State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0836

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Travis Clay Andersen,
Appellant.

Filed May 19, 2025
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Larson, Judge

Carver County District Court
File No. 10-CR-23-7

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark Metz, Carver County Attorney, Kevin A. Hill, Assistant County Attorney, Chaska,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Greg Scanlan, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Larson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARSON, Judge
On direct appeal, appellant Travis Clay Andersen challenges his threats-of-violence
conviction. Andersen argues: (1) the state failed to present sufficient evidence to prove
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) the district court abused its discretion when it
2
admitted evidence of prior bad acts under Minn. R. Evid. 404(b)(1); and (3) the district
court made legal errors when calculating his sentence. Because we agree with Andersen
that the district court made a legal error when it calculated his sentence, we reverse in part
and remand. We otherwise affirm.
FACTS
On November 29, 2022, Andersen attended criminal-court hearings at the Carver
County Courthouse. After being held in contempt of court, law enforcement placed
Andersen in a secure holding cell. A deputy entered the holding cell and removed
Andersen’s restraints after the hearings concluded. As the deputy opened the cell door,
Andersen rushed past the deputy, exited the holding cell, and closed the door behind him,
locking the deputy inside. Andersen exited the courthouse and attempted to flee in a
bystander’s car before law enforcement apprehended him. Andersen was then placed in a
holding cell at the Carver County Jail.
On the same day, a detective with the Carver County Sheriff’s Department was
assigned to investigate Andersen’s escape from custody and went to the Carver County Jail
to take pictures of Andersen. When the detective entered the hallway leading to the
booking area, he heard Andersen banging and yelling from inside the cell. As the detective
entered the booking area, the banging and yelling got louder. After entering the booking
area, the detective walked past the cell and observed Andersen in an agitated state—he was
“swinging something,” banging, and yelling. After the detective walked past the cell, he
heard Andersen yell the detective’s full name and birth date. The detective then walked
back to the cell door. While the detective stood at the cell door, Andersen said to the
3
detective: “You’re number one on my list. When I get out, I’m going to kill you.” After
Andersen made this statement, he swung his belly belt.1
The detective then walked away from the cell door to a nearby desk, where he spoke
with other staff. While the detective was standing at the desk, Andersen continued
swinging his belly belt inside the cell. The detective walked back to the cell door, took
pictures of Andersen through the cell-door window, and left the booking area. After the
detective took the photos, Andersen rushed from the back of the cell towards the cell door
and swung his belly belt at the cell-door window while screaming. The detective did not
tell any staff working in the booking area about the incident, but he did tell his coworkers
in the general-investigations unit. The detective self-reported the incident in early
December. On January 3, 2023, respondent State of Minnesota charged Andersen with
threats of violence, under Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1 (2022).
After charging Andersen, the state filed a notice of intent to introduce Spreigl
evidence.2 The state sought to introduce evidence of Andersen’s 2022 convictions for
harassment and retaliation against a judicial officer.3 These convictions stemmed from an

