In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Mitchell Pierson.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0954

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Mitchell Pierson.

Filed November 4, 2024
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-MH-PR-23-159

Kathleen K. Rauenhorst, Rauenhorst & Associate, P.A., St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant
Pierson)

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Anne Zimmerman, Assistant County Attorney, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondent county)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Cochran,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant challenges his commitment as a person who has a mental illness and is
dangerous to the public (MI&D), arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the
commitment. Because clear and convincing evidence supports the determination that
appellant meets the statutory criteria for MI&D, we affirm.
FACTS
For the last seven years, a ppellant Mitchell Pierson, 40, has been repeatedly
involved with mental health issues, many of them resulting from his delusional beliefs
2
about an ex -girlfriend and a daughter he claimed to have had with her. However, the
daughter does not exist. In 2017, these beliefs worsened, and appellant became threatening
and aggressive. Anoka County petitioned for his commitment as mentally ill (MI). The
district court ordered that appellant be supervised under a stay of commitment. Appellant
was discharged from an intensive residential treatment services (IRTS) center after refusing
to cooperate with his case manager and was committed for six mon ths. When h e was
allowed to leave the hospital in December for a holiday, he absconded from his father’s
home.
In January 2018, appellant was apprehended and hospitalized. His case manager
said appellant required commitment because of his limited insight into his mental health
and chemical dependency issues. He was provisionally discharged to a sober house in
May, and his case manager asked that his civil commitment be allowed to expire in May.
In June, appellant was admitted to an Adult Mental Health Unit at a hospital, again saying
that his ex-girlfriend and their daughter were being kidnapped and abused, that he needed
to be discharged so he c ould protect them, and that he had driven off the road because he
saw his ex -girlfriend screaming while she was taken away. Anoka County again filed a
petition to commit appellant as MI and chemically dependent (CD). An examiner reported
that appellant had “a fixed delusion that his [family members] have been kidnapped . . .
and, during the course of this investigation, engaged in a high -speed vehicle chase of a
vehicle, ran a red light, and nearly caused an accident .” The district court filed an order
committing appellant as MI but not CD for six months and authorizing the use of
neuroleptic medications. In August, appellant was provisionally discharged to an IRTS
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facility, but in October, the case manager filed a notice of intent to revoke the provisional
discharge (NIRPD) because appellant had violated some of its material conditions and
spoken of causing serious physical harm to himself and others. After repeatedly contacting
law enforcement to say that his family was going to be hurt, appellant was admitted to a
hospital for evaluation of his hallucinations, discharged early from a sober house, and
rehospitalized. In December, based on a final treatment report recommendation that
appellant’s MI commitment be extended, the district court extended it to 12 months and
authorized neuroleptic medications.
In January 2019, appellant was admitted to Minnesota Specialty Health Systems
(MSHS) in Willmar. He was provisionally discharged to a sober home in March, but was
discharged from the sober home for refusing to participate in its program. He was arrested
in May for possession of methamphetamines, and his commitment was continued for six
months. In August, a case manager filed a NIRPD because appellant had again violated its
material conditions. But in September, appellant was homeless, living out of his vehicle,
and increasingly delusional, believing the manager of an auto -repair shop was holding
appellant’s ex-girlfriend hostage.
In December 2019, the district court noted that appellant believed “that his ex -
girlfriend and daughter ha [d] been taken from him” and recommitted him as MI for 12
months. Weeks later, a crisis team responded to calls in which appellant claimed that his
wife and daughter were being killed in the next apartment. Appellant went to a hospital
because he believed that his “heart was switched out with someone on a spaceship.” He
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was placed on a 72 -hour hold, but the paperwork was not completed , and he was
discharged.
On January 1, 2020, appellant chased a friend and the friend’s girlfriend because he
thought they had his daughter locked in their car. He smashed the friend’s car wi ndow
with his hand and reportedly wielded a knife, dropping it when the police had him a t
gunpoint. Law enforcement then took appellant to a hospital, where he was placed on a
72-hour old and provisionally discharged. His case manager filed a NIRPD because
appellant had missed appointments for medications the previous month . In March,
appellant believed that his partner and their child were being held in a neighbor’s
apartment. He knocked on the door, punched the man who answered in the face, entered,
and began to strangle the woman who was in the apartment. Appellant was taken to a
hospital emergency department in restraints, and the ca se manager filed another NIRPD.
In April, appellant was provisionally discharged to an IRTS center and transferred to an
assertive community treatment (ACT) team for case management. But after a few months
during which things seemed to go better, appellant became more resistant to injectable
medication and began using methamphetamine.
In August 2020, the case manager file d a third NIRPD. Appellant was discharged
from the IRTS center and was homeless. He s aid he could hear his ex-girlfriend and his
daughter, who were kidnapped and were being tortured in an apartment near where
appellant was staying. Appellant was apprehended and brought to a hospital; his
commitment w ould expire in December. In November, a petition for appellant’s
recommitment as MI was filed. His delusion al beliefs of his ex -girlfriend and daughter
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being tortured continued. An examiner noted that appellant needed neuroleptic medication
and was compliant only when a Jarvis order was in effect.1 In December, appellant was
recommitted until December 2021 as a person who pose d a risk of harm due to mental
illness.
In February 2021, appellant t old the AC T team that his ex -girlfriend and his
daughter were being tortured. A hospital report ed an emergency response to a 911 call
from appellant’s apartment because appellant was yelling that his family was being tortured
and scaring other residents. Appellant was brought to the hospital; his case manager filed
a NIRPD. In October, a petition for appellant’s recommitment was filed with a request to
authorize neuroleptic medication, and the ACT team file d a NIRPD . Appellant was
provisionally discharged to an IRTS center, but he declined to participate, used substances,
and left. In November, appellant’s ACT team again requested the revocation of his
provisional discharge; the request stated that appellant was angry, distressed, and irritable,
said he was Jesus Christ, and refus ed his medication. Later in November, one examiner
said appellant had a chronic history of mental illness for many years and needed both
recommitment and a Jarvis order, and another examiner stated that appellant me t the
criteria of a person who posed a risk of harm due to mental illness and was likely to become
noncompliant without court oversight. Based on the examiners’ statements , the district
court recommitted appellant for 12 months , until November 2022. When appellant was
provisionally discharged, he made repeated calls to the police, saying that his ex-girlfriend

