State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0800

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Bashir Abdullahi Farah,
Appellant.

Filed May 19, 2025
Affirmed
Schmidt, Judge

Olmsted County District Court
File No. 55-CR-22-3637

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael Walters, Olmsted County Attorney, James E. Haase, Senior Assistant County
Attorney, Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Andrea Barts, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Schmidt, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Larkin,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SCHMIDT, Judge
Appellant challenges his convictions for first-degree aggravated robbery and
second-degree assault, arguing that the district court erred by admitting reputation
testimony from a law enforcement officer as to the untruthful reputation of a hearsay
2
declarant.1 Because the district court did not abuse its discretion and because any possible
error was harmless, we affirm.
FACTS
In April 2022, S.W. met appellant Bashir Abdullahi Farah at an apartment where
other people, including S.A., were present. When S.W. tried to leave, Farah pulled out a
knife, demanded that S.W. surrender his belongings, and cut S.W. with the knife.
Law enforcement responded to a call and could hear S.W. yelling for help when
they arrived. When officers entered the apartment, S.A. claimed that S.W. tried to rape
her. Officers saw S.W. slumped on the floor and found Farah hiding in a bedroom closet.
S.W. later told the detective that Farah cut him with the knife and took his possessions.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Farah with first-degree aggravated robbery,
first-degree assault, and second-degree assault. Farah waived his right to a jury and
proceeded with a bench trial. S.A. did not testify at trial, but—over the state’s hearsay
objection—the district court allowed the jury to hear S.A.’s statements that she made at the
scene as recorded in the responding officer’s body-camera video. Over defense counsel’s
objection for lack of foundation, an officer offered the following testimony at trial
regarding S.A.’s reputation for untruthfulness:
THE STATE: Are you familiar with [S.A.’s] reputation?

OFFICER: Yes, I am.

1 Appellant also challenges his conviction of third-degree assault. But that count is not
adjudicated in the warrant of commitment and we do not consider challenges to
unadjudicated counts. See State v. Ashland, 287 N.W.2d 649, 650 (Minn. 1979).
3
THE STATE: Are you familiar enough with her reputation to
have an opinion as to her character for honesty?

OFFICER: Yes.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Judge, I’m going to object on
foundation on this officer’s familiarity with [S.A. ’s]
reputation.

THE COURT: Sure. Maybe you could articulate more how
you know this individual so that I can have a better assessment
of, you know, how well you know her reputation for
truthfulness or untruthfulness.

THE STATE: I’ll follow up on that. So on the video we hear
you refer to [S.A.] as Lucky without her having to tell you her
name, correct?

OFFICER: That is correct.

THE STATE: How long have you known her as Lucky?

OFFICER: Ever since the first interaction that I had with her.
That’s what she had told me her name was.

THE STATE: How long ago was that?

OFFICER: I would say that was probably early in the
wintertime of, like —sometime in the wintertime of 2020 and
2021 I would say roughly.

THE STATE: And is she—is she also a person that you’ve
talked about with other officers?

OFFICER: That is correct.

THE STATE: Okay. . . . And how many times, best estimate,
do you think you’ve interacted with her in one fashion or
another?

OFFICER: Probably over 25.

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THE STATE: Okay. Is that sufficient, Your Honor, for me to
ask the—

THE COURT: (Indicating.)

THE STATE: And what is your opinion as to her reputation for
honesty?

OFFICER: Not very truthful.

On recross, defense counsel questioned the officer about S.A.’s reputation for
untruthfulness. When asked by defense counsel whether the officer had discussed S.A.’s
reputation with anyone in the community, the officer testified, “I’m sure that I’ve had
conversations with people” regarding “her honesty[.]”
The district court found Farah guilty of first-degree aggravated robbery,
second-degree assault, and third-degree assault. In its verdict and memorandum, the
district court addressed S.A.’s claim that the victim raped her:
[S.A.] almost immediately made claims that [S.W.] tried to
rape her but there was nothing credible about her claims under
the circumstances. [S.A.] deliberately sowed chaos and
confusion for the responding officers about what happened by
talking loudly and incessantly. She was not cooperative with
officers or credible.

The district court also addressed the testimony about S.A.’s reputation for untruthfulness:
“[The officer] credibly testified that [S.A.] had a reputation for untruthfulness, which was
based on approximately twenty-five prior encounters with [S.A.].”
Before sentencing, Farah moved for a new trial, arguing that the state impermissibly
attacked the character of a nontestifying declarant when the officer testified that S.A. has
5
a reputation for untruthfulness. The district court denied the motion and explained that the
officer’s testimony regarding S.A. did not impact the court’s verdict:
It is perfectly acceptable to allow a police officer, if they’ve
articulated that they’re familiar with the person’s reputation for
untruthfulness—which the officer did testify in that respect and
mentioned the roughly 25 prior encounters that she was aware
of. That’s exactly what the rule allows for, is for her to give
her opinion on the reputation of [S.A.] for truthfulness. But,
frankly, it really was not—it was a very insignificant portion
of the Court’s consideration.

