State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0833

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Nashid Asmir Abdul-Zahir,
Appellant.

Filed June 30, 2025
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge

Steele County District Court
File No. 74-CR-23-468

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Peter Magnuson, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Robert J. Jarrett, Steele County Attorney, Owatonna, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Andrew C. Wilson, Special Assistant Public Defender, Wilson & Clas, Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.
*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRATVOLD, Judge
Appellant Nashid Asmir Abdul- Zahir challenges the final judgment of conviction
for second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon. Abdul-Zahir argues that (1) his
constitutional rights were violated when respondent State of Minnesota took a saliva
sample from him without a search warrant and (2) the district court committed reversible
error when it instructed the jury on the definition of “dangerous weapon .” Because
Abdul-Zahir forfeited a constitutional challenge to providing the saliva sample, and
because any error in the jury instructions did not affect his substantial rights, we affirm.
FACTS
On March 27, 2023, the state charged Abdul-Zahir by complaint with offenses
alleged to have occurred from March 12 to 13, 2023, in Steele County. The state later
amended the complaint. The amended complaint alleged five counts of criminal sexual
conduct under Minn. Stat. §§ 609.342 (force or coercion to engage in sexual penetration
with personal injury), .344 (force or coercion to engage in sexual penetration) (2022). The
amended complaint also alleged second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon under
Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1 (2022), and unlawful possession of a firearm under Minn.
Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2022). Finally, the amended complaint alleged two counts of
fifth-degree assault under Minn. Stat. § 609.224, subd. 1(1)-(2) (2022).
Following a trial, a jury found Abdul-Zahir guilty of second-degree assault with a
dangerous weapon (count six) and the lesser included assault offenses (counts eight and
3
nine). The jury acquitted him of all other charges. This appeal contests solely
Abdul-Zahir’s conviction for second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon.
In October 2023, the state moved for a discovery order to obtain a saliva sample
from Abdul-Zahir under Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.02, subd. 2(1)(f). The state also moved for a
continuance of the trial date to complete DNA testing of the saliva sample. Abdul-Zahir
objected to continuing the trial date, arguing that it would deny him his right to a speedy
trial, which he had timely demanded. Abdul-Zahir also stated that, if the district court
denied the continuance, he would “object to the DNA swab as it would be pointless as [the
state] would not be able to test” the saliva sample. Abdul-Zahir faulted the state, pointing
out that the case was “seven months out” and arguing that the state “should have” ensured
that the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA) “completed” any testing “in
a more timely manner.” The district court granted the state’s motion for the saliva sample
and continued the trial date. The state obtained a saliva sample from Abdul-Zahir and
forwarded it to the BCA for DNA analysis.
The district court presided over Abdul-Zahir’s jury trial from December 18 to 22,
2023. The state offered testimony from J.C., four law-enforcement officers, a detective, a
nurse, and a BCA forensic scientist. After the state rested, Abdul -Zahir did not offer any
evidence. The following summarizes the evidence presented at trial.
J.C. testified that, on the evening of March 12, 2023, she went out “drinking” with
a group of friends and returned to her home in Austin after the bars closed. J.C. walked
from her apartment to a nearby convenience store for snacks. J.C. thought that she
recognized the driver of a car in the convenience-store parking lot; a second man was also
4
