Douglas James Williams, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0757

Douglas James Williams,
Appellant,

vs.

Musu Lamin,
Respondent.

Filed February 10, 2025
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-21-15433

Douglas James Williams, St. Paul, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Musu Lamin, Plymouth, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Schmidt,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s dismissal of his petition for a harassment
restraining order. We affirm.

2
FACTS
This appeal arises under Minnesota’s harassment restraining order (HRO) statute.
See Minn. Stat. § 609.748 (2024).1 On December 26, 2021, appellant Douglas James
Williams petitioned the district court for an ex parte HRO against respondent Musu
Lamin,2 who was appellant’s in-home caregiver at that time. See id., subds. 2 (“A person
who is a victim of harassment . . . may seek a restraining order from the district court in
the manner provided in this section.”), 4 (c) (providing that “[n]otice need not be given to
the respondent before the [district] court issues a temporary restraining order”). The
district court did not issue a temporary restraining order (TRO). See id., subd. 4(a) (stating
that the district court “may issue a temporary restraining order”). Appellant had requested
a hearing if the district court denied relief on his petition. Thus, the district court ordered
a hearing. See id., subd. 3(a) (“Upon receipt of the petition and a request for a hearing by
the petitioner, the [district] court shall order a hearing.”).

1 The 2022 version of Minn. Stat. § 609.748 was in effect when the district court filed the
order from which this appeal is taken. We cite the most recent version of Minn. Stat.
§ 609.748 because it has not been amended in relevant part. See Interstate Power Co. v.
Nobles Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 617 N.W.2d 566, 575 (Minn. 2000) (stating that, generally,
“appellate courts apply the law as it exists at the time they rule on a case”).
2 The case caption in the district court identifies the respondent as “Musu Lamin,” and we
use that name in the caption on appeal. However, the record indicates respondent’s last
name is “Menson,” which is the last name used by appellant in his brief and some of the
district court orders. We do not change the title of the action in this appeal. Minn. R. Civ.
App. P. 143.01. And we refer to respondent as “Musu Lamin” in this opinion, consistent
with the caption in this appeal and appellant’s prior appeals. See Williams v. Lamin, No.
A22-0416 (Minn. App. Oct. 28, 2022) (order op.) (Williams I); Williams v. Lamin, No.
A23-1748, 2023 WL 8868266, at *1 (Minn. App. Dec. 19, 2023) (Williams II).
3
On January 24, 2022, appellant and respondent appeared before the district court for
a hearing on appellant’s petition. The parties appeared remotely and without counsel.
After recessing the hearing so the parties could engage in mediation—which did not result
in an agreement—the district court informally questioned the parties about the underlying
dispute. The district court did not place the parties under oath, take sworn testimony, or
receive any exhibits. The district court informed the parties that the purpose of the hearing
was to determine whether the district court “should grant a temporary restraining order or
not.” After hearing appellant’s harassment allegations and respondent’s description of the
circumstances, the court “dismissed” appellant’s petition for an HRO, reasoning:
I have to make a determination that . . . the [r]espondent has
acted unreasonably and that she is committing acts of
harassment against you. And I’m just not hearing that yet.

. . . .

.
. . I’m going to dismiss the case as of today. But, [appellant],
if you come up with other facts that you think support your
claim that she’s committed unwanted acts, words or gestures
that have a substantial adverse [effect] on your safety, security
or privacy, you can go ahead and file another petition.
But at least as I’m hearing today, I don’t hear those
things.

Essentially, the district court determined that appellant’s petition did not contain
sufficient allegations to state a legal claim for relief under the HRO statute. See id.,
subds. 1(a) (defining harassment to include “repeated incidents of intrusive or unwanted
acts, words, or gestures that have a substantial adverse effect . . . on the safety, security, or
privacy of another”), 3(a) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed as requiring a hearing
on a matter that has no merit.”).
4
Appellant filed an appeal with this court, and on October 28, 2022, we reversed the
dismissal and remanded for a decision on the merits. Williams I, No. A22-0416.
Specifically, we determined that appellant’s petition
contains allegations that, if proven, implicate [appellant’s]
safety, security, or privacy. [Appellant] alleges that
[respondent] is trespassing in his residence, stealing his food,
mocking him while filming him without his permission, and
making false police reports about him. Any one of these
allegations, if proven true, may constitute an incident of an
intrusive or unwanted act that has a substantial adverse effect
on [appellant’s] safety, security, or privacy.

