United Christian Fellowship Church, et al., Appellants,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0718

United Christian Fellowship Church, et al.,
Appellants,

vs.

Spire Credit Union,
Respondent,

Jennifer L. Urban, et al.,
Respondents.

Filed January 21, 2025
Reversed and remanded
Reilly, Judge*

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-20-13930

Scott M. Flaherty, Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellants)

Mark A. Olson, Olson Law Office, Apple Valley, Minnesota (for respondents Jennifer L.
Urban, et al.)

Daniel Haws, HKM, P.A., St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent Spire Credit Union)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Bentley, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REILLY, Judge
Appellants United Christian Fellowship Church (UCFC) and John G. Westrick
(UCFC’s attorney) contest a series of district court orders related to UCFC’s claim of
“disparagement or slander of title” against respondents Jennifer L. Urban (an attorney who
represented certain voting members of UCFC in a prior lawsuit), and Legal for Good,
PLLC (Urban’s law firm).1 Appellants argue that the district court erred by (1) entering
judgment on the pleadings dismissing UCFC’s claim and (2) imposing sanctions on
Westrick for his conduct in bringing that claim. Because we conclude the district court
erred by entering judgment on the pleadings and abused its discretion by imposing
sanctions on Westrick, we reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
FACTS

UCFC is a nonprofit corporation. A previous dispute arose between UCFC’s voting
membership and its board of directors after the membership removed the board from
power. In October 2020, UCFC, with Westrick as its attorney, filed a summons and
amended complaint against respondents. The complaint alleged these facts: in November
2019, “certain persons became the authorized signatories” for UCFC with SPIRE Credit
Union, a “not-for- profit financial cooperative.”
2 In June 2020, during the earlier legal

