In Re the Custody of: B. G. F.;

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0832

In Re the Custody of: B. G. F.;

Matthew Ryan Foede, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Courtney Ann-Nicole Vaughn,
Appellant,

County of Sherburne,
Intervenor.

Filed January 13, 2025
Affirmed
Wheelock, Judge

Sherburne County District Court
File No. 71-FA-17-101

Carrie A. Doom, McKinnis & Doom, P.A., Cambridge, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cortney Ann-Nicole Vaughn, Big Lake, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and
Wheelock, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WHEELOCK, Judge
In this appeal from an order modifying physical and legal custody, appellant mother
argues that the district court (1) abused its discretion in its evidentiary rulings, (2) abused
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its discretion by modifying the custody order, (3) erred by terminating father’s
child-support obligation, and (4) demonstrated judicial bias. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Cortney Ann-Nicole Vaughn 1 (mother) and respondent Matthew Ryan
Foede (father) are the parents of B.G.F. (the child), born in July 2013. A district court filed
a custody order in June 2018, granting both parents joint legal and joint physical custody
of the child.
Both parents had equal parenting time until fall 2019, when the child started
kindergarten in the Sartell School District. At that time, the schedule changed to allow
mother, who lived in Sartell, to parent the child during the school week and every fourth
weekend while father parented the child during the other three weekends. Beginning in
kindergarten, the child missed classes or entire school days, and his attendance worsened
each year. By the winter of second grade, the child’s teachers identified him as being at
“high risk” in reading comprehension and math based on the school district’s goals for
students his age.
In July 2022, father filed a petition to modify (1) physical custody by reversing the
parenting schedule between the parents such that father would parent the child during the
school week and every fourth weekend and mother would parent the child on the remaining
three weekends in a four-week period and (2) legal custody by directing the child to attend

1 The caption in this matter is taken from the district court record. Minn. R. Civ. P. 143.01
(“The title of the action shall not be changed in consequence of the appeal.”). The caption
here contains a typographical error that reads “Courtney” instead of “Cortney,” which we
do not change.
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school in the Becker School District, where father lived. At a November 2022 initial
hearing on father’s petition, the district court determined that father presented a prima facie
case of endangerment and issued a temporary order granting father’s petition effective
immediately. Although the district court scheduled a full evidentiary hearing for April
2023, mother requested a continuance a few days before the hearing, and the district court
rescheduled it for September 2023.2
The hearing took place over five days spanning September through December,
during which the district court received testimony from father; father’s mother
(grandmother); mother; and E.C., father’s ex-girlfriend who shares a child with father.
Both parties submitted proposed findings in December 2023, and the district court granted
father’s petition in March 2024, in effect making permanent the temporary changes in
physical and legal custody that it had granted in November 2022, though both parents
retained joint legal and joint physical custody.
Mother appeals.
DECISION
Mother challenges the district court’s order in a self-represented brief. Her brief
identifies 12 issues that we organize into four categories: (1) rulings on evidentiary issues;