And in that respect, I will point out that in the motion
context and denying the motion, if it was error, which I don’t
feel that it was, to allow that testimony from [the officer], it
certainly was harmless because there was no reasonable chance
that it affected the ultimate outcome or the Court’s decision,
which was primarily based off the credibility findings
regarding [S.W.].

The district court then sentenced Farah to 180 months’ imprisonment. Farah appeals.
DECISION
Farah argues that the district court abused its discretion in determining that the state
provided sufficient foundation for the officer’s testimony about S.A.’s untruthfulness and
contends that the district court plainly erred in allowing the officer to testify about S.A.’s
untruthfulness because S.A.’s character for truthfulness had not been attacked . State v.
Amos, 658 N.W.2d 201, 203 (Minn. 2003) (reviewing evidentiary rulings for an abuse of
discretion); State v. Myhre, 875 N.W.2d 799, 804 (Minn. 2016) (reviewing unobjected-to
errors for plain error).
2 We are not persuaded.

2 Farah contends both issues should be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. But without
an objection to the admission of the testimony—and the record reflects none—we review
the second issue for plain error.
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First, the district court did not abuse its discretion because the state provided the
proper foundation for the officer to testify to S.A.’s untruthfulness. After Farah’s counsel
objected to foundation, the prosecutor asked several additional questions to establish
foundation. In response to the questioning, the officer provided that she: knew S.A.’s
nickname, knew S.A. since the winter of 2020 and 2021, talked to other officers about her,
and interacted with S.A. over 25 times. The prosecutor asked the judge whether the
questions were “sufficient.” The transcript notes that the judge responded by “indicating.”
The transcript does not reflect that Farah’s counsel raised a second objection to foundation,
and the prosecutor proceeded to ask the officer about S.A.’s reputation for honesty. The
district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the state had provided adequate
foundation for the officer’s testimony.
Second, the district court did not plainly err in allowing the officer to testify about
S.A.’s untruthfulness. Myhre, 875 N.W.2d at 804 (noting an appellant must prove, among
other factors, (1) error, (2) that is plain). S.A. did not testify at trial, but her recorded
hearsay statements from the officer’s body-worn camera were admitted over the state’s
hearsay objection. Given that S.A.’s hearsay statements were admitted, the state’s
questions related to S.A.’s credibility were appropriate under rule 806. See Minn. R. Evid.
806 (“When a hearsay statement . . . has been admitted in evidence, the credibility of the
declarant may be attacked, and if attacked may be supported, by any evidence which would
be admissible for those purposes if declarant had testified as a witness.”).
Farah contends that the district court plainly erred because S.A.’s character for
truthfulness had not been attacked before the officer testified about S.A.’s lack of honesty.
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But rule 608 distinguishes between evidence of bolstering a witness’ truthfulness and
evidence that attacks a witness’ truthfulness. Minn. R. Evid. 608(a)(2). The rule prohibits
the admission of evidence of truthful character if the character of the witness for
truthfulness has not yet been attacked. Id.; see also Minn. R. Evid. 608 1977 comm. cmt.
(“Evidence of truthful character is only admissible for rehabilitation purposes after the
character of the witness is attacked.”); State v. Lasnetski, 696 N.W.2d 387, 395-96 (Minn.
App. 2005) (affirming district court’s ruling prohibiting defendant from presenting
testimony about his truthfulness because the state had not attacked the defendant’s
character for truthfulness). That same prohibition does not apply to evidence of untruthful
character. See Minn. R. Evid. 608(a)(2). The district court neither erred, nor plainly erred
because the state appropriately offered testimony about S.A.’s lack of honesty under rule
806 after her hearsay statements were introduced through the body camera video.
Even if we were to assume that the district court abused its discretion or plainly
erred, we would still affirm because any possible error was harmless. State v. Smith,
940 N.W.2d 497, 505 (Minn. 2020) (reviewing evidentiary rulings for an abuse of
discretion “governed by the harmless error standard”); Myhre, 875 N.W.2d at 804 (noting
that if district court plainly erred in admitting evidence, relief only warranted if the ruling
affected substantial rights). “[I]n assessing whether an error is harmless, the question is
not whether the other evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, but rather whether
the error substantially influenced the verdict.” State v. Bigbear, 10 N.W.3d 48, 54 (Minn.
2024) (emphasis in original) (quotation omitted). “An error is not harmless if a reasonable
possibility exists that the error significantly affected the [fact-finder]’s verdict.” Id.
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We conclude that the officer’s testimony about S.A.’s reputation for untruthfulness
did not influence the district court’s verdict . In its posttrial ruling, the district court
explicitly found that even if it were an error to admit the officer’s testimony, “it certainly
was harmless because there was no reasonable chance that it affected the ultimate outcome
or the Court’s decision[.]” The district court noted that its decision “was primarily based
off the credibility findings regarding [S.W.].” The district court stated that S.A.’s
testimony constituted “a very insignificant portion of the Court’s consideration” in finding
Farah guilty. Thus, even assuming the officer’s testimony was improperly admitted, we
conclude that admitting the testimony was harmless.
Affirmed.