that undergirds setback
requirements, stating: “Yard controls provide for the orderly development and use of land
and to minimize conflicts among land uses by regulating the dimension and use of yards.”
MCO § 540.800. The image below, which appears in section 565.260 of the zoning code,
illustrates various types of yards that the zoning code recognizes, including rear, side, and
front yards.

5 The city recodified and amended its zoning code in 2023. Minneapolis, Minn., Ordinance
No. 2023-032 (May 30, 2023). We cite the current version of the city’s zoning code unless
it has changed in relevant part.
6

Pursuant to the zoning code, property owners can apply for variances from the
setback requirements if they seek to build in a manner that does not comply with the zoning
code. MCO § 525.460(a). To obtain a variance, an applicant must show that “complying
with the ordinance poses practical difficulties,” MCO § 525.460(c), and present evidence
to the city demonstrating that (1) “[c]hallenges exist in complying with the ordinance
because of circumstances unique to the property,” (2) the property owner seeks to use the
property in a reasonable way that keeps “with the spirit and intent of the ordinance and the

7
comprehensive plan,” and (3) “[t]he proposed variance will not alter the essential character
of the locality or be injurious to the use or enjoyment of other property in the vicinity.”
MCO § 525.460(c)(3).
The city’s department of community planning and economic development (CPED)
typically reviews variance applications and makes a recommendation to the city planning
commission to grant or deny each application. MCO § 525.110; accord State ex rel.
Neighbors for E. Bank Livability v. City of Minneapolis, 915 N.W.2d 505, 509 (Minn. App.
2018) (E. Bank), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 7, 2018). Individuals who disagree with CPED’s
recommendation can seek review by appealing to the “zoning and planning committee,
which recommends its decision to the ultimate decision maker —the Minneapolis City
Council.” E. Bank, 915 N.W.2d at 509. When multiple land use reviews are required for
a project, the city’s zoning code directs that the city’s planning commission is responsible
for reviewing all the applications pursuant to the city zoning code’s concurrent-review
provision. MCO § 525.20. CPED then conducts an initial review and makes a
recommendation to the planning commission on each application.
As is pertinent here, the developer submitted several applications for the project in
November 2022, including variance applications for (1) a reduction of the
reverse-corner-lot setback requirement along West 50th Street and (2) a reduction of the
rear-yard setback requirement along the alley.
6 The overarching dispute between Murphy
and respondents is over the city’s approval of these two variance applications.

6 The developer also submitted applications for rezoning of the site, a site plan review, and
an administrative height increase, none of which are at issue on appeal.
8
The Reverse-Corner-Lot Variance
A small lot that is not owned by any of the parties—lot number 3409—is located
across a public alley to the east of the project site. Unlike the other lots on the block —
which front either Beard Avenue South or Abbott Avenue South— lot 3409 fronts West
50th Street. Because the other three borders of lot 3409 are the alley and two abutting lots,
the part of the property along West 50th Street is lot 3409’s only potential “front yard.”
The illustration below depicts the project site and lot 3409.7

The positioning of the project site relative to lot 3409 rendered the project site a
“reverse corner lot,”8 which the city’s zoning code defines as a “corner lot that includes

7 We created this map—a simplified version —based on the maps in the record; it is not
drawn to scale.

8 This type of lot is alternatively called a reverse-corner-yard lot, a reverse-corner
front-yard lot, a double front-yard lot, or a lot with two front-yard setback requirements.

