State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0751

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jimmie Dunlap, Jr.,
Appellant.

Filed June 2, 2025
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-23-13905

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Robert I. Yount, Assistant County Attorney,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jennifer Workman Jesness,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Frisch, Chief Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
In this direct appeal from the judgment of conviction for unlawful possession of
ammunition and unlawful possession of a firearm, appellant Jimmie Dunlap Jr. argues that
the evidence is insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he constructively
2
possessed the ammunition or rifle found in his rental home. He also argues that the evidence
is insufficient to prove that the rifle, which was white in color and blockier than a traditional
firearm, met the definition of a “firearm” under Minnesota Statutes section 624.713,
subdivision 1 (2022). Dunlap raises other arguments in a supplemental brief. We affirm.
FACTS
The following facts were established at trial. In the afternoon of July 1, 2023, a man
was shot outside of a home rented solely by Dunlap. A neighbor called 9-1-1, and police
officers arrived to find the victim bleeding on the ground outside of Dunlap’s home.
Officers identified Dunlap as a suspect, and he “was arrested on the scene.”
As part of their investigation, officers spoke to individuals inside the home,
including Dunlap’s girlfriend and a couple with a baby. The couple and baby were
encountered near a bed in the basement, and they informed a n officer that Dunlap “was
allowing them to hang out inside his home.” An officer also obtained surveillance video
footage from a neighbor across the street, which captured the shooting but did not clearly
show that Dunlap was the shooter.
Additionally, pursuant to a search warrant, officers and forensic scientists searched
Dunlap’s home and discovered the following: One of the doors on the main level led to an
upstairs area that appeared to be a finished attic containing a bed with a crawl-space-sized
closet along the wall. In that upstairs room there were clothes, several size-11 Nike shoe
boxes, “a lot of” mail addressed solely to Dunlap, and a pistol-cleaning kit. In the closet,
amid more Nike and size-11 shoe boxes, there was a CZ-brand gun case. The case was
designed to hold a pistol and a single magazine, both of which were missing from the case,
3
but the case contained seven 9-millimeter rounds. In the closet, there was also an empty
CZ-brand 9-millimeter magazine on top of a shoe box. In the basement, on one side of the
stairs, there was an open area with a bed, which is where officers encountered the couple
with the baby. On the other side of the stairs, there was another open area with a few
random items and laundry machines. In that area was a built-in closet that contained a gun
case. The gun case contained a 10 -millimeter rifle, an ammunition box, 10- millimeter
bullets, and a 10-millimeter magazine.
Forensic scientists tested the gun case recovered from Dunlap’s basement and found
18 fingerprints on the gun case and its contents. Of the prints on the ammunition box that
were tested, one print was inconclusive and another was identified as belonging to an
individual other than Dunlap. On the interior of the gun case, three of the prints that were
tested did not result in matches and one matched another individual other than Dunlap. On
the rifle, one print was considered “low quality” and was not analyzed, and another print
from the muzzle end of the rifle matched Dunlap’s right thumb print.
Outside the home, the police found a discharged 9-millimeter casing and a spent
bullet at the site of the shooting. No 9-millimeter firearm was found in the home.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Dunlap by amended complaint with three
counts of unlawful possession of a firearm or ammunition in violation of Minnesota
Statutes section 624.713, subdivision 1(2)—one count for possession of the unrecovered
firearm used in the shooting, one for the rifle found in the basement, and one for the 9 -
millimeter bullets found in the upstairs bedroom—and one count of second-degree assault
with a dangerous weapon in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.222, subdivision
4
1 (2022). At the beginning of trial, Dunlap stipulated that he was ineligible to possess a
firearm or ammunition.
After the trial, the jury found Dunlap guilty of unlawful possession of the
ammunition and rifle and acquitted him of the other two counts. The district court imposed
concurrent 60-month prison sentences for the convictions.
Dunlap appeals.
DECISION
We first address Dunlap’s argument that the evidence is insufficient to prove that
he constructively possessed either the ammunition or the rifle. We next address his
argument that the evidence is insufficient to establish that the rifle was a “firearm.” And
last, we address Dunlap’s arguments in his supplemental brief.
