In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: A. N. W. and Z. C. W., Parents.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0827

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:
A. N. W. and Z. C. W., Parents.

Filed October 14, 2024
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Scott County District Court
File No. 70-JV-23-4436

Mallory K. Stoll, Blahnik, Prchal & Stoll, PLLC, Prior Lake, Minnesota (for appellant
A.N.W.)

Lucas J.M. Dawson, Halberg Criminal Defense, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for Z.C.W.)

Ronald Hocevar, Scott County Attorney, Elisabeth M. Johnson, Todd P. Zettler, Assistant
County Attorneys, Shakopee, Minnesota (for respondent county)

Madeline Erickson, Chaska, Minnesota (Guardian ad Litem)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Cochran,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CONNOLLY, Judge
On appeal from the termination of her parental rights, appellant -mother argues that
the district court abused its discretion in terminating her parental rights because
respondent-county failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence (A) a statutory bas is
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for termination of appellant’s parental rights; and (B) that the child’s best interests support
termination. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant A.N.W. (mother) and Z.C.W. (father) are the parents of M.A.W., born in
November 2022. Mother was the sole physical and sole legal custodian of the child because
she and father are not legally married. But father signed a recognition of parentage, and he
and mother and father claim to have been married in a religious ceremony in April 2022.
Mother moved to Minnesota in the beginning of 2022, after she met father online. At
the time the child was born, father and mother were living with father’s parents, his two
brothers, and a nephew. Mother was the child’s primary caretaker, and other family members
helped with feeding and changing the child.
On Christmas Eve of 2022, father and mother brought the child to the emergency
room. Mother claimed that, while father was downstairs, she accidentally dropped a half-full
mug of water onto the bed, which bounced and hit the child, who was lying on the bed. An
examination of the child revealed a “very small laceration” on her nose and a small
“contusion” on her right cheek. The child was subsequently discharged, and notes from the
examining physician indicated no basis to suggest suspicion of nonaccidental trauma.
A few weeks later, mother and father noticed that the child was “especially fussy” and
was “not using her right arm normally.” The parents took the child to the hospital, where
examining personnel observed “linear markings” on the child’s wrists, and an X-ray revealed
a fracture of her right arm. When asked about the child’s injuries, the parents were “unsure
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of how she sustained the right radial facture,” but stated that the child “is often very difficult
to dress” because she is “‘very strong and wiggly.’”
The child remained at the hospital overnight and, the next morning, a detective and a
child-protection worker spoke with the parents. During the interview, the parents described
the child as “very difficult.” They suggested that the broken arm may have been sustained
when mother was changing the child, and that the marks on the child’s wrists could have been
from round mittens that went around her hands and were held in place by Velcro.
Given that the cause of the child’s injuries was uncertain, the child was placed on a
72-hour health-and-safety hold. Upon being informed of the 72 -hour hold, the parents
became upset, and father stated that Minnesota law did not apply to him because he was not
a citizen of Minnesota, but instead claimed to be a sovereign citizen. The parents, however,
ultimately acquiesced to the 72 -hour hold, and the child was placed with the paternal
grandmother as the primary supervisor.
The child was discharged from the hospital on January 13, 2023, which was the Friday
before the Martin Luther King Day holiday weekend. After the long weekend, the social
worker attempted to contact the paternal grandmother, but was unable to reach her. A
subsequent investigation revealed that mother and father rented a U-Haul for a “one-way” trip
to Knoxville, Tennessee. And further investigation revealed that mother and father were
located at mother’s grandmother’s residence in Kentucky.
Law enforcement in Kentucky learned that mother and father “were believed to be
sovereign citizens and possibly armed with a firearm,” which indicated a “heightened risk.”
Police then obtained a search warrant for mother’s grandmother’s residence and pla ced
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several squad cars in front of the residence with their “emergency lights activated so it was
very apparent the police were there.” Law enforcement also attempted to contact father
through his cell phone, but the calls went straight to voicemail. And police simultaneously
attempted to make contact with mother and father through a loudspeaker.
Approximately two hours into the stand -off, a SWAT unit was called . Father
eventually contacted law enforcement, and negotiations ensued. Both mother and father were
active in the negotiations, and after approximately an hour of negotiating, father and mother
exited the residence. Father and mother were then arrested and charged with kidnapping.
And, during a search of mother’s grandmother’s home, police discovered a handgun that was
lawfully registered to father, as well as conditions in the home consistent with hoarding.
On January 18, 2023, respondent Scott County Human Services (the “county”) filed a
petition alleging that the child was in need of protection or services (CHIPS). A hearing was
then held on January 26, 2023, at which both mother and father referenced a potential genetic
explanation for the child’s broken arm, suggesting that the child may suffer from osteogenesis
imperfecta, which is also known as “brittle bone disease.” The distric t court found that,
although “mother and father expressed a desire to cooperate” with the county, the petition
established a prima facia showing that a juvenile protection matter existed. The district court,
therefore, ordered that the child remain in the temporary custody of the county for continued
placement in foster care.
On April 6, 2023, the county filed an expedited petition to terminate the parental rights
of mother and father on three statutory grounds: (1) Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2)
(2022) (parental neglect); (2) Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4) (2022) (palpable
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unfitness); and (3) Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(6) (2022) (egregious harm). 1
Following an eight-day trial in January and February of 2024,2 the district court denied the
county’s petition to terminate father’s parental rights. But the district court determined that
clear and convincing evidence supported the termination of mother’s parental rights under the
three statutory grounds alleged in the petition. The district court also determined that the
county made reasonable efforts to reunite mother with the child, and that termination of
mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests. Mother appeals.
DECISION
Parental rights may be terminated only “for grave and weighty reasons.” In re
Welfare of Children of B.M., 845 N.W.2d 558, 563 (Minn. App. 2014) (quotation omitted).
A district court may involuntarily terminate parental rights when the responsible social-
services agency made reasonable efforts toward reunification or those efforts were not
required, at least one statutory condition supports termination, and termination is in the
child’s best interests. See In re Welfare of Child of S.E.P. , 744 NW.2d 381 , 385 (Minn.
2008); Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a) (2022) (addressing when reasonable efforts are not
necessary).