9
more than one (1) lot line adjacent to streets of which one (1) lot line is substantially a
continuation of the front lot line of the adjacent property to the rear.” MCO § 565.130
(defining “reverse corner lot”). The version of the city’s zoning code that existed when the
developer submitted its variance applications established a 15-foot setback for front yards
in the Corridor 4 Built Form District. MCO § 552.810 tbl.552-18 (2020). At the time the
developer applied for its reverse-corner-lot variance, the project site was subject to
reverse-corner-lot setback requirements beca use the project site’s corner side yard runs
along West 50th Street and the project site is adjacent to lot 3409, which fronts West 50th
Street. But if lot 3409 had not rendered the project site a reverse corner lot, the project site
would have had a “corner side yard” along West 50th Street that was subject to a 12-foot
setback. See MCO § 540.860 tbl.540-19 (establishing that, for a 58-foot building in this
area, like the one proposed by the developer here, the standard corner-side-yard setback is
12 feet). However, because lot 3409 rendered the project site a reverse corner lot, the city’s
zoning code treated the project site’s yard along West 50th Street as a second “front yard”
of the project site that is subject to a minimum 15-foot front-yard setback instead of a
12-foot corner-side-yard setback. See MCO § 540.850 tbl.540-18.
In its reverse-corner-lot variance application, the developer requested a setback
along West 50th Street of 12 feet, 3 inches, rather than the second front-yard setback of
15 feet.
The Rear-Yard Variance
The city’s zoning code provides that the rear- yard setback for a proposed building
is determined by its height. MCO § 540.870 tbl.540-20. Because the project includes a
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building with a height of 58 feet, the zoning code dictates a minimum rear-yard setback of
9 feet. Id. The 2040 Plan identifies the project site as being in a “Corridor 4 Built Form
Overlay District” and a goods and services corridor, which means that the property may be
considered for commercial development and that there should be a variety of property types
in the area. 2040 Plan, supra, at 59, 69. In addition, the project site “slopes significantly
from north to south along the alley,” which is a physical attribute of the project site that
affects the construction of the parking lot that was designed to accommodate a 1:1 ratio of
parking spaces to residential units while maintaining the building’s required front-yard
setbacks.
In its rear-yard variance application, the developer requested a rear-yard setback of
five feet along the alley, rather than the standard setback of nine feet, to accommodate the
slope of the project’s parking-lot access point while maintaining the project site’s other
yards.
City Grant of the Variances
The developer submitted the variance applications in conjunction with applications
for rezoning, height increase, and site plan review. Because multiple land use reviews were
required for the project, the city’s zoning code directed that the city’s planning commission
was responsible for reviewing all the applications pursuant to the city zoning code’s
concurrent-review provision. MCO § 525.20. After CPED reviewed the developer’s
variance applications, it recommended to the planning commission that both be approved.
The planning commission adopted CPED’s findings and approved both of the developer’s
variance applications.
11
In approving the reverse-corner-lot variance application, the planning commission
reasoned that “[t]he reverse corner condition creates a practical difficulty with constructing
a multiple-family structure on a goods and s ervices corridor by requiring a yard that is
greater than the established setbacks in the general area.” The planning commission also
adopted CPED’s conclusion that these difficulties are not based on economic
considerations alone because approving the variance applications, along with the
developer’s other requests for the project, would bring the project site in line with the 2040
Plan’s land use policy by adding “new housing options to a high-demand area of the city
with good access to transit, employment and goods and services.”
In approving the rear-yard variance application and adopting CPED’s findings, the
planning commission reasoned that (1) the portions of the structure that will rise above the
first floor would comply with the nine-foot rear-yard setback requirement that applies to
other 58-foot-tall buildings in this area and (2) “the extra space is required at the rear yard
to accommodate the slope of the parking access while maintaining established yards in the
front of the building.” The planning commission also adopted CPED’s finding that “the
intent of setback regulations [is] to maintain access to light and air for adjacent properties,
to provide adequate separation between uses [,] and to encourage orderly development,”
and it determined that granting a variance for a rear-yard setback of five feet, given the
plan for all floors above the first floor to comply with the larger setback, “will not impact
the amount of light and air that adjacent properties receive.”
12
Judicial Review and Amendments to the City’s Zoning Code
Murphy unsuccessfully appealed the planning commission’s grant of the variances
to the city’s zoning and planning committee, and ultimately, the city council and mayor
affirmed the planning commission’s grant of the variances. Murphy then sought judicial
review of the city’s decision in district court, making the same arguments he raises here.
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the district court ruled in favor
of respondents.
On May 30, 2023, the city amended its zoning code “in the form of a complete
revision,” which included, among other things, creating an exception to reverse-corner
front-yard setbacks so that they no longer apply to reverse-corner lots “when crossing an
alley or other public right-of-way.” Minneapolis, Minn., Ordinance No. 2023 -032
(May 30, 2023) (codified at MCO § 540.830).9 The amendment went into effect on July 1,
2023. Id.
On April 24, 2024, Murphy filed a notice of appeal. In their initial briefs and at oral
argument to this court, the parties did not address how the May 2023 amendments could
affect the issues on appeal. Then, seven days after oral argument, the city amended the
city’s zoning code to state that land use applicants “may avail themselves of less restrictive
requirements provided by the zoning regulations in effect on July 1, 2023, or later” and
that “[a]ny zoning approval . . . that becomes unnecessary through the adoption of less

9 The 2023 recodification and amend ments resulted in renumbered sections. Although
some sections were substantively amended, others remain unchanged but are under a new
section number; for example, the definition of “reverse corner lot” in the current version is
the same, but it is now contained in section 565.130 instead of section 520.160.
13
restrictive regulations is void, and the building or use is no longer subject to the former
regulations.” Minneapolis, Minn., Ordinance No. 2024-044 (Nov. 20, 2024) (codified at
MCO § 520.40(b) (2024)). The relevant text of Minneapolis Ordinance No. 2024-044
states:
Section 1. That Section 520.40 contained in
Chapter 520, General Provisions, be amended to read as
follows:

520.40. Scope of regulations. (a) In general. All uses
of land or structures, all alterations, expansions or relocations
of existing structures, and all expansions, relocations or
intensifications of existing uses shall be subject to all
applicable regulations of this zoning ordinance.