2 Mother argues that the district court erred because it delayed the hearing, contrary to the
statute’s explicit requirement that it “shall hold a hearing at the earliest possible time to
determine the need to modify the order granting parenting time.” Minn. Stat. § 518.175,
subd. 5(d) (2022). But the only delay was the continuance that mother requested a few
days before the April 2023 hearing date. Mother requested another continuance at the next
hearing date, and the district court denied it in an effort to resolve this matter quickly as
required. We therefore discern no error in the district court’s decision to continue the
hearing to September 2023.
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(2) modifying legal and physical custody; (3) terminating father’s child-support obligation;
and (4) demonstrating judicial bias. We address each category of arguments in turn.
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion in its evidentiary rulings.
Mother asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it made the
following evidentiary rulings: (1) excluding one of mother’s witnesses ; (2) excluding
E.C.’s testimony related to E.C.’s affidavits; (3) admitting a newspaper article; and
(4) excluding mother’s exhibits about the child’s need for testing.
“Rulings on the admissibility of evidence lie within the district court’s discretion,
and this court will not disturb an evidentiary ruling unless it is based on an erroneous view
of the law or is an abuse of that discretion.” Aljubailah v. James, 903 N.W.2d 638, 644
(Minn. App. 2017) (quotation omitted). “[O]n appeal error is never presumed,” Loth v.
Loth, 35 N.W.2d 542, 546 (Minn. 1949) (quotation omitted), and inadequately briefed
issues are not properly before this court, In re Civ. Commitment of Kropp, 895 N.W.2d
647, 653 (Minn. App. 2017), rev. denied (Minn. June 20, 2017). Self-represented parties
are afforded some leeway but “are generally held to the same standards as attorneys and
must comply with court rules.” Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 629 N.W.2d 115, 119 (Minn.
App. 2001).
The Minnesota Rules of Evidence apply to custody-modification proceedings. See
Minn. R. Evid. 1101 (explaining that the rules of evidence apply to all state court
proceedings unless otherwise noted). Pursuant to these rules, the district court makes
preliminary determinations regarding the admissibility of evidence. Minn. R. Evid. 104(a).
The rules require that, for a witness to testify, their testimony must have foundation. For a
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witness’s testimony to have foundation, the testimony must “derive from the witness’
personal experience and personal knowledge” of the facts at issue. Minn. R. Evid. 701
2016 comm. cmt. Testimony is hearsay if it is an out-of-court statement offered to prove
the truth of the matter asserted. Minn. R. Evid. 801(c). The rules prohibit admitting
hearsay unless an exception applies. Minn. R. Evid. 802.
The Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure also apply to parties and their submission
of evidence. These rules allow a district court to prohibit the introduction of evidence if a
party fails to follow a discovery order. Minn. R. Civ. P. 37.02(b)(2). And they require a
party to identify for the court and the other party “each document or other exhibit, including
summaries, . . . identifying those items the party expects to offer” at least 30 days prior to
trial. Minn. R. Civ. P. 26.01(c). A district court’s record of a case includes documents,
such as affidavits, that are submitted to the court. See Est. of King, 992 N.W.2d 410, 415
(Minn. App. 2023) (explaining that these submissions comprise the appellate record).
If a district court erroneously admits or excludes evidence, the party may receive a
new hearing unless the error was harmless. Minn. R. Civ. P. 61; see Goldman v.
Greenwood, 748 N.W.2d 279, 285 (Minn. 2008) (applying rule 61 to an appeal of a
custody-modification order). An error is not harmless if the refusal to grant a new hearing
would be “inconsistent with substantial justice.” See Minn. R. Civ. P. 61. To demonstrate
that such an error resulted in prejudice and therefore was not harmless, an appellant must
show that the error “might reasonably have influenced the fact-finder and changed the
result of the proceeding.” Olson ex rel. A.C.O. v. Olson, 892 N.W.2d 837, 842 (Minn. App.
2017). Keeping these rules in mind, we consider each of mother’s arguments in turn.
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Exclusion of Mother’s Witness
Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion by excusing one of her
witnesses and by allowing father’s attorney to question the witness while preventing
mother from questioning the witness.3
The record shows that, when mother began questioning her witness, father’s
attorney objected on the grounds of foundation. After the district court sustained nine
objections of this nature, father’s attorney offered to “inquire of the witness to see if he
even has any information relevant to these proceedings.” The district court and mother
agreed, and father’s attorney conducted voir dire 4 to determine whether the witness
possessed personal knowledge and experience regarding the facts at issue. T he witness
admitted that he did not know father personally, that he saw mother and child only

3 Mother’s principal brief discusses only one witness but implies that other witnesses were
wrongfully excluded. Her reply brief asserts that the child was another improperly
excluded witness, but because mother did not raise it in her principal brief, we do not reach
this argument. Wood v. Diamonds Sports Bar & Grill, Inc., 654 N.W.2d 704, 707 (Minn.
App. 2002) (“If an argument is raised in a reply brief but not raised in an appellant’s main
brief, and it exceeds the scope of the respondent’s brief, it is not properly before this court
and may be stricken from the reply brief.”), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 26, 2003). Even if we
were to address this argument, it is not persuasive because whether to interview a child is
highly discretionary and, in reaching its decision, the district court considered the
testimony of others that relayed the child’s experiences and preferences. See Madgett v.
Madgett, 360 N.W.2d 411, 413 (Minn. App. 1985) (stating that interviewing a child is
discretionary and that, absent an interview, the district court may consider other evidence
of the child’s needs and preferences).

