State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0867

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Asad Rice Muhammad,
Appellant.

Filed May 12, 2025
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-23-20974

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, N. Nate Summers, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Steven P. Russett, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bond, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of third-degree criminal sexual conduct,
arguing that the district court abused its discretion by not permitting him to ask the
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complainant if she is a sex worker. He asserts additional arguments in a pro se
supplemental brief. We affirm.
FACTS
During the evening of September 29, 2023, M.M. told police officers working in a
store that a man “just raped” her and was outside. The officers found appellant Asad Rice
Muhammad sitting in his vehicle in the store’s parking lot; M.M. confirmed that he was
her assailant. Muhammad initially claimed that he was alone, but security footage
confirmed that he had arrived at the store with M.M. The officers then asked M.M. for
more information about what happened. She responded that she met Muhammad in
Minneapolis, they drove around in his vehicle, and he gave her drugs, which she ingested.
At that point, he asked “to do some sexual acts on her” and then “all of a sudden” became
aggressive, strangled her, and raped her. The officers noticed that she was “visibly shaken”
but did not see any marks on her neck. They arrested Muhammad.
Later that evening, M.M. underwent a sexual-assault examination. She told the
nurse examiner that she “went driving” with a man who “forced” her to “give . . . him oral”
and twice forced “penile vaginal penetration.” As she recounted the incident, she “did a
lot of crying.” She declined to answer questions about strangulation, and the nurse
examiner did not notice any marks on her neck. When a police investigator arrived at the
hospital to ask her about the incident, M.M. said that she did not know Muhammad. She
reiterated that he had strangled her and sexually assaulted her, including both oral and
vaginal penetration. She said that she was scared and thought he was going to kill her. The
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investigator did not notice any marks on M.M.’s neck. Subsequent testing of swabs taken
from M.M.’s body during the examination confirmed the presence of Muhammad’s DNA.
Muhammad was charged with two counts of third-degree criminal sexual conduct,
one based on an allegation of coercion to accomplish sexual penetration, and one based on
an allegation of force to accomplish sexual penetration. Before trial, Muhammad asserted
a defense of consent and moved to admit “evidence of [M.M.’s] previous sexual conduct”
under Minn. R. Evid. 412. He explained that he wanted to present evidence that M.M. is
a sex worker, that the sexual encounter in question was a consensual encounter in exchange
for money or something else of value, and that M.M. had engaged in a similar sexual
encounter with him in August 2023. He emphasized that M.M. described herself as a sex
worker to police and the nurse examiner. The district court partially denied the motion. It
permitted Muhammad to question M.M. and present evidence about a consensual exchange
of sex for money or drugs on the day in question, and the same for “previous sexual conduct
with each other.” But the court precluded Muhammad from presenting evidence or
questioning M.M. about whether she “is engaged otherwise as a sex worker.”
At trial, the state presented the testimony of M.M., the nurse examiner, one of the
officers M.M. interacted with at the store (and two videos from his body-worn camera),
and the police investigator. In testifying about the incident, M.M. said that Muhammad
pulled up in his vehicle as she was walking down the street and offered her a cigarette. She
said he claimed to know her but she did not remember meeting him. She explained that
she got in the car with him, he stopped to pick up some methamphetamine, and he then
parked the car. He put clothes up over the car windows, and M.M. assumed he was trying
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to give her privacy while she injected methamphetamine. He then asked her to “suck his
dick,” and when she refused he “choked” her with his hands around her neck for about 15
seconds. When he asked again, she agreed because she was scared. Next, he told her to
lie down and insisted on vaginal sex even though she told him no; he had sex with her for
a time and then ejaculated on her face. A few minutes later, he demanded oral sex again.
When she refused, he “made a comment about a girl that [was] gang raped and found dead
on a rooftop in South Minneapolis,” which intimidated and scared her, especially after the
choking incident, so she acquiesced again. Muhammad also tried to initiate vaginal sex
again but stopped after she said it hurt and clamped her legs together. She then told him
she needed to go to the store to get a change of clothes, planning to find officers and report
what had happened.
During cross-examination, defense counsel asked M.M. if she had met Muhammad
before the day of the incident; she answered in the negative. He repeatedly asked M.M.
why she would stop to talk to a stranger and get in a stranger’s car, emphasized her drug
use, and asked her about what she was wearing. And defense counsel reframed her
description of walking down the street when she met Muhammad as “walking the streets.”
Muhammad testified in his own defense. He said that he saw M.M. walking down
the street on the day in question and recognized her from a sexual encounter a month or
two earlier when he “had sex for money with her,” after “she told [him] she was a female
escort.” He added: “She was escorting herself. That’s what she’d do for money and I guess
to feed her habit, I guess.” And he said that on the evening in question she again agreed to
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“some forms of sexual encounter” in exchange for “ some money so she could get some
meth, so she could feel high.”
The jury found Muhammad guilty of third-degree criminal sexual conduct involving
coercion but not guilty of third-degree criminal sexual conduct involving force. The
district court imposed a presumptive 42-month prison sentence.
Muhammad appeals.
DECISION
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence of M.M.’s
history of sex work unrelated to Muhammad.

