Aaron Olson, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0686

Aaron Olson,
Appellant,

vs.

Community Action Partnership of Hennepin County (CAPSH),
Respondent,

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed January 27, 2025
Affirmed
Ede, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-23-12568

Aaron Olson, Minneapolis, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Jennifer L. M. Jacobs, Lockridge Grindal Nauen PLLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
respondent Community Action Partnership of Hennepin County)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Greg Merz, Richard Dornfeld, Assistant Attorneys
General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent State of Minnesota)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Ede,
Judge.

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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
EDE, Judge
This appeal follows the summary-judgment dismissal with prejudice of the claims
alleged in appellant Aaron Olson’s complaint. Olson challenges the district court’s order
granting summary judgment for respondent Community Action Partnership of Hennepin
County (CAPHC)1 and denying his motion to amend the complaint and to join respondent
State of Minnesota as a party. In addition, Olson seeks review of the district court’s order
denying his request to move for reconsideration. We conclude (1) that the district court did
not err in granting summary judgment and dismissing Olson’s claims with prejudice,
(2) that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Olson’s motion to amend the
complaint and to join the state as a party, and (3) that the court’s order denying Olson’s
request to move for reconsideration is not appealable. We therefore affirm.
FACTS
Complaint and Answer
In August 2023, Olson commenced a disability-discrimination lawsuit against
CAPHC under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), Minn. Stat. §§ 363A.01-.50
(2024).2 Olson alleged that, in the summer of 2023, CAPHC refused to process his

1 The case caption in the district court identified CAPHC by the acronym, “CAPSH.” But
CAPHC is identified in its appellate brief by the acronym, “CAPHC.” The caption of this
opinion conforms to the caption used in the district court. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 143.01.
But we use CAPHC’s preferred acronym throughout the body of the opinion.

2 Because those sections have not been amended in relevant part for purposes of our
analysis, we cite the most recent version of Minnesota Statutes sections 363A.01-.50. See
Interstate Power Co. v. Nobles Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 617 N.W.2d 566, 575 (Minn. 2000)
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application for energy assistance “in the manner [in] which it had previously done”—via
email—and therefore failed to provide a reasonable accommodation for his disability.
According to Olson’s complaint, CAPHC caused him “unacceptable ‘barriers to access’
with [CAPHC’s] needs-based services.” Olson maintained that he was facing “imminent
and full electricity shut-off in his apartment because he [was] unable to comply with
[CAPHC’s] demands for application processing, which disregard[ed] [his] disability.” The
complaint prayed for injunctive relief and damages.
In its answer, CAPHC explained that it is “a state and federally certified Community
Action nonprofit organization that contracts with the Minnesota Department of Commerce
to provide low-income home energy assistance services” to Hennepin County residents.
CAPHC denied being a “place of public accommodation.” Moreover, CAPHC asserted
that it was “without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of
[Olson’s] allegation regarding his disability and therefore denie[d] the allegation.” CAPHC
also denied the allegation that it had failed to provide Olson with reasonable
accommodations.
According to CAPHC’s answer, the Minnesota Energy Assistance Program (EAP)
application period opens each September and closes the following May 31. The EAP policy
manual requires households receiving Supplemental Security Income as their sole source
of income to submit a household signature and income documentation for the three months