1 See Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N.W.2d 139, 150 (Minn. 1988) (requiring judicial approval for
involuntary treatment with neuroleptic drugs).
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and his daughter were kidnapped and in danger; he refused medication, and he reported
delusions and hallucinations to the ACT team.
In March 2022, appellant was apprehended and taken to a hospital. In October,
examiners recommended appellant’s recommitment as MI for 12 months and noted that he
met the forensic psychiatric guidelines for neuroleptic medication. A petition for his
recommitment as MI and a request for neuroleptic medication were filed; one e xaminer
thought it likely that appellant would discontinue medication completely and deteriorate if
he were not committed. In November, appellant was recommitted for 12 months as a
person who posed a risk of harm due to mental illness.
In January 2023, appellant forced his way into his neighbors’ apartment and
assaulted them after accusing them of having his daughter in the apartment. He told the
woman he was going to “f--- her up,” bit the man’s hand, and began choking him. Then,
abruptly, he left. He was charged in Ramsey County with two counts of first-degree
burglary—assault of a person in building/on property, and the ACT team filed a NIRPD.
In March, Ramsey County petitioned for appellant’s commitment as MI&D. He was
transferred to Anoka Metro Regional Treatment Center in May. Following a Phase I
hearing in November 2023 and a Final Determination Hearing in April 2024, at which
appellant and two examiners testified, the district court filed an order for appellant’s final
commitment as MI&D. He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his final
commitment.

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DECISION
In an appeal from an order for civil commitment, this court reviews de novo whether
clear and convincing evidence supports the district court’s determination that an individual
meets the standards for commitment . In re Thulin , 660 N.W.2d 140, 144 (Minn. App.
2003). Because the district court is the best judge of the credibility of witnesses, due
deference is given to its findings of fact. In re Civ. Commitment of Crosby, 824 N.W.2d
351, 356 (Minn. App. 2013), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 23, 2013).
A “person who has a mental illness and is dangerous to the
public” is a person:

(1) who has an organic disorder of the brain or a substantial
psychiatric disorder of thought, mood, perception,
orientation, or memory that grossly impairs judgment,
behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or to reason or
understand, and is manifested by ins tances of grossly
disturbed behavior or faulty perceptions; and

(2) who as a result of that impairment presents a clear danger
to the safety of others as demonstrated by the facts that (i)
the person has engaged in an overt act causing or
attempting to cause serious physical harm to another and
(ii) there is a substantial likelihood that the person will
engage in acts capable of inflicting serious physical harm
on another.

Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 17 (2022). The district court concluded:
There is clear and convincing evidence that [appellant]
continues to be a person who has a mental illness and is
dangerous to the public. [Appellant’s] condition remains
essentially unchanged since his initial commitment. Any
reduction in his symptoms o r the risk he poses to others is
solely due to the fact that he has been residing in a controlled
treatment environment. The statute provides that [“I]f the
[c]ourt finds at the final determination hearing . . . that the
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patient continues to be a person who is [MI&D], then the court
shall order commitment of the proposed patient for an
indeterminate period of time.” Minn. Stat. § 253B.18, subd. 3
(2022). The court so finds.

In his brief, appellant offers neither legal argument nor evidentiary information to
oppose the district court’s finding; he offers nothing except his own unsupported views.
See, e.g., “Appellant denies that he has a mental illness”;2 appellant “denies that he presents
a clear danger to the safety of others”; appellant “denies that there is a substantial likelihood
that he will engage in acts capable of inflicting serious physical harm”; appellant “did not
cause serious physical harm”; and “Insufficient evidence was presented to the district court
to contradict appellant’s denial.” This court declines to address allegations unsupported
by legal analysis or citation. Ganguli v. Univ . of Minnesota, 512 N.W.2d 918, 919 n. 1
(Minn. App. 1984). It also declines to address an issue in the absence of adequate briefing.
State, Dep’t of Lab. and Indus. v. Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn.
1997).
The district court considered the testimony and reports of three doctors who had
recently and repeatedly examined appellant. The 20 -page Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law, and Order quote extensively from these sources to support the district court’s
determinations that appellant is MI&D and that there is no alternative less restrictive than
commitment to a secure facility that is consistent with appellant’s treatment needs and

2 However, the previous page of his brief states, “Appellant admits he has a mental illness
. . . .”
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public safety. Appellant offers no support, factual or legal, for his repeated denials of the
district court’s findings and conclusions, and there is no basis to reverse its order.
Affirmed.