Roosevelt Bartu, Jr., petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0912

Roosevelt Bartu, Jr., petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed February 24, 2025
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-20-17723

Roosevelt Bartu, Jr., Elk River, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Matthew D. Hough, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Harris, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and
Cochran, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
On appeal from the denial of his petition for postconviction relief, appellant argues
that the postconviction court abused its discretion by denying his requests for relief based
on an alleged Miranda violation and ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm.
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FACTS
Following an altercation in downtown Minneapolis, law-enforcement officers
arrested appellant Roosevelt Bartu, Jr. Respondent State of Minnesota charged Bartu with
first-degree aggravated robbery in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.245,
subdivision 1 (2020), and third-degree assault in violation of Minnesota Statutes section
609.223, subdivision 1 (2020). Bartu pleaded not guilty, and the case proceeded to a jury
trial.
Jury Trial
At trial, the state introduced surveillance videos of the assault, which we
summarized in our decision on Bartu’s direct appeal:
The surveillance videos (as evident in the recordings and as
explained by the victim at Bartu’s trial) depict a man walking
with bags of groceries and a case of beer and then being
followed by Bartu, who nabs a can of beer. The man confronts
Bartu, who then opens the can and pours out its contents. The
man walks away from Bartu, but Bartu follows him again,
overtakes him, and begins throwing punches at him. Then
others, who appear to be Bartu’s companions and acting in
concert with him, punch the man, strip off his coat and shirt,
throw him to the sidewalk, and kick him in the head. While
some beat the man, Bartu and others carry away the case of
beer and some of the groceries, leaving the man shirtless on the
ground, dazed.

State v. Bartu, No. A22-0527, 2023 WL 2762430, at *1 (Minn. App. Apr. 3, 2023), rev.
denied (Minn. July 18, 2023). The jury also heard the testimony of a sergeant who
interviewed Bartu after his arrest. The sergeant testified that Bartu admitted he pushed,
shoved, and charged at the victim, and also “physically took [a beer from the victim] by
force.”
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The jury found Bartu guilty of first-degree aggravated robbery, and the district court
entered judgment of conviction and sentenced him to 41 months’ imprisonment. Bartu
filed a direct appeal and then a petition for postconviction relief.
Direct Appeal
On direct appeal, we affirmed Bartu’s conviction, rejecting his argument that the
state impermissibly removed a prospective juror. Id. at *2-3. We also noted that Bartu
raised five additional issues in a supplemental brief but concluded that “none merit[ed] our
consideration.” Id. at *3. Among other issues, Bartu alleged that the sergeant “questioned
him without reading the Miranda warning.” He also raised a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel. Id. We declined to review the Miranda issue because the issue was
insufficiently briefed. Id. We also declined to review Bartu’s claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, but we “afford[ed] Bartu the opportunity to raise and properly
develop facts regarding that assertion in a postconviction proceeding.” Id.
Postconviction Proceedings
Following our decision, Bartu filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief and
requested an evidentiary hearing. Bartu ’s petition did not raise a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel. Instead, he made several other arguments, including that he was not
read his Miranda rights prior to being questioned by the sergeant. In response, the state
argued that Bartu’s postconviction claims were procedurally barred and that no evidentiary
hearing was warranted. In its order granting a hearing, the postconviction court determined
the hearing was appropriate because of the court’s “inability to fully grasp” Bartu’s
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arguments and because of our opinion on Bartu’s direct appeal, in which we preserved
Bartu’s opportunity to raise a postconviction claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.
Bartu appeared on his own behalf at the evidentiary hearing. 1 The postconviction
court inquired into whether Bartu wished to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel. Bartu answered affirmatively, indicating that he thought his counsel was
ineffective for failing to move to suppress his statement to the sergeant. The state argued
that an audio recording of Bartu’s statement to the sergeant proved that Bartu was read his
Miranda rights prior to the sergeant’s questioning. The postconviction court permitted the
parties to file supplemental briefing on the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel issue.
After the hearing, the state filed the recording of Bartu’s statement to the sergeant
and mailed a copy to Bartu. In the recording, the sergeant can be heard reading the Miranda
warning before questioning Bartu. The postconviction court received the recording into
evidence without objection. Bartu and the state then filed supplemental briefing on Bartu’s
claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel for failing to argue for
suppression of Bartu’s statement to the sergeant.
After reviewing the parties’ supplemental briefing, the district court filed a written
order denying the petition for postconviction relief. It determined that Bartu’s Miranda
claim was procedurally barred and, in the alternative, fails on its merits. The court also