1 A “belly belt” is “a tension device that secures [] handcuffed hands to a person’s waist.”
Andersen’s belly belt was attached only to his handcuffs, allowing him to swing it.
2 Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1) provides that “[e]vidence of another crime, wrong,
or act is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith.” But such evidence is admissible to prove “motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” Minn.
R. Evid. 404(b)(1). We refer to evidence offered under one of the rule 404(b) exception s
as “Spreigl evidence.” State v. McLeod, 705 N.W.2d 776, 787 (Minn. 2005) (citing State
v. Spreigl, 139 N.W.2d 167, 173 (1965)).
3 Although the record reflects that the March 1, 2022 incident resulted in Andersen’s
conviction for harassment and retaliation against a judicial officer, defense counsel and the
district court referred to the March 1, 2022 offense as “stalking.”
4
incident that occurred on March 1, 2022, where the detective was the lead investigator (the
Spreigl incident). The district court deferred ruling on the admissibility of the Spreigl
evidence.
A jury trial was held in October 2023, and the detective testified as the state’s only
witness. The detective described going to the booking area to take pictures of Andersen
“after an escape.” The detective characterized Andersen’s demeanor inside the cell as
angry and rageful. The detective also testified that he took seriously Andersen’s statement
that Andersen would kill the detective. The detective noted that he spoke to his family
about the incident when he otherwise does not talk to his family about work. He described
his reaction to Andersen’s statement as “high stress” and “surprising.” He testified that he
had “no reason not to believe” that Andersen would attempt to kill him.
The state introduced security-camera videos (with no audio) from the jail to
corroborate the detective’s testimony. One video, from the exterior of Andersen’s cell,
corroborated the detective’s testimony regarding his movements in the booking area and
showed Andersen intermittently appearing in the window of the cell door. When he was
visible, Andersen occasionally appeared to be speaking with an irate expression. A second
video, from the interior of Andersen’s cell, captured the same time period and sho wed
Andersen engaged in a variety of aggressive behaviors. Andersen swung his belly belt
toward the cell-door window and against the cell walls, appeared to scream, jumped up and
down erratically, and slammed his body against the wall.
After the detective finished his initial testimony and the jury left the courtroom, the
parties conferenced with the district court regarding the admissibility of the Spreigl
5
evidence. The state argued the Spreigl evidence was highly relevant to Andersen’s motive,
intent, and ability to carry out the threat. Defense counsel countered that the jury had
already heard prejudicial information through the detective’s mention of Andersen’s
“escape.” Defense counsel requested “a very brief instruction about the limit . . . that
[Andersen] was previously convicted of [stalking],” if the district court decided to admit
the Spreigl evidence. The district court admitted the Spreigl evidence, reasoning that it
was relevant to show motive and intent and supported the third element of the crime
charged—whether Andersen’s “words or actions created a reasonable apprehension that
[he] would follow through with .
. . the threat.” The district court also rejected defense
counsel’s request to use the word “stalking, ” noting concerns that it would be unfairly
prejudicial to Andersen.
The detective was then recalled by the state. Before the detective testified, the
district court gave the following instruction:
You’re about to hear evidence of occurrences or acts by the
[d]efendant on occasions other than November 29th of 2022.
This evidence is being offered for the limited purpose of
assisting you in determining whether the [d]efendant
committed those acts with which the [d]efendant is charged in
this [c]omplaint.

The [d]efendant is not being tried for and may not be
convicted of any offense other than the charged offense here in
this courtroom. You are not to convict the [d] efendant solely
because of the occurrences or acts other than the alleged
incident on November 29th, 2022.

The detective then testified about the Spreigl incident. Specifically, the detective testified
that: (1) a prosecutor called 911 on March 1, 2022, because Andersen came to their house
6
unannounced and uninvited around 10:00 p.m.; (2) the detective was involved in the
investigation; (3) Andersen was aware of the detective’s involvement; and (4) the
detective’s investigation uncovered that Andersen had learned significant non-public
information about the prosecutor’s life. Finally, returning to questioning about the incident
at issue in this case, the detective testified that, “with all the information [he] had,” he
believed Andersen would carry out the threat on his life.
Thereafter, the state rested its case, the jury exited the courtroom, and counsel
discussed the jury instructions with the district court. Regarding the Spreigl instruction,
the district court asked defense counsel if he wanted a limiting instruction. Defense counsel
answered affirmatively , and the district court included a standard limiting instruction.
Following its deliberation, the jury returned a guilty verdict.
On February 22, 2024, the district court held a sentencing hearing. At this hearing,
the district court sentenced Andersen for several convictions that are the subject s of
separate appeals. For the threats-of -violence conviction that is the subject of this appeal,
the district court sentenced Andersen to an executed term of 17.4 months in prison, to be
served consecutive to sentences the district court imposed for other convictions at the same
sentencing hearing.4
Andersen appeals.

