State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0710

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Bruce Edward Frye,
Appellant.

Filed September 2, 2025
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-21-1641

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Peter R. Marker, Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Charles F. Clippert, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and
Kirk, Judge.∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
In this direct appeal from the judgment of conviction for four counts of first-degree
criminal sexual conduct against two minor children, appellant Bruce Edward Frye argues
that the district court erred by not allowing him to admit evidence of the minors’ previous
sexual conduct. Frye contends that the exclusion of the evidence deprived him of his
constitutional right to offer evidence in his own defense, entitling him to a new trial.
Because we discern no error in the district court’s evidentiary ruling, we affirm.
FACTS
On March 25, 2021, Frye was charged with five counts of first -degree criminal
sexual conduct against Child 1 and Child 2— the granddaughter and great-granddaughter
of his long-term girlfriend—for conduct that was alleged to have occurred over
approximately the previous five years. Frye waived his right to a jury trial and agreed to
submit the case to the district court on stipulated evidence pursuant to Minnesota Rule of
Criminal Procedure 26.01, subdivision 3.
1 The following summarizes the stipulated
evidence.
On March 22, three days before the state brought its charges, the children reported
to the police that Frye had sexually assaulted them. At the time of their reports, Child 1
was age ten and Child 2 was age seven. After making their reports to the police, the children

1 Under this rule, if the district court finds the defendant guilty based on stipulated
evidence, “the defendant may appeal from the judgment of conviction and raise issues on
appeal as from any trial to the court.” Id., subd. 3(f).
3
underwent medical examinations at a children’s resource center. During these
examinations, each child was interviewed separately by a nurse practitioner. D uring
Child 1’s interview, Child 1 reported being sexually abused by Frye over the course of
about five years. During Child 2’s interview, Child 2 told the nurse practitioner that Child 2
knew that Child 1 had been sexually abused by Frye for about four years. Child 2 also
reported that Frye had touched Child 2’s genitals with his hands and put his genitals and
mouth on Child 2’s genitals. Both children reported that Frye had forced them to fellate
him.
During these interviews, both children described an incident that had taken place
two days before their reports to the police. On that day, the children were alone with Frye
watching a movie. Frye went into a bedroom and called for Child 2 to join him, but Child 2
ignored him at first. Frye became angry, and Child 2 eventually joined him in the bedroom,
where Frye had Child 2 lie on a bed. Shortly thereafter, Child 1 walked into the bedroom,
where Child 1 saw Frye standing near the bed with his penis out as Child 2 lay on the bed.
Child 1 asked Frye what he was doing and told him to stop. Frye approached Child 1, acting
as though he was going to strike the child. Child 1 threw a cup at him, which broke. After
the incident, the children decided to tell their parents about what Frye was doing to them.
They told their parents the next day and made their reports to the police the day after that.
4
Shortly after the children’s reports, the police conducted a Mirandized2 interview of
Frye. During the interview, Frye told the police that he had slept in the same bed as the
children but denied that he had ever touched them sexually. He said that he “might[]” have
touched the children’s genitals when “wrestl[ing]” or “tussl[ing]” with them. Fry e made
other statements that the interviewing officer interpreted as potentially admitting to sexual
misconduct, but Frye also recanted several times. The interview ended when Frye stated
that he needed to speak with a lawyer.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Frye with three counts of first-degree
criminal sexual conduct—penetration or contact with a person under 13 and an actor more
than 36 months older, in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.342, subdivision 1(a)
(2020), and two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct—penetration or contact
with a victim under 16 occurring as multiple acts over an extended period of time, in
violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.342, subdivision 1(h)(iii) (2014). The charged
offenses were alleged to have occurred over a period ranging from June 2016 to March
2021, with two of the charges alleging conduct against Child 1 and three alleging conduct
against Child 2.
Frye filed a series of motions with the district court, including a discovery demand
for records related to events in Plano, Texas, involving the children. Frye asserted that the
Plano records contained allegations by the children against someone other than Frye that

