State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0728

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Johnathon Jones,
Appellant.

Filed May 19, 2025
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-23-17995

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Matthew D. Hough, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

G. Tony Atwal, Gabriel Ramirez-Hernandez, Special Assistant Public Defenders, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and
Cleary, Judge.
∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
In this appeal from the final judgment of conviction for unlawful possession of a
firearm, appellant Johnathon Jones argues that the district court erred for two reasons when
it denied his motion to suppress evidence of the firearm. First, Jones contends that his
seizure by police was unlawful because it was not supported by a reasonable suspicion that
he was engaged in criminal activity. Second, he contends that the warrantless search of a
bag was not a valid search incident to arrest because his arrest was not supported by
probable cause and the search of the bag did not fall within the scope of a search incident
to arrest. We affirm.
FACTS
The facts related to the suppression issues are derived from the testimony and
exhibits presented during the evidentiary hearing on Jones’s suppression motion.
On August 22, 2023, a Minneapolis police sergeant received a tip from a
confidential reliable informant1 (CRI) that there were two individuals near a Minneapolis
liquor store who were unlawfully in possession of firearms. The CRI did not identify the
individuals by name or describe how the CRI knew that they were not lawfully allowed to

1 The sergeant testified that, to be classified as a confidential reliable informant for the
Minneapolis Police Department, an individual must have previously provided timely and
accurate information to law enforcement leading to state or federal criminal charges in at
least three separate cases. The informant who provided the sergeant information in August
2023 had worked with the Minneapolis Police Department for about nine years and had
previously provided timely and accurate information that qualified the informant as a
confidential reliable informant.
3
possess firearms, but the CRI did provide descriptions of their appearances. The CRI
described the individuals as two Black men, one of whom was shirtless, wearing red shoes,
and had a black bag. That man was later identified as D.R. According to the CRI’s
description, the other man was wearing a white tank top and was located near a Chevrolet
Suburban SUV. That man was later identified as Jones. In addition to describing D.R. and
Jones, the CRI stated that the CRI knew that the men had possessed firearms because the
CRI had observed it firsthand.
Shortly after receiving this information, the sergeant communicated to officers via
radio that the CRI had told him there were two men unlawfully in possession of firearms.
He repeated the CRI’s description of the men, including their clothing and their location
near a specific liquor store. Within about ten minutes, several officers reported to the area
near the liquor store, where they conducted surveillance. The officers observed a group of
men who appeared to be grilling or barbecuing while gathered near a Suburban. The group
included two men who matched the descriptions that the sergeant had provided. One of the
surveilling officers noticed a black bag by the feet of the man in red shoes, D.R. That officer
also recalled that the sergeant had provided information that there was a gun located inside
a black bag. During their surveillance, the officers did not observe either of the men in
possession of a firearm.
After surveilling the area for about 20 minutes, the officers conducted a “takedown”
of the men gathered near the Suburban, during which the officers approached the men from
all directions to detain them, identify them, and determine whether they were prohibited
from possessing firearms.
4
When the officers approached, D.R. fled the scene on foot. At the same time, Jones
stood up from a lawn chair that he had been sitting in, was handcuffed by police, and was
placed in the back of a squad car. While Jones was detained, officers confirmed his identity
and that he was prohibited from possessing a firearm.
Police then searched the area near the Suburban and found a black bag with a white
Nike logo leaning against the chair that Jones had been sitting in.2 An officer picked up the
bag and searched it with the assistance of another officer. Inside the bag, they found, among
other items, a firearm; mail addressed to Thomas Gary, which was later determined to be
another name used by Jones; and a prescription bottle belonging to Jones. Based on the
firearm in the bag and the officers’ determination that Jones was prohibited from
possessing a firearm, the officers arrested Jones.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Jones with one count of possessing
ammunition or a firearm after a conviction for a crime of violence, in violation of
Minnesota Statutes section 624.713, subdivision 1(2) (Supp. 2023). Jones filed a motion to
suppress the firearm evidence, asserting that it was obtained as the result of an
unconstitutional “initial stop, frisk, detention, arrest, seizure, and search” of his person and
property. At the evidentiary hearing on Jones’s motion, Jones argued that, when the officers
approached the area where he was seized, they immediately arrested him and did so without
probable cause. He also contended that the officers’ warrantless search of his bag was not
supported by probable cause or an exception to the warrant requirement.