(b) Exceptions. Buildings and uses that require a land
use application under the 1999 zoning code will be regulated
in accordance with the 1999 zoning code when a complete land
use application is submitted prior to July 1, 2023. In all other
instances, where a building permit (or grading or earth
retention permit for construction of a building) has been issued
and all required environmental approvals have been received
for the establishment, construction, alteration, expansion,
relocation, or intensification of any structure or use prior to the
effective date of this zoning ordinance, such action may be
completed in accordance with the regulations of the 1999
zoning code, provided the use is established, or construction or
excavation is begun with ninety (90) days of such date and
proceeds on a continuous basis toward completion, and subject
thereafter to the regulations of Chapter 535, Article VI,
Nonconforming Uses and Structures. A complete land use
application submitted prior to July 1, 2023, shall be reviewed
utilizing the zoning regulations and review processes in place
at the time the complete application was submitted and
buildings or uses may be established and completed in
accordance with the regulations of the 1999 zoning code.
However, such buildings and uses shall not be subject to the
1999 zoning code in perpetuity. An applicant may avail
themselves of less restrictive requirements provided by the
zoning regulations in effect on July 1, 2023, or later. Any
14
zoning approval granted by the city planning commission,
board of adjustment or city council that becomes unnecessary
through the adoption of less restrictive regulations is void, and
the building or use is no longer subject to the former
regulations. Changes to the approved building or use shall be
regulated by the applicable regulations governing such changes
in this zoning ordinance effective at the time such changes are
proposed. Changes to the approved building or use may
require new or additional land use applications as described in
Chapter 525, Administration and Procedures and Chapter 550,
Development Standards.

Section 2. That the amendment described herein to
Section 520.40 contained in Chapter 520, General Provisions
is effective retroactively from the effective date of Ordinance
No. 2023-032, which is July 1, 2023.

Id. §§ 1-2. After the city enacted Minneapolis Ordinance No. 2024-044, we requested
supplemental briefing from the parties to address whether these amendments to the zoning
code affect this court’s analysis of the issues on appeal.
ISSUES
I. Did the city’s planning commission have authority consistent with the MPA to grant
the variances?

II. Do the amendments to the city’s zoning code render the reverse-corner-lot variance
void?

III. Did the city have a reasonable basis to grant the rear-yard variance?

ANALYSIS
Murphy challenges the city’s grant of the two variances for the project. First,
Murphy contends that the MPA preempts the city zoning code’s concurrent-review
provision and thus that the city’s planning commission lacked authority to review and
approve the variance applications. Second, as to the reverse-corner-lot variance, he
15
contends that the city’s amendments to the zoning code do not render it void and that the
city did not have a reasonable basis to grant it. And third, as to the rear-yard variance, he
contends that the city did not have a reasonable basis to grant it. Respondents argue the
contrary. We consider each of Murphy’s arguments in turn.
I. The city’s planning commission had the authority to grant the variances under
the Municipal Planning Act.
“Preemption of municipal ordinances by state law is a legal question subject to de
novo review.” Bicking v. City of Minneapolis , 891 N.W.2d 304, 312 (Minn. 2017). We
begin with an overview of the applicable state and municipal laws, namely the MPA and
the city’s charter and code, before analyzing the merits of Murphy’s preemption argument.
The Municipal Planning Act
The legislature passed the MPA to provide cities the “necessary powers and a
uniform procedure for adequately conducting and implementing municipal planning.”
Minn. Stat. § 462.351. To that end, section 462.354 of the MPA provides for the
establishment of two municipal entities that have certain municipal planning powers: a
“planning agency” in subdivision 1 and a “board of adjustments and appeals” (board) in
subdivision 2. Minn. Stat. § 462.354. Subdivision 1 provides that the planning agency
may take the following alternate forms:
(1) It may consist of a planning commission, which may
or may not include municipal officials among its members.
The planning commission may be provided with staff which
may be a division of the administrative structure of the
municipal government. The commission shall be advisory
directly to the governing body.