1 Bartu did not order a transcript of the postconviction evidentiary hearing, and so that
transcript is not part of the record on appeal. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110.02, subd. 1
(providing that it is the appellant’s duty to supplement the record with transcripts of
proceedings that are relevant). We therefore rely on the postconviction court’s order and
the parties’ supplemental briefing below to restate the facts of the evidentiary hearing.
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rejected Bartu’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, concluding
that Bartu could demonstrate neither prejudice nor that counsel’s performance fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness.
Bartu appeals.
DECISION
Bartu challenges the district court’s denial of his petition for postconviction relief.
A person convicted of a crime may seek postconviction relief by filing a petition alleging
that the conviction “violated the person’s rights under the Constitution or laws of the
United States or of the state.” Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1(1) (2024). We review the
denial of a petition for postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion. Erickson v. State,
842 N.W.2d 314, 318 (Minn. 2014). A postconviction court abuses its discretion when it
exercises its discretion arbitrarily or capriciously, erroneously applies the law, or makes
clearly erroneous factual findings. Pearson v. State, 891 N.W.2d 590, 596 (Minn. 2017).
Bartu, who is self-represented, asserts that the district court abused its discretion by
denying his postconviction claims based on Miranda and ineffective assistance of counsel.
We address each claim in turn and conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in either regard.
I. Bartu’s Miranda claim is Knaffla barred.
Bartu first asserts that the postconviction court abused its discretion by denying his
Miranda claim as procedurally barred. We disagree.
It is well settled that, after a direct appeal has been taken, “all matters raised therein,
and all claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for
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postconviction relief.” State v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (Minn. 1976). There are
two exceptions to the Knaffla bar: “(1) if a novel legal issue is presented; or (2) if the
interests of justice require review.” Gilbert v. State, 2 N.W.3d 483, 487 (Minn. 2024).
The postconviction court determined that Bartu’s Miranda argument is
Knaffla-barred because Bartu raised it on direct appeal. The postconviction court further
determined that neither exception to the Knaffla bar applied.
We agree with the postconviction court that Bartu’s Miranda-violation claim is
Knaffla-barred because it is undisputed that Bartu raised his Miranda-violation argument
on direct appeal. 2 This court declined to review the merits of Bartu’s Miranda-violation
argument on direct appeal due to inadequate briefing. Bartu’s failure to adequately brief
the issue during his prior appeal does not revive the argument for purposes of a
postconviction proceeding. In fact, had Bartu not raised the issue on direct appeal at all, it
would still be Knaffla-barred at the postconviction proceeding. See Buckingham v. State,
799 N.W.2d 229, 232 (Minn. 2011) (holding that appellant’s postconviction-relief claim
asserting a Miranda violation was Knaffla-barred because it turned on “facts that were
known or should have been known to him at the time of his direct appeal”). Bartu’s
Miranda-violation claim centers on facts surrounding his interview with the sergeant—

2 To the extent that Bartu is arguing for the first time on appeal that his waiver of his
Miranda rights was ineffective (as opposed to his argument below that he did not receive
a proper Miranda warning), that argument was not raised before the postconviction court
and is therefore forfeited on appeal. See State v. Roby, 547 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Minn. 1996)
(holding that appellate courts “generally will not decide issues which were not raised before
the district court”).
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facts that Bartu knew of at the time of direct appeal. Accordingly, the postconviction court
did not abuse its discretion by denying Bartu’s Miranda claim as procedurally barred.
Bartu makes several arguments to persuade us otherwise. First, he argues that his
Miranda challenge should not be Knaffla-barred because his argument “is so novel that the
legal basis was not available in other proceedings.” But suppression of a statement based
on Miranda is not a novel legal issue. The United States Supreme Court decided Miranda
in 1966. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). As the postconviction court observed,
“[Bartu’s] claim[] regarding . . . his Miranda rights [is] well established” and is the type of
challenge that is “frequently raised.” Because Bartu could have moved to suppress his
statement based on Miranda prior to trial, his Miranda challenge does not present a novel
legal issue exempt from Knaffla’s procedural bar. Next, Bartu asserts that his claim should
not be barred because “Miranda is a constitutional issue that everyone in the United States
is afforded.” But the Knaffla bar “applies even in postconviction proceedings raising
constitutional issues of criminal procedure.” Lynch v. State, 749 N.W.2d 318, 321 (Minn.
2008) (quotations omitted). Lastly, Bartu argues that he “was not as educated as [he is]
now and did not approach [his supplemental] brief on the correct merits.” We acknowledge
that it can be challenging for a defendant who is not an attorney to file a supplemental brief,
but a postconviction petitioner’s belief that “an argument actually raised on direct appeal
could have been more complete” does not satisfy an exception to the Knaffla bar.
Reed v. State, 793 N.W.2d 725, 730 (Minn. 2010).
In sum, Bartu’s Miranda-violation claim was raised on direct appeal, and he has
demonstrated no circumstances exempting him from Knaffla’s procedural bar. We
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therefore conclude that the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion by determining
that Bartu’s Miranda- violation claim i s procedurally barred. As a result, we need not
consider the merits of Bartu’s Miranda argument.
II. The postconviction court did not abuse its discretion by denying Bartu relief
on his claims for ineffective assistance of counsel.

