Jacques Lafrenier, et al., Appellants,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0963

Jacques Lafrenier, et al.,
Appellants,

vs.

Joseph Berger,
Respondent.

Filed January 21, 2025
Reversed and remanded
Bratvold, Judge

Sherburne County District Court
File No. 71-CV-22-873

Eric Johnson, Johnson Tax Law P.C., St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellants)

Jacob E. Lanthier, Hellmuth & Johnson, PLLC, Edina, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Larson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRATVOLD, Judge
Appellants challenge the district court’s order granting respondent’s motion for
sanctions and awarding a money judgment to respondent. Appellants argue that the district
court abused its discretion by imposing sanctions under Minn. R. Civ. P. 11.03 and Minn.
Stat. § 549.211 (2024), raising two issues. First, appellants contend that respondent’s
motion was “blocked” because appellants took corrective action under the safe -harbor
2
provisions of the rule and statute. Second, appellants urge that the record does not support
the district court’s findings or its decision to impose sanctions. Because the parties disputed
whether appellants corrected the alleged sanctionable conduct and the district court did not
decide this threshold factual issue, we reverse the district court’s decision to award
sanctions. We therefore do not address the second issue. Thus, we reverse and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
FACTS
The following summarizes the district court’s factual findings and, when helpful to
understand the issues on appeal, includes other record evidence.
Appellant Jacques LaFrenier worked as an independent contractor for respondent
Joseph Berger’s company, Installing Coolers Etc. LLC (Installing Coolers), until 2017.1 In
2018, LaFrenier did not work for or receive payments from Installing Coolers.
In Fe bruary 2021, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) notified LaFrenier of an
income-tax deficiency for 2018; the IRS notice referred to $45,163 in compensation
reported on a Form 1099 filed by Installing Coolers. LaFrenier initiated proceedings in the
United States Tax Court to dispute the deficiency. In May 2022, LaFrenier and the IRS
stipulated that there was “no deficiency in income tax due” from LaFrenier for 2018 and
no penalty due.

