State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0883

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Tristin Tyler Jacox-Mann,
Appellant.

Filed August 18, 2025
Reversed and remanded
Reilly, Judge*

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-22-25145

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Nicole Cornale, Assistant County Attorney,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Suzanne M. Senecal- Hill,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ede, Presiding Judge; Bond, Judge; and Reilly, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REILLY, Judge
In this direct appeal from the judgment of conviction for first-degree sale of cocaine,
third-degree possession of cocaine, and third-degree possession of fentanyl, appellant

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
argues that his convictions must be reversed because law enforcement expanded the scope
of an equipment-violation vehicle stop without probable cause. Because the odor of
marijuana and Jacox-Mann’s admission of the use of marijuana do not constitute sufficient
probable cause to search a vehicle given the cannabis laws in effect at the time of the
incident, we reverse and remand.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Tristin Tyler Jacox-Mann with
four felony counts: first-degree sale of cocaine, third-degree possession of cocaine, third-
degree possession of fentanyl, and ineligible possession of a firearm. Jacox-Mann moved
the district court to suppress the drug and gun evidence police found during a roadside
search of his vehicle following a traffic stop, which occurred on December 14, 2022. The
district court denied Jacox-Mann’s motion. These facts come from the omnibus hearing
regarding the motion to suppress.
An officer testified that on December 14, 2022, just before 5:00 p.m., the officer
saw a Honda Pilot violate a number of traffic laws including (1) traveling with its
headlights off despite the snowy and rainy inclement weather after sunset, and (2) turning
left without signaling the turn. The officer made a U -turn, caught up to the Pilot, and
initiated a traffic stop. The Pilot stopped on the on-ramp to a highway, half in the on-ramp
lane and half over the white line designating the shoulder. After the officer stepped out of
his squad car and as he began approaching the Pilot on foot, he smelled a “quite strong”
odor of burnt and unburnt marijuana coming from the driver’s open window. The driver,
Jacox-Mann, identified himself with his identification card . He did not have a valid
3
driver’s license and claimed he was participating in a driver’s diversion program. The
officer told Jacox-Mann that he pulled him over because he had no front plate, failed to
signal a turn, and did not have on his headlights. The officer asked Jacox-Mann to step out
of the vehicle and the two walked to the rear of the Pilot.
The officer asked Jacox-Mann, “I’m smelling a little marijuana in the car. Do you
guys smoke at all?” Jacox-Mann replied, “Yeah I do smoke weed,” but denied having any
marijuana on his person. Jacox-Mann reached into his pockets and the officer replied,
“Stop digging in your pockets. Kind of making me a little nervous.” The officer then told
Jacox-Mann that he planned to frisk him and Jacox-Mann replied, “Okay.” The officer
confiscated a marijuana vape from Jacox-Mann’s pocket, which Jacox-Mann confirmed
was a “weed vape.” The officer told Jacox-Mann that officers would search the Pilot based
on the marijuana. Jacox-Mann spontaneously stated, “But . . . weed’s legal to smoke.”
The officer replied, “Not quite yet.” Jacox-Mann seemed surprised and responded, “Oh,
wow.”
A search of the car yielded: (1) one bag containing 23.91 grams of cocaine from
between the driver’s seat and the center console; (2) one bag containing 2.24 grams of
cocaine from between the driver’s seat and the center console; (3) one bag containing 11.4
grams of fentanyl pills; (4) additional marijuana in the center console; (5) a marijuana blunt
in the driver’s door; and (6) a .45 caliber pistol in the glove box.
The district court determined the officer had lawfully stopped Jacox-Mann’s vehicle
because he had an objective basis to do so. And the district court determined that the
officer’s observations—including the “quite strong” odor of burnt and unburnt marijuana
4
and Jacox-Mann’s admission that he does “smoke weed”—established probable cause to
search the vehicle. The district court denied Jacox-Mann’s suppression motion. The case
proceeded to a jury trial. A Hennepin County jury found Jacox-Mann guilty on all three
drug charges but not guilty of the ineligible-possession charge. The district court sentenced
him to 81 months in prison. Jacox-Mann appeals.
DECISION
Jacox-Mann argues the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress
because the officer did not have probable cause to search Jacox-Mann’s car. The United
States and Minnesota Constitutions protect against “unreasonable searches and seizures.”
U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. A warrantless seizure is reasonable when
it is supported by probable cause. State v. Glover, 4 N.W.3d 124, 132 (Minn. 2024)
(quotation omitted). Probable cause exists when “a person of ordinary care and prudence,
viewing the totality of circumstances objectively, would entertain an honest and strong
suspicion that a specific individual has committed a crime.” Id. (emphasis omitted)
(quotation omitted). Probable cause requires “something more than mere suspicion but
less than the evidence necessary for conviction.” State v. Williams, 794 N.W.2d 867, 871
(Minn. 2011). This inquiry is objective and turns on the cumulative facts of the individual
case. Id.
When reviewing a pretrial order denying a motion to suppress evidence, we
independently review the facts to “determine whether, as a matter of law, the district court
erred in not suppressing the evidence.” State v. Wilde, 947 N.W.2d, 473, 476 (Minn. App.
2020), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 1, 2020). In doing so, we review the district court’s factual
5
findings for clear error and its legal determinations de novo. State v. Ortega, 770 N.W.2d
145, 149 (Minn. 2009).
For an officer to search a vehicle without a warrant, circumstances must show that
there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in the car.
State v. Yarbrough, 841 N.W.2d 619, 622 (Minn. 2014). To search a car for marijuana
after smelling it, the totality of the circumstances must indicate a fair probability that the
car contains a criminal amount of marijuana. State v. Torgerson, 995 N.W.2d 164, 169
(Minn. 2023).
At the time of the search, marijuana was listed as a Schedule I controlled substance.
Minn. Stat. § 152.02, subd. 2(h) (2022). Marijuana was defined as “ all parts of the plant
of any species of the genus Cannabis.” Minn. Stat. § 152.01, subd. 9 (2022). Minnesota
law provided three exceptions that made cannabis possession noncriminal. See Torgerson,
995 N.W.2d at 169-70. The first exception was for “hemp,” defined as having a delta- 9
tetrahydrocannabinol concentration of less than 0.3 percent. See Minn. Stat. § 152.22,
subd. 5a (2022) (defining “hemp” by reference to the definition of “industrial hemp” set
forth in Minn. Stat. § 18K.02, subd. 3 (2022)). The second exception was for medical
cannabis possessed pursuant to Minnesota’s medical cannabis registry program.
Minn. Stat. § 152.32, subd. 2 (2022). And the third exception made possession of a “small
amount”—“42.5 grams or less” —of marijuana a noncriminal petty misdemeanor .1