2 “A police officer must give an individual in custody a Miranda warning before
interrogating that individual.” State v. Flowers, 788 N.W.2d 120, 128 (Minn. 2010) (citing
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966)).
5
involved similar conduct to what the children had accused Frye of and that those events
took place in summer 2020, less than a year before the children’s reports about Frye. The
parties agreed to the district court conducting in camera review of the records from Plano
because the events discussed in those records had occurred in close temporal proximity to
the alleged events that led to Frye’s charges and because of the age of the children.
As trial approached, the parties filed motions in limine. Frye requested an order
allowing him to elicit testimony about the children’s “sexualized behavior and sexual
knowledge prior to the offense date,” regardless of the application of any rape-shield law
or rule. The state, in turn, sought to exclude evidence of and reference to the Plano events,
arguing that the evidence was “irrelevant, more prejudicial than probative, and will confuse
the issues.” The state also sought to generally exclude any evidence of the children’s “prior
sexual knowledge.”
Following a hearing, t he district court ruled on the parties’ motions in a written
order. The district court denied Frye’s motion to admit evidence related to the Plano events
or any other previous sexual conduct involving the children, determining that the evidence
was barred by Minnesota Rule of Evidence 412. The district court recognized that, in some
cases, sexual-history evidence may be admissible when constitutionally required by a
defendant’s due-process rights. But it determined that, in the circumstances of this case,
any probative value of the evidence of previous sexual conduct was outweighed by its
potential for unfair prejudice.
The case proceeded to trial. Frye waive d his right to a jury trial and elected to
proceed on stipulated evidence. Pursuant to the parties’ stipulations, the district court
6
received eight exhibits, which included police records related to the children’s March 2021
reports and records from the children’s resource center, including video recordings and
transcripts of the interviews with the children. The district court did not hear any testimony.
The district court issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order, finding
Frye guilty of four of the five offenses charged. At a sentencing hearing, the district court
sentenced Frye to consecutive prison terms of 172 months for one count of first-degree
criminal sexual conduct against Child 2 and 172 months for one count of first-degree
criminal sexual conduct against Child 1.
Frye appeals.
DECISION
Frye argues that the district court prejudicially erred by excluding evidence of the
children’s previous sexual conduct. He contends that the ruling deprived him of his
constitutional right to present a complete defense.
“A [criminal] defendant has the constitutional right to present a complete defense.”
State v. Atkinson, 774 N.W.2d 584, 589 (Minn. 2009). This right is guaranteed by the Due
Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
article I, section 7 of the Minnesota Constitution. State v. Richards, 495 N.W.2d 187, 191
(Minn. 1992). But even when a constitutional right is implicated, appellate courts “review
the evidentiary rulings of the district court for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Carbo,
6 N.W.3d 114, 123 (Minn. 2024). And, even if a district court abused its discretion by
excluding evidence, appellate courts will reverse only if the exclusion was not harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Zumberge, 888 N.W.2d 688, 694 (Minn. 2017).
7
In prosecutions for criminal sexual conduct, evidence of a victim’s previous sexual
conduct is generally prohibited. Minn. R. Evid. 412; Minn. Stat. § 609.347, subd. 3 (2024).
For purposes of this rule, “previous sexual conduct” includes an alleged victim’s prior
allegations of sexual abuse. State v. Kobow, 466 N.W.2d 747, 750 (Minn. App. 1991), rev.
denied (Minn. Apr. 18, 1991). Minnesota Rule of Evidence 412 contains exceptions for
cases when consent is a defense or when the evidence presented by the prosecution
includes, under certain circumstances, semen, pregnancy, or disease. Minn. R. Evid.
412(1). It is undisputed that none of these exceptions applies here.
But even if the previous-sexual-conduct evidence does not fit a rule 412 exception,
a district court may admit the evidence if admission is constitutionally required by the
defendant’s right to offer evidence in his own defense. State v. Benedict, 397 N.W.2d 337,
341 (Minn. 1986). In ruling whether to admit evidence of an alleged victim’s previous
sexual conduct under this principle, district courts “balance the probative value of the
evidence against its potential for causing unfair prejudice.” Id.
Frye sought to elicit testimony regarding the events in Plano. He argues that the