4 Andersen was sentenced for convictions associated with the following district court files:
10-CR-22-1120, 10-CR-23-7, 10-CR-23-8, and 10-CR-23-152. This sentencing hearing is
the subject of several appeals before our court, including A24-0835, A24-0837, and A24-
0838.
7
DECISION
Andersen challenges his conviction on two grounds. First, he argues the state failed
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had the required mens rea for the offense.
Second, he asserts the district court abused its discretion when it admitted the Spreigl
evidence under rule 404(b)(1). In the alternative, Andersen challenges his sentence,
claiming it was improperly calculated. We address each argument in turn.
I.
Andersen first argues that the state presented insufficient evidence to sustain the
guilty verdict. “When evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, appellate courts carefully
examine the record to determine whether the facts and the legitimate inferences drawn from
them would permit the jury to reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt of the offense of which he was convicted.” State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d
257, 263 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). “The evidence must b e viewed in the light
most favorable to the verdict, and it must be assumed that the fact-finder disbelieved any
evidence that conflicted with the verdict.” Id. “The verdict will not be overturned if the
fact-finder, upon application of the presumption of innocence and the [s]tate’s burden of
proving an offense beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably have found the defendant
guilty of the charged offense.” Id.
“[T]he [s]tate bear[s] the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt every
element of a charged offense in a criminal trial.” State v. Pakhnyuk, 926 N.W.2d 914, 919
(Minn. 2019). To be found guilty of threats of violence, the state must prove that Andersen:
(1) “threaten[ed], directly or indirectly,” (2) “to commit any crime of violence,” and (3) did
8
so “with purpose to terrorize another . . . or in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such
terror.” Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1; see also State v. Schweppe, 237 N.W.2d 609, 613
(Minn. 1975) (describing the three elements). Here, Andersen contends the state did not
present sufficient evidence to prove the third element—that he acted “with purpose to
terrorize another . . . or in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror.” Minn. Stat.
§ 609.713, subd. 1; see also State v. Rund, 896 N.W.2d 527, 534 (Minn. 2017) (“[T]he
terroristic-threats statute includes more than one mens rea: either the purpose of terrorizing
or a reckless disregard of the risk of terrorizing.”).
To cause terror “means to cause extreme fear by use of violence or threats.”
Schweppe, 237 N.W.2d at 614. A defendant acts with such a purpose if it is their “aim,
objective, or intention” to terrorize. Id. And a defendant acts with reckless disregard if
they are “awar e of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that [their] words or actions will
cause terror in another, and [they] . . . act in conscious disregard of that risk.” State v.
Mrozinski, 971 N.W.2d 233, 240 (Minn. 2022); see also Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1.
The third element is not met when a defendant’s words are “merely flippant” or “spoken
in jest.” State v. Knaeble, 652 N.W.2d 551, 557 (Minn. App. 2002), rev. denied (Minn.
Jan. 21, 2003). And expressions of “transitory anger” are insufficient to satisfy the third
element. State v. Jones, 451 N.W.2d 55, 63 (Minn. App. 1990), rev. denied (Minn. Feb.
21, 1990).
We must first determine whether the evidence used to sustain the guilty verdict on
the third element was direct or circumstantial. See State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 39
(Minn. 2016). Direct evidence is “based on personal knowledge or observation and . . . if
9
true, proves a fact without inference or presumption.” State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592,
599 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). Circumstantial evidence is “evidence from which
the factfinder can infer whether the facts in dispute existed or did not exist.” Id. (quotation
omitted). “A state of mind generally is proved circumstantially, by inference from words
and acts of the actor both before and after the incident.” State v. Johnson, 616 N.W.2d
720, 726 (Minn. 2000). Here, we conclude the state relied on circumstantial evidence to
prove the third element, and so apply the circumstantial-evidence test.
When applying the circumstantial-evidence test, we conduct a heightened two-step
inquiry. State v. Ortega, 813 N.W.2d 86, 100 (Minn. 2012). First, we identify the
circumstances proved. State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 598 (Minn. 2013). In doing
so, “we defer to the jury’s acceptance of the proof of these circumstances” and “assume
that the jury believed the [s]tate’s witnesses and disbelieved the defense witnesses.” Id. at
598-99 (quotations omitted). Second, we determine if the circumstances proved, viewed
“as a whole,” are “consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except
that of guilt.” Id. at 599 (quotation omitted). In this step, we do not defer “to the fact
finder’s choice between reasonable inferences.” State v. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d 320, 329-
30 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted). “Circumstantial evidence must form a complete
chain that, in view of the evidence as a whole, leads so directly to the guilt of the defendant
as to exclude beyond a reasonable doubt any reasonable inference other than guilt.” State
v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted).
Beginning with the first step, the state proved the following circumstances at trial:
(1) after entering the booking area, the detective walked past a holding cell and observed
10
Andersen banging and yelling inside; (2) Andersen appeared agitated and was swinging
his belly belt; (3) after the detective walked by the cell, he heard Andersen yell the
detective’s full name and birth date; (4) the detective walked back to the cell; (5) while
standing at the cell door, Andersen said to the detective: “You’re number one on my list.
When I get out, I’m going to kill you.”; (5) Andersen’s demeanor when he made this
statement was “angry” and “rage[ful]”; (6) Andersen swung his belly belt at the window
of the cell door after he made the statement; ( 7) after the detective walked away from the
cell, Andersen continued swinging his belly belt; (8) the detective walked back to the cell
and took photos of Andersen through the cell-door window; (9) after the detective took the
photos, Andersen rushed from the back of the cell towards the cell door and swung his
belly belt at the cell-door window while screaming; (10) the detective felt “high stress”
after the interaction, and that reaction “surpris[ed]” him; (11) the detective took the threat
seriously because he had “no reason not to believe” that Andersen would attempt to kill
him after his release ; (12) the detective told his family and his coworkers about the
incident; and (13) the detective filed a report.
Moving to the second step, we analyze whether the circumstances proved are
consistent with guilt. We conclude that they are. Andersen yelling the detective’s full
name and birth date, Andersen stating that he would kill the detective upon his release,
Andersen’s “angry” and “rage[ful]” demeanor, Andersen’s aggressive behavior in
swinging his belly belt at the cell door, and the detective’s fearful response
5 to Andersen’s