2 The officers also searched a black bag that they had observed by D.R.’s feet and found a
firearm inside of it. The constitutionality of that search is not at issue in this appeal.
5
The district court denied Jones’s motion to suppress, ruling that police had probable
cause to arrest Jones based on the CRI’s firsthand observation of criminal activity, which
was minimally corroborated by police, and that the warrantless search of Jones’s bag was
a valid search incident to arrest. Jones filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the
search-incident-to-arrest exception did not apply because Jones was detained, but not yet
arrested, when police searched his bag. The district court denied the motion, reiterating that
police had probable cause to arrest Jones and that, because the bag was immediately
associated with him, the search fell within the search-incident-to- arrest exception to the
warrant requirement.
Jones waived his right to a jury trial and stipulated to the state’s case to preserve his
right to appeal a dispositive pretrial ruling, pursuant to Minnesota Rule of Criminal
Procedure 26.01, subdivision 4. The parties stipulated that the sole dispositive issue for
appeal is the constitutionality of the police search of Jones’s bag. The district court found
Jones guilty as charged and sentenced him to a prison term of 60 months.
Jones appeals.
DECISION
Jones contends that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress the
firearm evidence for two reasons. First, Jones asserts that, when police conducted the
takedown maneuver, Jones was seized and the seizure was not supported by reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity. Second, Jones argues that police lacked probable cause to
arrest him and that the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement did
not apply.
6
The state contends that Jones’s first argument—regarding the lawfulness of his
seizure—is not properly before us because it exceeds the agreed-upon scope of the appeal
under rule 26.01, subdivision 4, which, the state contends, is limited to the second issue—
the lawfulness of the search. But, the state argues, in any event, the seizure was supported
by reasonable suspicion. The state also defends the district court’s ruling on the second
issue, arguing that the search was a valid search incident to a lawful arrest.
We begin our analysis with the second issue and then return to the first.
I. The search of Jones’s bag was a valid search incident to a lawful arrest.