Appellate courts review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion,
even where, as here, the defendant claims that the exclusion of evidence deprived him of
his constitutional right to a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. State v.
Wenthe, 865 N.W.2d 293, 306 (Minn. 2015). A district court abuses its discretion if its
decision rests on an erroneous view of the law or is “against logic and the facts in the
record.” State v. Fernandez Sorto, 12 N.W.3d 207, 212 (Minn. App. 2024) (quotation
omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 17, 2024). Even if the district court abused its discretion
by excluding evidence, that error does not warrant reversal if it was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id. An error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if “the verdict
actually rendered was surely unattributable to the error.” Wenthe, 865 N.W.2d at 308
(quotation omitted).
In a criminal-sexual-conduct prosecution, evidence of the victim’s “previous sexual
conduct” is admissible only if its probative value “is not substantially outweighed by its
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inflammatory or prejudicial nature,” and only in specified circumstances, including when
the victim’s consent is a defense. Minn. R. Evid. 412(1)(A); see Minn. Stat. § 609.347,
subd. 3 (2024) (stating substantially identical rule). When consent is at issue, two types of
evidence may be admissible:
(i) evidence of the victim’s previous sexual conduct
tending to establish a common scheme or plan of similar sexual
conduct under circumstances similar to the case at issue,
relevant and material to the issue of consent;
(ii) evidence of the victim’s previous sexual conduct
with the accused[.]

