St. Paul Federation of Educators, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0760

St. Paul Federation of Educators,
Respondent,

Public Employment Relations Board,
Respondent,

vs.

St. Paul Public Schools, ISD No. 625,
Relator.

Filed March 3, 2025
Affirmed in part and reversed in part
Larkin, Judge

Public Employment Relations Board
File Nos. 21-U-001, 24-U-001

Paula R. Johnston, Education Minnesota, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent St. Paul
Federation of Educators)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Jennifer Moreau, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent Public Employment Relations Board)

Charles Long, Jamie Jonassen, Saint Paul Public Schools, St. Paul, Minnesota (for relator)

Considered and decided by Ede, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Larkin,
Judge.

2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARKIN, Judge
In this certiorari appeal, relator school district challenges a determination of the
Public Employment Relations Board that the district engaged in unfair labor practices. The
district argues that the determination was based on legal errors, unsupported by substantial
evidence, and arbitrary and capricious. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
FACTS
This appeal stems from a decision and order of respondent Public Employment
Relations Board (PERB) that relator St. Paul Public Schools, ISD No. 625 (the District)
committed unfair labor practices in violation of Minn. Stat. § 179A.13, subd. 2(1), (3)
(2024), by issuing a letter of directives and a written reprimand to AK, the District’s
employee and a union steward for respondent St. Paul Federation of Educators (the Union).
The letter of directives and written reprimand were based on three communications
involving AK.
First, on October 30, 2022, AK and two other union stewards sent the principal at
the school where AK worked a letter regarding “staff needs” and working conditions at the
school. The letter addressed issues such as confusion over parent pick-up procedures and
fire-drill routing. The stewards sought input from union members before submitting the
letter.
Second, o n January 27, 2023, AK and a union member drafted a n email to the
principal about a prior union meeting. At th at meeting, a teacher (Teacher A) told the
membership about an anonymous call , in which the caller claimed that a union steward
3
(not AK) complain ed about three teachers of color and call ed for their discharge. The
union membership was concerned about the anonymous call and wanted support from the
principal. AK and a union member circulated the draft email to all union members and
asked for their input. The draft email named the three teachers who were allegedly targeted
for termination. Teacher A told AK not to use names due to possible ramifications. AK
and the union member revised the email, removed Teacher A’s name (but incl uded her
position), and sent the email to the principal on January 31, 2023. The email stated, in part,
“We wanted to make sure you knew about this serious situation and would appreciate your
help in moving forward. It would be helpful for staff to know how to handle difficult
situations with parents and what steps to take if they find themselves in a similar situation.”
Third, on February 2, 2023, AK sent an email to all school staff regarding the staff
calendar:
Last spring we had a lot of discussion as a staff about
how stressful it is being blind -sided by events all of the
time. . . . [W]e decided we needed both a [Google] Calendar
and a list calendar (some preferred one, some the other). We
have them. Neither is completely up to date since there were
several field trips this week not on the calendar.
Here is the link to the list calendar - which is also in our
shared drive. Would you mind taking a peek at it to see if
there’s anything to add? [JL] made it accessible for everyone
to add their events.

