State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0904

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Alexander David Chaffee,
Appellant.

Filed March 10, 2025
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

Polk County District Court
File No. 60-CR-22-1893

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Greg Widseth, Polk County Attorney, Scott A. Buhler, Tanner D. Hermanson, Assistant
County Attorneys, Crookston, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, John Patrick Monnens, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and
Wheelock, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WORKE, Judge
Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion
for a downward dispositional sentencing departure. We affirm.

2
FACTS
In August 2023, appellant Alexander David Chaffee pleaded guilty to first-degree
driving while impaired (DWI)—operating or in physical control of a vehicle when his body
contained any amount of methamphetamine or its metabolite.1
In establishing the factual basis to support the plea, Chaffee stated that he used
methamphetamine on November 18, 2022. On November 22, 2022, he drove to a meeting
with a probation agent. After the meeting, Chaffee’s probation agent requested a urine
sample. Chaffee provided a sample that tested positive for methamphetamine. Chaffee
agreed that he has DWI convictions from 2016, 2018, and 2021.
The presumptive sentence was 75 months in prison, with a presumptive guidelines
range of 65 to 84 months. Chaffee had 11 criminal-history points, mainly from a string of
burglaries committed on the same day. The parties’ agreement contemplated Chaffee
moving for a downward dispositional departure.
At the sentencing hearing, Chaffee argued that he should receive a departure
because his criminal history is due to “a few bad decisions” from several years ago.
Chaffee also argued that he has family support and, since the charges, he has been receiving
treatment and has done everything asked by probation. Chaffee argued that, if the district
court did not find him particularly amenable to probation, the district court should still
grant a departure because his culpability was mitigated in the current offense.

1 Chaffee also pleaded guilty to a separate criminal charge in another matter at the same
time.
3
The state conceded that Chaffee seemed to “have done treatment and ha[d] done
well since” being charged. But the state argued that Chaffee has shown that he is not
particularly amenable to probation because he was charged with the new felony while he
was being supervised on probation. The state argued that Chaffee should be sentenced to
the bottom of the presumptive range on the sentencing guidelines grid.
The district court stated that Chaffee’s age of 34 years old and significant prior
criminal history did not support a departure. But his family support, remorse, and attitude
supported a departure. The district court stated, however, that to grant a departure, it had
to find that Chaffee was “particularly amenable to probation . . . . [in] other words . . . that
[he’s] exceptional, distinctive.” The district court stated that Chaffee was not particularly
amenable to probation because his history on probation had “been not good” and he had
been terminated from several treatment programs. The district court denied the departure
request and sentenced Chaffee to 65 months in prison, a term at the low end of the
presumptive guidelines range. This appeal followed.
DECISION
Chaffee argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his request for
a downward dispositional departure. This court reviews a district court’s denial of a motion
for a downward dispositional departure for an abuse of discretion . State v. Soto, 855
N.W.2d 303, 307-08 (Minn. 2014). “A district court abuses its discretion when its reasons
for [denying a] departure are legally impermissible and insufficient evidence in the record
justifies the [denial].” State v. Solberg, 882 N.W.2d 618, 623 (Minn. 2016). This court
will not interfere with the district court’s exercise of discretion, “as long as the record
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shows the [district] court carefully evaluated all the testimony and information presented
before making a determination.” State v. Van Ruler, 378 N.W.2d 77, 80-81 (Minn. App.
1985). Only in a “rare” case will this court reverse a district court’s imposition of a
presumptive sentence. State v. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981).
Here, the district court imposed a sentence within the presumptive range. The
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines establish presumptive sentences “to maintain
uniformity, proportionality, rationality, and predictability in sentencing.” Minn. Stat.
§ 244.09, subd. 5 (2024). A district court must impose a sentence within the presumptive
range unless it finds that “substantial and compelling circumstances are present.” State v.
Barthman, 938 N.W.2d 257, 270 (Minn. 2020) (quotation omitted). “Substantial and
compelling circumstances are those that make a case atypical.” State v. Walker, 913
N.W.2d 463, 468 (Minn. App. 2018).
Chaffee argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his departure
motion because substantial and compelling circumstances exist. He argues that he
completed treatment, has family support, and has an old criminal history that largely
occurred on one day when he was only 18 years old. He claims that the district court failed
to account for the measures he has taken since he was charged with the DWI offense. But
when a district court denies a departure and imposes a presumptive sentence, the district
court need not provide an explanation for denying the departure request. Van Ruler, 378
N.W.2d at 80. Even so, the district court stated on the record the reasons for finding
Chaffee not particularly amenable to probation, despite his completion of treatment.
5
When considering a motion for a dispositional departure, a district court generally
focuses on the defendant’s characteristics and whether he is particularly amenable to
treatment in a probationary setting. See State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982).
Whether a defendant is particularly amenable to probation depends on several factors,
including the defendant’s age, prior criminal record, remorse, cooperation, attitude in court,
and support of friends and family. Id.
The district court stated that Chaffee’s age and criminal history did not support a
departure but that his remorse, attitude, and family support did support a departure.
However, the district court stated that it could not find Chaffee particularly amenable to
probation because he had proved to be unsuccessful on probation.
The record supports the district court’s determination. First, the district court noted
that it reviewed “a lot” of information in considering Chaffee’s departure request. This
indicates that the district court “carefully evaluated all the testimony and information
presented before making a determination.” See Van Ruler, 378 N.W.2d at 80-81.
Second, the district court considered the Trog factors, finding that several of the
factors favored a departure, showing, again, that the district court considered all the
information presented. But the district court stated that Chaffee’s criminal history did not
support a departure. While Chaffee argues that his criminal-history score is largely due to
a one-day burglary spree, he fails to acknowledge that he has several DWI convictions,
which is the same charge to which he pleaded guilty in this case.
Third, although Chaffee suggests that the district court should have considered
factors that mitigated the present offense, several factors indicate that the offense was not
6
mitigated—Chaffee was on probation, and he was prohibited from using
methamphetamine, but he used methamphetamine prior to driving to a meeting with his
probation agent.
Finally, the district court properly considered that Chaffee had not been successful
on probation. Chaffee argues that the district court imposed a more stringent standard by
stating that the district court had to find that Chaffee was “exceptional, distinctive” to grant
his request. But these words align with the requirement that a district court must determine
that substantial and compelling circumstances exist that make the case atypical in order to
grant a departure. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Chaffee’s
request for a downward dispositional departure.
Affirmed.