In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: A. P., Parent.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0957

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: A. P., Parent.

Filed November 25, 2024
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Becker County District Court
File No. 03-JV-24-229

Timothy H. Dodd, Detroit Lakes, Minnesota (for appellant A.P.)

Brian W. McDonald, Becker County Attorney, Detroit Lakes, Minnesota (for respondent
Becker County Human Services)

Emily Shaffer, Moorhead, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Wheelock, Judge; and Smith,
John, Judge.
∗
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
The district court terminated a woman’s parental rights to two children. We
conclude that the district court did not err by finding that the county made reasonable
efforts to reunite her with the children. Therefore, we affirm.

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant
to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
FACTS
A.P. is the biological mother of two children who are the subjects of this appeal:
E.S., who was four years old at the time of trial, and T.P., who was eight months old at the
time of trial. The children’s biological father is deceased.
Becker County first received reports concerning A.P.’s parenting abilities in July
2023. It was reported that A.P. gave E.S. large amounts of Nyquil to induce sleeping,
repeatedly supervised E.S. inadequately, and car ed for E.S. in an unsanitary and unsafe
apartment. The county investigated these reports and concluded that they were well -
founded and that A.P. experienced significant mental-health issues that impeded her ability
to parent.
In August 2023, the county petitioned the district court for an adjudication that E.S.,
who then was three years old, was a child in need of protection or services (CHIPS). The
district court granted the petition, adjudicated E.S. as being in need of protection or
services, and adopted an out-of-home-placement plan for E.S.
In September 2023, A.P. gave birth to T.P. The county investigated T.P .’s well-
being in light of the then-existing out-of-home placement for E.S. and the concerns raised
by nurses at the hospital where T.P. was born, which related to A.P.’s inability to
understand how to feed a baby and safe sleeping practices. Four days after T.P.’s birth, the
county petitioned the district court for a CHIPS adjudication with respect to T.P. The
district court granted the petition, adjudicated T.P. as being in need of protection or
services, and adopted an out-of-home-placement plan for T.P.
3
The out-of-home-placement plans for E.S. and T.P. imposed substantially the same
requirements on A.P. The plans required A.P. to demonstrate that she could provide a safe,
stable home for the children on a permanent, consistent basis and place the children’s needs
above her own needs. The plans required A.P. to complete a parental -capacity evaluation
and a diagnostic assessment and to follow the recommendations of the evaluators and
assessors. The plans required A.P. to participate in individual ther apy and medication
management and to meet with a family -resource worker weekly to work on life-
management skills. The plans also allowed A.P. to have supervised visitation with the
children.
A.P. cooperated with the county and followed the case plans. In August 2023, A.P.
completed a diagnostic assessment. The assessor concluded that A.P. suffered from
schizoaffective disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and borderline personality disorder
and that her mental-health conditions adversely affected her ability to be a parent. The
assessor reported that A.P.’s parenting ability also was limited by her marginal cognitive
functioning and impairments to her mental health, knowledge of child development, and
amenability to treatment. A.P . consistently attended her supervised visitations with E.S.
and T.P ., communicated with the county social worker, and participated in individual
therapy. Despite this cooperation, A.P. struggled to meet the case plans’ requirements due
to her severe and chronic mental-health issues. A.P. was admitted to in-patient mental-
health facilities on three occasions between September 2023 and March 2024.
In December 2023, A.P. completed the required parental-capacity evaluation. The
evaluator concluded her 17-page written report with nine enumerated recommendations,
4
including, among other things, consistent mental-health treatment, continued medication
management, and continued parenting education and coaching. Notably, the evaluator
recommended that A.P. not be reunited with the children because there “are too many
concerns related to [A.P.’s] severe mental illness and subsequent impaired functioning.”
The evaluator also noted a “concern about [A.P.’s] ability to take care of herself” and stated
that “legal guardianship may be warranted. ” The eighth recommendation states, “A
neuropsychological evaluation may be beneficial in further assessing [A.P.’s] apparent
impairment in judgment, problem-solving, and memory.” 1 At trial, the county social
worker testified that she did not take any action to follow up on the eighth recommendation.
In February 2024, the county petitioned the district court for the termination of
A.P.’s parental rights based on multiple statutory grounds. The case was tried on two days
in April 2024. Seven witnesses, including A.P., testified. In May 2024, the district court
filed an order in which it concluded that the county had proved four statutory grounds for
termination. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), (4), (5), (8) (2022). The district
court also found that the county had made reasonable efforts to reunite A.P. with her
children. See Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h) (2022). Accordingly, the district court granted the
county’s petition and ordered the termination of A.P.’s parental rights. A.P. appeals.