4 Opposing counsel may “conduct a limited cross-examination, referred to as voir dire,” of
a witness to determine whether there is adequate foundation for the evidence offered. State
v. Hager, 325 N.W.2d 43, 44 (Minn. 1982). The district court’s decision to permit father’s
attorney to conduct this limited voir dire is in keeping with well-established practice and
was not an abuse of the district court’s discretion to manage the admission of evidence.
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“sporadically”—limited to four or five times in 2023—and that his knowledge of this
matter was “based on talking with [mother].” Because the witness knew about the matter
only through conversations with mother, he lacked the foundation required for him to offer
testimony and the district court did not abuse its discretion when it excused the witness.
Exclusion of E.C.’s Testimony
Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion by excluding E.C.’s
testimony about E.C.’s affidavits. E.C. and father share a child from their previous
relationship. E.C. provided an affidavit in support of father’s petition to modify physical
and legal custody, but a year later, she submitted a second affidavit in support of mother.5
At the evidentiary hearing, mother attempted to question E.C. about her second
affidavit and father objected on the grounds of foundation and hearsay. The district court
explained these rules of evidence to mother, who was self-represented during the hearing.
During mother’s questioning, however, E.C. testified that the last time she saw father and
the child at issue in these proceedings was during a brief parenting exchange of E.C. and
father’s shared child over a year before the day of the hearing. Because E.C. had not seen

5 Mother submitted a motion requesting that the district court find that father and his
attorney committed misconduct, conspiracy, and perjury. To support her motion, mother
attached about 50 pages of emails and screenshots of text conversations to demonstrate that
E.C.’s first affidavit was false. Mother alleged that father offered to “agree to [E.C.’s]
terms for custody” of their shared child if E.C. submitted the affidavit in support of his
motion, that father’s attorney wrote the initial affidavit for E.C., and that E.C. agreed to
sign the false affidavit while intoxicated and without reading it. The district court informed
mother that it would not consider mother’s motion at the evidentiary hearing on the motion
to modify custody (father’s motion) because she filed her motion shortly before the hearing
on father’s motion. Mother’s motion and accompanying evidence is included in the record
before us, but because it is not within the scope of this appeal, we do not address the motion
in this opinion.
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or spent time with father or with the child at issue in these proceedings during the time
referenced in her second affidavit, she could not have had personal knowledge about the
father’s relationship with the child as she discussed in her second affidavit and about which
mother attempted to question her during her testimony. Thus, the district court did not
abuse its discretion by excluding E.C.’s testimony about her affidavits.
We also note that E.C.’s testimony about the affidavits would be cumulative and
could be excluded under Minn. R. Evid. 403, and thus, any error in excluding them for lack
of foundation would be harmless. E.C.’s testimony about the affidavits would also be
hearsay as it was about E.C.’s statements within the affidavits and not her personal
knowledge of the events and facts in the affidavits. Because both of the affidavits are in
the record and E.C.’s testimony about the affidavits was properly excluded, the district
court did not abuse its discretion by excluding E.C.’s testimony about the statements she
made in her affidavits and any error was harmless.
Admission of Newspaper Article
Mother next argues that the district court admitted hearsay over her objections, but
the only instance she identified was the admission into evidence of a newspaper article
about a domestic-violence incident . Mother did not object to the admission of the
newspaper article at the hearing.
Father testified that mother called him in 2021 and asked that he keep the child safe
because her ex-boyfriend had threatened mother, father, their child, another of mother’s
children, and that child’s father. Father moved to admit as an exhibit a newspaper article
about the incident, and he testified that the article was consistent with his testimony. We
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agree that the newspaper article was hearsay because it contained out-of-court statements
that were offered to prove that the incident with the ex-boyfriend happened and that,
therefore, the article should not have been admitted. However, because father also testified
to his own experience of the incident and his testimony was consistent with the article, we
conclude that, even if the error had been properly preserved, mother was not prejudiced by
the admission and therefore any error in admitting the article was harmless and cannot
provide a basis for the relief mother seeks.6
Exclusion of Mother’s Exhibits
Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion by not admitting her
exhibits, specifically asserting that it should have admitted additional documentation
supporting the child’s need for attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) testing and
that the exclusion prejudiced her.7
The record shows that mother did not provide notice to the district court or father’s
attorney of her exhibits as required by the applicable rules and that, in fact, she had tried to
upload them on the morning of the hearing. At the hearing, the district court reminded

6 Mother asserts that other testimony was hearsay and prejudiced her, but she does not
identify what statements were erroneously admitted hearsay. Because mother has
inadequately briefed these arguments and error is never presumed on appeal, we do not
consider mother’s vague assertions that the district court admitted other hearsay. See Loth,
35 N.W.2d 546; Kropp, 895 N.W.2d at 653.