in the car, though J.C. did not know him. J.C. got into the car, “passed out,” and woke up
as they arrived at a motel in Owatonna.
All three entered a motel room. Shortly after, the driver left. The other man stayed
with J.C., who identified him as Abdul-Zahir. J.C. added that her cell phone “ was dead.”
J.C. testified that Abdul-Zahir pressured her into using cocaine and then sexually assaulted
her several times.
After the sexual assaults, Abdul-Zahir accused J.C. of taking his cell phone and
speaker; he became angry and repeatedly hit J.C. Abdul-Zahir retrieved “cords or wire
looking things” or “a charger” and threatened to “hang” J.C. if she did not return the items.
He then grabbed a black nine-millimeter handgun and “held the gun up to [J.C.’s] head and
said that he would shoot [her] and kill [her] if [she] didn’t give that stuff back.”
Abdul-Zahir also had a “smaller green” butane blowtorch and “held it close to [J.C.] like
he was going to burn” her. Abdul-Zahir told J.C., “I will f-cking kill you and I know people
that have— that can hide a body.”
J.C. went to the bathroom and vomited. Abdul-Zahir “shoved [her] head in the
toilet,” and she could not breathe. He “choked” J.C. “against the wall” with his hand and
kicked her. After the bathroom assault ended, someone from the motel entered the room,
and Abdul-Zahir told J.C. that they were leaving. They walked to a nearby convenience
store.
Two Owatonna law-enforcement officers responded to a reported trespass at the
motel around 5:00 p.m. on March 13, 2023. The first officer spoke with the motel owner,
who stated that two people had stayed in a room without paying. The second officer drove
5
around the area looking for the suspects , went to a nearby convenience store , and found
J.C. and Abdul-Zahir, who matched the motel owner’s description of the suspected
trespassers.
The second officer questioned J.C. because she had “fresh bruises and marks on her
face,” which the second officer described as “a fresh bruise on the right side of her chin,”
a swollen and split lip, “a bruise on the bridge of her nose,” and “two developing black
eyes.” Eventually, J.C. told the second officer that she and Abdul-Zahir had consensual sex
and that afterward he became angry and beat her. The first officer questioned Abdul-Zahir,
who denied having sex with J.C. or assaulting her. Abdul-Zahir left the convenience store.
J.C. declined the officer’s offer to take her to the hospital and went to her family’s home.
Later on March 13, J.C. went to the hospital, where she had a sexual-assault
examination. A sexual-assault nurse examiner (SANE) collected samples from J.C.; the
BCA received the samples for DNA analysis.
J.C. gave four statements to law enforcement and hospital staff, including the
interview with the second officer at the Owatonna convenience store. All of J.C.’s
statements were received into evidence. While some details in the statements varied, in all
statements J.C. described Abdul-Zahir sexually assaulting and beating her. In some but not
all statements, J.C. described weapons that Abdul-Zahir used, including a handgun, cords
or wires, and a blowtorch. During her trial testimony, J.C. admitted that she lied to the
second officer at the convenience store when she said that she and Abdul-Zahir had
consensual sex. At one point, J.C. also told law enforcement that she was injured at work,
which she admitted was not true during her trial testimony.
6
A BCA forensic scientist testified about a DNA analysis that compared J.C.’s body
samples to Abdul-Zahir’s saliva sample. The samples from J.C.’s mons pubis,1 neck, and
forehead contained a mixture of DNA from “two or more males” and had a “major profile”
that matched Abdul-Zahir.
As mentioned, the jury acquitted Abdul Zahir of all criminal-sexual-conduct and
firearm-possession charges. The jury found Abdul-Zahir guilty of second-degree assault
with a dangerous weapon and both counts of fifth-degree assault, which remain
unadjudicated. For second-degree assault, t he district court sentenced Abdul-Zahir to 57
months in prison.
Abdul-Zahir appeals.
DECISION
I. Abdul-Zahir forfeited his constitutional challenge to DNA evidence obtained
without a search warrant.