AK included a link and stated, “In terms of getting the events onto the Google Calendar, I
know [a staff member] is working hard on it but there have been some roadblocks for
access.”
4
The principal quickly responded to AK’s email, explained the calendar process,
directed staff to use only the established calendar, and noted that the established calendar
was up to date except for a “fieldtrip for today.” AK responded using the “reply all” feature
and noted that other field trips and events were not on the established calendar: “ There
were 3rd and 4th grade field trips as well this week. They are not on the calendar. There
are also new events in our PTO newsletter that are not on the c alendar.” The school staff
member in charge of placing events on the established calendar replied and directed AK to
“[t]ake a chill pill!!!!”
On February 7, 2023, the principal and AK met to discuss AK’s communications.
On February 10, 2023 , the District issued AK a letter of directives. The letter explained
that, as an employee , AK was expected to conduct herself appropriately in her
communications and interactions. The letter directed AK to adhere to her role and
responsibilities as a teacher; refrain from sending emails to all staff regarding the
management of school activities and functions at the school site; only communicate about
the duties of a union steward in her role as a union steward, and not about the duties of a
school administrator; be respectful and act professionally; be mindful about confidential
and private data; follow directives and expectations given by the principal; and exercise
good professional judgment. The Union did not grieve or otherwise contest the letter.
On April 13, 2023, the District conducted an investigative interview of AK. On
April 20, 2023, the District issued AK a written reprimand stating that AK was being
disciplined based on the October 30 working -conditions letter , “emails, staff [-]written
statements[,] and the investigative interview.” The reprimand directed AK to communicate
5
concerns to the principal, respond to and attend meetings requested by the principal, follow
the directives of her supervisors, and “[r]efrain from sending emails to the principal which
should go through the leadership team .” The reprimand stated, “ [w]hen communicating
your suggestions or recommendations provide these to your union steward who is on the
leadership team where information is communicated to the principal” and “[u]tilize the
union/principal meetings to address contractual discussions.”
The Union filed a grievance regarding the reprimand, which the District denied.
The Union then filed an unfair-labor-practices charge with PERB, alleging that the District
violated Minn. Stat. § 179A.13, subd. 2(1)-(3) (2024), based on the District’s February 10
letter of directives and April 20 written reprimand. PERB determined that there was a
“reasonable basis in law and fact to support PERB’s issuance of a Complaint that [ the
District] committed unfair labor practices .” PERB ordered an evidentiary hearing before
a hearing officer . After that hearing, the hearing officer determined that AK’s three
communications constituted protected activity and recommended that PERB find that the
District violated Minn. Stat. § 179A.13, subd. 2(1) , (3), because the District’s letter of
directives and written reprimand unlawfully directed AK to refrain from further union
activity.
The District filed exceptions to the recommended order, assigning multiple errors.
PERB denied the District’s exceptions, deleted one factual finding, and otherwise adopted
the hearing officer’s recommended order.
This certiorari appeal follows.