1 The remainder of this opinion will refer to UCFC and Westrick collectively as
“appellants,” and will refer to Urban and Legal for Good, PLLC, collectively as
“respondents.”
2 UCFC’s complaint also included claims against SPIRE for breach of contract and
wrongful dishonor. Those claims are not at issue on appeal.
3
dispute, Urban, representing “voting members” of UCFC, “sent a letter to SPIRE”
questioning the signatories’ right “to continue accessing funds on deposit with . . . SPIRE.”
Because of the letter, SPIRE froze the signatories’ access to the funds on deposit, causing
“checks written prior to the letter to be dishonored” and causing the heat in the church
building to be turne d off. And “[b]y dishonoring the checks . . . SPIRE . . . injured the
reputation and credit-worthiness of . . . UCFC and put it at risk of legal action.”
Because of Urban’s alleged conduct in sending the letter, UCFC asserted
“disparagement or slander of title.” UCFC alleged that respondents “disparaged [UCFC’s]
title and interest in its deposits.” And, UCFC asserted, it was foreseeable and the intended
purpose of the letter that SPIRE might deny UCFC access to its funds and would “dishonor
checks written by the current designated signatories of . . . UCFC.” Because of the letter,
UCFC claimed over $50,000 in damages.
UCFC attached to the complaint an exhibit that it represented to be Urban’s letter
to SPIRE. But the letter was instead correspondence between Urban and members of
[UCFC]’s board of directors. Urban did not copy SPIRE to the letter, and in the body of
the letter, did not mention SPIRE or freezing any financial accounts that belong to UCFC.
Respondents answered UCFC’s complaint and noted that the letter- exhibit was not the
letter referenced in the complaint.
In March 2022, respondents served Westrick with a motion for sanctions. See Minn.
R. Civ. P. 11.03(a). Respondents premised the motion on, among other issues, Westrick
attaching the incorrect letter to the complaint and failing to correct the error. Respondents
also argued that the tort of “disparagement” lacked any basis in Minnesota law outside the
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tort of “product disparagement” and that the tort of “slander of title” only applies to real
property.
In June 2022, respondents moved for judgment on the pleadings to dispose of
UCFC’s claim. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.03. As they had in the motion for sanctions,
respondents argued that UCFC failed to plead a viable legal claim under the tort of
“disparagement or slander of title” and pointed out that the letter in the complaint did not
support the allegations in the body of the complaint. Respondents also argued that under
agency law Urban could not be liable for acting on behalf of clients without having
committed an intentional tort, which UCFC did not allege.
The district court held a hearing on the motion for judgment on the pleadings in
August 2022. Immediately after the hearing, Westrick sent correspondence to the district
court conceding that he attached the incorrect letter to UCFC’s amended complaint.
Westrick enclosed a new letter-exhibit. The letter was from Urban to SPIRE and involved
a request to freeze UCFC’s accounts.
In November 2022, the district court granted respondents’ motion for judgment on
the pleadings and dismissed UCFC’s claim with prejudice. The district court first reasoned
that the letter UCFC attached to the complaint did not support its claim, noting that the
letter “is not addressed to SPIRE . . . , does not discuss the right to access any funds or
accounts the church held with SPIRE, and does not attempt to inform SPIRE that the
church’s directors had been removed from their positions.” The district court emphasized
that although UCFC eventually produced what it represented to be the correct letter, it did
5
so without requesting to reopen the record or moving to correct the complaint, and after
having “ample notice, time, and opportunity” to do so.
Second, the district court determined that UCFC’s “disparagement or slander of
title” claim was not viable under Minnesota law. The district court determined that it could
only find support in Minnesota law for a tort of disparagement in the context of “product
disparagement” or ‘“disparaging’ a party’s business reputation.” The district court also
determined that UCFC’s slander-of-title claim failed because its allegations did not pertain
to real property, and it insufficiently alleged that respondents made false and malicious
statements about UCFC’s financial accounts. Finally, the district court determined that
UCFC’s claim also failed because Urban sent the letter in her capacity as an agent for her
clients, and UCFC failed to sufficiently allege an intentional tort to render her liable despite
her status as an agent.
In late November 2022, shortly after the district court entered its order dismissing
appellants’ claim on the pleadings, respondents filed their motion for sanctions against
Westrick. In March 2023, the district court granted respondents’ motion and held Westrick
liable for “$500 in reasonable attorney fees” incurred by respondents in defending against
UCFC’s claim. The district court again reasoned that UCFC’s “disparagement or slander
of title” claim lacked basis under Minnesota law and determined that Westrick “could not
have held an objective belief” that UCFC had a viable claim. Finally, the district court
reasoned that the letter in the amended complaint was not what Westrick represented it to
be, and that Urban “repeatedly notified” Westrick about the problem extending back to
6
October 2020. Only after the hearing on respondents’ rule-12 motion, the district court
emphasized, did Westrick concede “that the exhibit was not what he claimed.”
Respondents moved the district court to reconsider its award of $500 in attorney
fees. The district court granted the motion and entered an amended order awarding
respondents $84,942.75 in attorney fees and costs incurred in their defense.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
Appellants argue (1) that the district court erred in granting respondents’ motion for
judgment on the pleadings and (2) that the district court abused its discretion by imposing
sanctions on Westrick. We address each issue in turn.
I. The district court erred by entering judgment on the pleadings.
Appellants contend that the district court erred by granting respondents’ motion for
judgment on the pleadings. First, appellants argue that slander of title extends to personal
property like financial accounts. Second, appellants argue that the district court erred by
failing “to read the complaint in the light most favorable” to UCFC.
Under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.03, “[a]fter the pleadings are closed but within such time
as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” “To withstand
a motion for judgment on the pleadings, [a party] must state facts that, if proven, would
support a colorable claim and entitle it to relief.” Midwest Pipe Insulation, Inc. v. MD
Mech., Inc., 771 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 2009). We review de novo whether a complaint
“sets forth a legally sufficient claim for relief.” Demskie v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n,
7 N.W.3d 382, 386 (Minn. 2024). In doing so, we examine “only the facts alleged in the
7
complaint, taking those facts to be true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of
the nonmoving party.” Id. And even if a complaint is too vague for the opposing party to
present an effective response, the party may “move for a ‘more definite statement’” to get
clarity as to what the complaint alleges. Id. at 387 (citing Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.05).
A. The district court erred by determining that slander of title is a cause of
action that only applies to real property.

