State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0818

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Alfredo Torrez,
Appellant.

Filed May 5, 2025
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Polk County District Court
File No. 60-CR-22-1611

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Greg Widseth, Polk County Attorney, Tanner Hermanson, Assistant County Attorney,
Crookston, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Joseph McInnis, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Bond, Judge; and Florey,
Judge.
∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REYES, Judge
In this direct appeal from his conviction of controlled-substance crimes, appellant
argues that (1) he must be permitted to withdraw his guilty pleas because they were both
involuntary and unintelligent; (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel; and (3) the
district court erred by imposing separate sentences for each of his convictions because they
were part of the same behavioral incident. We affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Alfredo Torrez with four drug-
related offenses that occurred in Polk County. The district court denied appellant’s request
to appoint a Spanish interpreter. On the morning of trial, appellant reached a plea
agreement with the state. Under the agreement, appellant would enter Alford guilty pleas
to first-degree controlled-substance crime—sale (count I) and conspiracy to commit first-
degree controlled-substance crime—sale (count IV).
1 The state agreed to dismiss the other
two counts and extend to appellant’s wife an offer that would resolve her pending cases
without jail time. The parties had no agreement on sentencing and left it to the district
court’s discretion.
Approximately two weeks later, appellant moved to withdraw his guilty pleas
because he no longer believed that they were in his best interest. At the hearing on his

1 “An Alford plea is a guilty plea by a defendant who maintains their innocence but pleads
guilty because they conclude that the evidence the State is likely to offer at trial is sufficient
to convict.” State v. King, 990 N.W.2d 406, 417 n.5 (Minn. 2023).
3
motion to withdraw, appellant testified that he believed the prosecutor would give him
twenty years but that a jury might give him “a chance.” Appellant also mentioned that he
forgets “a lot of stuff” and did not know if he was getting dementia. The district court
ultimately denied appellant’s motion and sentenced him to concurrent sentences of 117
months on count IV and 138 months on count I. This appeal follows.
DECISION
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied appellant’s motion
to withdraw his guilty pleas.

Appellant argues that he must be permitted to withdraw his guilty pleas under both
the fair-and-just and manifest-injustice standards because the pleas were involuntary and
unintelligent. We are not convinced.
A district court has “broad discretion” to permit withdrawal of a defendant’s guilty
plea, which we review for an abuse of discretion. State v. Abdisalan, 661 N.W.2d 691, 693
(Minn. App. 2003). A defendant can withdraw a guilty plea under one of two
circumstances. The first is to “correct a manifest injustice.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd.
1. The second is “at any time before sentence if it is fair and just to do so.” Id., subd. 2.
Because appellant’s brief does not make a withdrawal argument under the fair-and -just
standard, we only review his argument under the manifest -injustice standard. See State v.
Butcher, 563 N.W.2d 776, 780 (Minn. App. 1997) (an inadequately briefed issue is not
properly before this court).
Under this standard, a district court must permit a defendant to withdraw their guilty
plea at any time if they present “proof to the satisfaction of the court that withdrawal is
4
necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” Abdisalan, 661 N.W.2d at 693. “A manifest
injustice exists if a guilty plea is invalid,” which occurs when a plea is “not accurate,
voluntary, or intelligent.” State v. Brown, 896 N.W.2d 557, 560 (Minn. App. 2017).
Appellate courts review de novo whether a guilty plea is valid because it is a question of
law and review the district court’s factual findings in support of its determination for clear
error. Id.; State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010). “Findings of fact are not
clearly erroneous if there is reasonable evidence to support them.” State v. Danh, 516
N.W.2d 539, 544 (Minn. 1994).
The district court denied appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas under both
standards. Under the manifest-injustice standard, the district court determined that
appellant’s pleas were accurate, voluntary, and intelligent because he “had more than
adequate time to discuss with counsel” his options and the implications of the plea
agreement, and the record reflected that he “understood the charges, his rights under the
law . . . the inducements of the plea agreement/sentencing agreement and the consequences
of pleading guilty.” Additionally, the district court determined that there was “no
evidence” of “any undue pressures upon [appellant],” or that anyone “coerced the
[appellant] or otherwise forced [him] to enter the plea agreement/sentencing agreement.”
A. Appellant’s pleas were intelligent.
Appellant argues that his guilty pleas were unintelligent and thus invalid “because
his cognitive deficits prevented him from understanding their consequences and raised
doubts about his competence to stand trial.” The “cognitive deficits” appellant refers to
5
are (1) his disability in communication, which required a Spanish-language interpreter2 and
(2) dementia.3 The single consequence that appellant refers to is “that he had believed that
the plea gave him a chance to take care of his wife—not that he would be imprisoned for
the rest of his life.”
“The intelligence requirement [of a valid guilty plea] ensures that a defendant
understands the charges against him, the rights he is waiving, and the consequences of his
plea.” Brown, 896 N.W.2d at 561 (quotations omitted). A defendant “need not know every
consequence” of their plea for it to be intelligent, but they do need to know the direct
consequences, which are “definite, immediate[,] and automatic and are punitive and a part
of a defendant’s sentence.” Id. (quotations omitted).
At his plea hearing, appellant pleaded guilty to counts I and IV. He testified that he
understood “what’s going on here today,” that he was pleading guilty to counts I and IV,
and, in exchange, the state would dismiss counts II and III. Appellant confirmed that he
and defense counsel discussed “all of [his] options on how to proceed,” his “legal rights in
relation to case processing,” and the plea agreement. The district court thoroughly
explained the rights appellant was waiving by pleading guilty, and appellant repeatedly

