Todd Robert Reihs, petitioner, Appellant,

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0773

Todd Robert Reihs, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Commissioner of Public Safety,
Respondent.

Filed January 21, 2025
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

Blue Earth County District Court
File No. 07-CV-23-4025

Jacob M. Birkholz, Michelle K. Olsen, Birkholz & Associates, LLC, Mankato, Minnesota
(for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Ryan Pesch, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and
Klaphake, Judge.
∗
SYLLABUS
A district court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction under Minn. Stat. § 171.19
(2022) to review the extension of a driver’s license-revocation period.

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
OPINION
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant Todd Robert Reihs challenges the order denying his petition filed under
Minn. Stat. § 171.19. He argues that the district court erred in determining that it lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction to consider a challenge to respondent Minnesota Commissioner
of Public Safety’s extension of his license-revocation period following his violation of the
Ignition Interlock Device Program. Because the unambiguous language of Minn. Stat.
§ 171.19 does not authorize district court s to review license-revocation extensions, we
affirm.
FACTS
In April 2023, the commissioner revoked Reihs’s driver’s license pursuant to Minn.
Stat. § 169A.52 (2022) (the implied-consent law). The following month, Reihs enrolled in
the commissioner’s Ignition Interlock Device Program (the interlock program), which
enabled him to regain driving privileges subject to the requirements laid out in the
interlock-program guidelines. The interlock- program guidelines require participants to
submit to two types of alcohol-detecting breath tests via a device installed in their vehicle:
an initial test and rolling tests. The participant must pass the initial test to legally start their
vehicle. The device then periodically requests rolling tests at intervals of five to 45 minutes
while the vehicle is running. If a participant violates the interlock-program guidelines, the
commissioner must extend their license-revocation period. Minn. Stat. § 171.306,
subd. 5(a) (2022).
3
Reihs’s program-participant data reflects that he failed to complete multiple rolling
tests. Because of this, in July 2023, the commissioner sent him a warning letter stating that
he had violated the interlock-program guidelines and that further violations would result in
an extension of his program enrollment. In September, after Reihs again missed rolling
tests, the commissioner informed him that his license-revocation period was extended for
180 days pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 171.306, subd. 5(a). And when Reihs thereafter
continued to miss rolling tests, the commissioner advised him that his revocation period
was extended for an additional year. Both extension notices included language informing
Reihs that he had “the right to judicial review” as “outlined in Minnesota Statutes, section
171.19.”
After receiving the second extension notice, Reihs filed a petition in district court
under Minn. Stat. § 171.19, challenging the extension and seeking reinstatement of his
driver’s license. The district court held a hearing during which Reihs admitted that he
missed requested rolling tests in violation of the interlock-program guidelines. But Reihs
contended that equitable relief was warranted because he was not using alcohol and the
violations occurred because he needed t o leave his diesel truck running while he was
outside of the truck doing farm work. The court took the matter under advisement.
Subsequently, the district court issued an order asking the parties to submit written
arguments addressing whether it had subject-matter jurisdiction to hear Reihs’s challenge.
Reihs responded with arguments supporting jurisdiction; the commissioner took no
position on the issue. After considering the submissions, the district court issued an order
4
denying Reihs’s petition, reasoning that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction because
extension of a revocation is not one of the five acts enumerated in Minn. Stat. § 171.19.
Reihs appeals.
ISSUE
Does the district court have subject-matter jurisdiction under Minn. Stat. § 171.19
to review the commissioner’s license-revocation extension based on a participant’s
violation of the interlock-program guidelines?