I. The circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove that Dunlap constructively
possessed the ammunition and the rifle.
Dunlap argues that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he
possessed either the ammunition or the rifle.
To obtain the convictions, the state had to establish that Dunlap had either actual or
constructive possession of the ammunition and the rifle. State v. Smith, 619 N.W.2d 766,
770 (Minn. App. 2000), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 16, 2001). Constructive possession occurs
when “the state cannot prove actual or physical possession . . . but where the inference is
strong that the defendant at one time physically possessed the [contraband] and did not
abandon his possessory interest in [it].” State v. Florine, 226 N.W.2d 609, 610 (Minn.
1975). Constructive possession can be proved two different ways. State v. Harris, 895
5
N.W.2d 592, 601 (Minn. 2017). The state may prove that the contraband was found in a
place under the defendant’s exclusive control to which others did not have access, or, if the
contraband was found in a place to which others had access, the state may prove that there
was “a strong probability (inferable from other evidence) that at the time the defendant was
consciously or knowingly exercising dominion and control over it.” Id. “A defendant may
possess an item jointly with another person.” Id.
There is no dispute that Dunlap was not found in actual possession of the
ammunition or the rifle. The case is therefore one of constructive possession. The state
defends both convictions under the second form of constructive possession, arguing that
the evidence proves that Dunlap was consciously or knowingly exercising dominion and
control over the ammunition and rifle.1 We focus our analysis there.
To prove that Dunlap constructively possess ed the ammunition and the rifle, the
state relied on circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence is “evidence from which
the factfinder can infer whether the facts in dispute existed or did not exist” and “always
requires an inferential step to prove a fact that is not required with direct evidence.” Id. at
599 (quotation omitted). When an element of a conviction is based on circumstantial
evidence, appellate courts apply a heightened two-step analysis. State v. Colgrove, 996
N.W.2d 145, 150 (Minn. 2023).

1 The state notes that “[t]he record could support the conclusion [that Dunlap] had exclusive
control over the ammunition,” but it asserts that , because “the record more
straightforwardly shows [Dunlap] had dominion and control over” the ammunition, it
focuses on the second form of constructive possession.
6
First, we identify the circumstances proved , “winnow[ing] down the evidence
presented at trial by resolving all questions of fact in favor of the jury’s verdict.” Harris,
895 N.W.2d at 600. “[W]e reject only the evidence that is inconsistent with—or in conflict
with—the jury’s verdict.” Colgrove, 996 N.W.2d at 151. The remaining facts are
considered the circumstances proved. Id. at 150.
Second, we independently consider “whether the circumstances proved are
consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt.” Loving
v. State, 891 N.W.2d 638, 643 (Minn. 2017). The evidence “must form a complete chain
that, in view of the evidence as a whole, leads so directly to the guilt of the defendant as to
exclude . . . any reasonable inference other than guilt.” State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d
469, 473 (Minn. 2010). Appellate courts will reverse a conviction if a reasonable inference
other than guilt exists. Id. at 473, 481.
Circumstances Proved
Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and eliminating
any evidence that is inconsistent with the verdict, we identify the following circumstances
proved. On July 1, 2023, a man was shot outside of a home rented solely to Dunlap. Dunlap
was identified as a suspect and “was arrested on the scene.” During the investigation,
responding officers encountered multiple individuals in Dunlap’s home, including
Dunlap’s girlfriend and a couple with a baby who were found by a bed in the basement and
whom Dunlap “was allowing . . . to hang out inside his home.” Inside the home, a door on
the main level led to a finished attic containing a bed, clothing, shoe boxes, “a lot of” mail
addressed solely to Dunlap, and a pistol-cleaning kit. In a small closet upstairs near the
7
bed, there was an empty 9-millimeter magazine on top of a shoe box, and amidst more shoe
boxes, which were the same size and brand as those in the bedroom, there was an otherwise
empty gun case containing 9-millimeter rounds. In a wall closet in the basement, in an open
area near laundry machines, there was a gun case containing a rifle and 10-millimeter
ammunition and magazines. One fingerprint on the muzzle end of the rifle matched
Dunlap’s right thumb print.