1In the evaluator’s written report, the terms “neuropsychological evaluation” and
“neuropsychiatric evaluation” are used interchangeably.
5
DECISION
A.P. argues that the district court erred by terminating her parental rights.
Specifically, she argues that the district court erred by finding that the county made
reasonable efforts to reunite her with the children.
After a CHIPS adjudication, a county social services agency “shall ensure that
reasonable efforts . . . are made to prevent placement or to eliminate the need for removal
and to reunite the child with the child’s family at the earliest possible time.” Minn. Stat.
§ 260.012(a) (2022). In a proceeding to terminate parental rights, a district court “shall
make specific findings . . . that reasonable efforts to finalize the permanency plan to reunify
the child and the parent were made, including individualized and explicit findings
regarding the nature and extent of efforts made by the social services agency to rehabilitate
the parent and reunite the family.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 8(1).
The reasonable efforts required of a county depend on the facts and circumstances
of the case. See In re Children of T.A.A., 702 N.W.2d 703, 709 (Minn. 2005); In re Welfare
of Child of J.H., 968 N.W.2d 593, 601 (Minn. App. 2021), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 6,
2021). In determining whether a county made reasonable efforts, a district court “shall
consider” various statutory factors, including whether the services provided by the county
were realistic under the circumstances. Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h). A district court also
should consider the length of the county’s involvement and the quality of the county’s
efforts. J.H., 968 N.W.2d at 601.
This court applies a clear-error standard of review to a district court’s findings of
the underlying facts relevant to whether a county has made the required reasonable efforts.
6
In re Welfare of Children of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381, 387 (Minn. 2008); In re Welfare of
Child of D.L.D., 865 N.W.2d 315, 321-23 (Minn. App. 2015), rev. denied (Minn. July 20,
2015); see also In re Welfare of Children of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 899-902 (Minn. App.
2011), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). We apply an abuse- of-discretion standard of
review to a district court’s ultimate finding as to whether a county has made the required
reasonable efforts. D.L.D., 865 N.W.2d at 321-23 (citing J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 900-01).
In this case, the district court made multiple findings of fact concerning the services
that the county provided to A.P. The district court found that the county addressed A.P.’s
parenting skills by arranging a parental-capacity evaluation, in- patient mental-health
services, and parenting classes. The district court also found that the county assigned A.P.
a family-resource worker, who met with A.P. weekly to work with her on life-management
skills, applied for a waiver to assist A.P. in maintaining housing in the community,
organized supervised visitations between A.P. and the children, and assigned A.P. a worker
who specializes in helping people with mental illnesses improve their essential life skills .
Based on these underlying facts, the district court made an ultimate finding that the county
made reasonable efforts to reunite A.P. with the children.
A.P. does not challenge the reasonableness of the efforts described above. Rather,
she makes a narrow argument that the county did not satisfy its duty to make reasonable
efforts because the county did not take any action to implement the eighth recommendation
arising from the parental-capacity evaluation, which suggested a neuropsychiatric
evaluation. A.P. contends that a neuropsychiatric evaluation would have “improved [her]
7
situation” and “would have provided insight concerning the cause and treatment of” her
mental-health issues.
A.P.’s argument is based on testimony elicited at trial. During the cross-
examination of the county social worker, A.P.’s attorney asked whether the social worker
had arranged for a neuropsychiatric evaluation after receiving and reviewing the written
report of the parental -capacity evaluation. The social worker answered by stating, “I
overlooked that recommendation and I did not follow through with a referral for that
evaluation.” The social worker also testified that A.P. “was not even making any progress
in the treatment goals that she was participating in . . . so adding another evaluation and
more services on top of that would not have been beneficial to her.” In addition, the social
worker testified that, if a neuropsychiatric evaluation were requested, it could not be
scheduled for at least six months because of a waitlist. The social worker further testified
that a neuropsychiatric evaluation would not “change the outcome of her parenting
education . . . at this time.”
The district court specifically addressed th e absence of a neuropsychiatric
evaluation in its order, as follows:
The neuro-psychiatric evaluation would most certainly
be helpful to Mom in managing her own life and meeting her
own needs in the future. However, given Mom’s current
struggles and chronic instability with her mental health; this
evaluation would offer no additional helpful insight to the
Court in determining her parenting abilities and aid in
reunification of this family. A neuro-psychological evaluation
may or may not provide additional barriers to reunification.
However, given that Mom has barriers to parenting she has not
overcome, and this evaluation would not remove those
barriers, it is not a failure on the part of [the county] nor does
8
it provide a basis to find a lack of reasonable efforts. Mom is
struggling with her current services and has not evolved to a
point where implementing additional services would be
manageable.