1 The caption is taken from the district court record. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 143.01 (“The
title of the action shall not be changed in consequence of the appeal.”). The caption spells
appellant’s name “Lafrenier,” which we do not change. Because appellant’s brief spells his
name “LaFrenier,” we incorporate that spelling into our opinion.
3
On July 21, 2022, LaFrenier sued Berger —not Installing Coolers. The complaint
alleged six causes of action related to the IRS deficiency notice: injurious falsehood, breach
of contract and fiduciary duty, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
negligence, and fraud. In support of these claims, the complaint alleged that Berger filed a
Form 1099 falsely reporting that Berger paid LaFrenier $45,163 as compensation in 2018
and that the IRS notified LaFrenier that he had a tax deficiency. The complaint also alleged
that LaFrenier contacted Berger and asked him to correct the Form 1099, Berger refused
to do so, and LaFrenier “was forced to litigate the issue” in the United States Tax Court,
which reversed the deficiency. The complaint also alleged that Berger “acted with the
intent to harm” LaFrenier or otherwise knew or should have known that the false Form
1099 would harm LaFrenier. The complaint alleged damages for “professional fees” in the
tax court proceedings as well as “mental stress and anguish.”
In September 2022, LaFrenier moved to amend his complaint to add a claim for
punitive damages. Berger opposed LaFrenier’s motion to amend and submitted affidavits
from Berger and Installing Coolers’ accountant, both of whom averred that Berger never
personally submitted tax forms to the IRS. The accountant attested that “the first time [she]
heard about an issue with a Form 1099 for [LaFrenier] was in March 2021” and that, in
response, she submitted a Form 1099 to the IRS that stated Installing Coolers paid
LaFrenier $0 in 2018. The accountant also averred that, in 2019, Installing Coolers
submitted a corrected Form 1099 to the IRS that reported paying $45,163 to LaFrenier in
tax year 2016. Both Form 1099s that reported Installing Coolers’ payments to LaFrenier in
2016 and 2018 were attached to the accountant’s affidavit.
4
The district court denied LaFrenier’s motion to amend the complaint to add punitive
damages in a January 2023 order. The district court first noted that a claim for punitive
damages is not an independent cause of action. Because LaFrenier’s memorandum in
support of his motion focused on only one of his asserted causes of action—injurious
falsehood—the district court’s analysis considered that LaFrenier cited no legal authority
showing that Minnesota had recognized this tort. The district court stated that LaFrenier
cited one Minnesota legal authority , but it involved “slander of title to real estate and
tortious interference with contract.” The district court concluded that LaFrenier lacked “an
underlying cause of action to which a claim for punitive damages could attach” for two
reasons: (1) the tort of injurious falsehood “has not been recognized in the State of
Minnesota” and (2) LaFrenier’s other causes of action “lack a prima facie showing in the
record.”
Several months later, in April 2023, Berger moved for summary judgment. Berger
argued that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Minnesota does not
recognize the tort of injurious falsehood and LaFrenier’s other cause s of action lacked
evidence to prove an essential element of each claim.
On May 10, 2023, LaFrenier opposed Berger’s summary-judgment motion.
LaFrenier’s memorandum did not address any of the arguments in Berger’s
summary-judgment motion. LaFrenier instead stated that, after reviewing “internal
documentation” filed with Berger’s summary-judgment motion, he realized that Berger
“did not file the erroneous Form 1099 for 2018” with the IRS . LaFrenier also stated that
“[i]t appears substantially certain” that the tax-deficiency notice “resulted from” an IRS
5
error. LaFrenier pointed out that, in 2019, Installing Coolers “filed a corrected Form 1099
for 2016” reporting compensation of $45,163, “which is exactly the amount” stated in the
IRS deficiency notice for 2018. LaFrenier remarked that “the obvious conclusion is that
the [IRS] erroneously inputted the 2016 corrected number as the 2018 number” for
LaFrenier’s income. LaFrenier contended, however, that Berger “is still the cause” of
LaFrenier’s “litigation fees before the Tax Court” because Installing Coolers —not
Berger—“failed to provide a copy of the corrected Form 1099 for 2018” to LaFrenier or
his accountant as they had requested in March 2021.
On May 12, 2023, Berger served a motion for sanctions on LaFrenier and his
attorney, appellant Eric William Johnson, but did not file it. Berger argued that LaFrenier
and Johnson (appellants) (1) sued Berger “personally for claims based on no evidentiary
support or any likelihood to obtain such evidentiary support after further investigation”;
(2) made “false statements” and brought a “meritless Complaint” to harass Berger and
force him to incur litigation costs; (3) made “material misrepresentations” that LaFrenier
had a “false Form 1099,” even though LaFrenier “knew” this document “did not exist”;
(4) asserted “legal claims” that were “unwarranted by law, or not based on a nonfrivolous
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment
of new law”; (5) refused to voluntarily dismiss the complaint “after being provided
verifiable proof that it lacks any basis in law or fact”; and (6) made “new legal claims” in
opposition to Berger’s summary-judgment motion “without any legal authority or
identification of an existing cause of action.” Berger demanded that appellants voluntarily
6
dismiss the complaint and reimburse Berger for “his reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs
incurred to defend against the meritless Complaint.”
Ten days after being served with Berger’s motion for sanctions, on May 22, 2023,
LaFrenier filed a “Notice of Non-Objection.” The notice was four sentences long and stated
that LaFrenier “does not now object” to Berger’s summary-judgment motion, entry of final
judgment, and dismissal of the complaint with prejudice.
On May 23, 2023, the district court granted Berger’s summary-judgment motion.