Minn. R. Evid. 412(1)(A); see Minn. Stat. § 609.347, subd. 3(a). Known as the “rape-
shield law,” the statute “‘serves to emphasize the general irrelevance of a victim’s sexual
history.’” Wenthe, 865 N.W.2d at 306 (quoting State v. Crims, 540 N.W.2d 860, 867
(Minn. App. 1995), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 23, 1996)).
Muhammad argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting only
evidence of M.M.’s previous sexual conduct with him under Minn. R. Evid. 412(1)(A)(ii),
but not general evidence of her previous sexual conduct— specifically, that she is a sex
worker—under Minn. R. Evid. 412(1)(A)(i). He contends that evidence of M.M.’s sex
work would have “buttress[ed]” his testimony that they engaged in a consensual sexual
encounter on the evening in question and undermined M.M.’s testimony. He also asserts
this evidence was admissible because it was not evidence of specific other acts of
prostitution, it did not concern events after the incident in question, credibility was critical
to evaluating Muhammad’s consent defense, and the evidence was not unfairly prejudicial
because M.M. “readily admitted” to others that she is a sex worker. But none of these
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contentions addresses the central issue—whether evidence of M.M.’s sex work “tend[s] to
establish a common scheme or plan of similar sexual conduct under circumstances similar
to the case at issue, relevant and material to the issue of consent.” See Minn. R. Evid.
412(1)(A)(i) (emphasis added).
As the rape-shield law clarifies, and the district court noted, “[i]n order to find a
common scheme or plan, the judge must find that the victim made prior allegations of
sexual assault which were fabricated.” Minn. Stat. § 609.347, subd. 3(a)(i). Muhammad
never made an offer of proof as to any specific prior sexual conduct by M.M., let alone
present evidence that she fabricated a prior allegation of sexual assault. As such, he failed
to establish any basis for the district court to admit evidence of M.M.’s prior sexual conduct
unrelated to the defendant. While Muhammad emphasizes that M.M. acknowledged her
history of sex work during her interactions with police and the nurse examiner, he does not
explain how that acknowledgment makes the evidence any less prejudicial or more
relevant. In short, Muhammad has not demonstrated that the district court abused its
discretion by preventing him from questioning M.M. about her history of sex work
unrelated to him.
Moreover, Muhammad has not demonstrated any prejudice flowing from the district
court’s ruling. As noted above, an erroneous evidentiary ruling does not warrant reversal
if the jury’s verdict was “surely unattributable to the error.” Wenthe, 865 N.W.2d at 308
(quotation omitted). Muhammad is correct that this case was about credibility—the jury
was presented with an undisputed sexual encounter and asked to determine whose version
of it was more credible. He contends that it is reasonably likely that the jury would have
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found his consent defense more credible if he had been permitted to question M.M. about
being a sex worker. The record persuades us otherwise.
Indeed, the record shows that Muhammad presented that very evidence to the jury,
despite the district court’s ruling that he was not entitled to do so. He testified expressly
and repeatedly that M.M. was a sex worker, and defense counsel openly alluded to it while
cross-examining her. There is no reason to think that hearing M.M. acknowledge as much
herself would have affected the jury’s credibility determination. Additionally, the jury’s
verdict shows that it rejected Muhammad’s claim that their sexual encounter was
consensual; it simply found that he used coercion rather than force during the encounter.
On this record, the jury’s verdict that he was guilty of third-degree criminal sexual conduct
involving coercion is surely unattributable to the district court’s ruling preventing
Muhammad from questioning M.M. about being a sex worker.
II. Muhammad’s pro se supplemental arguments do not entitle him to relief.
In a pro se supplemental brief, Muhammad reiterates the evidentiary argument
advanced in his principal brief and addresses a range of additional subjects, including:
(1) M.M.’s credibility, (2) hearsay, (3) a juror who was not seated, (4) ineffective assistance
of counsel, (5) the legality of his sentence, (6) jury instructions, and (7) prosecutor ial
misconduct. For most of these, it is impossible to discern Muham mad’s argument with
sufficient clarity to address it. And for all of these, Muhammad fails to provide legal
analysis or citation to the record or legal authority. Given that failure to explain or support
his arguments, he has forfeited the m. State v. Reek, 942 N.W.2d 148, 165 (Minn. 2020).
Additionally, his arguments appear to concern witness credibility and various matters
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regarding the district court’s conduct of a criminal trial, all of which warrant substantial
deference on appeal. See State v. Colgrove, 996 N.W.2d 145, 150 (Minn. 2023)
(credibility); Wenthe, 865 N.W.2d at 306 (evidentiary rulings); State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d
303, 307-08 (Minn. 2014) (sentencing); State v. Moore, 863 N.W.2d 111, 118 (Minn. App.
2015) (jury instructions), rev. denied (Minn. July 21, 2015). Because nothing in
Muhammad’s pro se brief articulates a basis for deviating from thi s deferential posture,
identifies a clear abuse of discretion by the district court, or otherwise shows that he did
not receive a fair trial, he has not demonstrated a basis for relief.
Affirmed.