7 Mother also asserts that the district court should have considered the guardian ad litem’s
report and the 2018 parenting consultant’s recommendation, but these were prepared for
matters other than the underlying proceeding —mother’s order-for-protection petition that
was dismissed and the initial custody determination, respectively—and are not relevant to
the proceedings here.
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mother that it had told her previously about the applicable rules, including the timely
submission of evidence, and that she was required to follow them. The district court
excluded mother’s exhibits because she did not comply with the rules; we discern no abuse
of discretion. We also conclude that mother cannot demonstrate prejudice resulting from
exclusion of the additional documentation about the child’s alleged ADHD because the
district court permitted mother’s testimony about a possible ADHD diagnosis and admitted
into evidence father’s exhibit of the ADHD assessment mother procured. Thus, the district
court ultimately considered the information about ADHD. We conclude that the district
court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded mother’s exhibits and that any error was
harmless.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by modifying the custody order
as to parenting time and the child’s school district.
Mother challenges the district court’s grant of father’s petition that sought
modifications to legal and physical custody pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d) (2022) ,
arguing that the district court abused its discretion when making the best-interests and
endangerment findings.8 The district court granted father’s specific requests to (1) modify
physical custody such that the child would be with father during the school week and every
fourth weekend—an award of 58.1% of the parenting time —and the child would be with
mother on the other three of every four weekends—an award of 41.9% of the parenting
time—and (2) modify legal custody by changing the child’s school district from Sartell,