Abdul-Zahir first argues that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when the
state obtained his saliva sample without a search warrant under Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.02,
subd. 2(1)(f). The state counters that Abdul-Zahir “forfeited any Fourth Amendment
challenge by not raising it below.” The state also argues that Abdul-Zahir did not identify
“any good cause” for this court to consider his constitutional argument for the first time on
appeal. Abdul-Zahir does not respond to the state’s forfeiture arguments.

1 The SANE testified that the “mons pubis” is the “fatty area” “just above” the external
genitalia.
7
Appellate courts review de novo whether an issue is forfeited on appeal. State v.
Loveless, 987 N.W.2d 224, 236 (Minn. 2023). An appellate court “generally will not decide
issues which were not raised before the district court, including constitutional questions of
criminal procedure.” Roby v. State, 547 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Minn. 1996). But appellate
courts may review any matter “as the interests of justice may require.” Minn. R. Crim.
P. 28.02, subd. 11; see Roby, 547 N.W.2d at 357 (stating that appellate courts have
discretion to deviate from the forfeiture rule “when the interests of justice require
consideration of such issues and doing so would not unfairly surprise a party to the
appeal”).
In district court, Abdul-Zahir objected to the saliva sample on one ground:
timeliness. He argued that granting a trial continuance so that the BCA could perform a
DNA analysis of the saliva sample would impact his speedy- trial rights. Abdul-Zahir did
not object to the saliva sample as a warrantless search under the Fourth Amendment. And
on appeal, Abdul-Zahir does not request that this court consider the constitutional issue in
the “interests of justice,” nor does he identify a rationale for doing so. Even if he did ,
Abdul-Zahir’s decision not to raise a constitutional challenge in district court weighs
against our review of this issue. See State v. Williams, 794 N.W.2d 867, 874-75 (Minn.
2011) (concluding that the interests of justice did not require the court to consider a
constitutional challenge that the appellant raised for the first time on appeal).
Because the state offered the DNA evidence to prove the criminal -sexual-conduct
charges and Abdul-Zahir was acquitted of those charges, we are unable to discern a reason
to consider the constitutional issue for the first time on appeal. We conclude that
8
Abdul-Zahir forfeited his constitutional challenge to the DNA evidence based on the
Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., State v. Sorenson, 441 N.W.2d 455, 458-59 (Minn. 1989)
(declining to consider a Fourth Amendment challenge, in part because the appellant failed
to preserve the error below).
II. The district court did not commit reversible error when it instructed the jury
on the definition of “dangerous weapon.”
Abdul-Zahir argues that the district court plainly erred when instructing the jury on
the definition of a “dangerous weapon,” which is one element of the second-degree assault
conviction.
Abdul-Zahir did not object to the jury instructions during trial. Appellate courts
review an unobjected-to jury instruction for plain error. State v. Kelley, 855 N.W.2d 269,
273-74 (Minn. 2014). Under the plain-error test, “the appellant must show that there was
(1) an error; (2) that is plain; and (3) the error must affect substantial rights.” Id. If the first
three steps of the plain-error test are satisfied, appellate courts “may correct the error only
if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”
Id. at 274 (quotations omitted). But if “any one of the requirements” of the plain-error test
is not satisfied, “we need not address any of the others.” State v. Lilienthal, 889 N.W.2d
780, 785 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted).
A. The district court plainly erred when it gave the pattern jury instruction
defining “dangerous weapon.”

To establish error, the appellant must show that there has been “a deviation from a
legal rule unless the rule has been waived.” Kelley, 855 N.W.2d at 274 (quotation omitted).
An error in a jury instruction is plain if it is “clear or obvious,” which generally occurs “if
9
it contravenes case law, a rule or a standard of conduct.” State v. Smith, 901 N.W.2d 657,
661 (Minn. App. 2017) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 14, 2017). To
determine whether an error contravenes the law, appellate courts examine “the law in
existence at the time of appellate review, not the law in existence at the time of the district
court’s error.” Kelley, 855 N.W.2d at 277.
Abdul-Zahir argues that the district court plainly erred in instructing the jury on the
applicable law when it defined “dangerous weapon.” The state concedes that the district
court’s definition was an “unintended error” that occurred “[w]ithout the benefit of” a
recent supreme court decision but urges that a new trial is not required.
After closing arguments, the district court gave the pattern dangerous-weapon
instruction based on the jury-instruction guide at the time of trial:
Dangerous weapon means any device designed as a weapon
and capable of producing death or great bodily harm or any
other device or instrumentality that, in the manner that it is
used or intended to be used, is known to be capable of
producing death or great bodily harm. A firearm, whether
loaded or unloaded or even temporarily inoperable, is a
dangerous weapon.

(Emphasis added.) See 10 Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG 8.05 (2023). Abdul-Zahir urges
that the jury instruction was plain error, citing State v. Abdus- Salam, which was decided
while this appeal was pending. 1 N.W.3d 871 (Minn. 2024).
In Abdus-Salam, the district court dismissed charges of riot with a dangerous
weapon; the charges involved maneuvers with cars during intersection “takeovers.”
2 Id. at

2 The supreme court explained that, “during these ‘takeovers,’ dozens of vehicles and large
crowds of pedestrians intentionally blocked off a predetermined urban intersection, which
10
873-74. The district court determined that “probable cause did not exist for the dangerous
weapon element of the [riot] offenses because there was no evidence that the vehicles were
used in a manner calculated to produce death or great bodily harm.” Id. at 874 (emphasis
added). This court reversed, and the supreme court affirmed. Id. at 874, 879.
The supreme court stated that the district court failed to consider whether the
vehicles were “likely to produce death or great bodily harm” as provided in the statutory
definition. Id. at 875 (emphasis added). The supreme court examined the following
statutory definition of a “dangerous weapon”:
any firearm, whether loaded or unloaded, or any device
designed as a weapon and capable of producing death or great
bodily harm, any combustible or flammable liquid or other
device or instrumentality that, in the manner it is used or
intended to be used, is calculated or likely to produce death or
great bodily harm[.]