The one- page order stated that the district court received LaFrenier’s notice of
nonobjection and therefore dismissed the complaint and its claims “in their entirety.” The
order did not discuss the merits of the summary-judgment motion.
On June 8, 2023, Berger filed an amended motion for sanctions against appellants.
Berger’s memorandum first argued that the district court “has jurisdiction” to consider and
award sanctions after LaFrenier withdrew his opposition to summary judgment. Berger
then argued that LaFrenier’s complaint was “meritless” because (1) the injurious-falsehood
claim was “not based on a good-faith argument to establish a new law,” (2) the other claims
in LaFrenier’s complaint “were never supported by evidence or legal authority,” and (3) no
law or evidence supported LaFrenier’s claim that Berger was personally liable. Finally,
Berger argued that the complaint was “presented for an improper purpose”—to “harass and
annoy” Berger and to “force” Berger to incur substantial defense fees. Berger maintained
that LaFrenier’s “motivation” was “to get retribution for the false belief” that Berger
“purposefully filed a false Form 1099.”
7
Appellants opposed Berger’s amended motion for sanctions and argued, first, that
the motion “violates the 21-day safe harbor provisions ” of Minn. R. Civ. P. 11.03 and
Minn. Stat. § 549.211, subd. 4(a), because appellants “took appropriate corrective action
within the 21-day period.” Appellants also argued that they did not violate Minn. R. Civ.
P. 11.02 or Minn. Stat. § 549.211, subd. 2, because (1) the tort of injurious falsehood is
“endorsed” by the Restatement (Second) of Torts and was applied by a Minnesota court
“in at least one case, ” (2) LaFrenier’s claim that the false Form 1099 “was filed in
retaliation directly by [Berger] (or at his direction)” establishes Berger’s liability , and
(3) Berger “can point to no actions” to “annoy, vex, or harass” Berger or to “prolong the
proceedings.” Appellants did not address the other causes of action in the complaint.
In his reply memorandum, Berger argued, among other things, that LaFrenier
“failed to take adequate steps to remedy his sanctionable conduct.” Berger contended that
the purpose of rule 11.03 is to deter sanctionable conduct and that the district court “cannot
practically deter” rule 11 violations if its authority to sanction “is barred once a party
withdraws or voluntarily dismisses a claim.” Berger also argued that appellants
misrepresented to Berger and the district court that they possessed the “false Form 1099”
throughout this litigation. Berger maintained that appellants “never had evidence” that
Berger personally filed a “false Form 1099” with the IRS despite having “the full
opportunity to obtain the [alleged] document from the [IRS ] during the pendency of
litigation [LaFrenier] commenced against the agency.”
After a hearing, the district court granted the sanctions motion in a written order.
The district court first determined, citing caselaw, that it had jurisdiction to consider
8
sanctions “even after” LaFrenier’s claims were dismissed. The district court did not
determine whether appellants had taken corrective action under the safe-harbor provision,
despite noting that the parties disagreed about this issue. The district court nonetheless then
considered the merits of Berger’s motion and found that appellants violated rule 11.02
because they “failed to investigate the factual and legal bases” of LaFrenier’s claims and
“persisted” in the litigation despite lacking “factual and legal bases” for his claims. The
district court also found that appellants presented the complaint against Berger “for an
improper purpose” —“to prolong this litigation.” The district court directed Berger to
submit an affidavit “detailing his costs incurred in defending against the complaint.”
In December 2023, the district court entered a n order awarding Berger $10,000 in
attorney fees as a monetary sanction against appellants for violating Minn. R. Civ. P. 11.02
and Minn. Stat. § 549.211, subd. 2, and in a subsequent order, it directed entry of judgment.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
Appellants challenge the district court’s judgment and order awarding sanctions for
violations of Minn. R. Civ. P. 11.02 and Minn. Stat. § 549.211, subd. 2. This court reviews
a district court’s decision to impose sanctions for abuse of discretion. Buscher v. Montag
Dev., Inc., 770 N.W.2d 199, 210 (Minn. App. 2009) (applying the abuse-of-discretion
standard to sanctions under rule 11.03); Cole v. Star Tribune, 581 N.W.2d 364, 370 (Minn.
App. 1998) (applying the abuse- of-discretion standard to sanctions under Minn. Stat.
§ 549.211). A district court abuses its discretion when it makes findings “unsupported by
the evidence” or “by improperly applying the law.” Sehlstrom v. Sehlstrom, 925 N.W.2d
9
233, 239 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted) . The relevant provisions of Minn. Stat.
§ 549.211 and Minn. R. Civ. P. 11 are substantially identical regarding the issues on appeal.
Accordingly, for the remainder of this opinion, we will refer to rule 11. 2
Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 11 has two parts that relate to the sanctions issue
on appeal—certification and sanctions for violations of the certification provision. First,
under Minn. R. Civ. P. 11.02, an attorney or self-represented litigant who signs, files,
submits, or advocates a pleading or other document to the district court certifies “to the
best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief” after a reasonable inquiry that
(a) [the pleading or document] is not being presented for
any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;
(b) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions
therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law or the establishment of new law;
(c) the allegations and other factual contentions have
evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are likely
to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for
further investigation or discovery; [and]
(d) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on
the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably
based on a lack of information or belief[.]