ANALYSIS
Subject-matter jurisdiction is “a court’s authority to hear and determine cases that
are presented to it.” Rued v. Comm’r of Hum. Servs., 13 N.W.3d 42, 46 (Minn. 2024). A
defect in subject- matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time and cannot be waived.
Williams v. Smith, 820 N.W.2d 807, 813 (Minn. 2012). Jurisdiction is a question of law,
which we review the issue de novo. Underdahl v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety (In re Comm’r
of Pub. Safety), 735 N.W.2d 706, 710 (Minn. 2007).
Here, the jurisdiction inquiry turns on the interpretation of a statute, which we also
review de novo. State v. Defatte, 928 N.W.2d 338, 340 (Minn. 2019). The objective of
statutory interpretation is to “ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.”
Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2022). In doing so, we first determine whether the language of the
statute is clear or ambiguous. Westby v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 742 N.W.2d 443, 445
(Minn. App. 2007). Statutory language is ambiguous if it is “subject to more than one
reasonable interpretation.” State v. Cummings, 2 N.W.3d 528, 533 (Minn. 2024) (quotation
omitted). We interpret unambiguous statutory language according to its plain meaning and
refrain from further construction. Westby, 742 N.W.2d at 446. When the legislature does
5
not define a statute’s relevant terms, we may consult dictionary definitions to determine a
word’s “plain and ordinary meaning.” State v. Beganovic, 991 N.W.2d 638, 643 (Minn.
2023).
Minn. Stat. § 171.19 provides, in pertinent part:
Any person whose driver’s license has been refused,
revoked, suspended, canceled, or disqualified by the
commissioner, except where the license is revoked or disqualified
under section 169A.52, 171.177, or 171.186, may file a petition
for a hearing in the matter in the district court . . . and it shall be
its duty . . . to determine whether the petitioner is entitled to a
license or is subject to revocation, suspension, cancellation,
disqualification, or refusal of license, and shall render judgment
accordingly.

Minn. Stat, § 171.19 (emphasis added). Reihs invoked this statute to challenge the
commissioner’s decision to extend the period of his license revocation under Minn. Stat.
§ 171.306, subd. 5(a) (“If a[n] [interlock] program participant . . . violates the program
guidelines . . . , the commissioner shall extend the person’s revocation period . . . .”). He
contends that the extension is subject to judicial review because it constitutes a revocation
or a refusal by the commissioner under Minn. Stat. § 171.19.
1 Neither argument persuades
us to reverse.
First, Reihs asserts that extending a license-revocation period constitutes a
“revocation” under Minn. Stat. § 171.19 because there is “no material difference” between

1 In his brief to this court, Reihs also contends that the notice he received from the
commissioner stating that he had the right to judicial review under Minn. Stat. § 171.19
suggests the district court has “full authority” to review his challenge. But he agreed during
oral argument that subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be “conferred by consent of the
parties.” Seehus v. Bor-Son Constr., Inc., 783 N.W.2d 144, 147 (Minn. 2010) (quotation
omitted).
6
a revocation and an extension of revocation. He suggests that an extension of a revocation
period is, effectively, a “re-revocation.” We disagree.
The term “revocation” is not statutorily defined. See Minn. Stat. § 171.01 (2022).
Therefore, we may look to dictionary definitions to determine its plain meaning.
Cummings, 2 N.W.3d at 533. Dictionaries define “revocation” as “[t]he act or an instance
of revoking,” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1503 (5th ed.
2018), and “[t]he action of revoking, rescinding, or annulling; withdrawal,” 13 The Oxford
English Dictionary 838 (2d ed. 1989). Similarly, dictionaries define “revoke” to mean
“[t]o invalidate or cause to no longer be in effect, as by voiding or canceling,” The
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1503, and “[t]o annul, repeal,
rescind, [or] cancel,” 13 The Oxford English Dictionary 838.
2
All of these definitions connote an action that removes or restricts a status, privilege,
or authorization. Applying them to Minn. Stat. § 171.19 persuades us that “revocation”
plainly means the initial act or instance of withdrawing a person’s driver’s license. Because
an extension of a revocation period is not an initial instance of license withdrawal but a
continuation of a withdrawal that has already occurred, it is a distinct and separate action
from the revocation itself. Simply put, a revocation extension does not alter the license
status of the revoked person. Accordingly, we conclude that the plain meaning of the term