Before turning to the second step of the analysis, we address a dispute between the
parties over whether there is another circumstance proved—namely, that law enforcement
found Dunlap in the upstairs bedroom. Dunlap argues that “[n]o evidence showed [that he]
was found in proximity to the ammunition” that was found in the upstairs closet. The state
argues that Dunlap conceded during the trial that he was found and arrested in the bedroom.
It bases that assertion on the following: (1) defense counsel’s opening statement, during
which defense counsel told the jury that they “[would] hear” how, when the police
responded to the shooting, Dunlap “ was in the upstairs bedroom”; (2) a conversation held
between counsel on the record outside of the presence of the jury, during which the
prosecutor questioned whether defense counsel was conceding several facts mentioned in
defense’s opening statement including that Dunlap was upstairs, and defense counsel
responded that “those are the facts and we’re not disputing those facts”; and (3) testimony
from an officer during the trial, during which the officer agreed that Dunlap was “the
individual that was arrested on the scene.”
Circumstances proved are determined by “the evidence presented at trial.”
Colgrove, 996 N.W.2d at 150 (emphasis added) (quotation omitted). Opening statements
8
and closing arguments are not evidence. State v. McCoy, 682 N.W.2d 153, 158 (Minn.
2004); see also Graham v. Davis, No. A19-0283, 2019 WL 4008478, at *5 (Minn. App.
Aug. 26, 2019) (“We cannot consider [a party’s] opening statement and closing argument,
because statements and arguments presented by counsel are not evidence.”). 2 Similarly, a
conversation between counsel outside of the presence of the jury is not evidence. Cf.
McCoy, 682 N.W.2d at 158 (stating that arguments by attorneys are not evidence). Finally,
although during trial testimony an officer confirmed that Dunlap was arrested “on the
scene,” the officer never identified where “on the scene” the arrest occurred.
Additionally, although the jury was instructed that they could consider agreements
between the parties, defense counsel’s opening statement appeared to be a summary of
what counsel believed the jury “[would] hear” during the trial, not an agreement between
the parties. And to the extent that, during the conversation outside of the presence of the
jury, defense counsel agreed that Dunlap was upstairs at the time of arrest, the jury was
never made aware of that conversation.
Because the record does not contain evidence that Dunlap was arrested in the
upstairs bedroom and the parties did not stipulate to that fact, the circumstances proved do
not include that law enforcement found Dunlap in the upstairs bedroom.

2 We cite to this nonprecedential opinion for its persuasive value only. See Minn. R. Civ.
App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
9
Inferences from the Circumstances Proved
Turning to step two of the analysis, we evaluate the inferences from the
circumstances proved to determine whether they are consistent with Dunlap possessing the
ammunition and rifle and inconsistent with a rational hypothesis other than guilt.
Starting with the ammunition in the upstairs bedroom, Dunlap argues that the
ammunition being found in his home and his mail being found in the bedroom are
insufficient facts to prove that he knowingly exercised dominion and control over the
9-millimeter bullets that were found in the upstairs closet. We disagree.
Dunlap is the sole renter of the home, and the upstairs contained a bed, clothing,
shoe boxes, and a substantial amount of Dunlap’s mail, which together indicate that Dunlap
likely used the upstairs as his bedroom and that the items upstairs were his belongings. The
small closet was located near the bed and the shoe boxes in the bedroom match those in
the closet, making it reasonable to infer that Dunlap was using that closet to store his items.
Finally, because there was a pistol-cleaning kit in the bedroom and the closet contained an
empty 9-millimeter magazine that was sitting on top of the shoe boxes, clearly visible to
anyone who opened the closet door, it is a reasonable inference that Dunlap knowingly
stored and had dominion and control over the ammunition found in the upstairs closet. Cf.
State v. Simon, 275 N.W.2d 51, 52 (Minn. 1979) (determining that evidence showing that
the defendant’s bedroom contained a controlled substance, syringe, passport, and balance
scale was sufficient to prove constructive possession even though defendant jointly leased
the home and his co-tenant may have had access to his room).