16
(2) It may consist of a planning department with a
planning commission advisory to it and shall function as a
department advisory to the governing body and the municipal
administration. The planning department may be provided
with an executive director and other staff as in the case of other
municipal departments.

Id., subd. 1. Subdivision 2 provides that the board may take the following forms:
The governing body of any municipality adopting or
having in effect a zoning ordinance or an official map shall
provide by ordinance for a board of appeals and adjustments.
The board shall have the powers set forth in sections 462.357,
subdivision 6 and 462.359, subdivision 4. Except as otherwise
provided by charter, the governing body may provide
alternatively that there be a separate board of appeals and
adjustments or that the governing body or the planning
commission or a committee of the planning commission serve
as the board of appeals and adjustments, and it may provide an
appropriate name for the board. The board may be given such
other duties as the governing body may direct.

Id., subd. 2. Thus, the MPA prescribes specific duties for the planning agency and the
board. Among these duties, a planning agency has the duty to prepare and propose ways
to implement a city’s comprehensive plan, and a board has the duty to hear and decide
requests for variances. Minn. Stat. §§ 462.354-.355, .357, subd. 6. The MPA also provides
that the planning agency and board may be one entity and decide variance applications.
Minn. Stat. § 462.354, subd. 2. Importantly, the MPA also expressly provides that
municipalities may impose other duties on planning agencies by charter or ordinance. Id.,
subd. 1.
The City Charter and Zoning Code
At the municipal level, the Minneapolis City Charter and the city zoning code create
structure and processes that apply to the city’s planning in addition to the MPA. The city
17
charter provides for the establishment of a “planning commission,” Minneapolis, Minn.,
City Charter (MCC) § 7.2(a)(9) (2021), and the city’s zoning code provides for the
establishment of a board, MCO § 525.140(a). The city charter sets forth the composition
of the planning commission, MCC § 7.2(e)(1) (2021), and identifies specific functions that
the planning commission must perform, MCC § 7.2(e)(2) (2021). The city charter also
directs the planning commission to handle issues relating to the city’s comprehensive plan
and “perform any other duties for which [the city’s zoning code] provides.” Id. The city’s
zoning code provides that the planning commission’s duties include the review of land use
applications and site plans, MCO § 525.130(b), and that the board’s duties include hearing
and deciding variance applications. MCO § 525.140(b)(1).
The concurrent-review provision of the city’s zoning code provides that, when more
than one land use review is needed and the land use reviews would be assigned to both the
planning commission and the board, all land use reviews are reviewed by the planning
commission:
[T]o provide for the efficient administration of this zoning
ordinance, whenever a project or proposal requires more than
one (1) land use review, including but not limited to . . . site
plan review, rezoning . . . variance . . . all applications shall be
processed concurrently. If the required land use reviews are
assigned to both the city planning commission and the board
of adjustment, the city planning commission shall review all
applications in accordance with the standards herein
described.
MCO § 525.20 (emphasis added).
The MPA, city charter, and city zoning code thus function in concert to create the
multi-faceted system that all entities and individuals must navigate when seeking necessary
18
approvals to build a new project within the city. With this system in mind, we turn to
Murphy’s preemption argument.
The MPA does not preempt the city zoning code’s concurrent-review provision.
Murphy argues that the MPA preempts the city zoning code’s concurrent-review
provision by way of conflict preemption 10 and that the city violated the MPA by granting
variance-review authority to both its planning agency and its board because it violates the
legislature’s intent that municipalities use a uniform procedure for municipal planning. See
Minn. Stat. § 462.351 (establishing that municipalities use a “uniform procedure for
adequately conducting and implementing municipal planning”). He argues that, because
statutes prevail over municipal law, the city zoning code’s concurrent-review provision
must be preempted by the MPA. Respondents disagree, arguing that the MPA explicitly
permits the city zoning code’s concurrent-review provision. We agree with respondents.
Conflict preemption occurs when state and local laws “contain express or implied
terms that are irreconcilable with each other,” when “the ordinance permits what the statute
forbids,” or when “the ordinance forbids what the statute expressly permits.” Minn.
Chamber of Com. v. City of Minneapolis , 944 N.W.2d 441, 447 (Minn. 2020) (emphasis
omitted) (quotations omitted).