5 A “victim’s reaction to the threat is circumstantial evidence relevant to the element of
intent.” Sykes v. State, 578 N.W.2d 807, 811 (Minn. App. 1998), rev. denied (Minn. July
11
threat all support the rational hypothesis that Andersen intended to terrorize the detective
or, at a minimum, acted in reckless disregard of that risk. See Minn. Stat. § 609.713,
subd. 1.
Andersen does not disagree that the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt.
Instead, he submits that the circumstances proved are also consistent with a rational
hypothesis other than guilt; specifically, that Andersen was in a state of transitory anger
when he threatened the detective and was not thinking about his actions. We are not
persuaded.
Taking the facts in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence shows that
Andersen was conscious of the effect he had on the detective. Andersen addressed the
detective in a way that was likely to cause a reaction—using the detective’s full name and
birth date. When the detective responded by approaching the cell, Andersen threatened
him in a detailed manner. Not only did Andersen say that he would kill the detective, but
he also provided a timeframe—first thing upon Andersen’s release from custody. This
threat evinces a level of forethought that disproves Andersen’s argument that he was
experiencing transitory anger.
For these reasons, we conclude that the circumstances proved are inconsistent with
any rational hypothesis except that of guilt and, on that basis, we conclude the state
presented sufficient evidence to support the conviction.

16, 1998). The circumstances proved indicate that the detective experienced a strong
reaction to the threat —he was “surprise[ed]” by his “high stress” response, he told his
family and coworkers about the threat, and he filed a report.
12
II.
Andersen next challenges the district court’s decision to admit the Spreigl evidence.
Spreigl evidence “is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show
action in conformity therewith.” Minn. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). But such evidence may be
admitted “for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” Id.
Andersen makes two arguments regarding the Spreigl evidence: (1) the district
court improperly limited the scope of the evidence and (2) the district court erred when it
did not give an alternative jury instruction. We review both issues for an abuse of
discretion. See Griffin, 887 N.W.2d at 261-62 (Spreigl evidence); State v. Cole, 542
N.W.2d 43, 50 (Minn. 1996) (jury instruction). “A district court abuses its discretion when
its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the
record.” State v. Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d 281, 291 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted).
A. Scope of the Evidence
Andersen first argues that the district court abused its discretion when it denied
defense counsel’s motion regarding the scope of the Spreigl evidence. Before evidence of
a prior crime or other bad act may be admitted at trial
(1) the state must give notice of its intent to admit the evidence;
(2) the state must clearly indicate what the evidence will be
offered to prove; (3) there must be clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant participated in the prior act; (4) the
evidence must be relevant and material to the state’s case; and
(5) the probative value of the evidence must not be outweighed
by its potential prejudice to the defendant.