10
The evidence is also sufficient to preclude any reasonable inference other than that
Dunlap knowingly exercised dominion and control of the ammunition. Dunlap asserts that
others lived in the home, that those other individuals could have had access to the closet,
and that the ammunition in the closet “was hidden” and therefore could have been placed
there without Dunlap’s knowledge. While other individuals were in the home and may
have possessed the ammunition, an individual may jointly possess an item with others.
Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 601. And, although the ammunition was in a gun case in the closet
amid shoe boxes, Dunlap used the upstairs bedroom to store his items and there were other
items related to the gun case and ammunition in that area, namely, the pistol-cleaning kit
that was found in the bedroom and the 9-millimeter magazine that was clearly visible in
the closet. Because the only reasonable inference is that Dunlap would have known about
those other items, viewing the circumstances proved as a whole, we conclude that the only
reasonable inference is that Dunlap also knowingly exercised dominion and control over
the ammunition in the upstairs closet.
Turning to the rifle, Dunlap argues that the evidence is insufficient to prove that he
had dominion and control over it because the rifle was hidden downstairs in an area near
where the couple with the baby appeared to be living and the fingerprint on the rifle merely
shows that Dunlap touched it at some time. We disagree.
While others were present in the home—including the couple who were found near
the bed in the basement—Dunlap was the sole renter of the home and the rifle was not
found in the bedroom area but instead in a wall closet on the side of the basement close to
the laundry machines, an area that Dunlap likely used. And, even if other individuals had
11
touched the case in which the gun was stored, Dunlap’s fingerprint was found on the rifle
itself. While Dunlap is correct that the fingerprint only indicates that Dunlap touched the
rifle, when the circumstances proved are viewed as a whole, the fingerprint combined with
where the rifle was stored leads to only one reasonable inference— namely, that Dunlap
knowingly had dominion and control over the rifle. And, as stated above, even if others
also possessed the firearm, that is not inconsistent with guilt because an individual may
jointly possess an item with others. Id.
In sum, the evidence is sufficient to establish that Dunlap constructively possessed
the ammunition and rifle because the circumstances proved support a reasonable inference
that Dunlap knowingly exercised dominion and control over both items and do not support
a reasonable inference other than guilt.
II. The evidence is sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the rifle was
a “firearm” under Minnesota Statutes section 624.713, subdivision 1.
Dunlap also argues that the evidence is insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the rifle that he was convicted of possessing was a “firearm” under Minnesota
Statutes section 624.713, subdivision 1. A “firearm” under the statute “is a weapon, that is,
an instrument designed for attack or defense, that expels a projectile by the action or force
of gunpowder, combustion, or some other explosive force.” State v. Glover, 952 N.W.2d
190, 195 (Minn. 2020).
Dunlap argues that the state failed to provide direct evidence that the rifle was a
firearm, and so the circumstantial- evidence standard applies. The state disagrees, arguing
that the direct-evidence standard applies because the rifle itself was introduced into
12
evidence and “physical evidence of the fact itself” is direct evidence. See S tate v. Brazil,
906 N.W.2d 274, 278 (Minn. App. 2017), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 20, 2018).
When either direct or circumstantial evidence could apply, if “a disputed element is
sufficiently proven by direct evidence alone . . . it is the traditional standard, rather than
the circumstantial- evidence standard, that governs.” State v. Horst , 880 N.W.2d 24, 39
(Minn. 2016). Under the direct-evidence standard, appellate courts conduct “a painstaking
analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in a light most
favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to permit the jurors to reach the verdict which
they did.” State v. Stone, 995 N.W.2d 617, 621-22 (Minn. 2023).
Here, although the rifle is white in color and blockier than a traditional firearm, its
design has a clear resemblance to other semi- automatic rifles. We conclude that the rifle
itself, upon inspection by the jury, was sufficient to permit the jury to determine beyond a
reasonable doubt that the rifle fit within the caselaw definition of “firearm.”