1 After the district court filed its order in this matter, the legislature amended Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 1(b), by removing subdivision 1(b)(3) from the statutory grounds for
termination, which led to the renumbering of subdivision 1(b)(3) -(9). See 2024 Minn.
Laws ch. 115, art. 18, § 38, at 190-91. For consistency purposes, we cite the version of the
statute in effect at the time of the termination of parental rights (TPR) proceedings.
2 Due to the kidnapping charges, mother and father were incarcerated from January 2023,
until January 2024, and the criminal cases against them were scheduled to begin on
February 8, 2024.
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On appeal from a decision to terminate parental rights, this court reviews the district
court’s factual findings for clear error. S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 385, 387. In doing so, “we
closely inquire into the sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether it was clear and
convincing.” Id. at 385. But the district court’s ultimate decision whether to terminate
parental rights is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of Child of R.V.M. , 8
N.W.3d 680, 688 (Minn. App. 2024), rev. denied (Minn. July 19, 2024).
Mother concedes that the county engaged in reasonable efforts to reunify her with
her child. But mother argues that the district court erred by finding that the county proved
the three statutory grounds for the termination of her parental rights. See Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), (4), (6). And mother contends that the record lacks clear and
convincing evidence that termination of her parental rights was in the child’s best interests.
A. Statutory bases for termination of mother’s parental rights
The district court determined that clear and convincing evidence was presented
supporting the termination of mother’s parental rights under the following statutory
grounds: (1) Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2) (parental neglect); Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. 1(b)(4) (palpable unfitness); and (3) Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(6) (egregious
harm). Because only one statutory ground is necessary for the termination of parental rights,
we may affirm if at least one of these statutory grounds has bee n properly established ,
provided that the other requirements for terminating parental rights are satisfied. In re Welfare
of Children of R.W., 678 N.W.2d 49, 55 (Minn. 2004).

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1. Parental neglect
The district court may terminate parental rights if “the parent has substantially,
continuously, or repeatedly refused or neglected to comply with the duties imposed upon
that parent by the parent and child relationship.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1( b)(2).
Such duties include providing food, clothing, shelter, education, and other care and control
necessary for healthy child development. Id. “The district court must also determine that,
at the time of termination, the parent is not presently able and willing to assume her
responsibilities and that the condition will continue for the reasonably foreseeable future.”
In re Welfare of Child of A.M.C., 920 N.W.2d 648, 655 (Minn. App. 2018); see also In re
Welfare of S.Z., 547 N.W.2d 886, 893 (Minn. 1996) (instructing district court to “address
conditions that exist at the time of the hearing”).
Mother argues that the district court’s conclusions “are insufficient to satisfy this
ground for termination” because the court “relie [d] primarily on two incidents in which
[the child] was injured while in [mother’s] care,” which she claims “fail to satisfy the
statutory requirement that [mother] continuously or repeatedly refused to comply with the
duties imposed on her by the parent-child relationship.” We disagree. In finding that there
was clear and convincing evidence to warrant termination of mother’s parental rights under
section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(2), the district court referenced not only the injuries
that occurred to the child while in mother’s care, but also mother’s “dishonest[y] from the
start,” and her “refus[al] to acknowledge any responsibility” for the injuries. Moreover,
the district court found that mother placed the child in danger by fleeing to Kentucky and
refusing to comply with requests by law enforcement to leave the house. Mother’s conduct,
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when combined with her ongoing refusal to take responsibility for her actions, supports the
district court’s determination that mother has substantially, continuously, or repeatedly
refused or neglected to comply with the duties imposed upon her by the parent and child
relationship. As such, clear and convincing evidence supports the district court’s
determination of parental neglect under the statute.
2. Palpable unfitness
The district court also determined that the county presented clear and convincing
evidence supporting termination of mother’s parental rights under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. 1(b)(4). A district court may terminate parental rights under this statute w hen a
parent is
palpably unfit to be a party to the parent and child relationship
because of a consistent pattern . . . of specific conditions
directly relating to the parent and child relationship . . . which
are determined by the court to be of a duration or nature that
renders the parent unable, for the reasonably foreseeable
future, to care appropriately for the ongoing physical, mental,
or emotional needs of the child.

Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4). There must be “a consistent pattern of specific
conduct or specific conditions existing at the time of the hearing that appear will continue
for a prolonged, indefinite period and that are permanently detrimental to the welfare of
the child.” In re Welfare of T.R. , 750 N.W.2d 656, 661 (Minn. 2008). The specific
condition must directly affect the individual’s ability to parent. Id. at 662.
Mother argues that, under In re Welfare of M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d 370 (Minn. 1990),
the district court’s conclusions are insufficient to support termination of her parental rights
for palpable unfitness. In M.D.O., the appellant was convicted of second -degree murder
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of her adopted child. 462 N.W.2d at 372. The respondent subsequently moved to terminate
the appellant’s parental rights to a later born child, alleging that the appellant was palpably
unfit to be a parent because of a consistent pattern of specific condu ct and specific
conditions permanently detrimental to the later -born child’s health. Id. at 372-73. The
district court denied the petition, and this court reversed, concluding that the appellant was
palpably unfit to parent because the criminal convictio n showed a “consistent pattern of
abuse” of the child and mother refused “to admit her culpability” for the child’s death. Id.
at 374. On appeal, the supreme court reversed this court, concluding that the criminal
conviction did not support a finding of “a consistent pattern of abuse” because it is not an
element of the crime of which the appellant was convicted. Id. at 376. The supreme court
also determined that the record supported the district court’s findings that the respondent
failed to present clear and convincing evidence that the appellant fit the pattern of an
abusive parent likely to repeat abusive acts. Id. at 378. And the supreme court determined
that the record supported the district court’s findings that the appellant “had profited from
. . . treatment programs available in prison and, if given the opportunity, . . . would be a
good candidate for therapy.” Id.
Mother argues that M.D.O. supports reversal because, similar to M.D.O., there are
no findings here that she “is at risk of future and repeated abusive acts,” and she “not only
expressed a willingness to cooperate with [the county] and follow court orders,” but also
“immediately engaged with and became fully compliant with he r case plan within three
weeks of being released from custody.” This argument is unavailing. Unlike in M.D.O.,
the district court in this case did make findings that mother has engage d in a consistent
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pattern of specific conduct that rendered mother unable to appropriately care for the child.
See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4). Specifically, the district court found that mother
engaged in abusive conduct on two occasions, including conduct serious enough to
“cleanly break” the child’s arm. The district court also found that, after breaking the child’s
arm, mother fled with father and the child to Kentucky in violation of the 72-hour hold and
placed the child in a dangerous position by engaging in a standoff with law enforcement.
And the district court found that, despite her actions, mother has never “acknowledged
what truly happened or taken any responsibility for her actions or decisions,” which has
“prohibited her from safety planning to ensure [m]other received the services or assistance
she needed to ensure the abuse never happens again.” These findings support the
conclusion that, under section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(4), mother is palpably unfit to
be a party to the parent and child r elationship. See In re Children of T.A.A. , 702 N.W.2d
703, 708-09 (Minn. 2005) (affirming palpable-unfitness determination where parent failed
to protect her children from abuse by others in the past and refused to recognize her
responsibility to protect her child from abuse).
Mother argues that the “district court’s findings and conclusions that [she] refused
to accept responsibility for the fact that [the child] sustained injuries while in her care are
clearly erroneous,” because she testified that the child was injured while she was caring for
her. Indeed, when asked if the child’s arm was broken “while in [her] care,” mother replied,
“I suppose so, yes.” But acknowledging that the child’s arm was broken while in her care
is different than acknowledging that she caused the injury and taking responsibility for her
actions. Mother testified that she had no idea how the child’s arm was broken and claimed
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that the marks on the child’s wrists were from Velcro on the child’s baby mittens. The
district court did not find this testimony to be credible, and we defer to this credibility
determination. See Pechovnik v. Pechovnik, 765 N.W.2d 94, 99 (Minn. App. 2009) (noting
that appellate courts defer to the district court’s explicit and implicit credibility
determinations). And because we defer to the district court’s credibility determination, the
record supports the district court’s findings that mother “has been dishonest from the start,”
and never “acknowledged what truly happened or taken any responsibility for her actions
or decisions.”
Mother further argues that the “record does not contain clear and convincing
evidence that the conditions which lead to this juvenile protection matter would continue
for [the] reasonably foreseeable future” because, among other things, she has engaged in
services since her release from custody. But, although the district court found that mother
“cooperated with case planning to a certain extent,” the court also found that mother “has
not participated in safety planning and shows no indication of being honest about her
frustrations and behaviors.” In fact, the district court specifically found mother’s testimony
that she is willing to cooperate with any services and follow any court orders to not be
credible. Instead, the district court found that mother’s “testimony was guarded and lacked
awareness or acknowledgment for [the child].” And the district court stated that it did “not
believe [m]other would successfully be able to safety plan for [the child] given her denial
of the abuse.” It is well settled that, when reviewing TPR decisions, “[c]onsiderable
deference” is afforded the district court because it is in a “superior position to assess the
credibility of witnesses.” In re Welfare of S.S.W., 767 N.W.2d 723, 733 (Minn. App. 2009)
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(quotation omitted). In light of the deference afforded the district court’s credibility
determinations, the record supports the district court’s determination that the conditions
which lead to this child -protection matter would continue for the reasonabl y foreseeable
future because mother has failed to take credible steps to protect the child from herself.
Accordingly, clear and convincing evidence supports the determination that mother is
palpably unfit to be a party to the parent and child relationship.3
B. Best interests
If at least one statutory basis to terminate parental rights exists, the paramount
consideration in determining whether parental rights should be terminated is the child ’s
best interests. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7 (2022). Thus, if a district court determines
that a statutory ground for termination exists, it must also determine that termination is in
the child’s best interests before terminating parental rights. See In re Welfare of Children
of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 905 (Minn. App. 2011), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). “The
‘best interests of the child’ means all relevant factors to be considered and evaluated.”
Minn. Stat. § 260C.511(a) (2022).
To evaluate the best interests of a child in a proceeding to terminate parental rights,
a district court must consider “(1) the child ’s interest in preserving the parent -child
relationship; (2) the parent ’s interest in preserving the parent -child relationship; and