Id. We further determined that “[t]hese allegations, if proven true, may also constitute
‘repeated incidents’ as required to meet the definition of harassment under the HRO
statute.” Id.
On June 20, 2023, appellant appeared before the district court for a hearing on
remand, re-asserted his desire for an HRO, and indicated he was still being harassed by
respondent. Respondent was not present at that hearing. The ensuing July 5, 2023 order
states, under the verbiage, “TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER,” that
“Respondent’s request for a Temporary Restraining Order is GRANTED.”3
On July 11, 2023, respondent filed an admission of service of the July 5 TRO and
requested a hearing to contest the TRO. According to an October 18, 2023 order, the
district court scheduled an evidentiary hearing on appellant’s HRO petition for December

3 Although the July 5, 2023 order states that “Respondent’s request for a Temporary
Restraining Order is GRANTED,” the remaining language in the order expressly restrains
respondent from engaging in conduct directed at appellant, indicating that the district
court’s reference to “Respondent’s” request for a TRO is a typographical error.
5
6, 2023. Appellant filed an appeal with this court, seeking our review of the October 18,
2023 order. Williams II, 2023 WL 8868266, at *1. The district court canceled the
December 6, 2023 evidentiary hearing pending this court’s decision. Id.
We determined that the October 18, 2023 scheduling order was not an appealable
order and dismissed the appeal. Id. at *2. We explained that the July 5, 2023 order “granted
appellant a temporary HRO against respondent” and that the “October 18, 2023 order
scheduled an evidentiary hearing on appellant’s HRO petition,” which was still pending in
the district court at the time of the appeal. Id. at *1-2. We further explained that “[b]ecause
the October 18, 2023 order did not adjudicate appellant’s HRO petition,” it was not a final
appealable order. Id. We noted that “[t]he scheduling order did not decide appellant’s
HRO petition or prevent the district court from entering a final, appealable order deciding
that petition.” Id. at *2. We ordered that appellant “may seek review of the October 18,
2023 scheduling order in a timely appeal from a final order issued after the evidentiary
hearing on appellant’s HRO petition.” Id.
After this court’s decision, the district court scheduled an evidentiary hearing for
April 9, 2024. On April 8, 2024, at 11:25 p.m., appellant filed a “Motion to Vacate
Unlawful Hearing and Affidavit of Fraud by Court Clerk(s).” Among other requests,
appellant asked the district court to cancel the evidentiary hearing on his HRO petitio n—
which was scheduled for the following morning—and that the “standing HRO Order be
restored” and remain in effect for two years from the date of filing. Appellant did not
appear for the scheduled evidentiary hearing on April 9. The district court denied and
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dismissed appellant’s motion as untimely, dismissed appellant’s HRO petition for “failure
to prosecute,” and vacated the previously issued TRO.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
We begin with the standards that govern our review. “[O]n appeal error is never
presumed. It must be made to appear affirmatively before there can be reversal. . . . [T]he
burden of showing error rests upon the one who relies upon it.” Loth v. Loth, 35 N.W.2d
542, 546 (Minn. 1949) (quotation omitted). Issues that are not adequately briefed are
waived. Melina v. Chaplin, 327 N.W.2d 19, 20 (Minn. 1982) (stating that “[t]his issue was
not argued in the briefs and accordingly must be deemed waived”). And, “[a]n assignment
of error based on mere assertion and not supported by any argument or authorities in
appellant’s brief is waived and will not be considered on appeal unless prejudicial error is
obvious on mere inspection.” Schoepke v. Alexander Smith & Sons Carpet Co., 187
N.W.2d 133, 135 (Minn. 1971).
With these principles in mind, we turn to appellant’s request for relief from this
court, which is as follows:
Appellant herewith seeks in the ends of justice the
immediate restoration and modification of the Harassment
Restraining Order already issued, or an equivalent replacement
of same, modified to include Respondent’s employer and
attorney en banc, to remain in effect for a term of not less than
twenty-five (25) years in duration, and which bars said parties
from any further contact by any means with Appellant at any
location.