8 We note that modifying parenting time does not necessarily equate to modifying custody;
however, as the facts, law, and conclusions are the same for both analyses, we have
combined them in this opinion.
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where mother lived, to Becker, where father lived. We first explain the legal framework
that applies to a request to modify custody under Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d), then we analyze
each of mother’s arguments.
The party seeking to modify custody has the burden to meet the requirements for
modification set forth in Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d) because that statute “governs the
modification of custody orders after a judgment and decree.” Crowley v. Meyer,
897 N.W.2d 288, 293 (Minn. 2017). Where a child attends school is part of a legal custody
award, Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3(a)-(b) (2022), and custody matters are subject to a
best-interests analysis. Novak v. Novak, 446 N.W.2d 422, 424 (Minn. App. 1989)
(explaining that “general determinations of custody and resolution of specific issues” are
all subject to review of the child’s best interests), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 1, 1989); see
Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 3(a) (2022) (listing legal and physical custody modifications as
among a court’s decisions that require a best-interests determination).
A modification of parenting time may be a restriction if the modification increases
one person’s parenting time above 54.9% or decreases another’s parenting time below
45.1%. Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 5(c) (2022); Suleski v. Rupe, 855 N.W.2d 330, 336
(Minn. App. 2014) (“There is no statutory definition of what constitutes a ‘restriction’ of
parenting time.”). “To determine whether a reduction in parenting time constitutes a
restriction or modification, the court should consider the reasons for the changes as well as
the amount of the reduction.” Suleski, 855 N.W.2d at 336 (quotation omitted). If the
modification of parenting time is a restriction, then the district court must find that not
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modifying the “parenting time is likely to endanger the child’s physical or emotional health
or impair the child’s emotional development.” Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 5(c)(1).
To modify a custody order that specifies the child’s primary residence, a district
court must make certain findings. Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d). These findings include that
(1) there has been “a change . . . in the circumstances of the child or the parties” (first
required finding) and (2) “modification is necessary to serve the best interests of the child”
(second required finding). Id. Section 518.18(d) further provides that the district court
“shall retain the custody arrangement or the parenting plan provision specifying the child’s
primary residence that was established by the prior order” unless the court makes the
additional findings in the statute’s applicable subparts. Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d)(i)- (iv).
Here, the district court determined that subsection iv applied. Under section 518.18(d)(iv),
the district court must also find that “the child’s present environment endangers the child’s
physical or emotional health or impairs the child’s emotional development” (third required
finding) and “the harm likely to be caused by a change of environment is outweighed by
the advantage of a change to the child” (fourth required finding). Minn. Stat.
§ 518.18(d)(iv); accord Christensen v. Healey, 913 N.W.2d 437, 440 (Minn. 2018).
Mother’s challenges are to the district court’s determination of the second and third
required findings, the best-interests finding and the endangerment finding, respectively.
We next explain our standard of review before turning to mother’s arguments.
Appellate courts review an order modifying custody for an abuse of discretion.
Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 710 (Minn. 1985). “A district court abuses its discretion
by making findings of fact that are unsupported by the evidence, misapplying the law, or
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delivering a decision that is against logic and the facts on record.” Woolsey v. Woolsey ,
975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted). Appellate courts will defer to a
district court’s ability to evaluate witness credibility and will “set aside a district court’s
findings of fact only if clearly erroneous.” Goldman, 748 N.W.2d at 284. The district
court’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous if the appellate court “is left with the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id. (quotation omitted). When
reviewing the findings of fact for clear error, an appellate court need not “go into an
extended discussion of the evidence to prove or demonstrate the correctness of the findings
of the [district] court”; rather, the appellate court’s duty “is fully performed after it has
fairly considered all the evidence and has determined that the evidence reasonably supports
the decision.” In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 222 (Minn. 2021)
(quotations omitted). Appellate courts “neither reconcile conflicting evidence nor decide
issues of witness credibility, which are exclusively the province of the factfinder.” Gada
v. Dedefo, 684 N.W.2d 512, 514 (Minn. App. 2004). The party challenging the district
court’s findings must show that the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to
the district court’s findings, does not sustain the findings. Vangsness v. Vangsness,
607 N.W.2d 468, 474 (Minn. App. 2000). Having explained our standard of review , we
now turn to mother’s arguments.
A. Best-Interests Factors—the Second Required Finding
Appellate courts review the district court’s balancing of the best-interests factors for
an abuse of discretion. Thornton v. Bosquez, 933 N.W.2d 781, 794 (Minn. 2019). We
begin by noting that the “law leaves scant if any room for an appellate court to question
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the [district] court’s balancing of best-interests considerations.” Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d
at 477. A nonexclusive list of the best-interests factors is set forth in Minn. Stat. § 518.17,
subd. 1 (2022). See Geibe v. Geibe, 571 N.W.2d 774, 778 (Minn. App. 1997) (explaining
that the best-interests factors enumerated in this statute are the second required finding
when deciding whether to modify custody). Pursuant to that statute, the district court must
make detailed findings on each factor “based on the evidence presented and explain how
each factor led to its conclusions.” Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(b)(1).
Here, the district court reviewed the evidence and explained its conclusions on each
of the 12 factors. It determined that factors 1, 2, 4, 7, 8, and 10 favored father; factors 3
and 5 did not apply to the parties; and factors 6, 9, 11, and 12 were neutral. Because it
determined that, overall, the best-interests factors weighed in favor of father, the district
court concluded that the best interests of the child supported father ’s request to modify
custody.
Mother asserts that the district court abused its discretion when reaching its
conclusion on the best-interests factors by (1) basing its decision on only one or two factors
rather than considering them as a whole, (2) determining that six factors did not apply or
were neutral, (3) making insufficient findings of fact to support its conclusions of law,
(4) inaccurately summarizing the child’s attendance records, and (5) not considering her
evidence that would show the factors weighed in her favor.
9 However, all of mother’s

9 Mother also argues that the district court should have considered the merits of each school
district and the effects of modifying physical custody on the child’s insurance coverage ;
however, applicable law does not require the district court to make specific findings or
comparisons about school districts or insurance coverage. Moreover, any concerns about
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arguments ask us to reweigh evidence or engage in credibility determinations, neither of
which we can do. See Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 222 (holding that appellate courts do not
reconcile conflicting evidence on appeal and must review the evidence in support of the
district court’s determinations). Furthermore, we need not provide an extended discussion
of the evidence in order to review the correctness of the district court’s findings. Id.
After reviewing the record, we discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s
determinations on the best-interests factors because evidence supports each of the district
court’s findings. The evidence related to the child’s chronic tardies and absences from
school and his second-grade teachers identifying him as being at “high risk” support the
district court’s finding that the child’s educational development (factor 1), educational
needs (factor 2), ongoing development (factor 7), and stability in school and community
(factor 8) would be served by granting father’s petition. The evidence related to the child’s
exposure to domestic violence in mother’s home supports the district court’s finding that
the child’s well-being and development (factor 4) would be served by granting father’s
petition. Finally, the evidence related to mother’s moving in and out of the Sartell School
District as compared to father’s staying in the Becker School District supports the district
court’s finding that the child’s ongoing development (factor 7) and stability in school and
community (factor 8) would be served by granting father’s petition. Collectively, the