(stating that, generally, “appellate courts apply the law as it exists at the time they rule on
a case”). For the same reason, we also cite the current versions of other statutes cited in
this opinion.
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before execution of an application for energy assistance. CAPHC admitted in its answer
that, prior to 2022, its staff members had disregarded the EAP policy manual and had
instead “agree[d] to use information that [Olson] provided via email to fill out an
application on his behalf and [to] submit” that information “without the required household
signature.”
But CAPHC’s answer further maintains that it offered Olson reasonable
accommodations several times in September 2022 to assist him with completing an EAP
application for the 2023 EAP year. These accommodations included providing Olson with
a fillable PDF application, requesting Olson’s “phone number to assist him with a
telephone application,” offering “to conduct a home visit to complete the application and
collect his signature,” and informing Olson that a signed application is required each year.
Olson refused each of the available application methods and accommodations that CAPHC
offered and did not timely apply for the 2023 EAP year. CAPHC also attached several
exhibits to its answer , including the EAP policy manual—which states that “[t]he
application must be signed by the applicant to be effective” —and correspondence from
CAPHC to Olson detailing the accommodations CAPHC offered Olson to facilitate
processing of his 2023 EAP application. And CAPHC contended that it provided Olson
with full and equal access to its services and benefits in compliance with the MHRA, as
well as other applicable state and federal law.
Relevant Pretrial Motions
In November 2023, Olson moved to amend the complaint and to join the state as a
party. CAPHC opposed the motion, arguing that Olson’s “sole legal conclusion that the
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state . . . is liable for the conduct alleged in the complaint is insufficient to put the state . . .
on notice of the claims against it and entirely fails to state a cognizable claim against the
state.” The state also opposed the motion, asserting (1) that it was not a proper party and
(2) that the motion to amend the complaint and to join the state as a party was futile because
CAPHC had since approved Olson for benefits under the program, such that his
discrimination claim had become moot.
In December 2023, CAPHC moved for summary judgment on two grounds: (1) that,
because Olson’s electricity was never shut off and he was no longer facing any risk of shut
off, he “suffered no injury in fact” and his claims were also moot; and (2) that Olson could
not “establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination because he [could not] show
that he was denied meaningful access to CAPHC’s services.” Olson opposed CAPHC’s
summary-judgment motion, contending that he “continue[d] to face risk of injury” and that
his claim for injunctive relief remained viable.
After the district court heard oral arguments on the parties’ motions, the court took
the matters under advisement.
March 2024 Order

In March 2024, the district court filed an order denying Olson’s motion to amend
the complaint and to join the state as a party, granting CAPHC’s summary-judgment
motion, and dismissing Olson’s claims with prejudice (March 2024 order).
The district court determined that Olson’s claims did not require joining the state as
a party, reasoning that “[s]imply because the state has the power to compel CAPHC to
make a policy change to accommodate Olson does not mean that the state is a necessary or
6
proper party to bring the action against or that Olson could not succeed without the
involvement of the state.” And the district court ruled that there was no reason to join the
state as a party given that the state could provide no greater relief than CAP HC and that
Olson’s “claims [were] only applicable to a state actor, not the state.” The district court
also decided that, because Olson “ha[d] not challenged the validity or []constitutionality of
any law, and [had] only [sought] redressability for injuries under the current law,” the court
would not extend existing caselaw by granting Olson leave to join the state as a party.
Moreover, based on its grant of summary judgment for CAPHC, the district court
determined that Olson’s motion to amend the complaint and to add the state as a party was
futile.
In considering CAPHC’s summary-judgment motion, the district court “construe[d]
Olson’s claims for injuries and lack of assistance/accommodation as a claim for disability
discrimination under state and federal law.” The district court determined that Olson’s
claim for injunctive relief was moot and that Olson’s claims for damages lacked sufficient
legal and evidentiary support. Citing Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C., 596
U.S. 212, 230 (2022), the district court ruled that Olson has no claim for emotional distress
damages under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2018), because the United
States Supreme Court has held “that private claims to enforce the antidiscrimination
provisions of the Rehabilitation Act do not allow for recovery of emotional distress based
damages.” The district court also decided that “there [was] no evidence produced as to the
nature of any claimed disability, or evidence that such disability precluded Olson from
using the on-line portal or using any of the other methods offered by CAPHC to submit the
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[2023 EAP] application.” Thus, the district court determined that Olson had not produced
sufficient evidence to proceed on his MHRA claim and that “[t]he record [did] not support
a genuine issue of material fact as to an act of discrimination by CAPHC or failure of access
to the program based on Olson’s disability.”
April 2024 Order
After the district court had taken the parties’ motions under advisement, but prior to
the filing of the March 2024 order, Olson filed a letter with the district court requesting a
“hearing for leave to further amend his complaint to add that ‘communication disabilities’
and visual impairment are [his] MHRA qualifying disabilities.” In his letter, Olson stated
that these disabilities were “clearly inferred from the operative complaint.”
Following the filing of the March 2024 order, Olson emailed the district court
“seeking a ruling on his second Motion to Amend request.” In response, the district court
filed an order that “deni[ed] leave to amend for a second time,” construed Olson’s letter as
a request to move for reconsideration under Minnesota General Rule of Practice 115.11,
and allowed the parties to submit additional letter briefing on Olson’s request.
Olson filed a letter arguing that compelling circumstances supported his request to
move for reconsideration because the district court had overlooked evidence “proffered for
summary judgment that [was] critical to this case’s disposition.” According to his letter,
Olson “clearly swore in his complaints that he was receiving Supplemental Security
Income . . . , which . . . requires a finding of at least [one] condition that ‘substantially
limits a major life activity,’ qualifying him as a disabled person pursuant to the [MHRA].”
Olson also asserted that his qualifying disability was visual impairment.
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In April 2024, the district court filed an order denying Olson’s request to move for
reconsideration (April 2024 order). In that order, the district court explained its
determination that “Olson has not presented grounds for reconsideration.”
Olson appeals.
DECISION
Olson challenges the district court’s decisions to (1) grant summary judgment for
CAPHC, (2) deny his motion to amend the complaint and to join the state as a party, and
(3) deny his request to move for reconsideration. We address each issue in turn.
I. The district court did not err in granting CAPHC’s summary-judgment
motion.