Minn. R. Civ. P. 11.02.
Second, rule 11 provides that a party or attorney who violates rule 11.02 may be
sanctioned “after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 11.03.
Sanctions may be initiated by motion or on the court’s initiative. Minn. R. Civ. P. 11.03(a).

2 The safe-harbor provisions in Minn. R. Civ. P. 11.03(a)(1) and Minn. Stat. § 549.211,
subd. 4(a), are “almost identically worded.” Johnson v. Johnson, 726 N.W.2d 516, 518-19
(Minn. App. 2007).
10
“A sanction imposed for violation of [rule 11] shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter
repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated.” Minn. R.
Civ. P. 11.03(b). A sanction may be a nonmonetary directive or an order to pay a penalty
or reasonable attorney fees and other expenses. Id.3
Appellants’ brief to this court raises two issues. First, appellants challenge whether
the record and applicable caselaw support the district court’s determination that appellants
violated Minn. R. Civ. P. 11.02. Second, appellants contend that Berger was “blocked” by
the safe-harbor provision in Minn. R. Civ. P. 11.03 because LaFrenier’s nonobjection to
summary judgment “conceded the case in full” and “barred” Berger from filing his
sanctions motion with the district court.
We understand LaFrenier’s argument that Berger’s sanctions motion was “blocked”
or “barred” to mean that Berger’s motion could not be filed with or presented to the district
court because LaFrenier took corrective action under the safe-harbor provision. Berger
responds that he took all necessary steps to file his sanctions motion and that the district
court’s decision should be affirmed on the merits. Because we conclude that whether
appellants took corrective action under the safe-harbor provision is a threshold issue that

3 District courts also have inherent authority to impose sanctions as necessary to protect
their “vital function—the disposition of individual cases to deliver remedies for wrongs
and justice freely and without purchase; completely and without denial; promptly and
without delay, conformable to the laws.” State by Cunningham v. Iron Waffle Coffee Co.,
990 N.W.2d 513, 521 (Minn. App. 2023) (quotation omitted); see also Patton v. Newmar
Corp., 538 N.W.2d 116, 118-19 (Minn. 1995) (discussing a district court’s “considerable”
inherent authority to sanction a party for destroying evidence). Neither Berger nor the
district court discussed sanctioning appellants under the district court’s inherent authority.
Thus, we limit our review to the rule 11 issue presented.
11
must be resolved before a district court determines the merits of a sanctions motion, we
begin with that issue.
A close reading of Minn. R. Civ. P. 11.03 clarifies the steps a moving party is
required to take in seeking sanctions and shows the importance of any corrective action if
taken:
A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be made separately
from other motions or requests and shall describe the specific
conduct alleged to violate Rule 11.02. It shall be served as
provided in Rule 5, but shall not be filed with or presented to
the court unless, within 21 days after service of the motion (or
such other period as the court may prescribe), the challenged
document, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or denial is
not withdrawn or appropriately corrected.

Minn. R. Civ. P. 11.03(a)(1). Thus, a party who seeks sanctions under rule 11.03 must
(1) move for sanctions separately from other motions, (2) describe the specific conduct
alleged to violate rule 11.02, (3) serve the motion on the party it seeks to sanction, (4) wait
at least 21 days after service, and (5) may file or present the motion with district court if
the alleged sanctionable conduct “is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected.” Id.
The part of rule 11.03 that provides for a 21-day period in which a nonmoving party
may withdraw or take corrective action is known as the safe-harbor provision. Gibson v.
Coldwell Banker Burnet, 659 N.W.2d 782, 7 90 (Minn. App. 2003). “If the moving party
does not follow the procedure provided in rule 11.03(a)(1), the motion for sanctions must
be rejected.” Id. at 789-91 (reversing sanctions award after determining that the moving
party did not wait 21 days after service before filing the sanctions motion with the district
court).
12
The parties do not dispute that Berger followed four of the five steps required by
rule 11.03—Berger moved for sanctions separately from other motions, described the
alleged violations, served appellants, and waited 21 days before filing the sanctions motion
in district court.4
But appellants contend that they took corrective action under the safe-harbor
provision when LaFrenier filed a notice of nonobjection to Berger’s summary-judgment
motion. Appellants also argue that Berger cannot “have it both ways—use the safe- harbor
mechanism of Rule 11 to induce the opposing party to withdraw claims, then seek sanctions
despite the withdrawal of claims.”
Berger counters that LaFrenier’s nonobjection to summary judgment was not a
withdrawal and “did not ‘appropriately correct[]’ his sanctionable conduct.” Berger
maintains that the purpose of the safe-harbor provision “is not to ‘induce the opposing party
to withdraw claims’”; it is “a safeguard that allows them to take remedial action before the
motion for sanctions is filed.” Berger argues, citing examples, that appellants’ violations
of rule 11 were not limited to opposing Berger’s summary-judgment motion.
The parties disagree about whether the district court determined that appellants took
corrective action or failed to do so. Appellants argue that the district court “ignored the