Appellants first argue that the district court erred by determining that UCFC could
not state a valid claim for slander of title in reliance on disparaging statements about
financial accounts. Instead, they argue that slander of title can apply broadly to personal
property, including financial accounts. For support, they invoke Wilson v. Dubois, 29 N.W.
68 (Minn. 1886).
Wilson involved a circumstance in which the plaintiff was selling a horse and sued
the defendant for publishing a false and malicious statement about the horse. 29 N.W. at
68. There, the supreme court articulated the elements of “slander of title” as “[f]alse and
malicious statements, disparaging an article of property, when followed, as a natural,
reasonable, and proximate result, by special damage [to] the owner.” Id. Under Minnesota
law, animals are personal property. Sawh v. City of Lino Lakes, 823 N.W.2d 627, 632
(Minn. 2012).
Respondents counter that Wilson does not support reversal because slander of title
only applies to real property. For support, respondents rely on a more recent case:
Paidar v. Hughes, 615 N.W.2d 276 (Minn. 2000). Paidar involved a dispute over real
8
property, and the supreme court reversed a grant of summary judgment by determining that
attorney fees can represent special damages for slander of title. Id. at 277-79, 282.
In doing so, Paidar articulated the elements of slander of title as follows:
(1) That there was a false statement concerning the real
property owned by the plaintiff;
(2) That the false statement was published to others;
(3) That the false statement was published maliciously;
(4) That the publication of the false statement concerning title
to the property caused the plaintiff pecuniary loss in the form
of special damages.

Id. at 279-80 (emphasis added).
Although Paidar described slander of title as “concerning . . . real property,” we
understand that characterization as simply emphasizing the facts of that case, which
involved real property. Id. at 278-79. Indeed, Paidar cited Wilson as a source for the
elements of slander of title, and there is no basis to believe that the decision altered the
scope of such a claim so that it now only applies to real property. Id. at 280 (citing Wilson,
29 N.W. at 68-69). Paidar also cited Kelly v. First State Bank of Rothsay, 177 N.W. 347
(Minn. 1920). Kelly involved a dispute over farmland, but in describing slander of title, it
again did not limit the tort to real property: “Utterance of false and malicious statements
disparaging the title to property in which one has an estate or interest, if the statements are
untrue and cause damage, constitutes slander of title.” Id. at 347.3

3 We also note that the Restatement (Second) of Torts extends slander-of-title claims not
only to “a false statement disparaging” another’s land, but also, to another’s “chattels or
intangible things.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 624 (1977).
9
We conclude that Wilson fits UCFC’s claim for relief and, although dated, remains
good law. Like the horse in that case, bank deposits, or other financial accounts, are
personal property. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. § 272.03, subd. 2 (2022) (defining for property
tax purposes personal property to include “money,” “[a]ll credits over and above debts
owed by the creditor,” “income of every annuity,” and “public stocks and securities”).
Therefore, we conclude the district court erred by determining that appellants’ slander-of-
title claim failed because it did not pertain to real estate.
B. Under a notice-pleading standard, the district court erred by failing to
read the complaint in the light most favorable to UCFC.