6
DECISION
The Minnesota Public Employment Labor Relations Act (PELRA), Minn. Stat.
§§ 179A.01-.25 (2024), “governs labor relations between public employees and their
employers.” Allen v. Hennepin County, 680 N.W.2d 560, 563 (Minn. App. 2004), rev.
denied (Minn. Aug. 17, 2004). An employee or employee organization aggrieved by an
unfair labor practice may file a charge with PERB. Minn. Stat. § 179A.13, subd. 1(a).
Unless the charge has no reasonable basis in law or fact, PERB must issue a complaint and
provide a hearing before a hearing officer. Id., subd. 1(b). At the hearing, “[t]he party on
whom the burden of proof rests shall be required to sustain the burden by a preponderance
of the evidence.” Id., subd. 1(g). After the hearing, t he hearing officer must issue a
recommended decision and order. Id., subd. 1(d). Parties may file exceptions to the
hearing officer’s recomm ended decision and order with PERB . Id., subd. 1(k). PERB
must then review the recommended decision and order and “may adopt all, part, or none
of the recommended decision and order.” Id.
Under Minn. Stat. § 179A.052, decisions of PERB relating to certain unfair labor
practices, including violations of Minn. Stat. § 179A.13, may be reviewed by this court via
a writ of certiorari. “[D]ecisions of administrative agencies enjoy a presumption of
correctness, and deference should be shown by courts to the agencies’ expertise and their
special knowledge in the field of their technical training, education, and experience. ”
Anoka County v. Law Enf’t Lab. Servs., Inc., 3 N.W.3d 586, 591 (Minn. 2024) (quotation
omitted). “Review by certiorari is limited to an inspection of the record” and “is necessarily
confined to questions affecting the jurisdiction of the board, the regularity of its
7
proceedings, and, as to merits of the controversy, whether the order or determination in a
particular case was arbitrary, oppressive, unreasonable, fraudulent, under an erroneous
theory of law, or without any evidence to support it.” Dietz v. Dodge County, 487 N.W.2d
237, 239 (Minn. 1992) (quotation omitted). We may reverse an agency’s decision if its
findings or conclusions are unsupported by substantial evidence. Law Enf’t Lab. Servs.,
Inc., 3 N.W.3d at 591. Substantial evidence has been described as “relevant evidence that
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion .” In re NorthMet
Project Permit to Mine Application , 959 N.W.2d 731, 749 (Minn. 2021) (quotation
omitted). “[T]he appellant bears the burden of establishing that the agency findings are not
supported by the evidence in the record.” Law Enf’t Lab. Servs., Inc. , 3 N.W.3d at 591
(quotation omitted).
The District makes several arguments in support of reversal. One argument regards
a procedural issue. Other arguments regard the merits of PERB’s decision and order. We
address each issue in turn.
I.
The District contends that PERB “erred as a matter of law” by holding that the
District’s letter of directive s violated Minn. Stat. § 179A.13, subd. 2(3) , “without any
allegation from [PERB]” that the letter of directives violated that subdivision.
Under PELRA, if PERB finds that a charge has a reasonable basis in law or fact,
PERB “shall promptly issue a complaint . . . stating the charges” and give notice of a
hearing before a qualified hearing officer. Minn. Stat. § 179A.13, subd. 1(b). The “hearing
must address the issues in the complaint or amended complaint.” Minn. R. 7325.0220
8
(2023). The District argues that PERB’s complaint in this case did not indicate that the
following issue would be considered at the hearing: whether the District’s issuance of the
letter of directives violated Minn. Stat. § 179A.13, subd. 2(3).1
PERB’s “COMPLAINT AND NOTICE OF HEARING” in this matter has three
sections. The first section is untitled. We refer to it as the “introduction .” According to
the introduction, the Union filed a charge alleging that the District
violated Minn. Stat. § 179A.13, subd. 2(1) and (3), by issuing
a letter of directive on February 10, 2023, that restricted
employee [AK]’s protected activities by interfering with her
role as a Union steward, and by, on April 20, 2023, issuing
[AK] a letter of reprimand in retaliation for her activities as
Union steward.

In the final paragraph of the introduction, PERB generally states that after reviewing
the “parties ’ submissions and governing law,” PERB was persuaded that there was a
“reasonable basis in law and fact” to support its “issuance of a Complaint that [the District]
committed unfair labor practices within the meaning of [section] 179A.13, [subdivision]
2(1) and (3), by its letter of directive to [AK] on February 10, 2023, and its letter of
reprimand to her on April 20, 2023.” That statement reasonably suggests that PERB would
consider whether the letter of directives violated both subdivision 2(1) and 2(3).
However, the charges set forth in the second section of PERB’s “COMPLAINT
AND NOTICE OF HEARING,” which is entitled, “COMPLAINT,” are inconsistent with
the description of the charges in the introduction. Instead of alleging that the District’s