Olson maintains that the district court’s March 2024 order granting summary
judgment for CAPHC was erroneous, contending that he “made a valid MHRA claim,
satisfying all the elements necessary to maintain a prima facie case and withstand summary
judgment with substantiating proofs.” CAPHC responds that the district court correctly
determined that Olson’s claim for injunctive relief was moot, that Olson did not produce
sufficient evidence to support his MHRA claim, and that it was entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Olson’s arguments do not persuade us to reverse.
“The [district] court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.01. “A genuine issue of material fact exists if a rational trier
of fact, considering the record as a whole, could find for the nonmoving party.”
Aromashodu v. Swarovski N. Am. Ltd., 981 N.W.2d 791, 795 (Minn. App. 2022) (quotation
9
omitted). This court “review[s] a grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and resolving all doubts and
factual inferences against the moving party.” Id. (quotation omitted).
We next review the district court’s determinations (A) that Olson’s claim for
injunctive relief is moot and (B) that Olson did not establish a prima facie case of a MHRA
claim.
A. The district court did not err in determining that Olson’s claim for
injunctive relief is moot.

“A moot case is nonjusticiable.” Snell v. Walz, 985 N.W.2d 277, 283 (Minn. 2023).
Justiciability is an issue of law that we review de novo. See Dean v. City of Winona, 868
N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. 2015). “Issues which have no existence other than in the realm of
future possibility are purely hypothetical and are not justiciable.” Lee v. Delmont, 36
N.W.2d 530, 537 (Minn. 1949). We will dismiss an issue or claim on appeal as moot “when
a decision on the merits is no longer necessary or an award of effective relief is no longer
possible.” Dean, 868 N.W.2d at 5. “But mootness is not a mechanical rule that is
automatically invoked whenever the underlying dispute between the parties is settled or
otherwise reso lved; it is a flexible discretionary doctrine.” Snell, 985 N.W.2d at 284
(quotation omitted).
There are four exceptions to the mootness doctrine. See Winkowski v. Winkowski,
989 N.W.2d 302, 308–10 (Minn. 2023). The exceptions are: (1) for “issues that are capable
of repetition, yet likely to evade review,” id. at 308 (quotation omitted); (2) in cases
“[w]here an appellant produces evidence that collateral consequences actually resulted
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from a judgment” or where “a party demonstrates that real and substantial disabilities attach
to a judgment,” id. (quotation omitted); (3) “when the case is functionally justiciable and
presents an important question of statewide significance that should be decided
immediately,” id. at 309 (quotation omitted); and (4) “for instances when a party moots a
case by voluntarily ceasing the allegedly wrongful action,” id. at 310 n.10.
We conclude that the district court did not err in determining that Olson’s claim for
injunctive relief is moot. CAPHC’s summary-judgment motion included several exhibits:
a copy of Olson’s 2024 EAP application; correspondence from CAPHC to Olson
confirming approval of his 2024 EAP application and the resulting funds administered; and
a copy of Olson’s energy assistance portal with Xcel Energy “showing continuation of
electricity service and payment of energy assistance.” This evidence shows that, after
Olson did not properly submit a 2023 EAP application because he refused to provide a
household signature, he later correctly completed and signed a 2024 EAP application,
which was then approved. The funds that CAPHC administered based on that application
allowed Olson to avoid any energy shut-off.
In other words, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Olson and