2 Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary offers comparable definitions. “Revocation”
is defined as “an act or instance of revoking,” while “revoke” means “to annul by recalling
or taking back” or to “rescind.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1068 (11th ed.
2014).
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“revocation,” as used in Minn. Stat. § 171.19, does not include an extension of a driver’s
license revocation issued pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 171.306, subd. 5(a).
Second, Reihs argues that, if an extension of revocation is not a “revocation” under
Minn. Stat. § 171.19, it is a “de facto refusal to restore [his] license.” This argument is no
more convincing.
Like “revocation,” the term “refusal” is not statutorily defined. See Minn. Stat.
§ 171.01. Dictionaries define it as “[t]he act or an instance of refusing,” The American
Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1478, and “a denial or rejection of something
demanded or offered,” 13 The Oxford English Dictionary 494. To “refuse” means to
“indicate unwillingness to do, accept, give, or allow,” The American Heritage Dictionary
of the English Language 1478, and to “decline to take or accept (something offered or
presented); to reject [an] offer,” 13 The Oxford English Dictionary 495.3
The ordinary meaning of the term “refusal” clearly contemplates an action taken in
response to a preceding request, application, or demand. Indeed, “indicat[ing]
unwillingness” and “declin[ing] to accept” are both affirmative, responsive actions.
Similarly, both definitional phrases imply discretion on the part of the refuser. It follows
that an extension of revocation issued due to a violation of the interlock-program guidelines
cannot be a “refusal.” This is so because an extension does not arise from any sort of
request or application and it does not depend on the exercise of the commissioner’s

3 Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary similarly defines “refusal” as “the act of
refusing or denying,” and “refuse” as “to express oneself as unwilling to accept,” or “deny.”
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1047.
8
discretion. Minn. Stat. § 171.306, subd. 5(a) (stating “[i]f a program participant . . . violates
the program guidelines . . . , the commissioner shall extend the person’s revocation period”
(emphasis added)). We conclude that the plain meaning of the term “refusal,” as used in
Minn. Stat. § 171.19, does not encompass an extension of a driver’s license revocation
issued under Minn. Stat. § 171.306, subd. 5(a).4
The fact that the district court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Reihs’s
challenge does not leave Reihs without a remedy. The interlock -program guidelines
provide that “[i]f a participant disagrees with an action taken by [the commissioner] on a
violation, the participant may request an administrative review.”5 Minn. Dep’t Pub. Safety,
Minn. Ignition Interlock Device Program, Program Guidelines 13 (2016),

4 In his brief, Reihs follows his plain-meaning argument by asserting that —if nothing
else—Minn. Stat. § 171.19 should be construed as a “catch -all” grant of jurisdiction over
all license-related disputes because its language is “encompassing” and “not restrictive.”
Because we discern no ambiguity in the language of Minn. Stat. § 171.19, we do not reach
this argument. Westby, 742 N.W.2d at 446 (stating that when statutory language is
unambiguous, we “do not engage in further construction”). Regardless, we note that the
plain language of the statute contradicts this assertion. Minn. Stat. § 171.19 expressly
exempts challenges to revocations issued under Minn. Stat. § 169A.52, which governs
revocations resulting from alcohol-concentration test refusal or failure. This exemption
clearly distinguishes driving-while-impaired- and implied-consent -related revocations
from other instances in which a license may be revoked for the purposes of Minn. Stat.
§ 171.19.

5 Because the issue is not before is, we offer no opinion as to whether the commissioner’s
administrative decision would be subject to certiorari review by this court pursuant to
Minn. Stat. §§ 14.63 or 606.01 (2022). But we note that in other circumstances, we
reviewed a driver’s required participation in the interlock program on writ of certiorari
following administrative review. See Hughes v. Minn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, No. A21-0899,
2022 WL 90217, at *1 (Minn. App. Jan. 10, 2022).
9
https://dps.mn.gov/divisions/dvs/programs/mn-ignition-interlock/Documents/Ignition-
Interlock-ProgramGuidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/T8JC-NFCM].6
DECISION
A district court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction under Minn. Stat. § 171.19 to
review the extension of a driver’s license-revocation period. Accordingly, the district court
did not err by denying Reihs’s petition.
Affirmed.

6 The commissioner referenced the interlock-program guidelines in responding to Reihs’s
petition and the district court cited them in its order denying the petition.