10 Although it is unclear in his brief, Murphy specified at oral argument that he bases his
preemption argument on a theory of conflict preemption and not express or field
preemption. Express preemption occurs when “the legislature [has] expressly declared that
state law shall prevail over municipal regulation.” Bicking, 891 N.W.2d at 313 n.8
(quotation omitted). Field preemption occurs when “the Legislature has comprehensively
addressed the subject matter such that state law now occupies the field.” Id.
19
To support his position that the MPA does not authorize concurrent authority to
review variances, Murphy relies on the language in Minn. Stat. § 462.354, subd. 2, that
municipalities “shall provide by ordinance for a board of appeals and adjustments. The
board shall have the powers set forth in section[] 462.357, subdivision 6”—the subdivision
that addresses the hearing and granting of variance requests. Murphy’s argument appears
to hinge solely on this language. Murphy argues that, because the MPA’s plain language
gives a board the power to review variance applications but does not expressly give this
authority to planning agencies when a board also exists, the city zoning code ’s
concurrent-review provision violates the MPA. Compare Minn. Stat. § 462.354, subd. 2
(providing that boards hear requests for variances), with id., subd. 1 (lacking such
language). We are not persuaded. Although the MPA does not expressly contemplate the
city zoning code’s concurrent-review provision, it gives municipalities the ability to assign
other duties to their planning agencies. Minn. Stat. § 462.354, subd. 1.
The plain language of the MPA states that a city may assign “other powers and
duties” to its planning agency via ordinance or charter. Id. C onsistent with Minn. Stat.
§ 462.354, subd. 1, the city charter and the city’s zoning code require that the city establish
a planning agency, which it did when it created the planning commission. And the planning
commission has the authority to “perform any other duties for which an ordinance
provides.” MCC § 7.2(a)(9), (e)(2)(D). The city expressly assigned as one of those other
duties the review of variance applications when “land use reviews are assigned both to the
city planning commission and the board of adjustments.” MCO § 525.20. The city zoning
code’s concurrent-review provision affords both its planning commission and its board
20
jurisdiction to review variance applications when doing so provides for efficient
administration. Id.
Because the city zoning code’s concurrent-review provision is authorized by the
plain language of Minn. Stat. § 462.354, subd. 1, it does not conflict with the terms of the
MPA and we reject Murphy’s conflict-preemption argument.
Murphy argues that Nordmarken v. City of Richfield supports a conclusion that the
MPA preempts the city zoning code’s concurrent-review provision because, there, we
concluded that the MPA preempted a different provision in a city charter. 641 N.W.2d
343
, 346-49 (Minn. App. 2002), rev. denied (Minn. June 18, 2002). In Nordmarken, voters
sought to enforce a provision in Richfield’s city charter that “reserve[d] to the voters the
right to petition for referendum to approve or disapprove ordinances the city council
enacts.” Id. at 346. Th is court, however, concluded that the procedures detailed in the
MPA and the Metropolitan Land Planning Act (MLPA), Minn. Stat. §§ 473.85-.871
(2000), preempted the charter’s provision because the acts provided “a detailed and
elaborate structure of procedural authority and processes for comprehensive land use
planning” such that the legislature had “evinced its intent to occupy the field of the process
by which municipal land use and development laws are finally approved or disap proved.”
Id. at 349.
Although Nordmarken discussed numerous MPA provisions and considered
whether a provision of a city’s charter was preempted, that is where the similarities end.
The issue in Nordmarken concerned amending and approving comprehensive land use
plans, and the opinion did not address procedures for variances. See id. at 347
21
(acknowledging that the MPA gives municipalities general zoning authority); see also id.
at 348 (“The subject matter at issue . . . is the process by which municipalities adopt and
finally approve ordinances pertaining to land use planning and zoning.”). And while the
Nordmarken opinion briefly referenced the section of the MPA that authorizes
municipalities to establish a board and to give the board certain powers, id. at 350, it was
specifically discussing how the MPA and the MLPA preempt provisions in city charters
and ordinances that attempt “to control the process by which final approval of a plan or
zoning is obtained” via the right to petition by referenda. I d. We read Nordmarken to
apply to that limited circumstance. Murphy’s preemption argument differs from the
reasoning in Nordmarken because the issue here involves a municipality’s power to enact
ordinances using an express provision of the MPA itself—namely, Minn. Stat. § 462.354,
subd. 1. In this way, the city zoning code’s concurrent-review provision is an outgrowth
of the “single body of law” containing both the “necessary powers” and “uniform
procedure” that the Nordmarken opinion determined cities cannot undercut via
referendum. Id. at 347 (quoting the MPA’s policy statement in Minn. Stat. § 462.351
(2000)). Because Nordmarken does not support Murphy’s conflict-preemption argument,
we do not find this comparison persuasive.
11

