In re the Marriage of:

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0803

In re the Marriage of:

Kevin Eric Alstrin, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Allison Lynn Alstrin,
Respondent,

Carver County,
Respondent.

Filed January 21, 2025

Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Carver County District Court
File No. 10-FA-11-580

Kevin Alstrin, Excelsior, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Amanda A. Bloomgren, Katie C. Hanson, Bloomgren Hanson Legal, PLLC, Hopkins,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Jesson,
Judge.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CONNOLLY, Judge
In this child-support dispute, pro se appellant-father argues that he should not have
to reimburse respondent -mother for extracurricular fees and expenses spent on behalf of
the parties’ minor children and that the district court erroneously modified the decision by
the parenting consultant (PC). We affirm.
FACTS
The marriage between appellant Kevin Eric Alstrin (father) and respondent Allison
Lynn Alstrin (mother) was dissolved by stipulated judgment and decree in December 2012.
The parties were awarded joint legal custody of their three minor children, and mother was
awarded sole physical custody, subject to father’s parenting time. Pursuant to the judgment
and decree, father was ordered to pay child support and maintain medical and dental
insurance for the children. The decree also provided that “[t]he costs of agreed to sports,
after school activities shall be divided be tween the parties in accordance with the PICS [1]
Percentages in place at the time.”
In February 2019, the district court filed an order clarifying that:
Pursuant to the Judgment and Decree, the parties shall
share the costs of children’s uninsured medical and dental
expenses and agreed upon sports and after -school activities
pursuant to their current PICS percentages, now 64% for
[father] and 36% for [mother]. To the extent either party has
not been appropriately reimbursed for such expen ses, the
parties shall comply with the procedures set forth in Minn. Stat.
§ 518A.41, subd. 17 for reimbursement and enforcement.

1 “PICS” means parental income for determining child support. Minn. Stat. § 518A.26,
subd. 15 (2022).
3

In October 2020, the district court filed a stipulated order appointing a PC. Under
the parties’ agreement, the PC had authority to “[d]ecide child care, activity, vacation and
summer camp issues, including dates and times for the same, to the extent the specific
vacation dates have not been determined by a court order, prio r decision of a PC or
[parenting-time expediter], or are no longer workable due to a change in circumstances.”
The PC issued report #3 in February 2021, stating: Extra-Curricular Activities:
The parties have agreed that it is reasonable for the children to participate in one
sport/activity per season (Fall, Winter, Spring, and Summer). The report also states:
Activity Proposals. Either parent may propose an
extra-curricular sport/activity. Proposals must be submitted in
single topic OFW[2] message thread at least 72 hours prior to
any registration deadline and must include the following: name
of the hosting organization, program dates, general time
commitment, and cost. If the parent receiving the proposal
needs additional information, he/ she is responsible for
sourcing the information directly from the organization. A
non-response after 72 [hours] will be considered
approval/implied consent.

In July 2021, the PC issued report #4, which reiterated that decisions by the PC “are
effective immediately and are legally binding unless and until changed by the court.” And
the report reminded the parties that “[a]ctivities that impact both parents ’ parenting time
require mutual agreement and you previously agreed each child could reasonably be
allowed to participate in one sport/activity per season. Prior to enrollment, you are required
to make a proposal (refer to PC report #3).”