evidence was relevant to show that the children had a prior source of knowledge or
familiarity with sexual matters. The district court concluded that any probative value of the
evidence concerning the Plano events was outweighed by its prejudicial effect. For the
reasons that follow, we discern no abuse of discretion in that determination.
First, we consider the probative value of the evidence that Frye sought to admit.
Evidence of a person’s previous sexual conduct may be relevant “to establish a source of
knowledge of or familiarity with sexual matters in circumstances where the [fact-finder]
8
otherwise would likely infer that the defendant was the source of the knowledge.” Id. In
State v. Kroshus, for example, we concluded that it was error (albeit not reversible error)
for the district court to exclude the defendant’s proffered evidence of the alleged victim’s
previous report of sexual abuse as source-of- knowledge evidence. 447 N.W.2d 203, 205
(Minn. App. 1989), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 20, 1989). In that case, the jury had heard
testimony that the alleged victim “was not educated about sexual matters” and an expert
witness had testified that, due to a developmental disability, the alleged victim was
incapable of fabricating an “intricate story of sexual abuse” without having personally
experienced it or viewed it in very explicit pornographic material. Id. at 204-05. And, in
Benedict, the supreme court recognized the probative value of a victim’s previous sexual
conduct when the victim was five or six years old at the time of reporting the abuse and the
state’s expert had testified that the child had unusual knowledge of sexual matters for his
age. 397 N.W.2d at 338, 340-41.
Here, however, unlike in Kroshus and Benedict, there was no expert testimony
placing the children’s lack of sexual knowledge at issue. Moreover, the children were not
developmentally disabled like the victim in Kroshus or five or six years old like the victim
in Benedict. Child 1 was ten years old and Child 2 was seven years old at the time that they
made their reports, and, while they were certainly young, the record does not suggest that
they were so young or isolated as to have clearly lacked access to sexual knowledge
independent of their abuser. In these circumstances, it is less likely that a fact-finder would
infer that the sole source of the children’s knowledge of sexual matters was the defendant’s
9
conduct. See Benedict, 397 N.W.2d at 341. Thus, while the evidence may have had some
probative value, that value was limited.
Second, we consider the potential for unfair prejudice presented by the evidence of
the children’s previous sexual conduct. The district court determined that there was a
significant risk that the evidence would “create unfair prejudice” by “stigmatizing or
sexualizing the [children].” The district court also observed that the evidence carried a high
risk of causing the jury to confuse the issues.
Frye argues that presenting the evidence of the children’s previous sexual conduct
would not have stigmatized or sexualized them because, had the matter proceeded to a jury
trial, the children would have testified about their sexual conduct anyway when testifying
about the facts underlying the abuse allegations. Frye also argues that a jury instruction
could have alleviated any risk of confusing the jury. Frye’s arguments are not persuasive.
The evidence of the children’s previous sexual conduct bore a high risk of prejudice
because it risked stigmatizing and sexualizing the children. And the relatively close
timelines of the Plano events and Frye’s abuse of the children created a high likelihood of
confusing the jury.
We discern no abuse of the discretion in the district court’s determination that the
probative value of the evidence was outweighed by the potential for unfair prejudice. The
district court therefore did not clearly abuse its discretion by excluding the evidence.
10
Because we find no error in the exclusion of the evidence, we need not address whether
any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.3
Affirmed.

3 In a pro se supplemental brief, Frye makes a series of factual assertions that are outside
the record and that we interpret to be an attempt to challenge the district court’s factual
findings supporting his convictions. Frye does not cite any legal authority or make any
legal arguments for why his factual assertions should be considered or how they can
undermine the district court’s findings. “An assignment of error based on mere assertion
and not supported by any argument or authorities in appellant’s brief is waived and will
not be considered on appeal unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection.” Louden
v. Louden, 22 N.W.2d 164, 166 (Minn. 1946); see also State v. Krosch, 642 N.W.2d 713,
719-20 (Minn. 2002) (quoting Louden, 22 N.W.2d at 166). On our inspection of the record,
we do not discern any prejudicial error based on his assertions. We therefore deem his
argument forfeited.