Id. at 874-75 (emphasis added and omitted) (quoting Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 6 (2022)).
The supreme court focused on the part of the definition explaining “other device or
instrumentality that . . . is calculated or likely to produce death or great bodily harm.” Id.
at 875 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 6). After some discussion
of caselaw, the supreme court held that, in this context, “likely” does not mean “known to
be capable of,” as stated in the pattern jury instruction for “dangerous weapon.” Id. at 876.
The supreme court reasoned that defining a “dangerous weapon” as one that is “known to
be capable of” producing death or great bodily harm “arguably creates a lower threshold

allowed drivers—typically driving rear-wheel-drive passenger cars—to spin ‘donuts’
while the crowd cheered and filmed the action from both inside and outside the circle of
the ‘donut.’” Id. at 873-74.
11
for the State to meet when asserting that a device or instrumentality is a ‘dangerous
weapon.’” Id. The supreme court held that “likely” in the definition of “dangerous weapon”
means “probable or reasonably expected.” Id. at 877.
Abdul-Zahir’s argument for plain error is persuasive. The same statutory definition
of “dangerous weapon” that was analyzed in Abdus-Salam applies to the second-degree
assault charge against Abdul-Zahir. See Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 6 (defining “dangerous
weapon” for purposes of crimes in Minnesota). And Abdul-Zahir challenges the jury
instruction defining “dangerous weapon” as any device that “is known to be capable of
producing death or great bodily injury.” (Emphasis added.) This phrasing is materially
different from the statutory language “likely to produce death or great bodily harm” because
it creates a lower threshold for the state’s burden of proof. Abdus-Salam, 1 N.W.3d at
875-76 (citing Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 6).
Even though the supreme court’s ruling in Abdus-Salam occurred after
Abdul-Zahir’s trial, it is the caselaw that governs our analysis. See Kelley, 855 N.W.2d at
277 (holding that appellate courts review for plain error based on caselaw in existence at
the time of appellate review). Thus, we conclude that the district court’s jury instructions
contravened caselaw and that the error is “clear or obvious.” Smith, 901 N.W.2d at 661.
Therefore, the district court plainly erred in instructing the jury on the definition of
dangerous weapon.
12
B. Any plain error in the dangerous-weapon jury instruction did not affect
Abdul-Zahir’s substantial rights.

“An erroneous jury instruction affects a defendant’s substantial rights if the error
was prejudicial and affected the outcome of the case.” State v. Huber, 877 N.W.2d 519,
525 (Minn. 2016). An error is prejudicial “if there is a reasonable likelihood that giving the
instruction in question had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict.” Id.; see, e.g., State v.
Wenthe, 865 N.W.2d 293, 298-302 (Minn. 2015) (upholding conviction because there was
no reasonable likelihood, given the record evidence, that the jury’s verdict would have been
different had the district court not plainly erred by omitting a specific-unanimity
instruction); State v. Gebremariam, 590 N.W.2d 781, 783-84 (Minn. 1999) (reversing and
remanding for a new trial where the district court repeatedly erred in the jury instructions
for second-degree assault regarding the definition of “dangerous weapon”). Abdul-Zahir
bears the “heavy burden” to prove prejudice. Huber, 877 N.W.2d at 525.
Abdul-Zahir argues that “[d]iluting a statutory definition to ease [the state’s] burden
at trial affects [his] substantial right to a fair trial, including the right to a finding of guilt
only upon a showing of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a specific criminal law was
violated.” Abdul-Zahir also maintains that, because the jury acquitted him of illegally
possessing a firearm under Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2), “the only device(s) on which
it could have based its guilty verdict” for second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon
“were charging cables/wires, a butane lighter/torch, or a pocket knife.” 3 Abdul-Zahir