Before considering A.P.’s argument, we note that a neuropsychiatric evaluation may
have been recommended more for the purpose of assessing A.P.’s ability to parent than for
the purpose of identifying additional services that could benefit her . The district court
stated that a neuropsychiatric evaluation “would offer no additional helpful insight to the
Court in determining her parenting abilities.” We further note the district court’s statement
that a neuropsychiatric evaluation “may or may not provide additional barriers to
reunification,” which implies that a neuropsychiatric evaluation might have yielded more
evidence supporting termination of A.P.’s parental rights.
In any event, the record supports the district court’s findings concerning the absence
of a neuropsychiatric evaluation. The evaluator who recommended a neuropsychiatric
evaluation by stating that it “may be beneficial” also testified at trial that A.P.’s mental-
health symptoms are so severe that reunification is not a realistic goal for her. The family-
resource worker who assisted A.P. with parenting skills and life-management skills
testified that A.P. struggled to make progress in developing the skills required by the case
plan and was unlikely to make sufficient progress in the future. Both the county social
worker and the guardian ad litem testified that A.P. struggled to take care of herself and to
implement the practices outlined in her case plan due to her serious and ongoing mental-
health issues. The county social worker testified that A.P.’s therapist suspended individual
therapy for eight months because A.P. did not have the cognitive ability to make progress
9
in this area. The county social worker also testified that visitation with E.S. and T.P. had
not moved beyond supervised visitation because of ongoing concerns about A.P.’s ability
to ensure the children’s safety. This evidence supports the district court’s reasoning that
the absence of a neuropsychiatric evaluation is not inconsistent with a finding that
reasonable efforts were made.
A.P. relies on a prior opinion of this court in which we stated that the concept of
reasonable efforts includes “real, genuine help to see that all things are done that might
conceivably improve the circumstances of the parent and the relationship of the parent with
the child.” In the Matter of Welfare of J.A. , 377 N.W.2d 69, 73 (Minn. App. 1985)
(emphasis added). We have cited J.A. on only one occasion. See In the Matter of Welfare
of M.A., 408 N.W.2d 227, 236 (Minn. App. 1987), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 18, 1987). The
J.A. opinion is of limited precedential value because it predates the 1986 enactment of
section 260.012, which defines “reasonable efforts” for purposes of juvenile-protection
cases. See 1986 Minn. Laws ch. 448, § 1. The subsequent M.A. opinion is similarly
unhelpful because it does not cite section 260.012, presumably because that case was
commenced in 1982, before the 1986 enactment became effective. See 408 N.W.2d at
229-31.
In any event, to interpret J.A. in the manner suggested by A.P.—to require a county
to take every action that is remotely possible—would be inconsistent with the meaning of
the word “reasonable.” See The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language
1465 (5th ed. 2016) (“[n]ot excessive or extreme” and “fair”); Webster’s New International
Dictionary 2074 (2d ed. 1946) (“[n]ot more or less than reason dictates within due or just
10
limits”). In another case in which a similar argument was made , we concluded that a
county’s efforts were “reasonable” even though they were “less than perfect.” See In re
Welfare of Child L.L ., No. A13-1582, 2013 WL 8116310, at *6 (Minn. App. Mar. 24,
2014); see also Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c) (providing that nonprecedential
opinions are “not binding authority” but “may be cited as persuasive authority”). Given
the facts of this case, we similarly conclude that a neuropsychiatric evaluation was not
essential to the county ’s obligation to make reasonable efforts to reunite A.P. with the
children.
Thus, the district court did not err by finding that the county made reasonable efforts
to reunite A.P. with the children.
Affirmed.