11 Murphy also argues that a district court order from another case supports his argument
that the MPA requires the board to have exclusive jurisdiction over applications for
variances. This argument fails for two reasons. First, the cited disposition hinged wholly
on the city’s violation of its municipal land use procedures rather than a state law. Second,
district court orders do not control our de novo review of questions of law. See Bicking,
891 N.W.2d at 312.
22
We therefore hold that the MPA authorizes municipalities to provide concurrent
authority to planning agencies pursuant to section 462.354, subd ivision 1, and boards of
adjustments and appeals pursuant to section 462.354, subdivision 2 , to hear and decide
requests for variances.
II. The amendments to the city’s zoning code rendered the reverse-corner -lot
variance void.
At the time Murphy filed his appeal, he was challenging whether the city had a
reasonable basis to grant the reverse-corner-lot variance for the front-yard-setback
requirement; however, subsequent amendments to the city’s zoning code caused this court
to request supplemental briefing from the parties as to their impact on Murphy’s appeal.
Murphy contends that the amendments do not affect the analysis of the issues presented,
while respondents argue that the amendments render any challenges to the
reverse-corner-lot variance nonjusticiable. We agree with respondents.
Recall that the project site was subject to reverse-corner-lot setback requirements
because its corner side yard runs along West 50th Street and it is adjacent to lot 3409, which
fronts West 50th Street. There is, however, an alley between lot 3409 and the project site
as shown in the illustration of the project site and lot 3409, supra. Because an alley
separates lot 3409 and the project site, we must determine whether two amendments to the
city’s zoning code render the developer’s reverse-corner-lot variance void.
The first amendment relevant to our analysis was enacted in 2023 to MCO
§ 540.830, and it provides that “[r]everse corner front yard setbacks shall not be applied
when crossing an alley or other public right -of-way.” Minneapolis, Minn., Ordinance
23
No. 2023-032.12 The amendment went into effect on July 1, 2023. Id. The second
amendment was enacted in 2024 to MCO § 520.40(b), and it provides that “[a]ny zoning
approval . . . that becomes unnecessary through the adoption of less restrictive regulations
is void, and the building or use is no longer subject to the former regulations.” Id. The
amendment expressly allows land use applicants to “avail themselves of less restrictive
requirements provided by the zoning regulations in effect on July 1, 2023, or later.” Id.
In his supplemental brief, Murphy argues that the amendments cannot apply to the
reverse-corner-lot variance because the developer was not an “applicant” after July 1,
2023. Respondents argue that the plain language of the amendments means that they apply
here; thus, the reverse-corner-lot setback variance became unnecessary through the

12 The diagram below is taken from a related provision of the city’s zoning code to illustrate
reverse-corner lots after the 2023 amendments. MCO § 540.830 fig.540-1.