1 That subdivision prohibits p ublic employers, their agents, and representatives from
“discriminating in regard to hire or tenure to encourage or discourage membership in an
employee organization.” Minn. Stat. § 179A.13, subd. 2(3).
9
letter of directives violated both subdivision 2(1) and 2(3), the “COMPLAINT” states that
PERB found that there was a reasonable basis in fact and law to permit a finding that the
District committed unfair labor practices within the meaning of Minn. Stat. § 179A.13,
subd. 2(1), (3), in two specific ways. First, paragraph seven of the “COMPLAINT” states
that the District “interfered with, restrained or coerced employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed by [PELRA], in violation of Minn. Stat. § 179A.13, subd. 2(1) ,” by
committing “the conduct described in paragraph 5,” which discusses only the letter of
directives. Second, paragraph eight of the “COMPLAINT” states that the District
“discriminated in regard to the hire or tenure of employment of its employees, thereby
discouraging membership in a labor organization, in vi olation of Minn. Stat. § 179A.13,
subd. 2(3),” by committing “the conduct described in paragraphs 6(a) and 6(b),” which
discuss only the written reprimand.
The third section of PERB’s “COMPLAINT AND NOTICE OF HEARING ,” is
entitled “NOTICE OF HEARING AND HEARING PROCEDURE.” In that section,
PERB once again used general language to describe the issues to be decided , consistent
with its description of the Union’s charge in the introduction . PERB stated that “[a]n
evidentiary hearing is ordered to determine whether [the District], by its agent [principal],
violated Minn. Stat. § 179A.13, subd. 2(1) and 2(3),” without specifying which
subdivisions would be consid ered when assessing the District’s letter of directives and
written reprimand. PERB also stated that “[t]he hearing must address all issues in this
Complaint.”
10
In sum, although the Union arguably alleged that the letter of directives violated
both subdivision 2(1) and 2(3) , and general language in the first and third sections of
PERB’s “COMPLAINT AND NOTICE OF HEARING” could suggest that PERB would
consider each of those alleged violations, the “COMPLAINT” itself specified that PERB
would consider whether the letter of directives violated subdivision 2(1) and whether the
written reprimand violated subdivision 2(3).
When interpreting conflicting provisions within a document , specific provisions
govern over general provisions . See Burgi v. Eckes, 354 N.W.2d 514, 519 (Minn. App.
1984) (“[T]he specific in a writing governs over the general.”). We discern no basis not to
apply that principle here. Thus, the specific charges in the “COMPLAINT” —which
expressly tied the complained-of conduct to specific statutory subdivisions—identified the
issues for the hearing. Those charges did not allege that the District’s letter of directives
violated Minn. Stat. § 179A.13, subd. 2(3).
Moreover, as the District notes, even though it raised this procedural issue as an
exception to the hearing officer’s recommended order , PERB did not address the issue.2
Instead, PERB stated that the District offered “no basis for rejecting the Recommended
Order, apart from its disagreement with the outcome and a flawed analysis of PELRA.”

2 The District’s statement of exceptions assigned error as follows: “The Hearing Officer’s
Conclusion of Law No. 5 ,” which determined that the District’s issuance of the letter of
directives violated Minn. Stat. § 179A.13, subd. 2(3) , and constituted an unfair labor
practice, “is erroneous as a matter of law .” The District asserted that “[t]he only issue
regarding the February 10, 2023 Letter of Directives in the Complaint served by [PERB]
is whether the Letter violated Minn. Stat. § 179A.13, subd. 2(1),” and that “[t]he Hearing
Officer’s Conclusion of Law No. 5 exceeded his authority and constitutes an error of law.”
The District’s brief in support of its exceptions also addressed this issue.
11
Nor did PERB amend its complaint to allege that the District’s letter of directives violated
Minn. Stat. § 179A.13, subd. 2(3) . See Minn. Stat. § 179A.13, subd. 1(b) (authorizing
PERB to amend a complaint “at any time prior to the issuance of an order based thereon”).
Instead, PERB adopted the hearing officer’s recommended conclusion that the letter of
directives violated subdivision 2(3) , even though that issue was not stated in PERB’s
“COMPLAINT.”
Under the circumstances, PERB erred by determining that the District’s letter of
directives violated Minn. Stat. § 179A.13, subd. 2(3), because that issue was not identified
in the “COMPLAINT.” See Minn. R. 7325.0220 (stating that the “hearing must address
the issues in the complaint or amended complaint”).
The Union’s counterarguments do not persuade us otherwise. The Union notes that
it “alleged a violation of Minn. Stat. § 179A.13, subd. 2(3) in the unfair labor practice
charge form for both the Letter of Directives and the Written Reprimand.” The Union also
notes that the issue statement in its post-hearing brief assert ed that whether the letter of
directives violated subdivision 2(3) was an issue at the hearing. The Union asserts that the
District “had clear notice of the subd. 2(3) allegation regarding the Letter of Directives
from both the Union and [PERB].”
Although the Union arguably alleged that the letter of directives violated
subdivision 2(3), the charges in PERB’s “COMPLAINT” were clear: PERB charged that
the District’s issuance of the letter of directives violated subdivision 2(1) and that the
District’s issuance of the written reprimand violated subdivision 2(3). Because PERB’s
12
“COMPLAINT” did not charge that the District’s issuance of the letter of directives
violated Minn. Stat. § 179A.13, subd. 2(3), we reverse PERB’s determination of this issue.3
II.
We now turn to the District’s challenges to the merits of PERB’s determination that
the District’s issuance of the letter of directives violated Minn. Stat. § 179A.13, subd. 2(1).
The District makes three arguments in support of its contention that PERB erred in
applying PELRA. We address each in turn.
A.