4 Berger served his initial motion for sanctions on May 12, 2023, claiming that appellants
violated rule 11.02 because the complaint was “meritless” and was “presented for an
improper purpose,” specifically, to “harass and annoy” Berger and “force” Berger to incur
substantial defense costs. Ten days later, on May 22, 2023, LaFrenier notified Berger and
the district court that he no longer objected to summary judgment or to entry of a final
judgment dismissing his claims with prejudice. The district court granted summary
judgment and dismissed LaFrenier’s complaint. Berger then filed his amended sanctions
motion alleging the same violations on June 8, 2023.
13
safe-harbor provision” and instead discussed inapplicable caselaw. Berger responds in two
parts, which we discuss in turn.
First, Berger urges us to conclude that appellants “believe[]” that they dismissed
LaFrenier’s claims and that the dismissal “withdrew the district court’s authority to grant
sanctions.” While the district court’s jurisdiction was raised and decided below, the issue
was raised by Berger. Both the district court and Berger relied on Vegemast v. DuBois to
conclude that the district court had “jurisdiction” to award sanctions after LaFrenier’s
complaint was dismissed. 498 N.W.2d 763, 765-66 (Minn. App. 1993). And we agree that,
in Vegemast, we held that the district court had jurisdiction to award sanctions under
rule 11.03, even after the nonmoving party voluntarily dismissed all claims. Id. 5
But Vegemast was issued before the adoption of the safe-harbor provision in rule 11.
Vegemast was issued in 1993 , while the amendment of rule 11.03 adopting a safe-harbor
provision occurred in 2000. Order Promulgating Amendments to the Rules of Civil
Procedure, No. C6-84-2134 (Minn. Apr. 13, 2000).6 In Vegemast, we considered the 1991
version of rule 11.03 that was in effect at the time and that did not provide the nonmoving
party with an option to avoid sanctions by withdrawing or appropriately correcting their

5 Plaintiff Vegemast sued DuBois for defamation. Id. at 764. DuBois moved for summary
judgment on all claims and served Vegemast with a sanctions motion. Id. Twenty days
after service, Vegemast filed a voluntary notice of dismissal of all claims without prejudice
under Minn. R. Civ. P. 41.01(a). Id. After receiving the notice of dismissal, DuBois filed
the sanctions motion, which the district court granted. Id. On review with this court,
Vegemast contended that the district court “lacked jurisdiction” to award sanctions after
all claims were voluntarily dismissed. Id.

6 Minnesota Statutes section 549.211 first gained a safe-harbor provision in 1997. See 1997
Minn. Laws ch. 213, art. 1, § 1, at 1921 (providing a statutory 21-day safe-harbor period).
14
challenged claims or contentions. 498 N.W.2d at 765-66; Order Promulgating
Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure, No. CX-89-1863 (Minn. Sept. 5, 1991).7
As a result, Vegemast does not help resolve this appeal because appellants’
argument urges that, under the safe-harbor provision, they took corrective action by filing
a notice of nonobjection to summary judgment and that this “blocked” Berger from filing
his sanctions motion with the district court. The second part of Berger’s argument contends
that the district court “did not abuse its discretion when it determined [LaFrenier] failed to
cure his sanctionable conduct.” We do not agree with Berger’s reading of the district
court’s decision.
The district court’s sanctions order noted that the parties disputed whether
appellants took corrective action, but the district court did not determine whether appellants
withdrew or appropriately corrected the alleged violations of rule 11.02. This is
problematic for two reasons. First, whether a party has withdrawn or taken appropriate
corrective action in response to being served with a sanctions motion under rule 11.03 is a
question of fact. In re Supervised Est. of Flatgard, ___ N.W.3d ___, ___, 2024 WL
4875950, at *4 (Minn. App. Nov. 25, 2024) (“[W]hether a party has withdrawn a frivolous
claim within the safe-harbor period is a question of fact. ”). And we do not make factual
findings on appeal. Kucera v. Kucera, 146 N.W.2d 181, 183 (Minn. 1966) (“It is not within