2 OFW refers to “Our Family Wizard,” which is a cell phone application that assists parents
in managing child-custody schedules and co-parenting issues.
4
In September 2022, mother filed a notice with respondent Carver County under
Minn. Stat. § 518A.41, subd. 17 (2022), of intent to enforce unreimbursed medical and
dental expenses for the parties’ children for the time period of November 15, 2020, through
September 18, 2022. Father subsequently moved to contest the enforcement and collection
of these expenses, claiming that the “majority of expenses [mother] is seeking . . . are not
health/dental expenses,” but “are for discretionary, recreational activities.”
In March 2023, the district court referred to the child-support magistrate (CSM) the
parties pending “dispute regarding reimbursement of child activity payments.” Following
a hearing, the CSM determined that she “lack[ed] subject matter jurisdiction to determine
and enforce the division of extracurricular expenses between the parties.” Nonetheless,
“[i]n an attempt to save the parties some time in re-litigating these issues in their entirety,”
the CSM mad e “some findings of fact based upon the testimony given and evidence
provided at the hearing,” and noted that father’s “failure to contribute to fees and expenses
appears to be against the court orders, PC report (agreement), historical practice and
agreement of the parties and has been financially detrimental to [mother] and the children.”
The district court adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the CSM’s
order and determined that father owes mother “$17,308.51 for PICS adjusted
extracurricular fees and expenses incurred by [mother] for the benefit of the joint minor
children.” The district court also stated that the “children may continue to participate in
one sport per season,” and that the “[p]arties continue to be responsible for their percentage
of the expenses for these activities even if the expenses for the seasons come due at
different times than when the sport is in season.” Father appeals.
5
DECISION
I.
Father challenges the district court’s decision ordering him to reimburse mother for
extracurricular-activity fees and expenses she spent on behalf of the parties’ children.
Payment for a child’s extracurricular activities is in the nature of child support. See Minn.
Stat. § 518A.26, subd. 4 (2022) (defining “basic support” to include expenses related to the
child’s care); cf. McNulty v. McNulty, 495 N.W.2d 471, 473 (Minn. App. 1993) (affirming
the district court’s decision that significant expenses for a child’s extracurricular activities
can support an upward deviation from the presumptively -appropriate guideline support
obligation), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 12, 1993). We review a district court’s child-support
decision for an abuse of discretion. Butt v. Schmidt, 747 N.W.2d 566, 574 (Minn. 2008).
A district court abuses its discretion if it makes findings of fact that are not supported by
the record, misapplies the law, or resolves the matter in a manner that is contrary to logic
and the facts on record. Dobrin v. Dobrin, 569 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Minn. 1997).
PCs are “a creature of contract or of an agreement of the parties which is generally
incorporated into (or at least referred to in) a district court’s custody ruling.” Szarzynski v.
Szarzynski, 732 N.W.2d 285, 293 (Minn. App. 2007). The rules of general practice state
that “Parenting Consulting is a process defined by the agreement of the parties in which
the [PC] incorporates neutral facilitation, coaching and decision making.” Minn. R. Gen.
Prac. 310.03(c)(2). The PC’s authority comes from the parties’ agreement. See id.
Father argues that the district court abused its discretion in ordering him to
reimburse mother for his allotted percentage of the fees related to the children’s
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extracurricular activities because those “expenses were incurred unilaterally by mother
inconsistent with the communication guidelines outlined in the [PC’s] decisions.”
Specifically, he contends that the PC’s decision requires the children’s participation in
extracurricular activities to be mutually agreed upon by the parties, and because he never
consented to the children’s participation in their respective activities, he should not be
required to reimburse mother for these expenses.
We are not persuaded. Generally, stipulated rulings in dissolution matters are
treated as contracts for purposes of construction. See Pooley v. Pooley, 979 N.W.2d 867,
873 (Minn. 2022) (making this observation in the context of a stipulated dissolution
judgment, but also noting certain “unique features” of rulings in dissolution matters).
“Ignoring a provision in a contract will constitute waiver if the party whom the provision
favors continues to exercise his contract rights knowing that the condition is not met.” BOB
Acres, LLC v. Schumacher Farms, LLC, 797 N.W.2d 723, 727-28 (Minn. App. 2011)
(quotation omitted), rev. granted (Minn. June 14, 2011) and appeal dismissed (Minn. Aug.
12, 2011). Similarly,
where the course of conduct of a party entitled to performance
of certain terms or conditions of a contract has led the other
party to believe that such performance will not be required until
it has become too late to perform, the person who has so
conducted himself is barred from asserting the right he had.