1 “Petty misdemeanor” means a petty offense that is prohibited by statute, which does not
constitute a crime and for which a sentence of a fine of not more than $300 may be imposed.
Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 4a (2022).
6
Minn. Stat. §§ 152.027, subd. 4(a); .01, subd. 16 (2022). Under certain circumstances,
possession of over 1.4 grams or more of marijuana in a motor vehicle was a misdemeanor,
but possession of 1.4 grams or less was a noncriminal offense. Minn. Stat. § 152.027, subd.
3 (2022); Torgerson, 995 N.W.2d at 170. Consequently, under this statutory scheme,
possession of marijuana was “not always a crime.” Torgerson, 995 N.W.2d at 170.2
Jacox-Mann argues the district court erred by determining that the officer had
probable cause to search his vehicle. Jacox -Mann does not challenge the stop of his
vehicle. Rather, Jacox-Mann argues the district court erred in determining that the officer
had probable cause to search the car, contending that the officer’s sole basis for the search
was the odor of marijuana. Jacox- Mann also argues that , even if other factors are
considered, they do not amount to probable cause.
Under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, “[w]hen probable cause
exists to believe that a vehicle contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment permits the
police to search the vehicle without a warrant.” State v. Flowers, 734 N.W.2d 239, 248
(Minn. 2007). Probable cause “exists when there is a fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Torgerson, 995 N.W.2d at 169
(quotation omitted). Probable cause is a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis that

2 Currently, Minn. Stat. § 169A.36, subd. 3 (2024), provides that it is a crime for a person
to possess, while in a private motor vehicle on a street or highway, any cannabis flower, a
cannabis product, a lower-potency hemp edible, a hemp-derived consumer product, or any
other product containing an artificially derived cannabinoid that has been removed from
its packaging in which it was sold. This change was effective August 1, 2023. 2023 Minn.
Laws ch. 63, art. 4, § 30, at 2837.
7
requires “more than mere suspicion but less than the evidence necessary for conviction.”
Id. (quotation omitted). The Minnesota Supreme Court has held:
[T]he odor of marijuana may be considered as part of the
probable cause calculus. Specifically, the odor of marijuana is
one of the circumstances in the totality of circumstances
analysis that should be considered in determining if there is a
‘fair probability’ that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found in the location searched.