13
State v. Ness, 707 N.W.2d 676, 686 (Minn. 2006). Here, Andersen’s arguments relate to
the fifth requirement; he asserts that the way the state presented the Spreigl evidence caused
undue prejudice. To evaluate this question, “we balance the relevance of the [Spreigl
evidence], the risk of the evidence being used as propensity evidence, and the [s]tate’s need
to strengthen weak or inadequate proof in the case.” State v. Fardan, 773 N.W.2d 303,
319 (Minn. 2009).
Beginning with the probative value, the state needed to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that Andersen’s words “create[d] a reasonable apprehension that [he would] follow
through with or act on the threat.” Mrozinski, 971 N.W.2d at 240. And although the
detective testified that he took Andersen’s threat seriously and experienced a “high stress”
reaction to it, the state had a weaker case on this element. The detective had worked as a
licensed peace officer for nearly ten years and, before that, as a correctional officer. Absent
the Spreigl evidence, it was unclear why Andersen’s threat would have a particular impact
on someone who had likely been the subject of threatening languag e on other occasions
during their career. The Spreigl evidence helped the jury understand the context for the
detective’s response to Andersen’s threat. Thus, the evidence had high probative value.
Moving to the potential for undue prejudice, “the overarching concern over the
admission of Spreigl evidence is that it might be used for an improper purpose, such as
suggesting that the defendant has a propensity to commit the crime or that the defendant is
a proper candidate for punishment for his or her past acts.” Ness, 707 N.W.2d. at 685
(quotation omitted). Andersen contends that the district court’s narrowing instruction—
that the detective could not use the word “stalking”—increased the potential for prejudice.
14
According to Andersen, this narrowing allowed the jury to speculate that something more
sinister occurred, such as “violence or homicide.” But this overstates the record. The state
asked the detective why the prosecutor called 911. The detective answered that Andersen
went to the prosecutor’s home “unannounced and uninvited.” Nothing in the testimony
suggested that violence or homicide was involved in the incident.
Further, the cautionary instructions given by the district court “lessen[ed] the
probability of undue weight being given by the jury to the [ Spreigl] evidence.” State v.
Bartylla, 755 N.W.2d 8, 22 (Minn. 2008); see also State v. Clark, 755 N.W.2d 241, 261
(Minn. 2008) (holding that district court’s cautionary instructions regarding permissible
uses of Spreigl evidence “minimized” concerns about potential for undue prejudice); State
v. Welle, 870 N.W.2d 360, 366 (Minn. 2015) (stating that appellate courts presume jury
followed cautionary instructions). Here, the district court issued a cautionary instruction
before the detective testified about the Spreigl incident, informing the jury that they could
not “convict [Andersen] solely because of the occurrences or acts other than the alleged
incident on November 29th, 2022.” The district court also read a standard Spreigl
instruction prior to deliberation, again reminding the jury that they were “not to convict
[Andersen] solely because of the occurrence or act on March 1, 2022.” These instructions
reduced the prejudicial effect of the Spreigl evidence.
For these reasons, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion
when it admitted the Spreigl evidence, but did not allow the detective to use the word
“stalking.”
15
B. Jury Instruction
Andersen separately argues that the district court abused its discretion when it issued
its instructions to the jury regarding the Spreigl evidence.6 District courts “are allowed
considerable latitude” in choosing the language of jury instructions. State v. Gray, 456
N.W.2d 251, 258 (Minn. 1990) (quotation omitted). “[J]ury instructions must be viewed
in their entirety to determine whether they fairly and adequately explained the law of the
case.” State v. Flores, 418 N.W.2d 150, 155 (Minn. 1988).
Andersen first contends that the district court was required to give his defense
counsel’s requested jury instruction. See State v. Broulik, 606 N.W.2d 64, 68-71 (Minn.
2000). We disagree. Broulik and its progeny endorse the federal practice that, when a
defendant requests a modification to the standard Spreigl instruction “to explain the limited
purpose for which Spreigl evidence was admitted,” the district court must modify the
instruction. See State v. DeYoung, 672 N.W.2d 208, 212 (Minn. App. 2003). But such a
“limited purpose” instruction relates to the purposes outlined in the rule: “motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.” See Minn. R. Evid. 404(b). Here, Andersen did not ask the district court to
specify a rule 404(b) purpose; he instead sought “a very brief instruction” to describe his
prior conviction as “stalking.” Broulik and its progeny do not require the district court to
modify the standard Spreigl instruction to provide facts regarding the offense. See 606