The District argues that PERB erred “by failing to require the Union to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that [AK] was, in fact, engaged in protected conduct under
PELRA as is required by Minn. Stat. § 179A.13, subd. 2(1). ” See Minn. R. 7325.0230
(2023) (“The charging party has the burden of proving the unfair labor practice allegation
in the complaint by a preponderance of the evidence . . . .”). In effect, the District
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence , focusing its arguments on AK’s February 2,
2023 school-calendar communication.
Under Minn Stat. § 179A.13, subd . 2(1), “[p]ublic employers, their agents and
representatives are prohibited from . . . interfering, restraining, or coercing employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed” under PELRA. Under PELRA, “[p]ublic employees

3 Because we reverse PERB’s determination that the District’s letter of directives violated
Minn. Stat. § 179A.13, subd. 2(3), we do not address the District’s argument that the Union
failed to prove that the District’s letter of directives was motivated by anti-union animus.
13
have the right to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection.” Minn. Stat. § 179A.06, subd. 7.
In determining that the District interfered with AK’s rights under PELRA, the
hearing officer broadly determined that the District restricted AK’s rights to engage in
“union activity” and inhibited her right as a union steward “ to communicate with
bargaining unit members about working conditions .” In adopting the hearing officer’s
recommendations, PERB implicitly indicated that the PELRA rights at issue were those in
Minn. Stat. § 179A.06, subd. 7, which protects an employee’s right to engage in concerted
activities for the purpose of mutual aid or protection. For example, PERB cited Children’s
Studio School Public Charter School, which PERB stated was “remarkably similar.” 343
N.L.R.B. 801 (2004). In that case, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) considered
an allegation based on a violation of “ protected concerted activities .” Id. at 802. We
therefore consider whether there is sufficient evidence to support a determination that the
District violated Minn. Stat. § 179A.06, subd. 7.
In identifying protected conduct under PELRA, both parties rely on cases
interpreting the National Labor Relations Act ( NLRA). When interpreting PELRA “it is
often instructive to refer to decisions interpreting the [NLRA],” though such decisions are
not binding. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local 49 v. City of Minneapolis, 233 N.W.2d
748, 752 (Minn. 1975). The NLRA includes a provision that is analogous to section
179A.13, subdivision 2(1), forbidding an employer from interfering, restraining, or
coercing employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed under the NLRA . See 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2018). And like PELRA, the NLRA guarantees the right “to engage
14
in other concerted activities for the purpose of . . . other mutual aid or protection .” 29
U.S.C. § 157 (2018).
Under the NLRA, “[o] ne of the chief rights protected is the right to engage in
concerted activities for the purpose of improving working conditions. ” NLRB v. Mount
Desert Island Hosp. , 695 F.2d 634, 637 (1st Cir. 1982) ; see State v. McClenton , 781
N.W.2d 181, 191 (Minn. App. 2010) (“[A]lthough we are not bound to follow precedent
from other states or federal courts, these authorities can be persuasive.”), rev. denied
(Minn. June 29, 2010). “It is well settled that employees have the right to engage in
concerted activities for the purpose of protesting and forcing the improvement of working
conditions.” NLRB v. Robertson Indus. , 560 F.2d 396, 398 (9th Cir. 1976). “Concerted
activity” has been interpreted to include instances “where individual employees bring truly
group complaints to the attention of management.” MCPC, Inc. v. NLRB, 813 F.3d 475,
483 (3d Cir. 2016) (quotation omitted). “[T]alk looking toward group action” is protected;
mere griping is not. Mushroom Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683, 685 (3d Cir. 1964).
The record supports PERB’s determination that the communications underlying the
District’s letter of directives were protected concerted activities. The October 30 working-
conditions letter raised group concerns about conditions at the school. Likewise, the
January 31 email to the principal constituted a group action and sought advice about a
“serious situation,” namely, the anonymous allegation that teachers of color would be fired.
Finally, the February 2 emails addressed staff concerns about a school calendar that some
staff perceived as inadequate.
15
In sum, AK’s communications addressed working conditions and the concerns of
fellow employees, and the record supports PERB’s implicit determination that the District