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Appellant asserts multiple errors in his brief to this court including but not limited
to “unprecedented frauds upon the court” and the failure of “numerous district court
judicial officers . . . to accurately comprehend and duly incorporate” the applicable HRO
statute and procedures therein, as well as “the case record, procedural history, and the
district[] [court’s] own orders.”
At the heart of appellant’s arguments is his assumption that the July 5, 2023 TRO
was not a “temporary” prehearing HRO. He argues that his “case was incontrovertibly
proved at [the] hearing on January 24, 2022, and again at [the] hearing on June 20, 2023”
and that it is “not currently subject to further re-hearing.”
The law-of-the-case doctrine “provides that when a court decides upon a rule of law,
that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same
case.” State v. Miller, 849 N.W.2d 94, 98 (Minn. App. 2014) (emphasis omitted)
(quotations omitted). The doctrine is
a rule of practice followed between the Minnesota appellate
courts and the lower courts. It is a discretionary doctrine
developed by the appellate courts to effectuate the finality of
appellate decisions. It ordinarily applies where an appellate
court has ruled on a legal issue and has remanded the case to
the lower court for further proceedings.

Loo v. Loo, 520 N.W.2d 740, 744 n.1 (Minn. 1994) (citation omitted).
In dismissing appellant’s second appeal in this case, we reasoned that the July 5,
2023 order “granted appellant a temporary HRO against respondent,” that appellant’s HRO
petition was “still pending in district court,” and that the October 18, 2023 order “did not
adjudicate appellant’s HRO petition” and “did not decide appellant’s HRO petition or
8
prevent the district court from entering a final, appealable order deciding that petition.”
Williams II , 2023 WL 8868266, at *1-2. Thus, we have already determined that the
July 5, 2023 order was a TRO, and not an HRO. That determination governed future
proceedings in the district court, and it is not subject to review in this appeal. See Miller,
849 N.W.2d at 98 (discussing law-of-the- case doctrine); Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 140.01
(“No petition for rehearing shall be allowed in the Court of Appeals.”).
In sum, after we dismissed appellant’s second appeal in this matter, the case returned
to district court for a decision on the merits of appellant’s HRO petition. Williams II, 2023
WL 8868266, at *1-2. The district court held a hearing on June 20, 2023, and the July 5,
2023 TRO followed. Because respondent requested a hearing to challenge that TRO, the
next step in the process was a hearing on the merits of appellant’s HRO petition, which had
not yet occurred. See Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subds. 4 (e) (“If the temporary restraining
order has been issued and the respondent requests a hearing, the hearing shall be scheduled
by the court upon receipt of the respondent’s request.”) , 5(b)(3) (stating that the district
court may issue an HRO if certain requirements are met, including that “the court finds at
the hearing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent has engaged in
harassment”).
The hearing on the merits of appellant’s HRO petition was scheduled for April 9,
2024. The record shows that appellant was aware of that scheduled hearing and did not
appear. Instead, he filed a motion less than 24 hours before the hearing, erroneously
asserting that an HRO had already been issued, and requesting that the hearing be canceled.
Appellant asserts that the district court erred in denying and dismissing his motion as
9
untimely and by dismissing his HRO petition for failure to prosecute. But appellant does
not provide adequate briefing or legal argument in support of those assertions of error, and
we discern no obvious prejudicial error. The issues are therefore waived. See Melina, 327
N.W.2d at 20; Schoepke, 187 N.W.2d at 135.
We appreciate that appellant is without the benefit of legal counsel. However,
“[a]lthough some accommodations may be made for pro se litigants, this court has
repeatedly emphasized that pro se litigants are generally held to the same standards as
attorneys.” Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 629 N.W.2d 115, 119 (Minn. App. 2001). Under
those standards, appellant has not met his burden to establish reversible error in this appeal.
See Loth, 35 N.W.2d at 546.
Affirmed.