2 The record does not support appellant’s argument that he was disabled in communication.
Appellant has extensive experience with the court system, reads and writes English, was
born in Texas, is a U.S. citizen, could “communicate effectively” with his att orney, and
understood his plea-hearing proceedings.
3 Despite several references to dementia in his brief, there is no evidence in the record of
appellant having a dementia diagnosis. When appellant mentioned his memory difficulties
at trial, the district court asked whether appellant, who wa s 72 years old, had ever been
diagnosed with “Alzheimer’s, or any diagnosis like that?” Appellant testified that he had
never seen a doctor in his life and did not have a diagnosis but felt confident in his ability
to “understand what’s going on today, and to go forward with the plea agreement.”
6
responded that he understood. Appellant testified that he was comfortable moving forward
with the plea agreement. The prosecutor went through the plea agreement in detail .
Appellant confirmed that he understood it and acknowledged that the parties had no
agreement on sentencing. Additionally, appellant’s familiarity with court proceedings
given his prior convictions and sentences cuts against his argument that his pleas were
unintelligent. See State v. Doughman, 340 N.W.2d 348, 353 (Minn. App. 1983), rev.
denied (Minn. Mar. 15, 1984).
We conclude that appellant’s guilty pleas were intelligent because he was informed
of, and agreed that he understood, “the charges against him, the rights he [was] waiving,
and the consequences of his plea.” Brown, 896 N.W.2d at 561 (quotations omitted).
B. Appellant’s pleas were voluntary.
Appellant argues that his pleas were involuntary and therefore invalid because he
was “coercively forced [] to plead guilty to spare his terminally-ill wife jail time.” Part of
the plea agreement, which the state fully disclosed to the district court, provided that the
state would (1) not seek execution of appellant’s wife’s probationary sentences; (2) make
an offer to appellant’s wife to resolve her pending cases without additional jail time; and
(3) try to accommodate a contact visit between appellant and his wife before his transport
to prison.
The voluntariness requirement “ensures a defendant is not pleading guilty to
improper pressure or coercion.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 96. Under a “package deal” or
contingent-plea agreement, which is an agreement in which “a defendant agrees to plead
guilty in exchange for leniency for a third party[,]” a defendant must be permitted to
7
withdraw his or her guilty plea if “the state fails to fully inform the [district] court of the
nature of the plea, or if the [district] court fails to adequately inquire into the voluntariness
of the plea at the time of the guilty plea.” Danh, 516 N.W.2d at 542-43. Voluntariness is
analyzed “by considering all of the relevant circumstances.” Id. at 544 (quotations
omitted).
The Danh inquiry is more thorough than the typical voluntariness inquiry under
Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.01, subd. 1(4)(c).4 Id. at 542. Relevant factors for analyzing whether
a contingent-plea agreement was voluntary include: (1) whether the prosecutor had a
reasonable and good-faith case against the third party; (2) the strength of the factual basis
for the plea; (3) the nature and degree of coerciveness; (4) whether leniency to the third
party was a significant factor in the defendant’s decision to plead guilty; (5) the defendant’s
age; (6) whether the defendant or prosecutor initiated the plea negotiations; and (7) whether
charges were already filed against the third party. Id. at 543.
While the district court did not explicitly state that it was undertaking a separate
Danh analysis, the record reflects that it engaged in sufficient inquiry with respect to the
factors, which supports its ultimate determination that appellant’s pleas were voluntary.
The district court noted the evidence the state had against appellant ; took judicial
notice of appellant’s prior cases and convictions; noted that the judge in appellant’s case
was also the judge in related cases in which defendant’s wife and son were defendants and