The United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches and
seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. Generally, warrantless searches
and seizures are unreasonable unless a recognized exception to the warrant requirement
applies. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24,
33 (Minn. 2016). The state bears the burden to establish that an exception to the warrant
requirement applies. State v. Licari, 659 N.W.2d 243, 250 (Minn. 2003). Evidence obtained
during an unconstitutional search or seizure must be suppressed. State v. Jackson, 742
N.W.2d 163, 177-78 (Minn. 2007). When the facts are undisputed, appellate courts review
a district court’s pretrial ruling on a motion to suppress evidence de novo. State v. Onyelobi,
879 N.W.2d 334, 342-43 (Minn. 2016).
A. Probable cause supported the arrest.
Jones argues that the search of his bag was unlawful because officers did not have
probable cause to arrest him.
7
“Police may arrest a felony suspect without a warrant in any public place provided
they have probable cause.” State v. Cook, 610 N.W.2d 664, 667 (Minn. App. 2000)
(footnote omitted), rev. denied (Minn. July 25, 2000). There is probable cause to support a
warrantless arrest if “a person of ordinary care and prudence, viewing the totality of
circumstances objectively, would entertain an honest and strong suspicion that a specific
individual has committed a crime.” State v. Williams, 794 N.W.2d 867, 871 (Minn. 2011)
(quotation omitted). The probable-cause analysis requires an objective inquiry into the
circumstances of the case. State v. Torgerson, 995 N.W.2d 164, 169 (Minn. 2023).
Probable cause “requires something more than mere suspicion but less than the evidence
necessary for conviction.” State v. Mosley, 994 N.W.2d 883, 888-89 (Minn. 2023)
(quotation omitted) (addressing probable cause for warrantless search of vehicle). Whether
probable cause exists is based on the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 889.
Probable cause may be established based on an informant’s tip if the tip has
sufficient indicia of reliability. Id. at 890. As the supreme court explained in Mosley,
analysis of whether a tip has sufficient indicia of reliability takes into account the reliability
and the basis of knowledge of the informant, but the analysis is “not a rigid two-pronged
test.” Id. Instead, the informant’s reliability and basis of knowledge are “relevant
considerations” that, along with other indicia of reliability, are part of the analysis. Id.
(quotation omitted). If an informant’s tip to law enforcement is based on the informant’s
personal knowledge, officers need not corroborate “significant details” of the tip for it to
support a probable- cause determination. Id. at 892. “[C]orroboration of minor details is
8
enough to lend credence to an informant’s tip based on personal knowledge.” Id. (quotation
omitted).
Jones argues that probable cause to arrest him was lacking, relying heavily on our
decision in Cook. In that case, we determined that, even though a CRI was “undeniably
credible” as demonstrated by a history of providing law enforcement with other tips that
had led to at least 12 criminal convictions, probable cause was lacking to justify a
warrantless arrest because the CRI’s tip “lacked sufficient detail and range to establish the
CRI’s basis of knowledge.” Cook, 610 N.W.2d at 666-67. The informant’s tip included a
description of Cook’s physical appearance, clothing, vehicle, and a claim that Cook was
selling crack cocaine at a particular location while storing the crack cocaine in the
waistband of his pants. Id. at 666. The information provided by the CRI did not, however,
establish the basis of the CRI’s claimed knowledge that Cook was selling drugs because
the CRI did not claim to have purchased drugs from Cook or to have personally seen Cook
selling drugs. Id. at 668. Additionally, police corroboration of the tip was insufficient to
establish the CRI’s basis of knowledge because the corroborated details, such as Cook’s
clothing, vehicle, and location, “were entirely innocuous and lacked any incriminating
aspects.” Id.
Jones argues here that, like in Cook, the details of the CRI’s tip that were
corroborated by police —such as the description of Jones’s clothing and location—were
innocuous. He also points out that officers did not observe Jones engaged in criminal
activity, making furtive movements, possessing a firearm, fleeing from the scene, or
9
handling the bag that was searched. For these reasons, Jones asserts that, like in Cook, the
officers did not have probable cause to arrest him. We are not persuaded.
Here, the sergeant who received the CRI’s tip describing Jones and D.R. testified
that the information that was provided to him was “firsthand”—that the CRI had personally
“observed two individuals in possession of firearms.” This fact distinguishes this case from
Cook, in which there was no explanation of how the informant knew that Cook was selling
drugs. See id. at 668-69; see also Mosley, 994 N.W.2d at 891 -92 (concluding that Cook
was not on point in Mosley’s case because Cook did not involve an informant who reported
their personal observations). Additionally, the officers confirmed details from the CRI’s
tip. During their surveillance, which took place shortly after receiving the informant’s tip,
officers observed that D.R. and Jones matched the descriptions that the sergeant had
communicated over radio based on the informant’s tip. And the location and the vehicle
parked there also matched the information provided by the CRI. As in Mosley , the
corroboration of details that were provided by the CRI supports the existence of probable
cause. See 994 N.W.2d at 892.
Jones argues, though, that Mosley does not control here, because in that case the
informant provided their account of what they were observing while they were talking to
police, see id. at 886, whereas here, the record does not establish that the CRI’s tip was
contemporaneous with the CRI’s observation. This argument is persuasively refuted by the
state. As the state observes, while the CRI’s account in Mosley was contemporaneous, the
cases that the supreme court cited when explaining that police do not need to corroborate
significant details when a tip is based on the informant’s personal knowledge did not
10
involve an informant’s contemporaneous observation. See id. at 892; State v. Wiley, 366
N.W.2d 265, 269 (Minn. 1985) (concluding that warrant was supported by probable cause
where informant observed contraband two days before issuance of warrant); State v.
McCloskey, 453 N.W.2d 700, 701, 703 (Minn. 1990) (concluding that warrant was
supported by probable cause where informant reported observing narcotics at residence
within the preceding week).
While we conclude that the rule in Mosley does not depend on contemporaneous
observation by the informant, the staleness of a tip certainly may be considered among the
totality of circumstances in analyzing the existence of probable cause. See 994 N.W.2d at
892. Here, the record provides no basis to conclude that the CRI’s tip was stale. According
to the sergeant, the CRI reported that two individuals were near the identified liquor store
and were in possession of firearms. The CRI described the individuals and said that one
was near a Suburban. The sergeant quickly communicated the tip, and other officers
quickly responded to the identified location to find two men matching the physical and
clothing descriptions near a Suburban. On these facts, the tip was not stale.
In sum, the totality of the circumstances, viewed objectively at the time that officers
arrested Jones, supports the conclusion that police had probable cause to believe that Jones
was in unlawful possession of a firearm.
B. The search of Jones’s bag was a lawful search of his person incident to
his arrest.