resolving all doubts and factual inferences against CAPHC, the undisputed summary-
judgment record reflects that, although Olson might have at first faced a possible energy
shut-off, such a shut-off never occurred. His injunctive-relief claim is therefore moot.
Olson does not argue that any exception to the mootness doctrine applies. Instead, he insists
that the “[e]xceptions to the mootness doctrine are irrelevant because none of [his]
averments are moot.” As explained above, we disagree. And “[a] party’s failure to brief
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and argue an issue on appeal results in forfeiture of that issue . . . .” Jundt v. Jundt, 12
N.W.3d 201, 204 (Minn. App. 2024), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 31, 2024).
But we would still affirm despite Olson’s forfeiture of the mootness-exceptions
issue. While we are mindful that the risk of interruption in electricity service to Olson’s
private residence is perhaps consequential for Olson, he has not carried his burden of
showing that any purported injury is capable of repetition, yet likely to evade review. See
Winkowski, 989 N.W.2d at 308. Olson has neither produced evidence that collateral
consequences actually resulted from the district court’s grant of summary judgment against
him, nor has he demonstrated that real and substantial disabilities attach to that judgment.
See id. We also cannot say that this case is functionally justiciable and presents an
important question of statewide significance that should be decided immediately. See id. at
309. And, as in Winkowski, “[t]he voluntary cessation doctrine does not apply here . . .
because there is no challenged activity that was voluntarily ceased.” Id. at 310 n.10. The
inapplicability of the four exceptions to the mootness doctrine is particularly underscored
by Olson’s successful 2024 EAP application. Thus, the district court did not err in
determining that Olson’s claim for injunctive relief is moot.
Even if we did not conclude that Olson’s injunctive-relief claim is moot, we would
still reject it on the merits. The district court determined that “the record produced on
summary judgment and allegations in the complaint [fell] short of describing issues and
claims that meet the elements for issuance of a permanent injunction for future harm.”
Reviewing de novo, we would conclude that this determination was not erroneous. See
Brown v. Lee , 859 N.W.2d 836, 839–40 (Minn. App. 2015) (observing that “ a more
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deferential standard of review than de novo may be applicable when the district court has
balanced the equities and determined not to award equitable relief,” but concluding that “a
more deferential standard of review is not applicable” when the district court concludes
that a “claim fails as a matter of law”), rev. denied (Minn. May 19, 2015). “[T]o be granted
a permanent injunction, a party must show that any remedy at law would be inadequate
and that an injunction is necessary to prevent great and irreparable injury.” St. Jude Med.,
Inc. v. Carter, 913 N.W.2d 678, 683 (Minn. 2018) (quotation omitted). Viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to Olson and resolving all doubts and factual
inferences against CAPHC, Olson cannot make the required showing because the risk of
harm—an interruption of electricity service— no longer existed at the time of the March
2024 order. The undisputed summary-judgment record establishes that no injunction is
necessary to prevent a great and irreparable injury, even assuming without deciding that
any remedy at law might somehow be inadequate.
We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in determining that CAPHC
had shown that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that it is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.01.
B. The district court correctly determined that Olson did not establish a
prima facie case under the MHRA.