4 Appellant argues that “[t]he district court not only ignored the inquiries required in Danh,
but also it did not even ask the basic questions required by Rule 15.01, subd. 1(4)(c).”
Because the Danh factors support that appellant’s pleas were voluntary, we decline to
address his rule 15 argument.
8
that appellant’s case “was combined” with their cases; and noted appellant’s age.
Additionally, the prosecutor made a clear record of what the plea agreement entailed,
including that appellant’s wife would be treated with leniency. The record at appellant’s
plea hearing speaks to all of the Danh factors except whether the defendant or the
prosecutor initiated plea negotiations, and supports the district court’s determination that
appellant’s pleas were voluntary. Id. at 543. We agree with the district court’s
determination.
II. Appellant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel from his public
defender.

Appellant argues that his public defender provided constitutionally defective
assistance of counsel because he (1) undermined appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty
pleas and elicited damaging evidence from appellant at the motion hearing and (2) failed
to request a competency evaluation of appellant under Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01. We
disagree.
A. Standard of Review
As an initial matter, appellant argues that we should review this claim for structural
error. “A structural error occurs when counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s
case to meaningful adversarial testing,” entitling a defendant to relief without having to
demonstrate prejudice. Dereje v. State, 837 N.W.2d 714, 722 (Minn. 2013) (quotations
omitted). The “meaningful adversarial testing exception . . . must involve a complete
failure by counsel and does not apply to counsel’s failure to oppose the [s]tate’s case at
specific points in the proceeding.” Id. (emphasis added).
9
Because appellant argues that his public defender failed to oppose the state’s case
at one “specific point[] in the proceeding,” namely, only at the plea- withdrawal hearing,
the “meaningful adversarial testing exception” does not apply, and appellant’s argument
fails. Id.
In the alternative, appellant argues that we should review this claim under the two-
prong test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). We agree
that this is the appropriate standard of review for appellant’s claim. Under the Strickland
test, an appellant must show (1) that their counsel’s performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness and (2) that a reasonable probability exists that the outcome
would have been different but for their counsel’s errors. Andersen v. State, 830 N.W.2d 1,
10 (Minn. 2013); see State v. Bobo, 770 N.W.2d 129, 138 (Minn. 2009) (quotations
omitted). If one prong of the test is dispositive, this court need not address both. Andersen,
830 N.W.2d at 10.
Counsel acts within an objective standard of reasonableness when they provide the
client “with the representation by an attorney exercising the customary skills and diligence
that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under similar circumstances.” Bobo,
770 N.W.2d at 138 (quotations omitted). “[T]here is a strong presumption that counsel’s
performance was reasonable.” Andersen, 830 N.W.2d at 10. “Under the prejudice prong,
a defendant must show that his counsel’s errors so prejudiced the defendant at trial that a
different outcome would have resulted but for the error.” Bobo, 770 N.W.2d at 138
(quotations omitted).
10
Appellate courts review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel de novo because
they “involve mixed questions of law and fact.” Johnson v. State, 673 N.W.2d 144, 148
(Minn. 2004).
B. Appellant’s public defender’s performance did not fall below an
objective standard of reasonableness at the plea-withdrawal hearing.

Appellant argues that his public defender provided ineffective assistance of counsel
when he “plainly elicited evidence that damaged [appellant]’s case” and framed the
withdrawal argument as appellant simply changing his mind.
Appellant’s public defender, per appellant’s request, filed a motion to withdraw
appellant’s guilty pleas. At the hearing on the motion, appellant’s counsel correctly stated
that the district court had the discretion to decide whether to permit withdrawal. Defense
counsel also stated that he took “no issue” with the state’s memorandum opposing
withdrawal. Defense counsel then questioned appellant about his motion. Appellant
testified that he thought a jury would give him “a chance” at a shorter sentence and
confirmed that his request boiled down to him changing his mind. Trial counsel put forth
the basis for withdrawal that appellant provided to him. We t herefore conclude that
appellant’s public defender’s performance did not fall below an objective standard of
reasonableness.
C. Appellant’s public defender’s performance did not fall below an
objective standard of reasonableness when he failed to request a rule
20.01 evaluation.