Jones argues that, even if there was probable cause to arrest him, the search of the
black bag incident to arrest was still unconstitutional.
11
“A search incident to a lawful arrest is a well- recognized exception to the warrant
requirement . . . .” State v. Bernard, 859 N.W.2d 762, 766 (Minn. 2015). Under this
exception, an arresting officer may search both the person of the arrestee and the area
within the immediate control of the arrestee. State v. Bradley, 908 N.W.2d 366, 369 (Minn.
App. 2018) (citing Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. 438, 459-60 (2016)).
“A search of the arrestee’s person is fundamentally distinct from a search of the area
within the arrestee’s immediate control.” Id. at 370 (citing Birchfield, 579 U.S. at 460). An
officer’s search of the area within an arrestee’s immediate control is constrained to the area
into which the arrestee might reach to gain possession of a weapon or to destroy evidence.
Id.; State v. Robb, 605 N.W.2d 96, 100 (Minn. 2000). The officer’s authority to search the
area terminates once police have exclusive control and the threat that the arrestee will gain
access to a weapon or destroy evidence has ended. Bradley, 908 N.W.2d at 370.
In contrast, an officer’s authority to search an arrestee’s person “does not depend on
the probability that weapons or evidence may be found.” Id. (citing Birchfield, 579 U.S. at
640). “Rather, the mere fact of the lawful arrest justifies a full search of the person.” Id.
(quotation omitted). And a search of the arrestee’s person includes personal property that
is “immediately associated with the person of the arrestee.” Id. (quotation omitted). If the
suspect possesses an item that is closely associated with their person, such as a bag, at the
time they are detained , that item “may remain immediately associated with a suspect’s
person” for purposes of the search -incident-to-arrest exception, even after it is seized by
officers and the suspect is detained. Id. at 370-71 (citing State v. Wynne, 552 N.W.2d 218,
220 (Minn. 1996)).
12
Jones argues that the evidence does not establish that the black Nike bag was
“immediately associated” with Jones and that, as a result, the search cannot be justified as
a search of his person. And, he argues, the search cannot be justified as a search of the area
within his immediate control because, at the time of the search, Jones was handcuffed in a
squad car and the bag was within the exclusive control of law enforcement. Thus, he argues,
officers lacked the authority under either theory to search the bag under the search-incident-
to-arrest exception.
We conclude that the police’s search of the bag was a lawful search of Jones’s
person incident to arrest because the bag was immediately associated with him. Jones
argues that the evidence does not establish the bag as immediately associated with him
because there is no evidence that police observed Jones in physical possession of it during
their surveillance and the bag was found after detaining Jones. But one of the officers on
the scene testified that, during their surveillance, Jones “was behind the Sub urban, in that
open lot area, near the chairs” and that “the black bags” were “[i]n the exact same location.”
And officer testimony and body-worn camera footage confirm that the black Nike bag that
was searched was leaning against the lawn chair that Jones was sitting in when the officers
approached. On this record, we conclude that the district court did not err by determining
that the bag was immediately associated with Jones’s person and therefore could be
searched incident to Jones’s arrest.
In sum, because Jones’s arrest was supported by probable cause and the bag that
was searched was immediately associated with his person, the warrantless search of the
bag was authorized under the search-incident-to-arrest exception.
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II. The seizure was supported by reasonable articulable suspicion of wrongdoing.

Jones also argues that his suppression motion should have been granted because his
seizure was unlawful due to lack of reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing. As noted above,
the state contends that the argument is outside the scope of the issues preserved for this
appeal, which Jones contests. We need not resolve that dispute because Jones’s argument
fails on the merits.
A limited warrantless seizure of a person for investigatory purposes is not
unconstitutional if the officer has a particular and objective basis for suspecting the person
of criminal activity. State v. Johnson, 444 N.W.2d 824, 825 (Minn. 1989). “Reasonable
suspicion requires more than a mere hunch but is considerably less than proof of
wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence, and obviously less than is necessary for
probable cause.” State v. Taylor, 965 N.W.2d 747, 752 (Minn. 2021) (quotations omitted).
The reasonable-suspicion standard can be satisfied based on information provided by a
reliable informant. State v. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008).
We concluded above that probable cause existed to arrest Jones. We did so based
on the CRI’s tip and the subsequent corroboration by police. Because those facts satisfy
the probable- cause standard for arrest, they also satisfy the lower reasonable-suspicion
standard for an investigatory seizure. See Taylor, 965 N.W.2d at 752. Thus, Jones’s
argument that his seizure was not supported by reasonable suspicion and that the gun
evidence therefore must be suppressed fails.
Affirmed.