7 Berger’s brief to this court also cites several nonprecedential opinions by this court that
rely on Vegemast for their conclusions that a district court has jurisdiction to impose rule 11
sanctions after the nonmoving party has voluntarily dismissed their claims. We agree that
the cited caselaw relies on Vegemast for this point of law, but the nonprecedential opinions,
like Vegemast, do not discuss whether the nonmoving party’s action corrected the alleged
rule 11 violations. We therefore do not consider these authorities to be relevant or helpful.
15
the province of [appellate courts] to determine issues of fact on appeal.”); see also Hoyt
Inv. Co. v. Bloomington Com. & Trade Ctr. Assocs., 418 N.W.2d 173, 175 (Minn. 1988)
(“[A]n undecided question is not usually amenable to appellate review.”).
Second, as discussed above, whether a party has taken corrective action within the
safe-harbor provision is a threshold issue that must be resolved before a district court
determines whether to grant a sanctions motion. According to Minn. R. Civ. P. 11.03(a)(1),
a party seeking sanctions cannot file or present its motion “unless, within 21 days after
service of the motion . . . the challenged document, claim, defense, contention, allegation,
or denial is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected.” (Emphasis added.)
Still, appellants are incorrect in claiming that Berger was “blocked” from filing his
sanctions motion because Berger disputed whether appellants took corrective action within
the safe-harbor provision. Under rule 11.03 and related caselaw, Berger may present this
disputed factual issue to the district court for its determination by filing his motion for
sanctions. Under rule 11.03, if a district court determines that a nonmoving party has not
withdrawn or appropriately corrected the challenged claims or contentions within the
safe-harbor provision, then a district court may decide the merits of the sanctions motion.
Minn. R. Civ. P. 11.03; see also Flatgard, 2024 WL 4875950, at *4, *7 (affirming district
court’s decision finding that the nonmoving party did not correct alleged rule 11 violations
and awarding sanctions).
Thus, a nonmoving party’s attempt to correct a rule 11 violation within the
safe-harbor provision does not preclude the moving party from filing a sanctions motion
or a district court from finding violations and awarding sanctions, as caselaw recognizes.
16
For example, in Flatgard, Carlson submitted a statement of claim against Flatgard’s estate.
2024 WL 4875950, at *1. The special administrator disallowed Carlson’s claim, and
Carlson then petitioned the district court to allow his claim. Id. at *2. After the special
administrator served Carlson with a sanctions motion arguing that Carlson’s petition and
“the included claims and allegations” were frivolous, Carlson emailed the special
administrator within the safe-harbor period. Id. at *2-4. In the email, Carlson stated that he
would “withdraw the Petition as written to eliminate any potential violation of the Rules”
and that he would “send appropriate documentation” upon his return from a vacation. Id.
at *2. When Carlson did not respond to the special administrator’s requests for clarification,
the special administrator filed the sanctions motion after the safe-harbor period ended. Id.
at *2-3. Carlson then withdrew “the claims set forth in” his statement of claim and petition
with prejudice. Id. at *3.
In granting the sanctions motion and awarding monetary sanctions, the district court
determined that Carlson’s email “did not amount to a withdrawal” of his claims because it
was “a cagey message that suggested [Carlson] was going to continue to pursue claims and
remedies against the Estate, even if in a different form than what was written in the
Petition.” Id. at *4. Carlson appealed, and this court affirmed. Id. at *3, *7. We determined
that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the email “did not withdraw the
challenged claims under rule 11.” Id. at *5; see also Buscher, 770 N.W.2d at 211-12
(affirming rule 11 sanctions against Buscher’s law firm, even though Buscher filed
amended affidavits in an attempt to address rule 11 violations, and quoting the district
court’s determination that Buscher’s “attempt to cure the errors” did not “cure the harm
17
that has caused the unnecessary expenditure of court time and attorney time in responding”
to the misrepresentations in the original affidavits).
In summary, the district court did not determine the disputed factual issue of
whether appellants “withdrew” or “appropriately corrected” the violations of rule 11.02
alleged in Berger’s motion. Minn. R. Civ. P. 11.03(a)(1). Without this threshold
determination, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion by proceeding to
determine that appellants violated rule 11.02 and then awarding sanctions.
Thus, we reverse the district court’s order and judgment awarding sanctions and
remand for the district court to determine whether appellants withdrew or appropriately
corrected the alleged violations of rule 11.02 within the safe-harbor provision. If the district
court determines that appellants did not withdraw or appropriately correct the alleged
violations of rule 11.02, then it may proceed as it deems appropriate under Minn. R. Civ.
P. 11.03 and in a manner consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.