The MHRA provides that “discriminat[ion] against any person in the access to,
admission to, full utilization of or benefit from any public service because of . . . disability,
. . . or [the] fail[ure] to ensure physical and program access for disabled persons,” is “an
unfair discriminatory practice . . . unless the public service can demonstrate that providing
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the access would impose an undue hardship on its operation .” Minn. Stat. § 363A.12,
subd. 1. A public service is “any public facility, department, agency, board or commission,
owned, operated or managed by or on behalf of the state of Minnesota, or any subdivision
thereof, including any county, city, town, township, or independent district in the state.”
Minn. Stat. § 363A.03, subd. 35.
“[A] person may bring a civil action seeking redress for an unfair discriminatory
practice directly to [the] district court.” Minn. Stat. § 363A.33, subd. 1. “If the [district]
court . . . finds that the respondent has engaged in an unfair discriminatory practice, it shall
issue an order or verdict directing appropriate relief as provided by this section.” Id.,
subd. 6. The district court shall order the respondent to “pay an aggrieved party, who has
suffered discrimination, compensatory damages in an amoun t up to three times the actual
damages sustained,” if it finds that the respondent has engaged in an unfair discriminatory
practice. Minn. Stat. § 363A.29, subd. 4(a).
“To prevail on a disability discrimination claim [under the MHRA], a plaintiff must
show that: (1) he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) he was excluded from
participation in a public entity’s services, programs or activities; and (3) such treatment
was because of his disability.” Sonkowsky ex rel. Sonkowsky v. Bd. of Educ. for Indep. Sch.
Dist. No. 721, 327 F.3d 675, 678 (8th Cir. 2003) (concluding that the plaintiff failed to
establish a disability discrimination claim under the MHRA because he presented no
evidence that his ex clusion from a field trip “was based on [his] disability rather than on
14
his documented misconduct in the weeks preceding the trip”); 3 see also Banks v. Dakota
Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, No. A22-1818, 2023 WL 8178145, at *1, *3 (Minn. App. Nov. 27,
2023) (nonprecedential opinion applying the elements set forth in Sonkowsky to a MHRA
claim).4
In the March 2024 order, the district court determined that Olson had not produced
sufficient evidence to support the necessary elements of his claim. The district court ruled
that Olson had presented no evidence about the nature of his claimed disability and that he
had not shown “that such disability precluded [him] from using the on-line portal or using
any of the other methods offered by CAPHC to submit the [2023 EAP] application.” Thus,
the district court decided that “[t]he record [did] not support a genuine issue of material
fact as to an act of discrimination by CAPHC or failure of access to the program based on
Olson’s disability.”
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Olson and resolving all doubts
and factual inferences against CAPHC, we conclude that the district court did not err in its
summary-judgment determination. CAPHC demonstrated that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Olson did

3 “Although we are not bound to follow precedent from other states or federal courts, these
authorities can be persuasive.” N.H. v. Anoka -Hennepin Sch. Dist. No. 11, 950 N.W.2d
553, 563 (Minn. App. 2020) (quotation omitted). We cite Sonkowsky only as persuasive
authority.

4 We cite nonprecedential opinions herein as persuasive authority. See Minn. R. Civ. App.
P. 136.01, subd. 1(c) (“Nonprecedential opinions . . . are not binding authority except as
law of the case, res judicata or collateral estoppel, but nonprecedential opinions may be
cited as persuasive authority.”).
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not establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.01.
Olson’s initial complaint never specified his disability. Olson neither established in the
summary-judgment record that CAPHC refused to process his application because of such
a disability nor that he could not access the EAP application because of it. The exhibits
accompanying CAPHC’s answer reveal that CAPHC offered Olson several methods to
provide a signature for his 2023 EAP application. The email exhibits that O lson included
with his memorandum opposing summary judgment do not create a genuine issue of
material fact about whether a disability prevented him from accessing the EAP application.
Even considering Olson’s exhibits in the light most favorable to his case, the exhibits show
only that his unspecified disability precluded him from “follow[ing] the standard online
application process,” not that any of the several accommodations CAPHC offered were
inaccessible to him. Indeed, Olson’s ability to send multiple emails to CAPHC about the
application process directly contradict such a claim.
Thus, the district court did not err in determining that Olson could not establish any
of the three elements of a prima facie case of a disability discrimination claim under the
MHRA. See Sonkowsky, 327 F.3d at 678; see also Banks, 2023 WL 8178145, at *1, *3.
5