3 Because clear and convincing evidence supports two of the statutory bases under which
appellant’s parental rights were terminated, we need not address appellant’s argument that
the district court erred by terminating her parental rights for egregious harm under Minn.
Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(6). See R.W., 678 N.W.2d at 55 (stating that termination of
parental rights may be affirmed if at least one statutory ground has been properly
established).
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(3) any competing interest of the child.” A.M.C., 920 N.W.2d at 657 (quotation omitted);
see also Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.04(c)(2)(ii) (enumerating these factors). “Competing
interests include such things as a stable environment, health considerations and the child’s
preferences.” In re Welfare of R.T.B. , 492 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. App. 1992) . “Where the
interests of parent and child conflict, the interests of the child are paramount.” Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 7. A district court’s best-interest determination is reviewed for an abuse
of discretion. J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 905.
Mother argues that, based on “the district court’s findings and conclusions, none of
the three [best-interests] factors that [it] must consider support termination of [her] parental
rights.” We are not persuaded. The district court considered mother’s interest in
preserving the parent -child relationship and found that mother has “expressed the
importance of being in [the child’s] life.” The district court also considered the child’s
interest in preserving the parent -child relationship and found that “[a ] child generally has
a strong interest in being with her parents or family,” but in this case, the child “cannot
express an opinion or an interest regarding preserving the parent-child relationship.”
Finally, with respect to the competing interests of the child, the district court found
that “it is clear that [the child] suffered trauma from the abuse and separation from her
parents.” The district court also found that the child has been separated fr om mother for
over a year, and the child is now “closely bonded with her foster mother.” And,
importantly, the district court found that mother’s “denial and aversion to accepting
responsibility [for her actions] is not in [the child’s] best interests.” The district court
analyzed and balanced all these considerations and determined that “it is in the best
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interests of the child to have the parental rights of mother terminated.” Mother is unable
to show that the district court’s best-interests determination was an abuse of discretion.
In sum, there is clear and convincing evidence support ing the district court’s
termination of mother’s parental rights under at least two statutory grounds. The district
court also did not abuse its discretion in considering the child’s best interests. Accordingly,
the district court did not abuse its discretion in terminating mother’s parental rights.
Affirmed.