Appellants next argue that the district court erred by failing to “read the complaint
in the light most favorable” to UCFC. To begin with, we emphasize that “Minnesota is a
notice-pleading state.” Halva v. Minn. State Colls. & Univs., 953 N.W.2d 496, 500 (Minn.
2021) (quotation omitted). The purpose of notice pleading is to “fairly notify the opposing
party of the claim against it,” with the focus being “on the ‘incident’ rather than on the
specific facts of the incident.” Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 851 N.W.2d 598, 604-05 (Minn.
2014) (quotation omitted). Therefore, “[a] claim is legally sufficient if it is possible on any
evidence which might be produced . . . to grant the relief demanded.” Harkins v. Grant
Park Ass’n, 972 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted). For a party to
insufficiently plead a claim, it must appear “to a certainty that no facts, which could be
introduced consistent with the pleading exist, which could support . . . relief.” Demskie, 7
N.W.3d at 388. Minnesota’s notice-pleading standard permits “short and general
10
statements of fact” and does not require a party to address “every element of a cause of
action.” Id. at 387-88 (quotation omitted).
Appellants argue that the district court erred by focusing on the wrong letter having
been attached to the complaint. We agree. The lack of support in the letter for the
allegations in the body of the complaint did not demonstrate “to a certainty” that UCFC
would be unable to introduce any facts “consistent with the pleading.” See id. at 388
(quotation omitted). Therefore, insofar as the district court used the mismatch between the
letter and UCFC’s allegations as a reason to grant judgment on the pleadings, we conclude
it erred.
Next, appellants argue that the district court erred by determining that UCFC
insufficiently pleaded special damages and a false and malicious statement, both of which
are elements of slander of title. “Special damages are those which are the natural but not
the necessary and inevitable result of the wrongful act, ” are attributable to “the special
character, condition, or circumstances” of the injured party, and can be assigned “an exact
dollar amount.” Miller v. Soo Line R.R., 925 N.W.2d 642, 656 (Minn. App. 2019)
(quotations omitted). In a complaint, a party must “specifically state[] special damages.
. . . to give fair notice to opposing parties of matters not necessarily known to them, and to
obviate the giving of such notice as to matters they already know.” Id. at 656- 57; see
Swanny of Hugo, Inc. v. Integrity Mut. Ins. Co., No. A15-0370, 2015 WL 9437571, at *4-
5 (Minn. App. Dec. 28, 2015) (concluding that party sufficiently pleaded special damages
by stating, among other particulars, that insurance company’s denial of coverage
foreseeably resulted in debt, business closure, and “unnecessary humiliation and loss”),
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rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 15, 2016).4 UCFC alleges that, because of Urban’s letter, checks
it had written were dishonored and “the heat in the Church ha[d] been turned off,” resulting
in damages exceeding $50,000. We conclude that UCFC sufficiently pleaded special
damages.
For slander of title, m alice requires “[r]eckless disregard concerning the truth or
falsity of a matter . . . despite a high degree of awareness of probable falsity or entertaining
doubt as to its truth.” Brickner v. One Land Dev. Co., 742 N.W.2d 706, 711-712 (Minn.
App. 2007) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 18, 2008); see Hagle v. Bank of
New York Mellon, No. A14-0473, 2015 WL 648300, at *3 (Minn. App. Feb. 17, 2015)
(concluding that a party sufficiently pleaded slander of title when it alleged that another
party acted “in reckless disregard concerning . . . truth or falsity,” but did not actually “use
the words ‘malice’ or ‘maliciously’”). Here, in its complaint, UCFC stated that
respondents, through a letter to SPIRE, “made false assertions which intentionally
disparaged [its] title and interest in its deposits.” Given the leniency of Minnesota’s notice-
pleading standard, and its openness to “short and general statements of fact,” Demskie, 7
N.W.3d at 387, we conclude the allegations in the complaint about a false and malicious
statement were sufficient.
In addition, appellants dispute the district court’s determination that, based on the
allegations in the complaint, Urban could not be liable because she was acting as an agent

4 We note this opinion is nonprecedential and therefore not binding. We cite
nonprecedential opinions as persuasive authority only. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01,
subd. 1(c).
12
for her clients. A complaint fails when it simultaneously asserts a cause of action, and
states facts that “constitute a defense to the action.” Wallner v. Schmitz, 57 N.W.2d 821,
823 (Minn. 1953). As applicable here, although attorneys are generally “immune from
liability to third persons for actions arising out of that professional relationship,” that
immunity does not apply when an attorney “commits an intentional tort.”
Rucker v. Schmidt, 768 N.W.2d 408, 411-12 (Minn. App. 2009), aff’d, 794 N.W.2d 114
(Minn. Jan. 5, 2011). Slander of title is an intentional tort. See Dyrdal v. Wallenberg, No.
A23-1416, 2024 WL 1987879, at *3 (Minn. App. May 6, 2024). Therefore, because we
conclude that UCFC sufficiently pleaded a claim for slander of title, we also conclude that
it did not assert facts showing that Urban would be protected from liability simply because
she was acting on behalf of her clients.5
Finally, respondents argue that UCFC’s cause of action was excessively vague and
unclear because it use d the term “disparagement.” Respondents argue that Minnesota
limits “disparagement” claims to when a person “disparages the goods, services, or