Id. at 728 (quoting Wolff v. McCrossan, 210 N.W.2d 41, 44 (Minn. 1973)).
The reasoning set forth in BOB Acres, is applicable here. The parties’ stipulated
judgment requires the parties to share the costs of the children’s “agreed to sports [and]
after school activities . . . in accordance with PICS Percentages in place at the time.” The
7
parties later agreed to appoint a PC, who had the authority to decide issues related to the
children’s activities. Pursuant to the parties’ agreement, the PC decided that the children
are allowed to participate in one sport/activity per season, but that such activities must be
mutually agreed upon by the parties. This provision favors father because he is responsible
for paying a higher percentage of the fees related to the children’s activities, and the record
reflects that mother has facilitated the children’s participation in their various activities.
Although the record indicates that mother failed to follow the agreement by registering the
children for various activities prior to obtaining father’s approval, the record also reflects
that father neglected to exercise his rights under the agreement by failing to object to the
children’s participation in their activities despite having notice that mother registered the
children for the activities. Because father failed to exercise his rights under the agreement,
the record supports the district court’s determination that he has waived the “mutual-
agreement” aspect of the agreement by ignoring the fact that this provision of the agreement
was not satisfied. See id. (“Ignoring a provision of a contract will constitute waiver if the
party whom the provision favors continues to exercise his contract rights knowing that the
condition is not met.”).
Moreover, the record also supports the district court’s finding that father’s course
of conduct led mother to believe that father’s mutual agreement prior to registering the
children for all activities was not required. As the CSM found, mother enrolled “the
children in their usual[] extracurricular and summer activities and added those activities
and fees to a . . . spreadsheet [father] designed and the parties had been using since about
2017.” The CSM also found that mother “would send emails to [father] with information
8
on the activities and receipts.” And the CSM found that father attended tryouts and games,
as well as doing volunteer hours. These findings are supported by the record and are not
challenged on appeal. The CSM’s findings demonstrate that father had notice that the
children were participating in their various activities. But, despite having notice that the
children were participating in their respective activities, father never objected or informed
mother that he did not agree that the children should participate in these activities. Under
these circumstances, father’s course of conduct led mother to believe that mutual
agreement by the parties was not required prior to enrolling the children in their activities.
As such, father is barred from asserting this right. See id.
Finally, the parties’ agreement states that “[a] non-response after 72 [hours of the
children being enrolled in an activity] will be considered approval/implied consent.” As
addressed above, father had notice that the children were enrolled in their usual activities,
and father never voiced any objection. Thus, father implicitly consented to the children’s
participation in their usual activities. Father does not dispute the amount he is required to
pay; rather, he simply asserts that he is not required to reimburse mother for the children’s
sports and activities. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in requiring father
to reimburse mother for the fees related to the children’s participation in their activities.
II.
Father argues that the district court improperly reformed the parties’ agreement
related to the children’s participation in extra -curricular activities. Stipulations in
dissolution proceedings are favored by courts “as a means of simplifying and expeditin g
litigation” and “are therefore accorded the sanctity of binding contract s.” Shirk v. Shirk,
9
561 N.W.2d 519, 521 (Minn. 1997). The rules of contract construction apply when
construing such stipulations. Blonigen v. Blonigen, 621 N.W.2d 276, 281 (Minn. App.
2001), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 13, 2001). But children’s interests are “nonbargainable”
and “less subject to restraint by stipulation.” Kaiser v. Kaiser, 186 N.W.2d 678, 683 (Minn.
1971) (making this observation in context of child-support requirements). We review de
novo the district court’s legal conclusion relating to the enforceability and interpretation of
a dissolution-related stipulation. See Kielley v. Kielley, 674 N.W.2d 770, 777 (Minn. App.
2004) (“Whether a stipulation is supported by consideration is a legal question, which we
review de novo.”).
As stated previously, the PC’s report #3 states that the “parties have agreed that it is
reasonable for the children to participate in one sport/activity per season (Fall, Winter,
Spring, and Summer).” The district court expounded on this agreement, by clarifying that
the “children may continue to participate in one sport per season as follows: Swimming
(fall to spring) and summer camp for [child 1]; Lacrosse (winter, spring, summer) for [child
2]; and Lacrosse (winter and spring) and Football (fall) for [child 3].”
Father argues that the district court’s reformation of the parties’ agreement related
to the children’s participation in certain activities3 was improper because the court lacked
“the authority to do so without the parties having an opportunity to stipulate to what it
might look like.” But father fails to cite any legal authority supporting his position. The

3 Father also claims that the district court modified the parties’ agreement with respect to
the parties’ continued (1) use of OFW, and (2) responsibility for the costs of activities in
accordance with PICS percentages in place at the time the expense occurred. But these
requirements did not change any prior agreements of the parties.
10
failure to cite legal authority supporting an argument constitutes forfeiture of the argument.
In re Welfare of Child of J.H., 968 N.W.2d 593, 602 n.7 (Minn. App. 2021), rev. denied
(Minn. Dec. 6, 2021). And “[a]lthough some accommodations may be made for pro se
litigants, this court has repeatedly emphasized that pro se litigants are generally held to the
same standards as attorneys and must comply with court rules.” Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald,
629 N.W.2d 115, 119 (Minn. App. 2001). Thus, father’s argument is not properly before
us.
Moreover, th e PC’s report #3 states that the PC’s decisions “are legally binding
unless and until changed by the court.” (Emphasis added.) And the PC’s report #4 contains
a similar provision. As such, unreviewable decision-making authority is not bestowed
upon the PC. Further, this court in Szarzynski, indicated that judicial review of a PC’s
decision is not prohibited. See 732 N.W.2d at 290-91 (observing that, notwithstanding the
PC’s decision, the appellant could move the district court to modify the parenting plan the
parties reached under Minn. Stat. § 518.1705 to grant a request for unsupervised parenting
time). Rather, the district court retains authority over parenting issues, irrespective of the
appointment of a PC. See id. at 293.
Finally, the district court’s modification was consistent with the parties’ previous
agreement as set forth in the PC’s reports, as well as the parties’ course of conduct. The
parties previously “agreed that it is reasonable for the children to participate in one
sport/activity per season (Fall, Winter, Spring, and Summer)” and, consistent with this
agreement, mother continued to enroll the children in their usual activities. Father was on
notice that mother enrolled the children in these activities and never voiced any objection.
11
Father’s failure to object indicates an implicit acquiescence to the children’s participation
in their usual activities. Under these circumstances, the district court’s modification did
not change the parties’ implicit agreement related to the children’s activities. Accordingly,
the district court did not err in reforming the PC’s decision regarding the children’s
participation in extracurricular activities.
Affirmed.