3 To support this argument, Abdul-Zahir notes that the district court inferred that
Abdul-Zahir did not have a firearm. At sentencing, the district court stated, “we don’t have
a firearm involved here. We have a dangerous weapon. I mean, the inference is that he
13
contends that, because none of the non-firearm weapons were “designed as a weapon,” the
jury should have decided whether they satisfied the statutory definition of a “ dangerous
weapon”: a “device or instrumentality that, in the manner it is used or intended to be used,
is calculated or likely to produce death or great bodily harm.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 6.
The state counters that Abdul-Zahir incorrectly assumes that this court is bound to
conclude that the jury found Abdul-Zahir did not have a firearm at the motel when it
acquitted him of unlawful firearm possession. The state argues that this court cannot “make
assumptions about a jury’s factual determinations associated with a not-guilty verdict”
because of the jury’s power of lenity. The state emphasizes that its theory at trial was that
Abdul-Zahir committed second-degree assault when he threatened J.C. with a firearm, not
when he assaulted J.C. using the other non-firearm weapons in the motel room.
The state’s argument is persuasive for three reasons that rest on long-standing
caselaw and this record. First, a jury may find a defendant guilty of one charge and not
guilty of another charge, even if those verdicts are “logically inconsistent.” State v. Stay,
923 N.W.2d 355, 365 (Minn. App. 2019), aff’d, 935 N.W.2d 428 (Minn. 2019); see State
v. Bahtuoh, 840 N.W.2d 804, 821 (Minn. 2013) (stating that reversal is not available “in
cases of alleged conflict between guilty and not-guilty verdicts”). This is because “the jury
in a criminal case has the power of lenity—that is, the power to bring in a verdict of not

would have been convicted of possession of the firearm if he had used the firearm to
assault, right?” The district court eliminated a “firearm modifier” because “the jury had to
have found that the blowtorch was the dangerous weapon that was used in the assault.”
While this inference— which was unchallenged by the state—may have affected the district
court’s sentencing decision, it does not alter our analysis of the issue on appeal.
14
guilty despite the law and the facts.” State v. Perkins, 353 N.W.2d 557, 561 (Minn. 1984).
Second, “[a]ppellate courts generally do not engage in postverdict inquiry into the thought
processes of jurors.” Stay, 923 N.W.2d at 365 (quotation omitted). Thus, while the jury’s
acquittal of Abdul-Zahir on the unlawful-firearm-possession charge is inconsistent with
Abdul-Zahir threatening J.C. with a firearm, it is a logical inconsistency that does not
support reversal. See Bahtuoh, 840 N.W.2d at 821.
Third, the record sustains the state’s claim that it supported the second-degree
assault charge by offering evidence of a firearm. J.C. testified that Abdul-Zahir threatened
to kill her with a nine -millimeter handgun. This testimony was corroborated by J.C.’s
statements to police and hospital staff after the assault. During closing arguments, the
prosecuting attorney argued that Abdul-Zahir committed second-degree assault with a
dangerous weapon when he took “a gun out to intimidate” J.C. The prosecuting attorney
did not mention any other weapon in arguments related to the second-degree assault charge.
Based on applicable caselaw and this record, we conclude that Abdul-Zahir’s
conviction for second- degree assault with a dangerous weapon rests on evidence that he
threatened J.C. with a firearm. We cannot presume that Abdul-Zahir had no firearm based
on the jury’s acquittal of him on the unlawful-firearm-possession charge; the jury could
have believed that Abdul-Zahir possessed a firearm and found him not guilty out of lenity.
Id.
Because the jury’s guilty verdict on the second-degree assault charge is supported
by evidence that Abdul-Zahir threatened J.C. with a firearm, the plainly erroneous
instruction about other devices or instrumentalities would not have affected the outcome
15
of the jury’s verdict. A firearm is a “dangerous weapon” under the applicable statutory
definition. See Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 6 (defining “dangerous weapon,” in part, as “any
firearm, whether loaded or unloaded”); CRIMJIG 8.05 (same). The district court instructed
the jury that a “firearm, whether loaded or unloaded or even temporarily inoperable, is a
dangerous weapon.”
Because there is no reasonable likelihood that the plain error in the jury instructions
significantly affected the verdict, we conclude that the error did not affect Abdul- Zahir’s
substantial rights.4 And because Abdul-Zahir did not satisfy the third step in the plain-error
analysis, “we need not address” the fourth step—whether the error seriously affected the
fairness and integrity of judicial proceedings . Lilienthal, 889 N.W.2d at 785 (quotation
omitted).
Affirmed.

4 Because we conclude that any error did not affect Abdul-Zahir’s substantial rights, we
need not address the state’s concessions that (1) “there was no evidence presented showing
that” the cords or wires were “capable of producing death or bodily harm” under the
instructed definition of “dangerous weapon” and (2) “there was no evidence that
[Abdul-Zahir] threatened J.C. with a knife.” We also need not address the state’s argument
that “the jury could have found that [threatened] burns from a torch . . . satisfied the great
bodily harm standard.”