interfered with AK’s rights under Minn. Stat. § 179A.06, subd. 7. See NLRB v. Talsol
Corp., 155 F.3d 785, 797 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that an employee ’s comments about
safety at a group meeting attended by employees and management constituted protected
concerted activity because the meeting was conducted to address plant safety concerns, the
employee’s questions were on the topic of safety, and the context indicated that the
employee’s statements were “not purely personal gripes”).
B.
The District argues that PERB “erred as a matter of law in determining that [AK’s]
conduct resulting in the February 10, 2023 , Letter of Directives ‘was well within steward
conduct that the NLRB has repeatedly held protected from employer discipline.’” The
District asserts that PERB’s decision “ entirely disregards” two Eighth Circuit decisions:
Earle Industries, Inc. v. NLRB, 75 F.3d 400 (8th Cir. 1996) and Carleton College v. NLRB,
230 F.3d 1075 (8th Cir. 2000).
In Earle, an employer challenged the NLRB’s determination that it committed an
unfair labor practice by firing an employee for insubordination and dishonesty. 75 F.3d at
401. The Eighth Circuit agreed that the employer “was entitled to fire ” the employee
because the employee “was part of a group of employees who assisted and accompanied
[Reverend Jesse] Jackson in making his way through a part of the plant where he had no
right to be ” and defied a manager before a crowd of employees “by means of a false
statement.” Id. at 405, 407. The Eighth Circuit noted that the employee’s insubordination
16
occurred in the context of a union campaign, but found that “ the factors of context,
impulsiveness and effect on discipline ” weighed against the employee. Id. at 407. For
example, the employee “deliberately lied to Jackson to cause him to push forward instead
of going back to the visitor’s entrance,” as a manager had requested. Id.
In Carleton College , the Eighth Circuit denied enforcement of an NLRB unfair -
labor-practice order, concluding that there were legitimate reasons for the nonrenewal of
an employee’s contract. 230 F.3d at 1077-78, 1080, 1082. For example, the employee, in
the context of a meeting with the dean of the college, used “vulgarities” and described the
music department as a “laughingstock” and a “pig.” Id. at 1081.
AK’s conduct in this case is easily distinguishable from the employee conduct in
Earle and Carleton College . In her February 2 school -calendar communications, AK
addressed group concerns regarding the accuracy of the school calendar. In her “reply all”
response to the principal, AK made factual assertions regarding the calendar’s
completeness. But the record does not suggest that AK was dishonest, much less that she
“deliberately lied” in a way that undermined management. Nor did AK use vulgar
language or engage in name calling.
The District asserts that AK’s communications were unprofessional, inappropriate,
and constituted insubordination. But the District exaggerated the tone and content of AK’s
communications in its briefing and oral argument to this court . For example, at oral
argument, the District asserted that AK wrote that staff felt “back-stabbed” by the calendar
omissions. The District later acknowledged that AK actually used the phrase “blind -
sided.” And in its briefing, the District insists that AK’s communications crossed a line
17
separating protected and unprotected union communications. But courts have held that far
more egregious comments are protected. For example, in Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v.
NLRB, the Eighth Circuit upheld an NLRB determination that the firing of an employee
violated the NLRA, even though that employee made racist comments while on a picket
line. 866 F.3d 885, 889 (8th Cir. 2017).
PERB recognized that “ not all union steward conduct is protected ,” but it
determined that AK’s conduct was “ not even close to the conduct that was held
unprotected” in the cases that the District cited. Having reviewed the relevant caselaw, we
cannot say that PERB erred in determining that AK was engaged in protected conduct. See
Law Enf’t Lab. Servs., Inc., 3 N.W.3d at 591 (stating that deference should be shown to an
agency’s expertise); Carleton College, 230 F.3d at 1078 (“ We will enforce the Board ’s
order if the Board has correctly applied the law and its factual findings are supported by
substantial evidence on the record as a whole, even if we might have reached a different
decision had the matter been before us de novo.” (quotation omitted)).
C.
The District argues that PERB erred in holding that PELRA “does not require proof
that any specific employee was interfered with, restrained, or coerced in exercising
statutory rights.” The District asserts that PELRA rights must “actually be affected in order
to establish a violation of Minn. Stat. [§] 179A.13, subd. 2(1).”
The District relies on a nonprecedential opinion from this court as support. See