“[A] defense attorney’s failure to challenge a defendant’s competence to proceed is
deficient representation if a reasonably skilled attorney would have doubted the
11
defendant’s competence under the circumstances.” State v. Epps, 996 N.W.2d 226, 239
(Minn. App. 2023).
In State v. Epps, this court affirmed the district court’s decision denying the
appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas on the basis that he was incompetent to
enter them even when, at a postconviction hearing, he presented testimony from himself,
his probation officer, his trial attorney, and a forensic psychologist who previously found
him incompetent three times and competent once. Id. at 233-34. There, the appellant
testified at the guilty- plea and sentencing hearings “that he felt comfortable pleading
guilty,” that he called the victim in violation of the domestic-abuse no-contact order, and
that he understood the rights he was giving up by pleading guilty. Id. at 230-32. We
concluded that the appellant’s conduct “did not provide the attorney with an objective
reason to doubt [the appellant]’s competence.” Id. at 239.
The evidence in Epps was significantly more substantial than the evidence before
the district court. Appellant’s age, his testimony at the plea hearing that he understood
what was going on and that he wished to proceed with his guilty pleas, and his ability to
communicate effectively with everyone throughout his case, all support that “a reasonably
skilled attorney would [not] have doubted” appellant’s competence under the
circumstances. Id. at 239. Appellant’s comments about his memory, when considering
the totality of the circumstances, is not enough to overcome the strong presumption that
trial counsel acted reasonably by not requesting a rule 20.01 evaluation. See Andersen,
830 N.W.2d at 10. We conclude that appellant cannot meet the first prong under
Strickland, and his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim fails.
12
III. The district court did not err when it imposed separate sentences for each of
appellant’s convictions.

Appellant argues that the district court erred when it imposed separate sentences for
each of his convictions because “there was no showing that [they] were not part of the same
behavioral incident.” Appellant’s claim is unavailing.
Minn. Stat. § 609.035, subd. 1, “generally prohibits multiple sentences, even
concurrent sentences, for two or more offenses that were committed as part of a single
behavioral incident.” State v. Bakken, 883 N.W.2d 264, 270 (Minn. 2016); see Minn. Stat.
§ 609.035, subd. 1 (2024) (“[I]f a person’s conduct constitutes more than one offense under
the laws of this state, that person may be punished for only one of the offenses.”). Whether
multiple offenses “were part of a single behavioral incident is a mixed question of law and
fact, so [appellate courts] review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its
application of the law to those facts de novo.” Bakken, 833 N.W.2d at 270. To determine
whether multiple crimes were part of a single behavioral incident, appellate courts consider
“(1) whether the offenses occurred at substantially the same time and place[] and
(2) whether the conduct was motivated by an effort to obtain a single criminal objective.”
Id. (quotations omitted).
Because appellant entered Alford guilty pleas, we consider what evidence the state
would have presented at trial to show appellant’s guilt on each charge. See State v. Theis,
742 N.W.2d 643, 649 (Minn. 2007). On count I, the sale charge, the state would have
presented evidence that, on October 6, 2022, law enforcement found six wrapped baggies
of methamphetamine at appellant’s home in addition to evidence that the
13
methamphetamine was for sale versus for personal use. The state would have also
presented evidence of statements appellant made to law enforcement one week later in
which he admitted to receiving the drugs a few days before they were found at his home,
how much he paid for them, and his expected profit.
On count IV, the conspiracy charge, the state would have presented testimony that
appellant’s son was selling methamphetamine; testimony from a witness who dealt directly
with appellant “for quite some time” to obtain “substantial quantities of
methamphetamine”; and evidence that drugs associated with appellant’s family were found
on others during various searches.
We conclude that the evidence that the state would have produced at trial shows that
the offenses occurred at substantially different times. See State v. Heath, 685 N.W.2d 48,
61 (Minn. 2004).
Regarding the “single criminal objective” prong, while “defendants convicted of
drug sales may be motivated by the single criminal objective of selling drugs to relieve
financial hardship, [the supreme court] has held that the criminal plan of obtaining as much
money as possible is too broad an objective to constitute a single criminal goal within the
meaning of section 609.035.” State v. Gould, 562 N.W.2d 518, 521 (Minn. 1997); see
State v. Barthman, 938 N.W.2d 257, 267 (Minn. 2020).
We conclude that counts I and IV were not part of a single behavioral incident and
that the district court properly imposed separate sentences on each conviction.
Affirmed.