Bartu next challenges the postconviction court’s denial of his claims for ineffective
assistance of counsel. We again conclude that the postconviction court did not abuse its
discretion.
Criminal defendants are guaranteed the right to assistance of counsel. U.S. Const.
amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6. “The right to counsel includes the right to effective
assistance of counsel.” State v. Paige, 765 N.W.2d 134, 140 (Minn. 2009). To prevail on
a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, a postconviction petitioner must “allege facts
that, if proven by a fair preponderance of the evidence, would satisfy the two prongs of the
test announced in” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Zumberge v. State,
937 N.W.2d 406, 413 (Minn. 2019). Under Strickland, the petitioner must show that
(1) “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and
(2) “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688,
694). If the petitioner does not satisfy one prong, the reviewing court “need not consider
both prongs in determining that the claim fails.” Swaney v. State, 882 N.W.2d 207, 217
(Minn. 2016). This court reviews a postconviction claim for ineffective assistance of
counsel de novo. Taylor v. State, 887 N.W.2d 821, 823 (Minn. 2016).
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Bartu contends that both his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing
to challenge the admission of his statement to the sergeant under Miranda. The
postconviction court rejected Bartu’s claims, concluding that he could not establish that his
attorneys’ performances were objectively unreasonable nor that his attorneys’ failures to
raise the Miranda issue affected the outcome of the proceeding. We agree with the
postconviction court’s conclusions.
First, Bartu cannot establish that his attorneys’ performances fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness. When we evaluate a claim for ineffective assistance of
counsel, “there is a strong presumption that counsel’s performance was reasonable.”
Andersen v. State, 830 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Minn. 2013); see also Zumberge, 937 N.W.2d at 413
(applying the same principle to review of appellate counsel’s performance). “An attorney’s
performance falls below an objective standard of reasonableness when they fail to exercise
the skills and diligence of a reasonably competent attorney under the circumstances.”
Allwine v. State, 994 N.W.2d 528, 536 (Minn. 2023).
Bartu alleges that both trial and appellate counsel were ineffective because they
“never challenged the interrogation nor the waiver of Miranda.” This argument is not
persuasive. The recording of Bartu’s statement shows that the sergeant advised Bartu of
his rights, and repeatedly ensured that Bartu affirmatively exercised or waived those rights
with a “yes or no” before proceeding with questioning. And, although Bartu’s responses
are largely indiscernible in the recording because of poor audio quality, nothing in the
recording supports Bartu’s assertion in his brief that “it is obvious that [he] was not
coherent and could not give an affirmative answer.” Thus, trial counsel could have
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reasonably concluded that Bartu received a proper Miranda warning and waived his rights,
therefore obviating the need for a suppression motion. Bartu cannot overcome the strong
presumption that trial counsel’s performance was objectively reasonable.
Nor was it objectively unreasonable for appellate counsel to not raise the Miranda
issue on direct appeal. “Appellate counsel does not have a duty to raise all possible issues,
and may choose to present only the most meritorious claims.” Zumberge, 937 N.W.2d at
413 (quotation omitted). Because nothing in the record supports Bartu’s claim that he did
not receive a Miranda warning, Bartu’s Miranda claim was unlikely to be successful.
Therefore, appellate counsel’s decision to not raise the issue was objectively reasonable.
Because Bartu cannot meet Strickland’s first prong with regard to either trial counsel or
appellate counsel, his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel fail. Swaney, 882 N.W.2d
at 217.
Even if Bartu could demonstrate that his attorneys’ performances fell below the
threshold of objective reasonableness, Bartu fails to explain how the outcome of the
proceedings would have differed had his attorneys raised the issue. Bartu merely asserts
that his statement should not have been admitted. But had Bartu’s statement been
suppressed, the jury still would have seen the surveillance videos depicting everything that
Bartu admitted to during his interview with the sergeant. Given the strength of the state’s
other evidence, the jury likely would have found Bartu guilty even if his statement to the
sergeant had been suppressed. For the same reason, this court likely would not have
granted Bartu relief on his Miranda claim had it been raised by appellate counsel on direct
appeal. Accordingly, Bartu cannot meet the second prong of Strickland.
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In conclusion, we agree with the postconviction court that Bartu cannot establish
either prong under Strickland. Thus, the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion
by denying Bartu’s petition for postconviction relief.
Affirmed.