Stephens v. Bd. of Regents, No. A03-1082, 2004 WL 237386 (Minn. App. Feb. 10, 2004),
rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 30, 2004). Nonprecedential opinions of this court are not binding,
18
but they may be persuasive. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c)
(“Nonprecedential opinions and order opinions are not binding authority except as law of
the case, res judicata or collateral estoppel, but nonprecedential opinions may be cited as
persuasive authority.”). In Stephens, this court dismissed a claimed violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 179A.13, subd. 2(1), because the appellant made “no argument that respondent interfered
with, restrained, or coerced her into not exercising rights guaranteed under PELRA.” 2004
WL 237386, at *2-3.
PERB rejected the District’s reliance on Stephens, stating that the claim in that case
failed, “not because PELRA requires proof that an employee actually refrained from
subsequent PELRA-protected conduct, but because she was merely alleging breach of her
individual employment contract, failing even to allege any employer conduct that violated
PELRA.” PERB explained that interference with an employee’s exercise of rights “does
not require proof that any specific employee was interfered with, restrained, or coerced in
exercising statutory rights.” PERB re lied on Green Apple Supermarket of Jamaica, Inc. ,
in which the NLRB stated, “It is well settled that the test of interference, restraint, and
coercion under Section 8(a)(1) of the [NLRA] does not turn on the employer’s motive or
on whether the coercion succeeded or failed.” 366 N.L.R.B. No. 124, slip op. at 20 (2018)
(quotation omitted).
Again, w hen interpreting PELRA “it is often instructive to refer to decisions
interpreting the [NLRA],” though such decisions are not binding. Local 49, 233 N.W.2d
at 752. But in Stephens, we did not discuss the relevant persuasive decisions interpreting
the NLRA. See Brandeis Mach. & Supply Co. v. NLRB, 412 F.3d 822, 830 (7th Cir. 2005)
19
(stating that the test is “whether the employer engaged in conduct, which, it may reasonably
be said, tends to interfere with the free exercise of employee rights under the [NLRA] ”)
(quotation omitted)); Nat’l Steel & Shipbuilding Co. v. NLRB, 156 F.3d 1268, 1271 (D.C.
Cir. 1998) (stating that an employer interferes with NLRA rights “if its actions have merely
a tendency to coerce, regardless of their actual impact in a particular case” (quotation
omitted)). For that reason, our nonprecedential decision in Stephens is not persuasive here.
PERB did not err by instead relying on decisions interpreting the NLRA.
III.
Finally, we address the District’s contention s that PERB’s decision and order
reflected its will rather than its judgment and that the decision and order was therefore
arbitrary and capricious. See In re Quantification of Env ’t Costs, 578 N.W.2d 794, 799
(Minn. App. 1998) (“If an agency’s decision represents its will and not its judgment, the
decision is arbitrary and capricious. ”), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 18, 1998). The District
relies, in part, on PERB’s determination that the District’s issuance of its letter of directives
violated Minn. Stat. § 179A.13, subd. 2(3), even though PERB’s “COMPLAINT” did not
identify that charge as an issue to be determined at the hearing. Although we reverse the
determination that the District’s issuance of its letter of directives violated Minn. Stat.
§ 179A.13, subd. 2(3), we do not otherwise conclude that PERB’s decision and order was
arbitrary or capricious.
Caselaw provides that an agency decision is not arbitrary and capricious if the
agency took a hard look at the salient issues. Reserve Mining Co. v. Herbst, 256 N.W.2d
808, 825 (Minn. 1977). In assessing whether PERB met that standard, we note that PERB
20
rejected the following finding of fact by the hearing officer: “Before a meeting scheduled
for February 7, 2023 with the principal, [AK] reasonably believed that the meeting over
her ‘communication’ might lead to discipline and asked for but was denied union
representation consistent with NLRB v. Weingarten , Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975).” In
rejecting that finding, PERB explained:
While the record supports the Hearing Officer’s statement that
[AK] sought, and was denied, union representation, we reject
any implicit legal conclusion that the [District’s] denial
violated [PELRA] for the following reasons: (1) PERB’s
Complaint did not include any allegation that a denial of union
representation violated PELRA so that the [District] was not
afforded notice that [this] alleged violation . . . was being
adjudicated. (2) The Hearing Officer’s list of Conclusions of
Law does not include any mention of [this] . . . violation.
(3) The Hearing Officer’s list of remedial recommendations
does not mention any remedy for [this] . . . violation.