5 Although Olson’s complaint and subsequent motion to amend the complaint and to join
the state as a party do not explicitly cite any basis for recovery under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2018) and the Rehabilitation Act, we
nonetheless discern no error in the district court’s summary-judgment dismissal of Olson’s
damages claims to the extent that he seeks relief based on those federal statutes. This is
because the same reasoning set forth above defeats such claims. “The ADA, the
Rehabilitation Act, and the MHRA prohibit discrimination because of a disability against
‘qualified’ disabled persons.” Tori v. Univ. of Minn., No. A06-0 205, 2006 WL 3772316,
at *4 (Minn. App. Dec. 26, 2006) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a), 12132 (2000); 29 U.S.C.
§ 794(a) (2000); Minn. Stat. § 363A.08, subd. 2, 6 (2004)). As explained above, there is
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II. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Olson’s motion to
amend the complaint and to join the state as a party.

Olson contends that the district court abused its discretion by not granting him leave
to amend the complaint and to join the state as a party. According to Olson, “CAPHC, the
state . . . , and the Minnesota Commissioner of Commerce are all responsible for
maintaining a partial barrier for [him] to access their energy assistance services.” The state
counters that the district court did not abuse its discretion because it was not a necessary
party under Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 19.01 and because permissive joinder per
Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 20.01 was unwarranted.
After a responsive pleading is served, a party may amend a pleading only “by leave
of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when
justice so requires.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 15.01. “The district court has broad discretion to grant
or deny leave to amend a complaint, and its ruling will not be reversed absent a clear abuse
of that discretion.” Metro Bldg. Companies, Inc. v. Ram Bldgs., Inc., 783 N.W.2d 204, 210
(Minn. App. 2010) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 10, 2010).
Below, we analyze the district court’s determinations to deny Olson’s motion to
amend the complaint and to join the state as a party on (A) necessary joinder,
(B) permissive joinder, and (C) futility grounds.

no genuine issue of material fact because Olson did not present evidence of his alleged
disability. We likewise conclude that the district court did not err in determining that
CAPHC was entitled to summary judgment on a claim for damages grounded in the
Rehabilitation Act because the United States Supreme Court has held “that emotional
distress damages are not recoverable under” that law. See Cummings, 596 U.S. at 230.
17
A. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying joinder of the
state under Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 19.01.

“A person who is subject to service of process shall be joined as a party in the action
if . . . in the person’s absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already
parties.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 19.01. Necessary joinder is also required if “the person claims
an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the
action in the person’s absence” would either: “(1) as a practical matter impair or impede
the person’s ability to protect that interest”; or “(2) leave any one already a party subject
to a substantial risk or incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by
reason of the person’s claimed interest.” Id. “If the person has not been so joined, the court
shall order that the person be made a party.” Id.
We have therefore explained that “[a]n indispensable party is a party without whom
the action could not proceed in equity and good conscience.” Hoyt Props., Inc. v. Prod.
Res. Grp., L.L.C., 716 N.W.2d 366, 377 (Minn. App. 2006) (quotation omitted), aff’d, 736
N.W.2d 313 (Minn. 2007). If a district court “can render an adequate judgment without the
absent party” and “relief can be crafted” without prejudice to the absent party’s rights, then
the court is unlikely to find the party to be indispensable. Id.
In his motion to amend the complaint and to join the state as a party, Olson argued
that the state was an indispensable party to the action. But the district court determined that
Olson’s claims did not require joining the state as a necessary party because both of his
prayers for relief—an injunction to stop the energy shut-off in his home and money
damages for his pain and suffering—could be “fully remediated by CAPHC.” The district
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court further reasoned: “Simply because the State has the power to compel CAPHC to
make a policy change to accommodate Olson does not mean that the State is a necessary
or proper party to bring action against or that Olson could not succeed without the
involvement of the State.”
We conclude that this determination was not an abuse of discretion. The record
reflects that CAPHC prevented any interruption in electricity service to Olson’s residence
by administering energy assistance funds to Olson after he completed and signed a 2024
EAP application. Thus, the state’s absence from the lawsuit did not impede complete relief
from being accorded among those already parties. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 19.01. Nor did
Olson establish that proceeding in the state’s absence would impair or impede an interest
claimed by the state or leave CAPHC subject to a substantial risk of incurring double,
multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations. See id. As a result, the district court could
render an adequate judgment without the state and could craft relief without prejudice to
the state’s rights. See Hoyt Props., Inc., 716 N.W.2d at 377. And Olson cannot
convincingly claim that the state “is a party without whom the action could not proceed in
equity and good conscience.” Id.
Because Olson has not shown that the state is a necessary or indispensable party,
the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to amend the complaint
and to add the state as a party under Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 19.01.