5 Respondents argue that UCFC’s claim should also fail because it alleges facts that
Urban’s letter to SPIRE related to anticipated litigation, and therefore, the complaint
establishes that absolute privilege protects her from liability. In Minnesota, “absolute
privilege” protects attorneys from liability for defamatory statements “at a judicial or quasi-
judicial proceeding” if the statement “is relevant to the subject matter of . . . litigation.”
Mahoney & Hagberg v. Newgard, 729 N.W.2d 302, 306 (Minn. 2007). The privilege
applies even when an attorney’s statements are malicious or intentionally false. Id. That
said, as appellants point out, respondents did not raise the defense of absolute privilege in
their responsive pleadings to the complaint, and the district court did not address absolute
privilege in its order granting judgment on the pleadings. As a result, the issue is not
properly before us. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (stating that
appellate courts generally address only those questions previously presented to and
considered by the district court).
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business of another by false or misleading representation of fact.” Minn. Stat. § 325D.44,
subd. 1(8) (2022). That said, “disparagement” is still a term that bears strong association
with slander of title. See Wilson, 29 N.W. at 68 (defining slander of title as involving
“[f]alse and malicious statements, disparaging an article of property”); Kelly, 177 N.W. at
332 (defining slander of title as involving “[u]tterance of false and malicious statements
disparaging the title to property”). Here, in its complaint, UCFC claimed relief under a
theory of “disparagement or slander of title.” We conclude that, under a notice-pleading
standard, UCFC’s use of “disparagement” does not preclude or negate its claim for “slander
of title.”
For these reasons, the district court erred by granting respondents’ motion for
judgment on the pleadings.
II. The district court abused its discretion by imposing sanctions on Westrick for
bringing the slander-of-title claim on behalf of UCFC.

Appellants next argue that the district court abused its discretion by imposing
sanctions against Westrick. Appellants contend that sanctions were unwarranted because
the claim Westrick brought on behalf of UCFC had an objectively reasonable basis in
Minnesota law.
When an attorney presents a pleading to the district court, he is “certifying that to
the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry
reasonable under the circumstances[,]” that “(1) it is not being presented for any improper
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation”; and “(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by
14
existing law.” Minn. Stat. § 549.211, subd. 2 (2022); Minn. R. Civ. P. 11. 02. “If, after
notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond,” a district court determines that an attorney
violated either of those standards, “the court may . . . impose an appropriate sanction” on
the attorney. Minn. Stat. § 549.211, subd. 3 (2022); Minn. R. Civ. P. 11.03.
Sanctions should be reserved “for substantial departures from acceptable litigation
conduct.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 11 2000 advisory comm. cmt. Whether sanctions are warranted
depends on whether the attorney had “an objectively reasonable basis for pursuing a factual
or legal claim or whe n a competent attorney could form a reasonable belief a pleading is
well-grounded in fact and law.” Uselman v. Uselman, 464 N.W.2d 130, 143 (Minn. 1990),
superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in Radloff v. First Am. Nat’l Bank of
St. Cloud, 470 N.W.2d 154, 159 (Minn. App. 1991), rev. denied (Minn. July 24, 1991). A
district court must limit sanctions “to what is sufficient to deter repetition of the conduct
or comparable conduct by others similarly situated,” and may come in the form of “an order
directing payment to the movant of some or all of the reasonable attorney fees and other
expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation.” Minn. Stat. § 549.211, subd. 5(a)
(2022); Minn. R. Civ. P. 11.03(b). We review an award of sanctions for an abuse of
discretion. Collins v. Waconia Dodge, Inc., 793 N.W.2d 142,145 (Minn. App. 2011), rev.
denied (Minn. Mar. 15, 2011).
The district court imposed sanctions, in part, because “[w]hile Minnesota courts do
recognize slander of title as a valid cause of action, the title slandered must be title to real
property.” But for the reasons we described earlier, we conclude UCFC’s claim of
“disparagement or slander of title” was “warranted by existing law.” See Minn. Stat.
15
§ 549.211, subd. 2. Therefore, Westrick’s conduct in asserting the claim was objectively
reasonable and the district court abused its discretion by imposing sanctions for that reason.
Because the district court’s decision to impose sanctions was driven largely by its
determination that the slander-of-title claim lacked an objectively reasonable basis in
Minnesota law, we reverse the order in full. We acknowledge that the district court also
based its imposition of sanctions on Westrick’s failure to correct his mistake of attaching
the wrong exhibit to the complaint. Although we effectively vacate the sanctions order,
the district court has discretion on remand to reconsider imposing sanctions, so long as it
does not rely on Westrick’s decision to bring the slander-of-title claim.
Reversed and remanded.