Id. at 174 (quotation omitted). But, on its own, the odor of marijuana “is insufficient to
establish a fair probability that the search would yield evidence of criminally illegal
drug-related contraband or conduct.” Id. at 175.
The district court determined that the strong odor of marijuana “emanating from the
car,” and Jacox-Mann’s admission that “I do smoke weed,” can be considered when
analyzing whether the officers had probable cause to search the vehicle for contraband.
The district court determined that, “based on [Jacox-Mann’s] statement confirming that he
smokes marijuana and the smell of marijuana emanating from the car,” the officer had
probable cause that the vehicle contained contraband.
Jacox-Mann argues that the officer only stated that he was searching the car because
of the odor of marijuana. Jacox-Mann contends that the officer did not articulate “a
particularized and objective basis for suspecting the seized person of criminal activity.”
State v. Cripps, 533 N.W.2d 388, 391 (Minn. 1995). The record consists of officer
testimony at an omnibus hearing and the officer’s bodycam-footage of the incident.
Besides the odor of marijuana— which can be considered within the totality of the
circumstances for the probable cause calculus—the officer testified that a “marijuana vape”
8
was discovered on Jacox-Mann’s person and that Jacox-Mann confirmed to the officer, “I
do smoke weed.” That said, even these added facts do not provide sufficient probable
cause to search the vehicle. Admission of use and the smell of marijuana are not enough
to suggest that there is a criminal amount of drugs in the vehicle. At the time of the search,
possession of less than 1.4 grams of marijuana in a car was a petty misdemeanor, not a
crime. Minn. Stat. § 152.027, subd. 3 (2020) (providing that possession of more than 1.4
grams of marijuana in a car is a misdemeanor).3 While the odor of marijuana is a factor in
assessing probable cause for a search, the odor by itself “is insufficient to establish a fair
probability that the search would yield evidence of criminally illegal drug-related
contraband or conduct.” Torgerson, 995 N.W.2d at 175. Similarly, neither admittance of
use nor possession of a marijuana vape with an unknown quantity of marijuana is enough
to establish the necessary fair probability.
The officer smelled marijuana, Jacox-Mann admitted that he did “smoke weed,” and
a marijuana vape of an unknown quantity was discovered on Jacox- Mann’s person. But
these circumstances, together or alone, are insufficient to establish that a criminal amount
of marijuana would be discovered in the car. Thus, the officer did not have probable cause
to believe Jacox-Mann’s car contained contraband to justify the warrantless search of his
automobile. See id. at 169.

3 The statute also provides two other noncriminal forms of marijuana: industrial hemp and
medical marijuana. The district court addressed only industrial hemp.
9
While we conclude that the officer lacked probable cause to search the vehicle, we
decline to analyze the state’s alternative ground for denying Jacox-Mann’s motion to
suppress—inevitable discovery, which the state argued at the omnibus hearing in district
court.4 The state contended that, because neither Jacox-Mann nor the passenger possessed
a valid license, the evidence would have been discovered during a tow-inventory of the
vehicle.5 The district court did not address the state’s argument about inevitable discovery
because it found that probable cause supported the warrantless search. “It is not within the
province of [appellate courts] to determine issues of fact on appeal.” Kucera v. Kucera,
146 N.W.2d 181, 183 (Minn. 1966); Fontaine v. Steen, 759 N.W.2d 672, 679 (Minn. App.
2009) (same) (quoting Kucera, 146 N.W.2d at 183).
Therefore, we reverse and remand to the district court to consider the state’s
alternative theory of inevitable discovery.
Reversed and remanded.

4 The inevitable-discovery exception provides that evidence seized in a warrantless search
may be admissible if the state proves by a preponderance of evidence that the evidence
“ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.” State v. Licari,
659 N.W.2d 243, 254 (Minn. 2003).
5 When a vehicle involved in a stop requires removal from a location for traffic or safety
reason, officers will conduct a tow-inventory, which includes an itemized listing of all the
contents within a vehicle.