24
adoption of less restrictive requirements in MCO § 540.830 and the reverse-corner-lot
setback variance is void.
“The interpretation of an existing ordinance is a question of law for the court. We
review a question of law de novo.” RDNT, LLC v. City of Bloomington, 861 N.W.2d 71,
75 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted). “The rules governing statutory interpretation are
applicable to the interpretation of city ordinances.” Cannon v. Minneapolis Police Dep’t,
783 N.W.2d 182, 192-93 (Minn. App. 2010). “The object of all statutory interpretation is
to ascertain and effectuate” the legislative body’s intent, and if the ordinance is
unambiguous, “we interpret it according to the plain meaning of its text.” Pfoser v.
Harpstead, 939 N.W.2d 298, 310 (Minn. App. 2020) (quotation omitted), aff’d,
953 N.W.2d 507 (Minn. 2021); see Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2024) (“The object of all
interpretation and construction of laws is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the
legislature.”). “The specific meaning of a word depends on how it is being used in
context.” Buzzell v. Walz, 974 N.W.2d 256, 261 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted). A
court’s interpretation of a statute must give effect to all of its provisions whenever possible.
Minn. Stat. § 645.16; Pfoser, 939 N.W.2d at 310.
Murphy does not contend that the amendments are ambiguous; instead, he focuses
on the portion of the amendment that provides that “[a]n applicant may avail themselves
of less restrictive requirements provided by the zoning regulations in effect on July 1,
2023,” MCO § 520.40(b), to argue that, because the city granted the variances in January
2023—the city’s final ratification occurred on January 12, 2023 —the developer was no
longer “an applicant” under the city’s zoning code in July 2023. However, Murphy ignores
25
the following sentence: “Any zoning approval granted by the city planning commission,
board of adjustment or city council that becomes unnecessary through the adoption of less
restrictive regulations is void, and the building or use is no longer subject to the former
regulations.” Id. Reading the provisions of the 2024 amendment as a whole, we conclude
that the city intended to void its approvals of zoning requests that had become unnecessary
as a result of the adoption of less restrictive regulations.
We apply the plain language of the 2024 amendment here. It is undisputed that the
developer presently has a zoning approval—a reverse-corner -lot variance—granted by the
planning commission. It is also undisputed that there is a public alley between the project
site and lot 3409. Pursuant to the 2023 amendments to MCO § 540.830, “[r]everse corner
front yard setbacks shall not be applied when crossing an alley or other public
right-of-way.” Thus, the amendment to section 540.830 is a less restrictive regulation that
operates to render the reverse-corner-lot variance unnecessary, and MCO § 520.40(b)
mandates that the variance is now void.
Because the reverse-corner-lot variance is void by operation of the city’s zoning
code, the reasonableness of the city’s actions in granting the variance is a nonjusticiable
issue that we do not reach.
III. The city had a reasonable basis to grant the rear-yard variance.
Murphy next argues that the city lacked a reasonable basis to grant the rear-yard
variance, asserting that the developer merely chose a design that did not comply with the
city’s zoning code. Although Murphy conceded that the slope of the project site constitutes
a circumstance unique to the project site, he argues that circumstance—the slope—did not
26
create any challenge to the project’s compliance with the city’s zoning code. Respondents
argue that the city had a reasonable basis to grant the rear-yard variance because the project
site’s slope along its alley makes it difficult to construct the proposed project while
maintaining other established yards.
Appellate courts review a local government’s zoning decision “independent of the
findings and conclusions of the district court.” Nw. Coll. v. City of Arden Hills,
281 N.W.2d 865, 868 (Minn. 1979). “The setting aside of routine municipal decisions
should be reserved for those rare instances in which the City’s decision has no rational
basis. Except in such cases, it is the duty of the judiciary to exercise restraint and accord
appropriate deference to civil authorities.” White Bear Docking & Storage, Inc. v. City of
White Bear Lake, 324 N.W.2d 174, 176 (Minn. 1982). “The fact that a court reviewing the
action of a municipal body may have arrived at a different conclusion . . . does not
invalidate the judgment of the city officials if they acted in good faith and within the broad
discretion accorded them by statutes and the relevant ordinances.” VanLandschoot v. City
of Mendota Heights, 336 N.W.2d 503, 509 (Minn. 1983).
The supreme court clarified the various articulations of our review , often called
“rational-basis review,” in Honn v. City of Coon Rapids: “the standard of review is the same
for all zoning matters, namely, whether the zoning authority’s action was reasonable.”
13
313 N.W.2d 409, 416-17 (Minn. 1981). Thus, parties challenging a municipality’s grant of

13 Murphy incorrectly argues that we must “view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the party against whom judgment was granted.”
27
a variance must “show that the grant was unreasonable.” Sagstetter v. City of St. Paul,
529 N.W.2d 488, 492 (Minn. App. 1995) (emphasis added).
To determine whether a municipal body’s action was reasonable, we apply a
two-step analysis: first, we determine whether the city supported its action with legally
sufficient reasons, and second, we determine whether those reasons have a factual basis in
the record. RDNT, LLC, 861 N.W.2d at 75. We must affirm a city’s decision if at least one
of the reasons for its decision is legally sufficient and supported by evidence in the record.
St. Croix Dev., Inc. v. City of Apple Valley, 446 N.W.2d 392, 398 (Minn. App. 1989), rev.
denied (Minn. Dec. 1, 1989).
The city’s zoning code sets forth the requirements for the city to grant a variance:
A variance may be granted from the regulations of the
zoning code only when the applicable board, commission, or
council makes each of the following findings based upon the
evidence presented to it in each specific case:

(1) Challenges exist in complying with the
ordinance because of circumstances unique to the property.
The unique circumstances were not created by persons
presently having an interest in the property and are not based
on economic considerations alone.

(2) The property owner or authorized applicant
proposes to use the property in a reasonable manner that will
be in keeping with the spirit and intent of the ordinance and the
comprehensive plan.

(3) The proposed variance will not alter the
essential character of the locality or be injurious to the use or
enjoyment of other property in the vicinity. If granted, the
proposed variance will not be detrimental to the health, safety,
28
or welfare of the general public or of those utilizing the
property or nearby properties.