6 The state argues that defense counsel did not request an alternative jury instruction at
trial. The record belies this argument. During a bench conference, defense counsel
requested “a very brief instruction about the limit . . . that [Andersen] was previously
convicted of [stalking].”
16
N.W.2d at 71 (“[F]ailure to give an instruction on the specific purpose for which [Spreigl]
evidence may be considered is not error where no request to so instruct is made.”).
Andersen argues second that the district court abused its discretion when it did not
modify the standard Spreigl instruction to describe his prior offense as “stalking.” Again,
we disagree. The record demonstrates that the district court did not summarily reject
Andersen’s request. Instead, the district court engaged in a thoughtful analysis before
deciding to provide the standard instruction. The district court reasoned that the word
“stalking” has “a[n] explosive connotation,” and that the defense wo uld be “left to try to
figure that out.”
For these reasons, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion when it
issued the standard Spreigl instruction.
III.
In the alternative, Andersen raises two challenges to his sentence. First, he argues
the district court erroneously applied a three-month sentence enhancement to his
permissive-consecutive sentences. Second, he asserts the district court erred when it
imposed a fractional sentence. We review both issues de novo and address each in turn
below. S ee State v. Williams, 771 N.W.2d 514, 520 (Minn. 2009) (whether sentence
conforms to sentencing guidelines); State v. Scovel , 916 N.W.2d 550, 554 (Minn. 2018)
(interpretation of sentencing guidelines).
A. Sentence Enhancement
Andersen first challenges the district court’s decision to impose both permissive-
consecutive sentences and a three-month sentence enhancement. Andersen asserts that the
17
district court cannot impose both because a permissive-consecutive sentence requires the
district court to apply a criminal-history score of zero and a three-month sentence
enhancement requires the district court to apply a criminal-history score of seven or greater.
We agree with Andersen.
Beginning with permissive-consecutive sentences, when, as here, an offender is
convicted of multiple current offenses at the same time, concurrent sentencing is
presumptive. State v. Rannow, 703 N.W.2d 575, 577 (Minn. App. 2005); see also Minn.
Sent’g Guidelines 2.F (2022) (“Generally, when an offender is convicted of multiple
current offenses . . . concurrent sentencing is presumptive.”). But the sentencing guidelines
allow for permissive- consecutive sentencing in certain instances. See Minn. Sent’g
Guidelines 2.F.2.a. Here, the parties agree that Andersen’s threats-of-violence conviction
qualified for permissive-consecutive sentencing. See Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 6 (2022).
But to impose permissive-consecutive sentencing, the district court must either “use a
Criminal History Score of 0 or the mandatory minimum for the offense, whichever is
longer, to determine the presumptive duration.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.F.2.b. Because
there is no mandatory minimum sentence for a threats- of-violence conviction, see Minn.
Stat. § 609.11, subd. 1 (2022), the district court had to apply a criminal-history score of
zero in order to impose permissive-consecutive sentences.
With regard to a three -month sentence enhancement, the Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines prescribe presumptive sentences for felony offenses. Minn. Sent’g
Guidelines 2.C (2022). For any particular offense, the presumptive sentence is “presumed
to be appropriate for all typical cases sharing criminal history and offense severity
18
characteristics.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 1.B.13 (2022). When the cell in the applicable
guideline grid is shaded, as it is for Andersen’s threats-of-violence conviction, the district
court must calculate a sentence range:
If the duration for a sentence that is a presumptive commitment
is found in a shaded area, the standard range – 15 percent lower
and 20 percent higher than the fixed duration displayed – is
permissible without departure, provided that the minimum
sentence is not less than one year and one day, and the
maximum sentence is not more than the statutory maximum.

Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.C.1. Thereafter, the district court may impose a three- month
sentencing enhancement if: “(1) at least one -half custody status point is assigned; and
(2) the offender’s total Criminal History Score exceeds the maximum score on the
applicable Grid (i.e., 7 or more).” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.B.2.c (2022).
Here, to impose permissive-consecutive sentences under the plain language of the
rule, the district court had to use a criminal-history score of zero. The district court used
this criminal-history score to calculate Andersen’s sentencing range at 12 to 14.4 months.
The district court, then, applied the three- month enhancement to Andersen’s sentenc ing
range, arriving at 15 to 17.4 months. But the district court cannot impose a three-month
enhancement when, as here, the defendant has a criminal-history score of zero. Id.
(requiring criminal-history score to “exceed[] the maximum score on the applicable Grid”).
Thus, because the district court needed to use a criminal -history score of zero to impose a
permissive-consecutive sentence, its application of the three-month sentence enhancement
was an error.
19
B. Fractional Sentence
Andersen finally argues that the district court erred when it imposed a fractional
sentence.7 Specifically, Andersen asserts that the plain language of the guidelines requires
a district court to round down when its guideline calculation results in a fractional number.
We disagree.
We use statutory-interpretation principles to interpret the sentencing guidelines.
State v. Woolridge Carter, 9 N.W.3d 839, 843 (Minn. 2024). Our objective when
interpreting the sentencing guidelines is to effectuate the intent of the Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines Commission (the commission).8 Id. When interpreting the
guidelines, we “presume that plain and unambiguous language in the Guidelines manifests
the intent of the Commission.” Id. at 844. Only when the language “is subject to more
than one reasonable interpretation” may we “consider extrinsic sources and canons.” Id.
We conclude that the guidelines unambiguously provide the method for the district
court to calculate a sentence that is in a shaded cell: “[T]he standard range – 15 percent

7 Andersen argues the district court erred when it imposed a fractional sentence of
17.4 months, rather than rounding his sentence down to 17 months. Because we conclude
the district court erred when it applied a three-month sentence enhancement and remand
for resentencing on that basis, the upper end of Andersen’s sentence range will not be 17.4
months on remand. However, because the district court may arrive at a fractional sentence
on remand, we address this legal question.
8 The legislature provides the commission with the authority to “promulgate Sentencing
Guidelines for the district court.” Minn. Stat. § 244.09, subd. 5 (2024). Accordingly,
except for modifications to the sentencing-guidelines grid, the commission may modify the
guidelines in accordance with the commission’s procedural rules and without legislature
approval. Id., subd. 11 (2024). “Therefore, our objective when interpreting the Guidelines
is to effectuate the intent of the [commission].” State v. Woolridge Carter, 9 N.W.3d 839,
843 (Minn. 2024).
20
lower and 20 percent higher than the fixed duration displayed – is permissible without
departure, provided that the minimum sentence is not less than one year and one day, and
the maximum sentence is not more than the statutory maximum.” Minn. Sent’g
Guidelines 2.C.1. Applying this language, the mathematical calculation may, at times,
result in a fractional sentence. Take, for example, the calculation of Andersen’s sentence
without a three-month enhancement. Assuming a criminal history score of 0, the cell at
the intersection of an offense severity level of 4 is 12 months.
9 Minn. Sent’g
Guidelines 4.A. The lower range of the sentence cannot be less than one year and one day.
See Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.C.1. The higher range of the sentence may be 20% greater
than 12 months, which is 14.4 months ((12 × .2) + 12 = 14.4). Under the plain language,
this is the appropriate way to calculate the guideline range, and nothing in Minn. Sent’g
Guidelines 2.C.1 requires the district court to modify the resulting durations.
10
Moreover, even if the sentencing guidelines were ambiguous with respect to the
commission’s intent, that ambiguity is resolved by reviewing the comments. See
Woolridge Carter, 9 N.W.3d at 846 (noting that if language of guidelines is ambiguous,
we may consider nonbinding comments). Throughout the comments, the commission
provides examples that include fractional sentences. See Minn. Sent’g Guidelines cmt.

9 Twelve months is equivalent to one year and one day. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 4.A
(2022).
10 We also observe that the commission has discussed the concept of rounding down in the
context of calculating felony points and does not include similar language with respect to
calculating sentences. Compare Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.B.1.i (2022) (providing sum of
felony weights “must be rounded down to the nearest whole number”), with Minn. Sent’g
Guidelines 2.C.1 (providing “the standard range” for a sentence is “15 percent lower and
20 percent higher than the fixed duration displayed” in corresponding cell).
21
2.G.01 (2022) (providing 20.5 months as presumptive-sentence length as example); Minn.
Sent’g Guidelines 4.A (providing chart with examples of executed sentences that includes
fractional periods of imprisonment). Thus, we discern that it is the commission’s intent to
allow the district court to calculate fractional sentences.
For these reasons, we conclude the district court did not err when it imposed a
fractional sentence, but did err when it applied a three-month sentence enhancement.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for resentencing.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.