the child’s insurance coverage were moot by the time the district court issued its final
disposition on this matter in March 2024, given that the district court issued the temporary
order in November 2022. Thus, we do not address either of these arguments.
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evidence supports that the modification would maximize parenting time with both parents
(factor 10) and thus also supports granting father’s petition.
We note that the district court did not receive evidence that it would be appropriate
for the child to testify as to his preference (factor 3) or that either parent had physical-,
mental-, or chemical- health needs that affected the child (factor 5), and it properly
concluded that these factors did not apply. As for the remaining factors, the district court
received testimony from mother and father that demonstrated both parents were active in
their relationships with the child (factor 6), the child had siblings with both mother and
father and would continue having a relationship with all of them despite the modification
(factor 9), each parent is committed to supporting the other’s relationship with the child
(factor 11), and there is tension between the parents (factor 12); thus, none of these factors
weigh in favor of or against granting father’s petition. Because the district court’s findings
are supported by the evidence and we do not reweigh or reconcile conflicting evidence, we
discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s determination on the second required
finding under Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d)—that the best interests of the child would be served
by granting father’s petition to modify physical and legal custody.
B. Endangerment—the Third Required Finding
The next step of the section 518.18(d) analysis requires the district court to find
endangerment. Endangerment is determined by looking at “the child’s present
environment” to decide whether it “endangers the child’s physical or emotional health or
impairs the child’s emotional development.” Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d)(iv). As explained
previously, appellate courts do not reweigh or reconcile conflicting evidence and review
17
the evidence to ensure the district court’s decision is supported. Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at
222. Whether endangerment exists is a question of fact that we review for clear error. See
Sharp v. Bilbro, 614 N.W.2d 260, 264 (Minn. App. 2000) (stating that the record must
support the finding of endangerment and that we will not reverse so long as the findings
are not clearly erroneous), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 26, 2000). “The concept of
endangerment is unusually imprecise, but a party must demonstrate a significant degree of
danger to satisfy the endangerment element of section 518.18(d)(iv).” Goldman,
748 N.W.2d at 285 (quotation omitted). Endangerment may be purely to the child’s
emotional development. Geibe, 571 N.W.2d at 778. Poor school performance may
indicate a danger to the child’s well-being and development. Lilleboe v. Lilleboe,
453 N.W.2d 721, 724 (Minn. App. 1990).
Mother argues that the district court clearly erred by concluding that the child was
endangered in her care because the district court did not consider all the evidence. The
evidence that she argues the district court did not consider is that the child told her witness
that he was afraid of being hurt by father, the child was not present during the assault by
her ex-boyfriend and she protected the child from any possible effects of the violence, the
attendance records show that most of child’s absences were excused for appointments or
sick days, and the child was physically harmed in father’s care when his girlfriend cut the
child’s toenails.
The evidence in the record supports the district court’s finding that the child had
attendance and performance issues in school while in mother’s care, and caselaw
demonstrates that this supports a determination of endangerment. In Higgins v. Higgins ,
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we affirmed a district court’s finding of endangerment when a parent “ha[d] a history of
difficulty getting [the child] to school on time” and there were recurring absences, even
when some absences and tardies were excused. No. A12-2127, 2014 WL 273926, at *4-5
(Minn. App. Jan. 27, 2014). 10 Exposure to violence in the home also affects a child’s
well-being and emotional development and thus demonstrates endangerment. For
example, if a child is afraid of a caregiver’s paramour, then this may support a finding of
endangerment, even if the child does not witness domestic abuse between the caregiver
and their paramour. Greenwood v. Greenwood, No. A17-1206, 2018 WL 3097651, at *3
(Minn. App. June 25, 2018). Because the district court received evidence that the child
consistently has been absent from school and that the child is afraid of mother’s boyfriend
and may have been present when there was violence in mother’s home, the district court’s
finding of endangerment was not clearly erroneous.
Based on our review of the record and the district court order, we are not persuaded
by mother’s challenges to the district court’s grant of father’s requests to award father
58.1% of the parenting time and mother 41.9% of the parenting time and to change the
child’s school district from Sartell to Becker. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s
modification of the custody order.
III. The district court did not err by terminating father’s child-support obligation.
Mother argues that the district court erred by terminating father’s child-support
obligation without making findings as required by Minn. Stat. § 518A.37, subd. 1 (2022).