Moreover, even if viewing the rifle alone was insufficient, the circumstantial
evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the rifle was a firearm. Using the two-step
analysis outlined above, the relevant circumstances proved include that the rifle was stored
in a gun case along with 10-millimeter ammunition and a magazine. A reasonable inference
from seeing an object that resembles a traditional firearm, is stored in a gun case with
ammunition, and is called a “rifle” is that the object is a firearm. Further, the jury was not
presented with any circumstance proved that would allow a reasonable inference that the
rifle was not a firearm. Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to prove
13
that the rifle meets the definition of firearm under Minnesota Statutes section 624.713,
subdivision 1.
III. Dunlap’s supplemental brief do es not establish any claim for which he is
entitled to relief.
Dunlap appears to raise four other arguments in his supplemental brief.
First, Dunlap asserts that his due-process rights were violated when an officer listed
him as the primary suspect in the search-warrant affidavit. In support of this argument ,
Dunlap cites the Fourteenth Amendment and appears to argue his case under the two-step
analysis from the Supreme Court’s decision in Neil v. Biggers regarding eyewitness
identification. 409 U.S. 188, 196-200 (1972); see also Seelye v. State, 429 N.W.2d 669,
672-73 (Minn. App. 1988) (summarizing and applying the two-step analysis from Biggers).
Biggers permits reversal of a conviction when the conviction is based on eyewitness
identification at trial and the in-court identification was based on a pretrial photog raphic
identification utilizing an impermissibly suggestive procedure . 409 U.S. at 196-97. Here,
the search warrant is not in the appellate record, but the trial transcript shows that no
witness at trial identified Dunlap as the shooter or stated that they saw Dunlap in physical
possession of a firearm or ammunition. Instead, it was left to the jury to determine whether
Dunlap was the shooter or possessor of the firearm and ammunition based on the evidence
as a whole, including the surveillance video, testimony about what the shooter was wearing
in the video and what Dunlap was wearing when he was arrested, and testimony about what
was discovered in Dunlap’s home. Because there was no eyewitness identification at trial,
Dunlap’s due-process rights were not violated under Biggers.
14
Second, Dunlap discusses the district court’s pretrial decision to allow the state to
amend the complaint. Dunlap then cites State v. Baxter, which states that the district court
“retains broad discretion over how the case proceeds once it is filed,” which “includes the
power to grant or deny the prosecutor’s request to amend the complaint.” 686 N.W.2d 846,
851-52 (Minn. App. 2004). To the extent that Dunlap is arguing that the district court
should not have permitted the state to amend its complaint, Dunlap has not explained how
the district court erred or abused its discretion in doing so. Accordingly, we decline to
consider whether the district court’s decision to permit the state to amend the complaint is
reversible error. See State v. Bartylla, 755 N.W.2d 8, 22 (Minn. 2008) (“[Appellate courts]
will not consider pro se claims on appeal that are unsupported by either arguments or
citations to legal authority.”).
Third, Dunlap discusses the quality of the fingerprinting method used by the
forensic scientists, asserting that it was not adequate. During the trial, a forensic scientist
testified in-depth about his methods and Dunlap’s counsel cross-examined the witness
about the quality of the fingerprinting method, raising the same concerns that Dunlap now
raises in his supplemental brief. Accordingly, the jury was informed of Dunlap’s concerns
and we defer to the jury’s implicit determination that the forensic scientist’s testimony
about his method of fingerprint testing was credible. See State v. Robinson, 921 N.W.2d
755, 761 (Minn. 2019) (stating that appellate courts defer to the jury to assess witness
credibility).
Finally, Dunlap appears to argue that the district court abused its discretion by not
considering an affidavit from Dunlap’s girlfriend that “was given after the jury
15
deliberated.” However, Dunlap does not explain why the district court abused its discretion
by not considering this document, instead simply stating that the district court “could have
taken the affidavit into consideration.” Because Dunlap does not provide us with an
argument or sufficient legal authority to review whether the district court should have
accepted the affidavit, we decline to consider this argument. See Bartylla, 755 N.W.2d at
22.
In conclusion, Dunlap’s supplemental brief does not establish any valid claim for
relief.
Affirmed.