MCO § 525.460(c).14
Thus, to approve a variance application, the city must make the findings required
by section 525.460(c) of the city’s zoning code based on evidence in the record. Applying
the relevant analytical framework to the city zoning code’s requirements for granting a
variance, we consider first whether the city provided legally sufficient reasons for its grant
of the variance, then we consider whether there are facts in the record to support that
decision.
The city determined that the developer proposed to use the property in a reasonable
manner that will be in keeping with the spirit and intent of the ordinance and the
comprehensive plan. It specifically acknowledged that the proposal included sufficient
parking to accommodate the residential portion of the project and observed that the intent

14 The MPA mirrors the city zoning code’s language:

Variances shall only be permitted when they are in harmony
with the general purposes and intent of the ordinance and when
the variances are consistent with the comprehensive plan.
Variances may be granted when the applicant for the variance
establishes that there are practical difficulties in complying
with the zoning ordinance. “Practical difficulties,” as used in
connection with the granting of a variance, means that the
property owner proposes to use the property in a reasonable
manner not permitted by the zoning ordinance; the plight of the
landowner is due to circumstances unique to the property not
created by the landowner; and the variance, if granted, will not
alter the essential character of the locality. Economic
considerations alone do not constitute practical difficulties.

Minn. Stat. § 462.357, subd. 6(2).
29
of rear-yard setback requirements “is to maintain access to light and air for adjacent
properties, provide adequate separation between uses and to encourage orderly
development.” The city noted that, for this project, the rear -yard variance request
“concerns only the first level of the property structure which contains the enclosed parking
structure. The remainder of the structure above the first floor is setback at least nine feet
in compliance with the minimum setback requirements in the Corridor 4 district.” The city
also determined that the project was in keeping with the spirit and intent of the goods and
services corridor and the 2040 Plan. It reasoned that, even with this variance, the project
will meet the general area’s setback requirements and that the developer proposed a design
that minimizes the impact of the building’s increased height with an architectural character
that complements the existing development.
As to the essential character of the locality, the city determined that “[t]he proposed
variance will not alter the essential character of the locality or be injurious to the use or
enjoyment of other property in the vicinity” because the project “is designed to complement
the existing development patterns[] and architectural character” of the neighborhood. The
city also reasoned that the building “utilizes setbacks and other architectural strategies to
minimize the impact of the increased building height and bulk on adjacent lower scale
uses.” Finally, the city determined that the project site’s slope presented a challenge in
complying with the zoning code because the slope is a unique circumstance of the property
that was not caused by the developer. The city determined that the slope created a need for
extra space in the project site’s rear yard to enable the construction of parking spaces “while
maintaining established yards in the front of the building.” The city’s decision refutes
30
Murphy’s argument that the developer simply had no “desire” to comply with the city’s
zoning code. The decision shows that the project was designed to consider the purpose of
the city’s zoning code and to minimally deviate from its requirements due to a unique
physical feature of the property. The city set forth legally sufficient reasons to grant a
variance consistent with the city’s zoning code.
We now examine whether the city had a factual basis to grant the variance. A review
of the record demonstrates that the project includes parking for the residential portion of
the building at a 1:1 ratio; that, even with the proposed five-foot rear setback variance, the
“remainder of the structure above the first floor is setback at least nine feet”; and that the
project site slopes from north to south along the alley. The record also shows that the
developer did not cause the slope of the natural landscape. The record contains facts that
support the city’s legally sufficient reasons for granting the rear -yard variance for a
five-foot rear-yard setback instead of a nine-foot rear-yard setback.
Because the city provided legally sufficient reasons based on facts in the record to
support the findings required by the city’s zoning code, its decision to grant the rear -yard
variance was reasonable. Accordingly, we affirm the city’s grant of the rear-yard variance.
In its effort to abide by the variance requirements of section 525.460(c) of the city’s
zoning code, consistent with the policies, goals, standards, and maps that guide the city’s
physical, social, and economic development, the planning commission determined that the
rear-yard variance should be granted. As the supreme court stated in White Bear Docking,
the “setting aside of routine municipal decisions should be reserved for those rare instances
in which the City’s decision has no rational basis. Except in such cases, it is the duty of
31
the judiciary to exercise restraint and accord appropriate deference to civil authorities in
the performance of their duties.” 324 N.W.2d at 176. This is not one of those rare
instances, and we conclude that, here, the city acted within its broad discretion when it
decided to grant the variance.
DECISION
We hold that the MPA authorizes the city to provide concurrent authority to its
planning commission and its board of adjustments and appeals to hear and decide requests
for variances. The city’s planning commission thus had the authority to grant variances
from the zoning code. Although we do not review the city’s grant of the reverse-corner-lot
variance because it is void by operation of city ordinance and thus the issue is
nonjusticiable, we conclude that the city had a reasonable basis for granting the rear-yard
variance.
Affirmed.