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B. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying joinder of the
state under Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 20.01.

“All persons may be joined in one action as defendants if there is asserted against
them jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief” arising out of the same
transaction or occurrence “and if any question of law or fact common to all defendants will
arise in the action.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 20.01.
Because the district court determined that the state could provide no greater relief
than CAPHC, it ruled that there was no reason to join the state as a party “when the claims
[were] only applicable to a state actor, not the state.” The district court also distinguished
the caselaw cited by Olson and declined to join the state as a party because Olson had not
challenged the validity or constitutionality of any statute and was only seeking redress for
his alleged injuries under applicable law.
For two reasons, we conclude that the district court’s decision was not an abuse of
discretion.
First, the district court correctly determined that both case s on which Olson relied
in seeking permissive joinder of the state — Minnesota Min. & Mfg. Co. v. State, 289
N.W.2d 396 (Minn. 1979), and Continental Can Co. v. State, 297 N.W.2d 241 (Minn.
1980)
6—are distinguishable from this matter. One of the issues presented in Minnesota
Mining was whether “the Federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) pre-
empt[ed] application of the Minnesota Human Rights Act.” 289 N.W.2d at 397. But the

6 In Frieler v. Carlson Mktg. Grp., Inc. , 751 N.W.2d 558, 564–65 (Minn. 2008), the
Minnesota Supreme Court recognized that Continental Can Co. was superseded by statute.
See 1982 Minn. Laws ch. 619, §§ 2, at 1511; 3, at 1511.
20
state’s joinder was not a contested issue on appeal. See id. And for good reason, as the
district court appropriately observed here: in general, the state is a proper party when the
validity of a statute is in question, which was the case in Minnesota Mining. See, e.g., Minn.
R. Civ. P. 5A (requiring notice to the Minnesota Attorney General if a state statute is
challenged). As the district court correctly noted, that is not the case in the present matter.
Continental Can Co. likewise did not involve an appellate challenge to the state’s joinder
as a party but rather similarly confronted an issue of statutory interpretation that involved
the state: whether certain acts of sexual harassment constitute sex discrimination in
employment conditions and, if so, whether the MHRA imposes a duty on an employer.
297 N.W.2d at 245. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that these
two cases are distinguishable because Olson has not raised any analogous claims about the
validity, scope, and interpretation of the MHRA.
Second, “if the state can provide no relief, and [Olson] do[es] not indicate that it
can, it is questionable whether the joinder of the state as a party is proper under Minn. R.
Civ. P. 20.01.” Meriwether Minn. Land & Timber, LLC v. State, 818 N.W.2d 557, 573
(Minn. App. 2012). Olson has not explained how the state could have provided him with
relief, other than paying him damages for the purported physical and emotional distress
caused by an energy shut-off that never occurred.
Permissive joinder under Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 20.01 is
discretionary—the district court was not required to add the state as a party to the action.
See Minn. R. Civ. P. 20.01. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion
in deciding not to join the state as a party under rule 20.01.
21
C. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that joinder
of the state was futile.