10 “Nonprecedential opinions . . . may be cited as persuasive authority.” Minn. R. Civ.
App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
19
However, the statute on which mother relies refers to deviations from the presumptively
appropriate child-support obligation. Here, the district court applied the presumptively
appropriate child-support obligation and the statutory deviations do not apply.
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law that appellate courts review de
novo. Floding v. Gillespie, 866 N.W.2d 905, 909 (Minn. 2015). “Whether the district
court correctly applied the law is a legal question, which we review de novo.” In re Welfare
of Child. of M.A.H., 839 N.W.2d 730, 746 (Minn. App. 2013). Minnesota law provides
that a parent who is awarded 55% or more of the parenting time of a child receives “a
rebuttable presumption that the parent has a zero dollar basic support obligation.” Minn.
Stat. § 518A.26, subd. 14 (2022) (defining “obligor”). Here, the district court awarded
father 58.1% of the parenting time, which is more than 55% of the parenting time.
Therefore, father, presumptively, has no support obligation under section 518A.26,
subdivision 14, and, absent rebuttal of that presumption, the district court did not need to
provide further written findings. Mother does not dispute the facts, nor has she argued or
shown that any exception to the presumption applies. We thus conclude that the district
court did not err by terminating father’s child -support obligation without further written
findings.
IV. The district court judge did not demonstrate bias.
Mother’s final argument is that the district court judge exhibited bias toward her
because the judge granted father’s motion, the judge informed mother of the time during
the evidentiary hearing, and the judge interrupted mother during her questioning of a
20
witness.11 Appellate courts presume that the district court judge has discharged their duties
properly. Hannon v. State, 752 N.W.2d 518, 522 (Minn. 2008). Adverse rulings by a judge
do not, by themselves, constitute judicial bias. State v. Sailee, 792 N.W.2d 90, 96 (Minn.
App. 2010), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 15, 2011). An appellate court reviews the record as
a whole when considering a claim of judicial bias. State v. Morgan, 296 N.W.2d 397, 404
(Minn. 1980).
When viewing the record as a whole, it is clear that the judge did not demonstrate
bias toward mother during the proceeding but engaged in appropriate management of the
courtroom. The record shows that the judge raised the issue of time to assist mother and
to schedule another date for the hearing to continue. The judge said:
It is 4 o’clock. I bring that up because you’ve raised
concerns about your time frame, and I don’t want to get beyond
that and I know sometimes you can lose track of time. If it’s
the case that you need to be somewhere around the Sartell area
by 5, then we need to stop.

We also need to pick another date so that we can
continue taking testimony in this case. I’m trying to look for a
next date.

. . . .

I’m not trying to limit you in what you want to present
to the Court.

11 Mother also asserts that the judge took father’s proposed order under advisement before
she submitted hers, but we see no evidence of this in the record, and mother does not
identify where in the record it occurs. She also argues that the judge denied her request to
change the venue, but there was no error in this denial because the proceedings had already
begun and all the parties and the child lived in Sherburne County.
21
The record also demonstrates that the judge consistently took time during the
evidentiary hearing to explain the rules of evidence to mother to help her navigate repeated
objections from father’s attorney. For example, the judge explained foundation as follows:
Laying a foundation is not going to get over a hearsay
objection. The hearsay objection is because the statements in
the affidavit were made outside of the court. They’re
statements that are being offered for the truth of the matter.

If you have something that [E.C.] has witnessed, ask her
about it. If there’s something that she has seen that might be
relevant, ask her about that. But what I can tell you is her
opinions on things, like whether [father] is a good dad, [is] not
relevant, and it calls for speculation.
The judge also repeatedly explained hearsay to mother to help mother elicit testimony, for
example:
So, [mother], to the extent that your question asks
[father] to recall a conversation that took place outside of court,
even with you or with someone else, that calls for hearsay. And
so the basis of his knowledge would be based on—would be
something that someone told him and that calls for hearsay and
that’s not allowed. If these are things that you want to bring to
the Court’s attention, you can certainly do that during your
testimony.
The judge provided appropriate guidance and managed the proceedings as necessary
through all five days of the evidentiary hearing. Our review of the record as a whole
persuades us that the district court judge did not demonstrate bias.
In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion or err when making evidentiary
rulings, modifying the custody order, modifying parenting time, or terminating father’s
child-support obligation; nor did it demonstrate bias during the proceedings.
Affirmed.