PERB’s explanation shows that it took a hard look at th is issue. In addition, PERB took
“care to explain why the [District’s] exceptions are not consistent with PELRA,” providing
approximately six pages of legal analysis to support its decision.
Although PERB should have addressed the District’s exception assigning error to
the hearing officer’s recommendation that the District’s issuance of the letter of directives
violated Minn. Stat. § 179A.13, subd. 2(3), PERB otherwise took a hard look at the issues,
and its decision was not arbitrary or capricious.
Conclusion
For the reasons explained in section I of this opinion, we reverse PERB’s
determination that the District’s issuance of the letter of directives violated Minn. Stat.
§ 179A.13, subd. 2(3). But we affirm the remainder of PERB’s decision and order.
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Because proof of only one unfair labor practice is necessary to sustain PERB’s order, and
because we affirm PERB’s determination that the District’s issuance of the letter of
directives violated Minn. Stat. § 179A.13, subd. 2( 1), we do not remand for further
proceedings.4 See Minn. Stat. § 179A.13, subd. 1(i) (“If, upon a preponderance of the
evidence taken, the hearing officer determines that any party named in the charge has
engaged in or is engaging in an unfair labor practice, then a recommended decision and
order shall be issued . . . .”) (emphasis added)).
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

4 We note that PERB also determined that the District’s issuance of the written reprimand
violated Minn. Stat. 179A.13, subd. 2(1), (3). That determination—which the District does
not challenge—also sustains PERB’s order.