“Leave to amend ‘should be freely granted, except where to do so would result in
prejudice to the other party.’” Hunter v. Anchor Bank, N.A., 842 N.W.2d 10, 17–18 (Minn.
App. 2013) (quoting Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. 1993)), rev. denied
(Minn. Mar. 18, 2014). But “[e]ven in the absence of prejudice, a district court may deny
a motion to amend a pleading if the amendment would serve no useful purpose, such as if
an amended claim is not viable or would not withstand a motion for summary judg ment.”
Id. at 18 (quotation and citations omitted).
Along with the foregoing bases, the district court denied Olson’s motion to amend
the complaint and to join the state as a party on the ground that joinder would be futile.
This decision was not an abuse of discretion. Adding the state as a party to the action does
not bolster the merits of Olson’s MHRA claim. For the reasons discussed above, Olson’s
proposed amended complaint still fails to make a prima facie showing of an MHRA
violation. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the
amendment Olson sought would serve no useful purpose because his amended claims were
not viable and would not withstand a motion for summary judgment. Id.
We therefore conclude that the district court’s denial of Olson’s motion to amend
the complaint and to join the state as a party was not an abuse of discretion.

22
III. The April 2024 order denying Olson’s request to move for reconsideration is
not appealable.

Finally, Olson seeks appellate review of the April 2024 order denying his request to
move for reconsideration. CAPHC asserts that the April 2024 order is not appealable under
Minnesota Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 103.03. We agree with CAPHC.
Whether the April 2024 order is appealable is a question of law that this court
reviews de novo. See Kastner v. Star Trails Ass’n, 646 N.W.2d 235, 238 (Minn. 2002)
(“Whether the district court’s May 11 order denying respondent’s immunity-based
summary judgment motion is immediately appealable requires construction of a procedural
rule and is therefore a question of law subject to de novo review.” (citation omitted)). But
“[w]e review a district court’s decision to allow a motion for reconsideration for an abuse
of discretion.” Goerke Fam. P’ship v. Lac qui Parle- Yellow Bank Watershed Dist. , 857
N.W.2d 50, 52–53 (Minn. App. 2014).
“Motions to reconsider are prohibited except by express permission of the court,
which will be granted only upon a showing of compelling circumstances.” Minn. R. Gen.
Prac. 115.11. The Minnesota Supreme Court has explained that “courts will ‘rarely’
exercise their power to reconsider decisions, and ‘are likely to do so only where intervening
legal developments have occurred . . . or where the earlier decision is palpably wrong in
some respect.’” Stern 1011 First St. South, LLC v. Gere, 979 N.W.2d 216, 220 (Minn.
2022) (quoting Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 115.11 1997 advisory comm. cmt.); see also 1300
Nicollet, LLC v. Cnty. of Hennepin, 990 N.W.2d 422, 434 n.9 (Minn. 2023) (quoting this
aspect of Gere).
23
We conclude that a denial of a request to move for reconsideration is not an
appealable judgment or order under Minnesota Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 103.03.7
Indeed, the April 2024 order denying Olson’s request to move for reconsideration is not
appealable under rule 103.03(b) because it is not “an order which grants, refuses, dissolves
or refuses to dissolve, an injunction.” Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03(b). The April 2024
order also did not grant or deny a new trial. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03(d). Nor did
the April 2024 order determine the action and prevent a judgment from which an appeal
might be taken. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03(e).
Thus, we conclude that the April 2024 order is not appealable.8
Affirmed.

7 While we acknowledge that we may review the denial of a request to move for
reconsideration “as the interest of justice may require,” we are not persuaded that the
interests of justice require us to do so here. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.04.

8 Even if the April 2024 order were appealable, we would still affirm. This is because we
discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to deny Olson’s request to
move for reconsideration, given that Olson claimed no intervening legal developments and
did not persuasively articulate how the March 2024 order was palpably wrong in some
respect. See Gere, 979 N.W.2d at 220; see also Goerke, 857 N.W.2d at 52–53.